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Climate change, dwindling resources, and growth of the global population have emerged 
as challenges for all areas of political action in modern societies. These challenges have been 
on the political agenda since the "Limits to Growth" report was released in 1972. While the 
challenges are well known, and there seems to be some form of consensus that sustainability 
is a goal worth striving for, little discussion is taking place of how the changes necessary to 
achieve this goal will affect our political institutions, our social relationships, our moral 
responsibilities, and our self-understanding in general.  
The more far-reaching the necessary changes are, the more pressing the following 
questions will become: To what extent are political and economic institutions – national as 
well as global - capable of realizing sustainable politics and on which ethical grounds? Will 
personal liberties, such as freedom of movement, property rights, and reproductive autonomy, 
need to be limited in order to realize sustainable politics? How could we extend the current 
system of human rights to incorporate the rights of future generations? Can we expect human 
beings to take responsibility for the living conditions of future generations, and how do such 
responsibilities affect philosophical and eschatological theories? An ethics of an open future 
must develop criteria for moral action under conditions of uncertainty. A developed theory of 
the principle of precaution in ethics and law, however, is lacking. These questions propelled 
the common discussions and individual reflections of this conference, arriving at a great 
variety of stimulating contributions from our academic community. A peer-reviewed selection 
is presented in this anthology. Roughly speaking, they are grouped into three thematic circles 
addressing issues of Climate Change, Sustainability and Social Change on the level of ethical 
theory and practice.  
Climate change 
Michel Bourban uses his analysis of human rights as a tool in order to grasp the wider 
implications of Climate Change. He identifies institutional as well as other policy-based 
v 
approaches to solve the problems at hand. Investigating the findings of the Intergovernmental 
Report on Climate Change, he calls for arguments from various societal backgrounds in order 
to overcome political inactivity. Robert Heeger offers a probe into the normativity of the 
questions relating to future generations and the underlying issues of (human) rights. His 
reflection is clearly nourished by the concept of justice and its concomitant query of the range 
of human responsibility. His four questions demonstrate not only an interest in an open 
discourse freed from structures of power, but also a sincere concern for finding common 
answers across disciplines. Tim Christian Myers understands Climate Change as an 
interruption of our routine lives with all the anxiety it may spur. Drawing particularly on 
Heidegger and a broader phenomenological tradition, his prolegomena for truly existentialist 
Ethics includes more stable human relations to the socio-ecological world, combining ethical 
reflection with pragmatism as well as a sense of awe over against the unprecedented changes 
to our systems of life.  Jonathan Parker refers to an interesting early response to ecological 
challenges demonstrated in the life of Aldo Leopold's activities in Wisconsin during the 
Depression. As a pars pro toto, it illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches, but more importantly, the need for ensuring action by instigating 
changes on the (very) local level. Kian Minz Woo's interest in economic modelling leads him 
to defending the concept of discounting on normative grounds. Comparing the knowledge of 
Early and Later Individuals, he concludes that certain forms of relativism are integrative parts 
of epistemic capabilities of different agents. The awareness of our status in this regard can, 
thus, frame our rational ethical choices. Jo Dirix, Wouter Peeters and Sigrid Sterckx discuss 
political measures to control emissions. They conclude that whether emissions trading is 
morally reprehensible depends on its design and that the EU Emissions Trading System fails 
to respect justice-based criteria.  
Social change 
Auke Pols and Henny Romijn make an ethical evaluation of irreversible social change and 
propose an alternative decision rule, called “Safe Minimum Standard”, for such social 
changes. They illustrate the decision rule with the case of land acquisition in Tanzania. From 
a perspective of political philosophy, Norbert Campagna discusses the implication of rising 
sea-levels for populations of countries likely to disappear. The nations with largest emissions 
have a collective responsibility to care for populations of disappearing countries, thus opining 
that the USA have a duty to care for the population of the disappearing island Kiribati. Gerald 
Hess and Hugues Poltier put the environmental crises in a social and political context and 
argues that it requires a holistic political philosophy and an inclusive, ecumenical community.  
Sustainability 
Food choices have become moral choices. Joan McGregor focuses on our food choices 
from a sustainability and global justice perspective and she argues that our purchases are 
complex and impinge on multiple values. Denis Malherbe and David Wellman challenge a 
construction of the European Union based on financial and market-oriented regulations. They 
argue for the need of an alternative European vision, anchored in learning and caring 
communities emphasizing ecological requirements for survival. Pietro Lanzini investigates 
how different green behaviours connect to and influence each other. He reports a real-life 
experiment showing how the nature of incentives has a relevant direct impact on the 
behaviors being incentivized. Jann Reinhardt uses Jewish law and a brief comparison with the 
German constitution as a platform for examining the precise role of ethical responses to 
societal questions of sustainability. Distinguishing the intra-religious, inter-religious, and 
secular levels, a number of venues for further dialogue and particularly systematisation are 
vi 
identified, resulting in proposing an intensified focus on education and narrative for fostering 
more sustainable approaches. Egidio de Bustamente is interested in narratives, too, but 
moving within a postmodern framework, his transrational approach incorporates different 
culturally developed rationalities and categories such as aesthetics in order to promote a 
holistic relationship with the whole eco-system. Finally, Ralf Lüfter offers a profound 
reflection on the concept of sustainability, and describes with Kant the clear limitation of 
using it beyond its function as economical principle serving the idea of quantifiable 
optimization. As long as we move within parameters of means, ends and measures, the true 
value of things and beings remain undiscovered, as do the immediate ends  of our (in-)actions. 
His argument is, thus, Kantian in its hesitance to accept necessity as sufficient argumentative 
grounds when dealing with the open future and the concept of perfection. 
Concluding remarks 
A conference on Climate Change, Sustainability, and an Ethics of an Open Future cannot 
reach a clear conclusion in the sense of defining final statements and lines of action. The 
contributions in this anthology demonstrate, however, a common trait in spite of their very 
different approaches, academic backgrounds, and argumentative punches: they share a 
common concern to find precise, well-founded answers to the Climate Change occurring. The 
very diversity indicates clearly how the need for adequate human responses to an 
encompassing ecological crisis (in the most traditional sense of the word) requires 
collaboration across disciplines, traditions, and faiths. Only by taking the full scope, and thus 
also the limitation, of human reasoning into account, truly sound arguments for required 
action and further reflection can be shaped. In full line with fifty years of research in ethics, 
this Societas Ethica conference has proven once more that plurality in ethics, while often seen 
as an indication of weakness or inadequacy, in fact is its very condition.  
This conference was the 50th Societas Ethica Conference. The Conference Proceedings 
therefore also include an historical exposé of Societas Ethica presented by Professor Karl 
Wilhelm Dahm. 
The conference marked the starting point for the new journal De Ethica, A Journal of 
Philosophical, Theological Ethics. The Editor-in –Chief Professor Brenda Almond gave a talk 
introducing the new journal which also is included in the Conference Proceedings. 
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Climate Change, Potential Catastrophes and the Rights 
of Present and Future Generations 
Michel Bourban 
University of Lausanne, Switzerland 
Abstract 
Climate change is one of the most challenging environmental problems of our time. In this 
paper, I analyse some of the ethical issues raised by climate change, especially the human 
rights that are threatened by the impacts of global warming and the problem of partial 
compliance or non-compliance to moral duties. I also assess some ethical implications of 
potentially catastrophic phenomena driven by this ecological issue and recommend specific 
solutions by briefly developing institutional reforms to current climate policies. My point is to 
explain, by using a normative approach based on sound empirical findings, in what sense 
climate change can be seen as a philosophical problem that should worry ethicists and political 
theorists, and what can be done to avert the massive violation of the rights of present and 
future victims of climate change. I focus specifically on solutions in terms of mitigation (and 
therefore set aside adaptation and compensation) and try to explain why incentives can play an 
important role to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Keywords: Climate change, human rights, realism, motivation, incentives. 
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In order to successfully tackle climate change, a balance between four main objectives 
must be found: justice, or fairness; environmental effectiveness, or maximizing the effects of 
climate policies; political realism, or institutional feasibility; and economic efficiency, or 
minimizing the costs of climate policies. Since these aims may (and often do) conflict with 
each other, reconciling them is a difficult task: an environmentally effective solution reducing 
quickly and drastically greenhouse gas emissions such as a very high carbon tax may conflict 
with social justice by harming the poor, for low-income people suffer the most from increases 
in the price of energy; likewise, an economically efficient and politically realistic solution 
such as institutional offsetting through the Clean Development Mechanism1 can sacrifice 
environmental effectiveness and fairness in the name of cost effectiveness.  
Here I wish to focus mainly on the relation between two objectives: fairness, by asking 
how to understand and reduce specific climate injustices; and realism, by developing 
institutional reforms that are possible to carry out in fact. If the first objective is the most 
important one, it is also crucial to make sure that fair solutions to climate change can be 
implemented in the non-ideal circumstances of the real world, especially in situations of 
partial compliance or non-compliance to moral duties. 
I begin by explaining why an approach of climate justice based on universally accepted 
human rights is normatively convincing as well as politically realistic; then, I show how 
impacts of global warming threaten some human rights of members of present and future 
generations, even if we use conservative projections; I finally ask what kind of climate policy 
could prevent the violation of these human rights. To ensure that future generations will enjoy 
an open future rather than suffer from the catastrophic impacts of an abrupt climate change, I 
believe that an approach trying to combine fairness and realism represents an important 
contribution.  
I. Why Human Rights?  
The ultimate objective of the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the foundational international climate treaty that was written in 1992 and entered 
into force in 1994, is to achieve “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system”, its 194 Parties being “determined to protect the climate system for present 
and future generations.”2 To know how to avoid a “dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”, we need a normative as well as an empirical analysis. If the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) gathers every five to six years accurate 
empirical findings, human rights are a convincing moral approach.  
In order to develop a realistic position, I will focus only on human rights that already exist 
in international law, rather than on new environmental human rights; I will also refer 
exclusively to negative righty, because they are philosophically and politically less 
controversial than positive rights. For instance, even minimalists such as David Miller 
acknowledge that negative human rights generate duties towards distant strangers3. Such 
rights can be described as “the internationally recognized minimal standard of our age”4: by 
showing how climate change threatens them, one can find an uncontroversial position. My 
aim is not to develop a theory of justice, but rather to present an approach of climate justice 
1  To know more about offsetting, the following paper is a useful introduction: Keith Hyams and Tina 
Fawcett, “The ethics of carbon offsetting,” WIREs Climate Change 4:2 (2013), pp. 91-98. 
2 UN 1992, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, online at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed 2013-07-19). 
3  David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
4  Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, second 
edition (Cambridge : Polity Press, 2008 (2002)), at p. 25. 
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based on human rights: the point is not to find pure principles of justice but only to prevent 
specific climate injustices5. 
There are very different theories of human rights, such as legal, political and moral 
approaches. Like Simon Caney and Derek Bell, I use here a moral theory of human rights, 
where these rights are characterized by four main elements: 
 
• They are based on our common humanity and are therefore independent of the country 
in which persons are born, the place where they live or the actions they have performed; 
• They represent a moral threshold below which no one should not fall, the most basic 
moral standards to which persons are entitled; 
• They generate obligations on all persons to respect these basic minimum standards: 
everyone has a duty not to violate or contribute to the violation of human rights;  
• They take priority over other moral values, such as promoting happiness. 
 
In short, “human rights specify minimum moral threshold to which all individuals are 
entitled, simply by virtue of their humanity, and which override all other moral values.”6 
II. How are Human Rights Threatened by Climate Change? 
Policymakers, whether citizens or politicians, tend to worry about the short and (at best) 
middle term consequences of the policies they choose and design. This is not a hypothesis 
concerning human nature; it is a fact that represents one of the best explanations of the 
deplorable state of climate policies. Moral considerations matter; but to make sure that they 
matter enough, they must somehow be connected to people’s interests. This statement refers 
to the metaethical problem of motivation: there is a psychological gap between the acceptance 
of a rule and acting in accordance with it. Moral norms cannot by themselves compel 
conformity: all they do is prescribe a certain course of action. In order to make someone act 
accordingly, they often have to rely on further factors. As Dieter Birnbacher puts it, “having 
moral reasons for an action and being motivated to carry it out are distinct items, so that a 
psychological mechanism independent of the acceptance of the moral rule is needed to 
explain action in conformity with it.”7 This is why we must not only refer to moral motives to 
combat climate change: we must also rely, as I will try to show below, on quasi-moral and 
non-moral factors. Otherwise, the problem of motivation remains unaddressed.  
One good starting point to explain why human rights are jeopardized by climate change is 
the 2007-2008 Human Development Report, which reads: “climate change is already starting 
to affect some of the poorest and most vulnerable communities around the world.” According 
5  Ibid., at p. 25: “[h]uman rights thus furnish a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of social justice: that 
some institutional design realizes human rights insofar as is reasonably possible may not guarantee that it is 
just. Only the converse is asserted: an institutional design is unjust if it fails to realize human rights insofar 
as is reasonably possible.” 
6  Simon Caney, “Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds,” Human Rights and Climate 
Change, edited by Stephen Humphreys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 69-90, at p. 
73. As Simon Caney emphasises a former paper on the topic, his approach is inspired by Pogge’s political 
philosophy: “[m]y strategy here is much influenced by the work of Thomas Pogge.” (Simon Caney, 
“Human Rights, Responsibilities and Climate Change,” Global Basic Rights, edited by Charles Beitz and 
Robert Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 227-247, at p. 234). See also Derek Bell, 
“Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?,” Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 14:2 (2011), pp. 99–124, and Derek Bell, “Climate change and human rights,” WIREs 
Climate Change 4:3 (2013), pp. 159-170. 
7  Dieter Birnbacher, “What Motivates Us to Care for the (Distant) Future?,” Intergenerational Justice, edited 
by Axel Gosseries and Lukas H. Meyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 273-300, at pp. 273-
274. 
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to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), if global greenhouse gas emissions 
keep on increasing, “climate change will undermine international efforts to combat poverty”, 
for instance by “hampering efforts to deliver the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] 
promise.” For this reason, our contribution to this environmental problem represents “a 
systematic violation of the human rights of the world’s poor and future generations and a step 
back from universal values”. In other words, “[t]he real choice facing political leaders and 
people today is between universal human values, on the one side, and participating in the 
widespread and systematic violation of human rights on the other.”8 
The UNDP refers to a plurality of human rights. As Stephen Humphreys details, “climate 
change will undermine – indeed, is already undermining – the realization of a broad range of 
internationally protected human rights: rights to health and even life; rights to food, water, 
shelter and property; rights associated with livehood and culture; with migration and 
resettlement; and with personal security in the event of a conflict.”9 Three of these rights, that 
I will interpret as negative rights, are quite uncontroversial in political and philosophical 
debates: the rights to subsistence, to health and to life.  
An “Optimistic” Scenario 
I will now analyse how climate change threatens these rights by using a conservative 
approach: the predictions of the 2007 IPCC Report10. This report is conservative for numerous 
reasons, the main one being that most of recent scientific publications on the future impacts of 
global warming are much more pessimistic. The reason for this is that the IPCC uses only a 
gradual model of the rising of global temperature, without developing a scenario assessing 
what would happen in the event of an abrupt warming. One additional reason to use this 
report is that it is the most authoritative scientific source for multidisciplinary debates on 
climate change, and thus represents a common starting point for policymakers and 
philosophers. 
First, let us take the right to subsistence. It can be minimally defined as the right not to be 
deprived of one’s means of subsistence by other people’s actions. Two impacts of global 
warming that will hit agriculture badly are sea-level rise and extreme meteorological events. 
Because of such (and many other) effects, by 2020, in some African countries, agricultural 
production will be diminished up to 50%, thereby exacerbating poverty in the poorest regions 
of the world; by 2050, crop yields could decrease up to 30% in central and south Asia; and 
finally, by 2100, mean yields for some crops in northern India could be reduced by up to 70%.  
One country in which a massive violation of this right will occur if political inertia 
remains is Bangladesh: some lands will be lost to the sea, some will be flooded when there are 
storms, and even lands that remains dry will be damaged. All of this will cripple agricultural 
output, increase hunger and starvation, and push the country further into poverty: rising sea 
will flood large tracts of land, interfering with existing infrastructure and food production, 
“possibly creating the largest humanitarian crisis the world has ever faced.”11 But small island 
nations such as the Maldives face an even worse fate: they may entirely disappear beneath the 
8  UNDP 2007, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a 
Divided World (New York: United Nations Development Programme Publications), online at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_Summary_English.pdf (accessed 2013-07-19). 
9  Stephen Humphreys, “Introduction: human rights and climate change,” Human Rights and Climate Change, 
edited by Humphreys, pp. 1-33, at p. 1. 
10  IPCC 2007, “Summary for Policymakers,” Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, edited by M. L. Parry et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 7-22. 
11  Andrew Guzman, Overheated: The Human Cost of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), at p. 12. 
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waves, which will cause massive migration, with entire populations becoming not only 
climate migrants, but also climate exiles12.  
The second negative internationally recognized human right threatened by climate change 
is the one to health. It can be defined as the right not to have one’s health seriously threatened 
by other people’s actions. Climate change will affect the health status of millions of people 
during the century by: increasing malnutrition and consequent disorders; increasing disease 
and injury due to heatwaves, floods, storms, fires and droughts; increasing frequency of 
cardio-respiratory diseases; and by altering the spatial distribution of some infectious 
diseases.  
Let us take two existing diseases: malaria and dengue fever. If global temperatures 
increase by 2 to 3°C, malaria will present a risk to an additional 3 to 5% of the world’s 
population, that is, around 200 million additional people. Concerning dengue fever, if the 
temperatures increase by 2.5°C, then 2.5 billion additional people will be at risk. Climate 
change will also increase the risk of a global health crisis by pushing always more people in 
cities and refugee camps with unsanitary spaces, precisely the conditions suitable to the 
outbreak and the spread of a global epidemic13. Therefore, climate change will reinforce and 
amplify current as well as future socio-economic disparities, leaving the disadvantaged with 
greater health burdens: it will greatly exacerbate global health inequities among current 
generations and establish profound intergenerational inequities14. 
The last human right I would like to mention is the one to life. It can be defined as the 
right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life. Multiple effects of climate change threaten it. 
For example, because of an increasing frequency of severe weather events such as tornados, 
hurricanes, storm surges and floods, millions of people will loose their lives during the 21st 
century. About 40% of world population lives in coastal regions: many of these regions will 
become more and more dangerous to live in15. Another impact is the increasing frequency of 
droughts: by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are projected to be exposed to 
increased water stress only in Africa; and by 2050, more than an additional billion of people 
will be concerned by this problem in Asian regions.   
Billions of people rely on mountain glaciers to serve as massive water-storage facilities. 
These natural storage systems are melting, creating flooding during the rainy season and 
drought during the dry season. If climate change impacts are already observed in the Maldives 
and Bangladesh because of sea-level rise, we also see them in Bolivia because of melting 
glaciers. Half of humanity may be hit, mostly in Asia, with diminishing agricultural 
production and more people getting sick and starving to death16. 
These different drivers of human rights violation do not operate in isolation: most of them 
are interrelated. For example, heat and droughts are often linked, along with fires and water 
shortages. Floods precipitate disease outbreaks such as cholera and other diarrheal disease, 
damage infrastructures and disrupt food and water security. Many regions will be exposed to 
multiple impacts and thus multiple human rights violations17. More generally, the impacts of 
climate change “will interact with wider social, economic and ecological processes that shape 
12  Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir C. Rajan, “The Ethical Implications of Sea-Level Rise Due to Climate 
Change,” Ethics & Public Affairs 24:3 (2010), pp. 239-260. 
13  Guzman, Overheated: The Human Costs of Climate Change, ch. 6: “Climate Change is Bad for your 
Health”. 
14  Elizabeth G. Hanna, “Health hazards,” The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, edited by 
John S. Dryzek et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 217-231. 
15  Neil Adger and Sophie Nicholson-Cole, “Ethical dimensions of adaptating to climate change-imposed 
risks,” The Ethics of Global Climate Change, edited by Denis G. Arnold (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 255-271. 
16  Guzman, Overheated, pp. 104-118. 
17  Hanna, “Health hazards”, at p. 225. 
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opportunities of human development.”18 In other words, climate change will magnify existing 
risks by exacerbating world poverty, the most important cause of human rights violation.  
In What Sense are Human Rights “violated” by Climate Change? 
Before going further, an important question of definition arises: in what sense can we say 
that specific human rights of the global poor and future generations are violated by the 
impacts of global warming? The problem here is that it is very hard to assess who is 
responsible for and who is suffering from the harms resulting from the effects of global 
warming. Indeed, it is very complex to know (1) who, between individuals, corporations, 
States and international organizations, is the main responsible for historic and current 
emissions; and (2) who is a victim of a harmful consequence of climate change rather than of 
another social or environmental problem. As Dale Jamieson puts it, “climate change is not a 
matter of a clearly identifiable individual acting intentionally so as to inflict an identifiable 
harm on another identifiable individual, closely related in time and space.”19 
For this reason, nobody has an individual responsibility for climate change-induced 
human rights: in this case, there is no such thing as an individual action that wrongs persons, a 
specific, culpable action that hurts people. However, many have a collective responsibility for 
imposing to countless other people the harmful consequences of their actions: even if each 
isolated agent’s actions are not harmful, they are part of a causal chain that predictably causes 
climate change. Limiting our conception of human rights violations to discrete actions that in 
isolation inflict a severe harm on a specific victim would be a mistake. Following Elizabeth 
Ashford, we can say that “if the cumulative result of the behavior of a vast number of agents 
is the infliction of an extremely severe harm on a vast number of victims, and if the harm is 
foreseeable an unreasonably imposed, it may constitute a human rights violation even if no 
agent’s action, considered in insolation, inflicts a severe harm on anyone.”20 
A useful distinction here is the one between standard and systematic human rights 
violations. If standard human rights violations represent discrete harmful actions or omissions 
perpetrated by specific agents against specific victims that take place over a specific period of 
time, systematic human rights violations result form the interaction of the activities of a vast 
number of agents via their membership of global and domestic social institutions. Such harms 
“can only be seen by looking at the ongoing effects that systematically result from the normal 
behavior of millions of agents via their participation in social institutions and more.”21 
Systematic human rights violations result from the everyday behavior or millions of agents 
and for this reason these agents can share liability for systematic human rights violations even 
if they are not blameworthy for specific victims’ harms22.  
A Pessimistic (but not Less Realistic) Scenario 
So far I have focused on one sort of interest: the fundamental interests of present and 
future victims of climate change. Following the interest theory of rights, one can say that 
climate change threatens human rights because it jeopardizes people’s interests in subsistence, 
18  UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, pp. 18-19. 
19  Dale Jamieson, “The Nature of the Problem,” The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, edited 
by John S. Dryzek et al., pp. 38-54, at p. 44. 
20  Elizabeth Ashford, “Severe Poverty as a Systematic Human Rights Violation,” Cosmopolitanism Versus 
Non-Cosmopolitanism: Critiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations, edited by Gillian Brock (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 129-155, at p. 136. 
21  Ibid., at p. 140. 
22  It could also be shown that the global affluent are responsible for climate change-induced human rights 
violations because of their causal responsibility for global emissions, their ability to tackle the problem, and 
the fact that they benefit from historical emissions, but I leave this task aside here. I only wanted to show 
why it is correct to speak here of climate change-induced violations of human rights. 
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health and life. Those interests are weighty enough to impose obligations on others, which is 
the reason why they must be protected by rights. If this gives to policymakers a compelling 
moral reason to act, their own interests are not directly concerned: if the approach I have 
developed so far deals with the objective of justice, it is not yet realistic enough. To motivate 
the global affluent to act, we should ask not only why they have strong moral reasons based 
on global and intergenerational justice to tackle climate change, but also why it is in their own 
interest to do so.   
We should therefore find factors that motivate people to comply with their moral duties. 
Especially in the case of intergenerational ethics, the acceptance of moral duties is insufficient 
to motivate action in conformity with these duties in cases where competing motivations 
exist. As Birnbacher emphasises, “[m]oral motives are usually too weak to effect appropriate 
action unless supported by quasi-moral and non-moral motives pointing in the same 
direction.”23 If moral motives refer to acts performed from consciousness or simply in virtue 
of the fact that they are duties, quasi-moral motivations are altruistic motives such as love, 
compassion, solidarity or generosity, and non-moral motives refer to the desire for self-
respect, social recognition and personal interest promotion. To make sure that the global 
affluent are sufficiently motivated to act, we must therefore show if, and in what sense, 
specific quasi-moral and non-moral motives point in the same direction than moral duties.  
One way to achieve this objective is to assess the effects of an abrupt warming. If the 
2007 IPCC uses a gradual model of climate change, more and more scientists emphasise the 
possibility of an abrupt increase in global temperatures due to positive feedbacks in the 
climate cycle. For instance, the terrestrial and the oceanic systems may be transformed form 
carbon sinks to sources of greenhouse gases24. Catastrophic scenarios are so influent in 
climate sciences that even the 2012 IPCC Special Report mentions them: “[l]ow-probability, 
high-impact changes associated with the crossing of poorly understood climate thresholds 
cannot be excluded, given the transient and complex nature of the climate system. Assigning 
‘low confidence’ for projections of a specific extreme neither implies nor excludes the 
possibility of changes in this extreme.”25 
If these catastrophic consequences would worsen the human rights violation of poor 
people and of distant future generations, they would also hit very badly affluent people and 
their children and grandchildren, wherever they live. Affluent people are directly concerned, 
because of their direct interests in economic growth, health security and political stability; 
even their own fundamental interests in subsistence and life may be jeopardized. In that sense, 
they have non-moral reasons, based on their personal interests, to fight global warming. But 
they also have quasi-moral reasons to do so, since their descendants may be forced to live in 
an even more dangerous world: as long as present people care for their children, they have a 
strong interest to tackle climate change. 
Some catastrophic events will happen only in several centuries; but some may already 
happen before the beginning of the 22nd century. According to Andrew Guzman, “within my 
lifetime, or, if we are lucky, within the lifetime of my children, there will be acute water 
shortages affecting hundreds of millions, or perhaps billions, people.”26 Likewise, according 
23  Birnbacher, “What Motivates Us to Care for the (Distant) Future?”, at p. 282 
24  A good reference on this topic is: David Archer, The Long Thaw: How Humans are Changing the next 
100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
25  IPCC 2012, “Summary for Policymakers,” Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, edited by C. B. Field et al. (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), pp. 3-22, at pp. 11-12. 
26  Guzman, Overheated, p. 131 
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to James Hansen, “the best estimate I can make of when large sea level change will begin is 
during the lifetime of my grandchildren – or perhaps your children.”27  
Much more can be said about catastrophic scenarios, but the point is that they represent a 
powerful driver of political action: they are scientifically based and deal with the non-moral 
and quasi-moral motivations of affluent citizens throughout the world. They are not less 
realistic than the gradual model if we keep on increasing global emissions; they are just, as 
the IPCC puts it, “poorly understood”, but it neither means that they are unlikely, nor that 
they will only happen in the distant future. As Henry Shue emphasises, “[t]hat something is 
uncertain in the technical sense, that is, has no calculable probability, in no way suggests that 
its objective probability, if known, would be small. There is a grand illusion here: if we 
cannot see what the probability is, it must be small. … This inference is totally groundless. If 
all we know is that the probability cannot be calculated, then we do not know anything about 
what it is; if we do now know anything about what it is, then we do not know whether it is 
small or large.” 28. And even if we discover later that the probabilities of a catastrophic 
climate change are low, then strong action to mitigate climate change remains crucial. As 
John Broome explains, “what is most likely to happen is not necessarily the most important 
consideration in making a decision. An unlikely possibility may be more important if its 
results will be extremely bad.”29 
III: How to Protect Climate Change-Threatened Human Rights? 
So far I have asked how we can understand specific climate injustices; now I ask how we 
can try to prevent most of them by institutional reforms. The question is not anymore: “how 
to justify the existence of duties towards present and future victims of climate change”, but: 
“how to ensure that these duties will be fulfilled before widespread human rights violations 
happen?” To make sure that political recommendations are realistic, or that institutional 
reforms are feasible, the urgent problem is less to deal with the non-identity argument or the 
notions of “responsibility” and “capacity” to combat climate change, like many philosophical 
debates on climate change do, than to address the different meanings of the notion of 
“interest”. Here again, the point is to make sure that the problem of motivation, crucial for 
political action, is not set aside.  
The Interests of the Global Affluent to Tackle Climate Change 
Climate change is a tragedy of the commons: the atmosphere is a carbon sink everybody 
can freely use, transmitting the costs of its overuse to others. The specificity of the climate 
tragedy is that it is global and intergenerational: not only affluent living people have a strong 
individual interest not to mitigate their emissions, since the environmental costs of their 
behaviour is payed by the global poor; they also have a collective interest not to tackle climate 
change, since its burdens will be also borne by subsequent generations30. This commonly used 
model is correct, but, I think, incomplete. It only deals with one very narrow kind of interest: 
the perceived interests of the global affluent. Rich consumers and producers indeed have a 
short-term interest to increase their emissions to minimize their costs or maximize their 
27  James E. Hansen, Storms of my Grandchildren: The Truth about the Coming Climate Catastrophe and our 
Last Chance to Save Humanity (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), p. 256 
28 Henry Shue, “Deadly Delays, Saving Opportunities: Creating a More Dangerous World?,” Climate Ethics: 
Essential Readings, edited by Stephen M. Gardiner et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 163-
177, at p. 148.  
29  John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (New York & London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2012), p.120. 
30  Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 24-38, 108-123. 
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benefits: burning fossil fuels enables them to use cheap energy, food production and 
transportation systems, and so on.  
But if we add to the picture the middle-term interests of wealthy people and their indirect 
interests in the well-being of their descendants, we get a more accurate idea of the behaviour 
it would be rational for them to adopt. If catastrophic impacts of climate change were to 
happen this century, these interests would be seriously threatened. But to motivate them to 
act, using pessimistic projections is not necessary: even in conservative scenarios, some of 
their interests such as their economic security are threatened, with diminished importations, 
exportations and international financial transactions as the economy of other countries 
collapse under the severe impacts of climate change. Likewise, their health security can be 
seriously jeopardized by the creation and the spread of a global epidemic. In a globalized 
world, no country is protected from the impacts of climate change31.  
With this picture in mind, much can be done to make the global affluent change their 
habits. Since these habits are mostly shaped by institutions, we ought to begin by reforming 
them in order to change people’s behaviours. As Ashford writes, “[t]he harms are produced 
by the operations of social institutions, which structure the behavior of millions of agents, and 
can only be ended by reform of those social institutions”32.  
First, we can implement an educational system based on enlightened self-interest ethics to 
make people understand that it is in their own interest to tackle climate change. As 
consumers, they would choose less carbon-intensive products; as citizens, they would choose 
more environmentally friendly politicians and policies. As Guzman puts it, “I am convinced 
that the most important barrier to a sensible and determined response to climate change is a 
lack of public understanding about the ways in which our lives and the lives of children will 
be affected.”33 Or, as Hansen writes, “[c]itizens with a special interest – in their loved ones – 
need to become familiar with the science, exercise their democratic rights, and pay attention 
to politicians’ decisions.”34  
This solution bets on the intelligence of citizens, rather than on their virtue or morality. Its 
advantage is that it is a liberal form of education, not based on perfectionism; its disadvantage 
is that it is too slow to deal with this urgent problem in time. Before it can have any effect, 
widespread human rights violation generated by climate change will happen. 
To complement this first solution, a second one would be to “nudge” people to mitigate, 
instead of waiting for them to do so voluntarily. We can use market mechanisms such as 
carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems to incentivize people to reduce their emissions, so 
that their short-term or perceived interests become identical to their middle-term and indirect 
interests. If people take too much time to understand that they have strong interests and 
compelling moral duties to mitigate, we can still reform existing institutions so that it 
becomes in their perceived interest to do so.  
This solution is not paternalistic for two reasons. First, it does not force people: it only 
gives them price-incentives to mitigate. If they decide to keep on increasing their emissions, 
they are free to do it, but they will pay for their unsustainable behaviours. Second, this policy 
is not only based on affluent citizens’ interests; it is also based on poor and future people’s 
human rights, and therefore represents a realization of the no-harm principle. 
31  Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzman, “Climate change and U.S. Interests,” Environmental Law Reporter 
41:8 (2011), pp. 10695-10711.  
32  Ashford, “Severe Poverty as a Systematic Human Rights Violation”, at p. 142.  
33  Guzman, Overheated, p. 2. 
34  Hansen, Storms of my Grandchildren, p. xi 
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The Interest of Developed Countries’ Representatives to Tackle Climate Change 
The problem with these policies is that they are not yet realistic enough: if they can 
motivate affluent citizens to combat global warming, we still need to know why politicians 
would decide to implement strong climate policies. In other words: how to motivate the 
motivators?  
One solution here would be to strengthen cooperation between the countries at the 
international level. We should focus on the next global climate agreement and wonder how 
previous treaties must be reformed to enhance collaboration. One way to do so would be to 
make some concessions to US negotiators: we can leave behind the politically controversial35 
notions of climate debt and historical responsibility that will never get the majority at the 
Senate and show that even if we do so, developed Parties must still bear most of the climate 
burdens. For instance, Paul Baer has operationalized the polluter pays and the ability to pay 
principles and shown that, even if we take 1990 as the starting date to measure responsibility 
and capacity, the US must pay for 29.4% of climatic costs, whereas China must pay only for 
5.1%, about six times less36. In total, without taking into account historical emissions, 
developed countries have to pay for more than 70% of climatic costs. 
Lots of other ideas have been recently developed, such as adding new Parties to the 
Annex I countries37 or changing multilateralism into some form of minilateralism38. The point 
is to try to change the strategy of developed Parties from “you go first” to “we go first and 
you follow”.  
In any event, one unavoidable pragmatic constraint is that to be feasible, the next climate 
agreement will have to maintain a sufficient degree of compatibility with deeply embedded 
institutions of the climate regime: this is why a global cap-and-trade system is a promising 
solution. As currently implemented, this market mechanism is often environmentally 
inefficient, or unfair, or both: this is why we must wonder how best to reform systems such as 
the European Trading Scheme. We could make rich countries pay for their carbon permits, 
while poor countries would receive them for free; we could also use some of the money raised 
by the auctioning of permits to compensate the increase in energy prices for low-income 
households and finance the research, development and deployment of technologies creating 
energy by using renewable natural resources. The growing literature on this topic can be used 
to make the next climate treaty fairer and more efficient39. 
The Interest of the Poor to Participate in Climate Negotiations 
If we want the next climate treaty to be fair, we need to take procedural or participative 
justice into account. Here the solution is to promote fairer political participation at the 
35  Jonathan Pickering and Christian Barry, “On the concept of climate debt: its moral and political value,” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 15:5 (2012), pp. 667-685. 
36  Paul Baer, “The greenhouse development right framework for global burden sharing: reflection on 
principles and prospects,” WIREs Climate Change 4:1 (2013), pp. 61-71. 
37  Jonathan Pickering et al., “« If Equity’s In, We’re Out »: Scope for Fairness in the Next Global Climate 
Agreement,” Ethics & International Affairs 26:4 (2012), pp. 423-443. 
38  Robyn Eckersley, “Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?,” 
Global Environmental Politics, 12:2 (2012), pp. 24-42. 
39  Simon Caney and Edward Page have made important philosophical contributions to this topic: Simon 
Caney, “Markets, Morality and Climate Change: What, if Anything, is Wrong with Emissions Trading?,” 
New Political Economy 15:2 (2010), pp.197-224; Simon Caney and Cameron Hepburn, “Carbon Trading: 
Unethical, Unjust and Ineffective?,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69 (October 2011), pp. 201-
234; Edward A. Page, “Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading,” International 
Theory 3:1 (2011), pp. 37-69; Edward A. Page, “Cashing in on climate change: political theory and global 
emissions trading,” Critical Review of International and Political Philosophy 14:2 (2011), pp. 259-279; 
Edward A. Page, “The hidden costs of carbon commodification: Emissions trading, political legitimacy and 
procedural justice,” Democratization 19:5 (2012), pp. 932-950. 
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international level. We do not need to open a debate on global democracy; we only need to 
wonder how to make existing international climate negotiations more democratic. If a global 
climate change agreement is to be both fair and effective, it must strengthen its democratic 
commitments and resist to the antidemocratic trends that currently characterize international 
negotiations. As Paul Hunt and Rajat Khosla put it, “[e]ven though those living in poverty are 
disproportionately affected by the adverse effects of global warming, they are invariably 
excluded from relevant policy discussions. … States have a human rights responsibility to 
take measures that facilitate, in all relevant policy-making, the active and informed 
participation of those affected by climate change, including those living in poverty.”40 
One way to promote democratic climate negotiations would be to change the current 
regime from “one dollar, one vote” to “one person, one vote”, with the power of decision 
depending on the percentage of world population represented by delegates. US’s percentage 
of world population is 4.6%; China’s is 19.6%. If, as a nation, China is today the main 
emitter, Americans emit on average four times more than Chinees do. More generally, 
developing and developed countries are each responsible for about 50% of global emissions; 
but while the former represent 80% of world population, the latter represent only 20%. Since 
those who are the least responsible for the problem are the poorest and the most numerous, 
delegates of developed countries must have a stronger influence in climate negotiations than 
US’s special interests, which represent less than 0.1% of world population. If the EU, the 
AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) and the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China) had fair opportunities of participation in the designing of climate policies, if the 80% 
could have more influence than the 0.1% in climate negotiations, they would not any more be 
blocked by one country, or special interests in some developed countries.  
Even if this institutional reform proposal is based on the interests of the poor, it is also 
compatible with the interests of the global affluent. If this reform would be bad for the 
superrich who are permanently lobbying US negotiators, it would be good for most of the 
world’s population. As Joseph Stieglitz has shown, fairer international negotiations are not 
only good for the global poor, but also for most of the global rich41. 
Conclusion 
Climate change is not just a problem for the future: it is already affecting humanity and 
the environment. It is too late to hold back global warming, but the longer we wait to respond 
to it the more difficult it will be to limit its most adverse impacts, and the more costly it will 
be to adapt. While the IPCC projected that many of the adverse effects of global warming 
would occur much later in the century, recent science tells us that they will occur much 
sooner – and in many cases may be happening already – and will likely be substantially more 
severe that the IPCC anticipated. If we want to avoid the most dramatic impacts of climate 
change, then action is needed now42. 
A human rights-based approach could guide this action. Identifying likely transgressions 
of human rights by the impacts of global warming could refocus attention on the human 
priorities that ought to drive policy: building human rights assessments into mitigation and 
adaptation scenarios would refine and improve policies, and provide criteria for their adoption 
or rejection43. Here I have only tried to explain in what sense specific human rights are 
40  Paul Hunt and Rajat Khosla, “Climate change and the right to the highest attainable standard of health,” 
Human Rights and Climate Change, edited by Humphreys, pp. 238-256, at p. 251. 
41  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006). 
42  Paul G. Harris, What’s Wrong with Climate Politics and how to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), pp. 
3-16. 
43  Stephen Humphreys, “Conceiving justice: articulating common causes in distinct regimes,” Human 
Rights and Climate Change, edited by Humphreys, pp. 299-319, at p. 315. 
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violated by climate change, and how a few institutional reforms may reduce these climate 
injustices: but global warming causes many other forms of harms, and to combat it we should 
implement many other climate policies. I have therefore just begun to answer to two leading 
questions in climate ethics: “how to justify the existence of duties towards present and future 
victims of climate change”, and “how to ensure that these duties will be fulfilled before 
widespread and sever harms happen?” 
To ensure that existing and future people won’t live in a dangerous world where 
systematic violations of human rights by climate change become unavoidable, strong climate 
policies must be adopted in the coming decades. To do so, developing moral reasons for 
action is an important task; but we also need to develop quasi-moral and non-moral reasons to 
guarantee that policymakers of the developed world will be motivated to sign and respect a 
binding climate treaty. This is why justice and political feasibility are compatible: for the next 
climate treaty to be adopted by developing Parties, principles of distributive and procedural 
justice will have to play an important role; but to guarantee that developed Parties will be also 
be inclined to sign it, an approach of climate justice dealing with the problem of motivation is 
essential.  
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Abstract 
This paper deals with the problem of moral responsibility in view of climate change. It 
assumes that we have a responsibility to future generations, and it inquires what this 
responsibility implies. The leading idea is that in order to determine what implications 
responsibility to future generations has, we need to consider what normative questions we 
should ask about climate change and about our response to it. Four normative questions are 
discussed. 1. How should we respond to uncertainty? Should we apply cost-benefit analysis in 
order to cope with uncertainty? 2. How should we evaluate the emission of greenhouse gases? 
Given that the effects of emissions will be bad, should we judge that we as emitters harm the 
receivers and by that do them an injustice? 3. How should we compare present costs and future 
benefits? Should we give little or much weight to the benefits and well-being of people in the 
further future? 4. How should we take heed of human rights? Should we try to avoid the 
adverse outcomes of a cost-benefit approach by adopting a human rights approach that 
specifies minimum thresholds to which all human beings are entitled? 
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I. The Problem 
Our attitude to climate change is not one of indifference. Our motto is not "Nach uns die 
Sintflut!", meaning that it does not matter what happens after we have gone. One thing that 
militates against this indifference is the belief that we have a responsibility to future 
generations. Suppose we share this belief. Then we have to think out what responsibility to 
future generations implies in view of climate change. I want to deal with this problem. My 
central claim is that in order to determine what responsibility to future generations implies, 
we need to consider what normative questions we should ask about climate change and about 
our response to it. I will take up four normative questions. 
II. How Should we Respond to Uncertainty? 
Let me start by sketching the problem of uncertainty. The theory of climate scientists 
describes the development of the Earth's climate as a progressive warming of the atmosphere, 
and it explains this warming as being caused by humanity's emissions of greenhouse gases, 
starting with the Industrial Revolution. The theory merits a high credence since no other 
theory provides a better explanation. The theory also allows certain predictions about the 
future climate. Its broad predictions can be taken as clear and safe, for instance that the world 
will continue to warm and that the sea level will continue to rise. But when it comes to more 
detailed predictions of the future impacts of greenhouse gases, we are faced with a great deal 
of uncertainty. There are two reasons for this. First, the climate system is so huge and 
complex that its behaviour can only be predicted by making many assumptions and 
approximations. Second, the future progress of climate change will be influenced by many 
external factors, for instance by how much the human population grows and how technology 
develops. Uncertainty with regard to more detailed predictions is a great problem when we 
think about how we should act in response to climate change. For we are unsure what the 
effects of climate change will be, and we are equally unsure what will be the effects of our 
action in response to climate change. 
How should we cope with this uncertainty?  One important theory states that we should 
use cost-benefit analysis with the aim of maximizing expected value. Let me briefly explain 
this recommendation.   
What we should try to maximize is expected value, or our expectation of the goodness of 
the world. In a situation of uncertainty, we must calculate expected value. We can do this by 
applying cost-benefit analysis. In principle, the expected value of an action can be calculated 
in the following way. We first identify the different results the action might have. We judge 
the value and the probability of each of the possible results. For each result, we calculate the 
arithmetical product of its value and its probability. Then we add up all these products. This 
gives us the expected value of the action.  
However, in practice, this reasoning confronts us with a problem. To calculate the 
expected value, we need to know both the value and probability of each of the possible 
results, but in practice, we do not have that knowledge. The question is what we should do,  
and the answer is that we must try to estimate values and probabilities as well as we can.1 Let 
me take probabilities first. What probability we should assign to a possible result is a matter 
of rationality. We should ask how much credence we rationally should give to the possibility 
that the result will occur. The answer should depend on the evidence we have. The more 
evidence we can muster, the more tightly the evidence will determine the probability. When it 
1  John Broome, Climate Matters; Ethics in a Warming World  (New York/London: W.W. Norton, 2012), p. 
187.  
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comes to estimating the value of each possible result, we have to weigh good features against 
bad ones, that is to say, we have to apply cost-benefit analysis to each of the possibilities 
separately. Each possibility will lead to the world's developing in some particular way. For 
instance, people's well-being will improve or diminish in a particular way. We have to set a 
value on this development. 
What does this approach imply with regard to climate change? Its main implication is 
this. In order to calculate the expected value of our actions in response to climate change, we 
need to estimate their results. Our actions - including doing nothing - can have bad results, 
called "costs", or they can have good results, called "benefits". We have to weigh the costs 
against the benefits and we have to take account of costs and benefits both to the present 
generation and to future generations. In short, using cost-benefit analysis implies comparing 
the costs of an undiminished progress of climate change with the costs and benefits of 
combating climate change. Such weighing up is needed for making out which course of action 
would be best on balance.2  
Should we adopt the cost-benefit approach? If we reflect on this question, we should take 
into account that there is disagreement about the application of cost-benefit analysis to the 
issue of climate change. On the one hand, cost-benefit analysis has been taken to offer a 
tenable response to uncertainty about how to cope with climate change. On the other hand, it 
has been criticized for being inappropriate for assessing the problem of climate change. 
Critics have argued as follows. Cost-benefit analysis is tied to a conventional economic 
framework and can within that framework be useful for evaluating competing projects by 
directly assessing their costs and benefits. But the problem of climate change has a long-term 
nature and goes beyond the conventional economic framework. Therefore, it is inappropriate 
to apply conventional cost-benefit analysis to the issue of climate change. This criticism can 
be illustrated by two instances. First, the critics bring to the fore that conventional cost-benefit 
analysis is overly simplistic in talking about costs and benefits accruing to people in the far 
future. It neglects the problem that projecting costs and benefits in the long-term future is a 
difficult, if not impossible task, because we do not know precisely what the global economy 
will look like in the further future, which technological and social changes will occur, and 
what the specific negative effects of climate change will be.3 A second instance of criticism is 
that conventional cost-benefit analysis undervalues the costs and benefits accruing to future 
people. In conventional calculations, these costs and benefits are subject to a positive discount 
rate. This means that they count as less than current costs and benefits and that they over very 
long time periods disappear or become minimal. But such results seem absurd. To illustrate 
the absurdity of a substantial discount rate, critics give us an example: "At the standard 5% 
discount rate, the present value of the earth's aggregate output discounted 200 years from now 
is a few hundred thousand dollars."4  
In the face of the disagreement about the application of cost-benefit analysis to the issue 
of climate change, the question of whether we should adopt the cost-benefit approach requires 
considerable thought. To mention one possible reflection, could we reach a tenable response 
to uncertainty by modifying the approach, for instance by focusing on the basic conditions of 
the life of future people?  
2  Broome, Climate Matters, p. 101.   
3  Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 237. 
4  Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm, p. 268. 
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III. How Should We Evaluate the Emission of Greenhouse Gases?  
The broad predictions of climate science give rise to the value judgement that the effects 
of the emissions on human beings will be bad. For example, farming in the tropics will be 
damaged by a rise in temperature; drought will be severe, particularly in Africa; coastal areas 
will be subject to flooding and erosion as the sea level rises; many people's health will be 
damaged and many people will be killed. Should this evaluation of effects lead us to the 
further evaluation that the emitters of greenhouse gases harm the receivers and by that do 
them an injustice? 
This question is about what we are doing when we emit greenhouse gases. It regards our 
morality as private persons. Its background is the moral claim that we have duties of justice, 
and it calls upon us to judge whether we by emitting greenhouse gases are breaching a duty of 
justice.  
Let me start by sketching the background. That we have duties of justice is part of our 
common-sense morality and of many moral theories. Duties of justice are owed by one person 
to another particular person, or to other particular people. If we breach a duty of justice, we 
are doing an injustice, and there is always some particular person to whom it is an injustice. 
In our context, one important example of a duty of justice is the duty not to harm other 
people.  
Given this background, how should we judge our emissions of greenhouse gases? Are 
there sufficient reasons for stating that we by emitting greenhouse gases are harming other 
people and thus doing them an injustice? Let me mention some important reasons that have 
been presented in the literature.5 1. The harm caused by our emissions is a result of what we 
do, for instance heating flats, driving cars, rearing cattle. 2. The harm we do is not trivial but 
serious. 3. It is not accidental since it is often the predicted result of deliberate acts of ours. 4. 
We do not compensate the victims of our harm. These victims are huge numbers of people 
scattered all over the world. 5. We normally make our greenhouse gas emissions for our own 
benefit. We benefit, for example, from the comfort of our homes, the travelling we do, or the 
consumer goods we buy. 6. The harms done by the emissions of the rich are only to a small 
part reciprocated by the emissions of the poor. 7. We could easily reduce our emissions if we 
are not among the very poor who have to burn fuel to survive.  
From these reasons it can be concluded that when we as rich people emit greenhouse 
gases without compensating the people who are harmed, we act unjustly. This conclusion 
leaves us with a problem. Each of us is under a duty of justice not to emit greenhouse gases 
without compensating the people who are harmed as a result. If it is impossible for us to make 
this restitution, then our carbon footprint ought to be zero. But how should we satisfy this 
requirement? Looking for a solution, we could consider the following proposal. Even if we 
take steps to reduce our emissions, we will still cause emissions. We should try to cancel or 
offset these emissions. We can do this by using preventive means, that is means that make 
sure that less greenhouse gas gets into the atmosphere. Plenty of organizations use our money 
to finance projects that diminish emissions somewhere in the world, create sources of 
renewable energy, or promote the efficient use of energy. If we offset all our emissions, we 
cause no greenhouse gas to be added to the atmosphere, and we do no harm to anyone through 
emissions.6  
5  Broome, Climate Matters, pp. 55-9. 
6  Broome, Climate Matters, pp. 79 and 87. 
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IV. How Should We Compare Present Costs and Future Benefits?  
Let me first point to the very long timescale concerned. The changed climate will persist 
for a very long time. The emissions of greenhouse gas cause a progressive warming, and if 
that gas is carbon dioxide, the warming is spread across centuries, because some of the gas 
will stay in the air that long. The warming of the atmosphere harms many presently living 
people, but most of the bad effects will not be suffered for many decades from now, indeed 
for more than a century from now. They will be suffered mostly by people who are not yet 
living. Their lives will be much worse than they would have been if we had controlled our 
emissions. Likewise, efforts to control climate change will only slowly become effective. For 
example, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions will result in benefits within a few 
decades, but most benefits will come only after a very long time. 
Measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gas are costly. The costs of such measures 
will be borne at present or in the near future. Therefore, the question arises how we should 
weigh up costs borne by present people against future people's benefits. The answer seems in 
the first place to depend on what value we should set on future people's benefits compared 
with our own.  
In climate economics, this issue appears under the heading of "discount rate". Two 
prominent studies may illustrate this. The Stern Review7 uses a low discount rate (1.4 percent 
per annum). It discounts future benefits to a low degree, which means that it gives much 
weight to the interests of future people and asks the present generation to make urgent 
sacrifices for the sake of future people. Nordhaus' study "A Question of Balance"8 uses a high 
discount rate (5.5 percent per annum). It discounts future benefits to a high degree, which 
means that it gives little weight to the future. It concludes that only a modest response now is 
demanded and strong action can be delayed for decades. It is worth mentioning that the 
discount rates of Stern and Nordhaus make a sixty-fold difference to the value we assign to 
commodities a century from now.9 
What value we should set on future people's benefits is not just an economic question but 
also a moral question, because it determines more than anything else what sacrifices the 
present generation should make for the sake of the future. How should we answer this 
question? Perhaps the following proposal is worth considering. Suppose we do not reject all 
discounting of future benefits. We may, for example, discount future commodities because of 
their diminishing marginal benefit. That is to say, we may share some of the economists' 
optimistic assumptions: The world's economic growth will continue, despite climate change 
and the present crisis; people in general will therefore be richer in the future than they are 
now; they will possess more commodities; since they already have a lot, extra commodities 
will bring them less well-being than extra commodities received by someone who has few. 
But discounting future commodities does not imply discounting future well-being, because 
well-being is not a commodity. "Well-being" stands for a person's life going well, her 
possessing whatever is good for her (pleasure, satisfaction of her preferences, knowledge, or 
something else).10 What value we should set on the well-being of persons depends on our 
basic moral view. One important view we have been offered is that someone's well-being has 
the same value whenever it occurs, and whoever's well-being it is.11 If we take this view, well-
being should not be discounted. Commodities, that is the material goods people buy and the 
services they use, can be regarded as sources of well-being. They are benefits if they increase 
7  Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
8  William Nordhaus, A Question of Balance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
9  Broome, Climate Matters, p. 139. 
10  Broome, Climate Matters, pp. 113 and 129. 
11  Broome, Climate Matters, p. 146. 
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the well-being of persons. This implies that the discount rate for evaluating these benefits 
should be low.  
V. How Should We Take Heed of Human Rights?  
A cost-benefit approach to climate change can be criticized for its aggregative nature. 
This criticism is as follows. A cost-benefit approach is concerned with the aggregate level of 
expected value, the total wealth of current and future generations, and it neglects the plight of 
the very seriously disadvantaged if their plight is outweighed by the benefit of others. A cost-
benefit approach fails to protect the basic interests and entitlements of the most vulnerable, 
and this is an important omission.  
How should we try to avoid this adverse outcome? Should we agree to an important 
proposal that has been presented not long ago? The proposal is that we should consider the 
impact of climate change on the fundamental human rights of people.12 It argues that 
anthropogenic climate change jeopardizes three key human rights: first, the human right to 
life: all persons have a human right not to be arbitrarily deprived of their life; second, the 
human right to health: all persons have a human right that other people do not act so as to 
create serious threats to their health; third, the human right to subsistence: all persons have a 
human right that other people do not act so as to deprive them of the means of subsistence.13 
In order to underline the status of these rights, four properties of human rights are being 
highlighted.14 First, human rights refer to those rights that persons have qua human beings. 
Second, human rights represent moral thresholds below which people should not fall, the 
most basic moral standards to which persons are entitled. Third, human rights represent the 
entitlements of each and every individual to certain minimum standards of treatment, and they 
generate obligations on all persons to respect these basic minimum standards. Fourth, human 
rights generally take priority over moral values, such as increasing efficiency or promoting 
happiness. So, human rights specify minimum moral thresholds to which all individuals are 
entitled, simply by virtue of their humanity, and which override all other moral values.  
This plea for human rights as thresholds is important in the debate over climate change. It 
may induce us to adopt a human rights approach to climate change. Suppose it does. Then we 
ought to consider how our approach can be brought to bear in public decision-making. One 
question to think about is whether taking heed of human rights can go together with some 
cost-benefit analysis, even though a human rights approach is an alternative to a cost-benefit 
approach.  
An example may show that some cost-benefit analysis can be combined with taking heed 
of human rights. Consider the emissions control system known as "cap and trade". This 
system is drawn up in cost-benefit terms. It attaches a price to emissions. The "cap" is the 
maximum amount of greenhouse gas a country is allowed to emit. Each country divides its 
cap among its economic agents by allocating emission permits. The "trade" is the buying and 
selling of permits. It occurs among the economic agents in an emission market. The cap is 
reduced from one period (often several years) to the next, thereby reducing total emissions 
over time. When the cap is tight, the emissions price will be pushed up and economic agents 
will find it profitable to economize on their emissions rather than buying lots of permits. Two 
recent evaluations of this emissions control system appreciate its virtue. They judge it to be 
"almost the only deliberate climate-change policy to actually reduce emissions to any 
significant degree so far,"15 and to be "an effective means" to cut back carbon emissions 
12  Simon Caney, "Climate change, human rights and moral thresholds", Human Rights and Climate Change, 
edited by Stephen Humphreys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 69-90. 
13  Caney, "Climate change", pp. 75-82. 
14  Caney, "Climate change", pp. 71-3. 
15  Simon Caney and Cameron Hepburn, "Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust and Ineffective?" Royal Institute 
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sharply and aggressively "by placing a price on carbon emissions."16 But they combine their 
appreciation of cap-and-trade with a human rights approach. They criticize the way the 
system treats the least advantaged. One evaluation criticizes the unequal distribution of wealth 
the system exacerbates:  Controlling greenhouse gas emissions leads to an increase in the cost 
of emission. The impacts are worse for poorer households than richer households. To avoid 
these impacts, emissions allowances must be sold to firms with a portion of the revenues 
directed to provide compensation to poorer households.17 The other evaluation focuses on the 
global poor. More than two billion human beings suffer from energy poverty. Their 
subsistence rights are not fulfilled. They need to be provided with access to energy, especially 
electricity. Cap-and-trade alone would simply make life worse for the poorest by driving up 
the price of fossil fuels. A plan must be implemented that directly tackles energy poverty by 
driving down the price of renewable energy to a level that the poorest can afford.18 In these 
evaluations of the cap-and-trade system, cost-benefit thinking is combined with taking heed 
of human rights. 
VI. Conclusion 
If we want to clarify what responsibility to future generations implies in view of climate 
change, we need to consider what normative questions we should address about climate 
change and about our response to it. I have discussed four such questions: How should we 
respond to uncertainty? How should we evaluate the emission of greenhouse gases? How 
should we compare present costs and future benefits? How should we take heed of human 
rights? There are more questions to be asked, for instance about human lives, the world's 
population, or the value of nature. But I hope the four questions I have discussed will be 
sufficient for a helpful elucidation. 
  
of Philosophy Supplement, 69 (2011), p. 227. 
16  Henry Shue, "Climate Hope: Implementing the Exit Strategy", Chicago Journal of International Law 13:2 
(2013), p. 398. 
17  Caney and Hepburn, "Carbon Trading", p. 223. 
18  Shue, "Climate Hope", pp. 391, 396, 398. 
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Abstract 
Climate change cannot be managed by experts and politicians alone. Consequently, 
climate ethics must take up the challenge of inviting public responsibility on this issue. New 
sociological research on climate denial by Kari Norgaard, however, suggests that most citizens 
of industrialized countries are ill-prepared to cope with the ethical significance of climate 
change. I draw upon Martin Heidegger to offer a new reading of climate denial that suggests 
viable responses to this problem. I argue that the implications of climate change are largely 
received as an “existential threat” to the extent that they endanger the integrity of everyday 
existence. In other words, the implications of climate change for everyday life unsettle what 
phenomenologists call the “lifeworld.” Should basic lifeworld assumptions, which cultures rely 
on to makes sense of the world and their purposes in it, come under serious question, anxieties 
surface that most people are profoundly motivated to avoid. Hence, the ethical obligations 
entailed by climate change are “denied” in the form of protecting lifeworld integrity for the 
sake of containing anxieties that would otherwise overwhelm people. Finally, I submit that 
existential approaches to climate denial can empower a confrontation with “climate anxiety” in 
ways that open up ethical reflection. 
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I. Introduction: Climate Ethics from the Bottom Up 
In 1992, the year the United Nations introduced the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change that laid the groundwork for the Kyoto Protocol, Dale Jamieson made a seminal case 
for climate ethics.1 He argued that scientific knowledge, although indispensable, doesn’t 
translate into appropriate action. Moreover, climate change cannot be managed as a technical 
problem by experts and politicians. Instead, Jamieson argued, this issue confronts us with 
questions about how we relate to each other and to nature, as well as questions about who we 
are and how we ought to live. Hence, climate change is primarily an ethical issue. 
In the past two decades, experts, politicians, and an increasingly professionalized 
environmental movement have taken on climate change only to prove Jamieson right. Despite 
over two decades of overwhelming scientific consensus regarding the enormity of climate 
change, and several ambitious international conventions attempting to address it, emissions 
have dramatically increased during this time, not decreased. Arguably, the Kyoto Protocol 
and market-based solutions like the European Union’s venture into cap-and-trade have failed. 
Economist Nicolas Stern famously proclaimed climate change “the greatest market failure the 
world has ever seen,”2 and some notables like James Gustave Speth are having serious doubts 
about capitalism’s ability to address this problem at all.3 
Faith in green technologies is also problematic. Energy-efficiency improvements have 
been met with higher emissions because lower utility costs have translated into warmer 
buildings and bigger refrigerators, while better fuel economy has been outpaced by more cars 
on the road, longer commuting distances, and a sports utility vehicle fad. In Green Illusions, 
Ozzie Zehner deconstructs the techno-optimism behind solar, wind, biofuels, and other 
hopefuls to conclude that we don’t have an energy crisis: we have a consumption crisis.4 
My point isn’t simply that large-scale solutions are useless. Indeed, one could scarcely 
imagine mitigating global emissions without them. However, political realism demands that 
policies and basic institutional reforms commensurate with the magnitude of this issue be met 
with widespread public support and involvement. In fact, given the global track record of the 
past two decades, it’s become clear that such changes have to be instigated and enforced by a 
politically organized populous willing to keep powerful interests in check. The totalizing 
nature of climate change necessitates empowered and clear-sighted democracies like never 
before, and this in turn requires the kind of moral force that underlies all mass movements 
later generations recognize as historical in scope. Unfortunately, ethical responses to climate 
change by the public have proven equally discouraging. Growing awareness over the past two 
decades has not translated into the widespread normative changes demanded by this issue. 
What accounts for this? Climate ethicists offer a range of ideas that include conceptual 
clarity, political inertia, worldviews, character vices, and other barriers to action. It’s 
important to note in this regard that the way one understands the major barrier(s) to 
normativity has a strong influence on one’s theoretical approach to climate ethics. If the 
problem of normativity boils down to muddled concepts, clarity will bring home the ethical 
implications of climate change to compel appropriate action. If, instead, motivation to act is 
1  Dale Jamieson, “Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming.” Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, edited 
by Stephan M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), pp. 77-86. 
2  Nicholas Stern, “The Economics of Climate Change.” Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, edited by 
Stephan M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp. 39-76, at p. 39. 
3  James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing 
from Crisis to Sustainability (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
4   Ozzie Zehner, Green Illusions: The Dirty Secrets of Clean Energy and the Future of Environmentalism 
(Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2012). 
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inhibited by worldview perceptions blind to the moral urgency of climate change, a paradigm 
shift is needed. Or perhaps ethical responses are obstructed by bad habits or ill-adapted 
character traits. If so, new virtues are called for. 
These and other approaches to the problem of normativity are found throughout the 
climate ethics literature. New ethnographic research on climate denial by sociologist Kari 
Norgaard, however, complicates these views. Her observations suggest that climate denial is a 
defensive reaction to emotional disturbances triggered by the unsettling implications of 
climate change. Moreover, denial of this sort is intersubjective, meaning that it has to be 
understood in terms of collective socio-cultural experience. Ultimately, she argues, what is 
often denied in climate change is not the reality or even the seriousness of this issue, but 
precisely its normative significance for everyday life. This makes her work centrally relevant 
to climate ethics. And as I argue in this paper, Norgaard’s research lends itself to an 
existentialist way of understanding the normativity problem at the center of climate ethics, 
and in the process provides a new perspective from which to approach the field. 
Even if Norgaard’s ethnographic findings accurately capture the phenomenon of climate 
denial, however, it still leaves the ethicist wondering how to philosophically address this 
central barrier to normativity. My own approach draws on Martin Heidegger to thematize 
climate denial more comprehensively and in ways that suggest viable ethical avenues. 
Specifically, I argue that climate change is received primarily as an existential threat that 
shuts down ethical reflection, and that the emotional disturbances observed by Norgaard are 
largely secondary to this more basic condition. By existential threat, I don’t mean a physical 
danger. I mean a threat to the structures of meaning that constitute community or 
intersubjective identity.5 By calling into question our most basic assumptions about how we 
ought to live, how we ought to relate to others and to nature going into the future, the 
continuity of social existence is threatened at a collective level. In other words, the ethical 
implications of climate change pose an existential threat insofar as they call into question the 
intersubjective structures of what phenomenologists call the lifeworld. The sign of such a 
threat is a creeping anxiety that compels us to engage in the forms of denial analyzed by 
Norgaard. Hence, a Heideggerian interpretation of this research would understand climate 
denial as an anxious attempt to work with others in order to keep the ethical significance of 
climate change at a safe remove. 
If climate change is indeed received as an existential threat, those interested in 
empowering public responsibility might want to consider an existentialist approach to climate 
ethics. To this end, I conclude that some measure of anxiety is appropriate as a signal that 
basic existential changes are needed, as long as bottom-up ways of responding to anxiety are 
put forward that truly open people up to this daunting issue. 
II. The Existential Probelm 
In a recent interview, Bill McKibben remarked that addressing climate change is like 
building a movement against ourselves—as if the abolition movement depended on slave 
owners.6 Although we can draw powerful examples of collective mobilization from history, as 
with World War II, what most of them have in common is a felt need to react against an 
external threat like fascism. Climate change, however, complicates this line between external 
and internal. Of course, McKibben doesn’t believe that “external enemies” are absent. In a 
world marked by widening gaps of wealth and power, it’s not the consumers that have been 
5  By “community” or “intersubjective identity” I mean traditions (religious, political, professional, etc.) that 
connote common ways of thinking, speaking, feeling, perceiving, and being. 
6  Bill McKibben, “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” Rolling Stones Magazine: July 19, 2012, online 
at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719 (accessed 
2013-11-11). 
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controlling the fate of climate policy over the past two decades. One must look instead to 
producers like Exxon Mobil. I think McKibben’s point, however, is that most people in 
affluent societies tend to identify with the very industrial world order that Exxon Mobil 
represents. Identity, after all, is constituted by socio-cultural experience, and the latter has 
long been infused with the ethos and mores of industrialization, including its scientific, 
technological, and economic power. There’s a sense in which we see ourselves—our past and 
future—in the very world responsible for climate change, and so cannot easily imagine 
carbon-healthy alternatives to it. I call this the existential problem. 
For Herbert Marcuse, we see ourselves in a world that is nevertheless alien to us—just as 
medieval Christians saw themselves in a supernatural God beyond their experience and power 
to influence. For him, however, the “external world” most identify with today belongs, not to 
the supernatural, but rather to the material order that governs everyday existence. The result, 
for Marcuse, is a “one-dimensional” internalization of the industrial order itself to the extent 
that it has become self-evident and beyond question. With the introduction of mass 
communications (e.g. advertising), for instance, social experience has become standardized to 
such an extent that our ability to think, speak, feel, perceive, and behave beyond the industrial 
order of immediate existence has been severely compromised. “The concepts which 
comprehend the facts and thereby transcend the facts are losing their authentic linguistic 
representation. Without these mediations, language tends to express and promote the 
immediate identification of reason and fact, truth and established truth, essence and existence, 
the thing and its function.”7 
If we add to this list the immediate identification of what ‘is’ (reality) and what ‘ought to 
be’ (possibility), mediating ethical concepts also seem unlikely to develop and take hold. 
Future possibilities are already encapsulated in present realities. Yet, for Marcuse, the 
function of a viable culture (or lifeworld) is to mediate existence by distinguishing real needs 
and problems from false ones in light of higher ideals. If the industrial order is received as 
self-evident, however, any basic problems intrinsic to it are concealed. Hence, the existential 
problem is born from the recognition that truly ethical responses to climate change require 
shifts in identity that are significantly distinct from the industrial order responsible for climate 
change. 
Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Keymer come close to this problem in the climate 
ethics literature with their recent anthology Ethical Adaptation to Climate Change. Here, they 
attempt to broaden the focus from prescriptions to virtues in an effort to ground action in a 
new understanding of human excellence. A new vision of the good life is called for to 
facilitate new ways of being human in a world where adapting to climate change will become 
the prime directive. “Who we are today” they explain, “is not ready for this and who we have 
been got us into this mess.”8 Thus, we are invited to transform ourselves in the context of 
“well-worked-out relationships between our lives, our institutions, and the extrahuman 
world.”9  
What remains to be seen, however, is whether or not communities are open to accepting 
this invitation to self-transform in the first place. If we do in fact internalize a world of social 
forces largely beyond our grasp and influence, self-transformation in the name of climate 
ethics must seem like pure fantasy—a request to create something ex nihilo. 
7  Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston 
Mass.: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 85. 
8  Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Keymer, “Introduction: Adapting Humanity,” Ethical Adaptation to 
Climate Change: Human Virtues of the Future, edited by Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Keymer 
(Cambridge, Mass. & London, England: The MIT Press, 2012), pp. 1-23, at p. 15. 
9  Ibid, p. 2. 
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The existential problem, however, runs deeper still. Insofar as self-identity is 
fundamentally implicated in the same world order of production and consumption causing 
climate change, asking for fundamental ethical changes that conflict with that world must 
seem tantamount to a kind of identity crisis. Reforming one’s identity risks endangering the 
collective sense of order, stability, and continuity in life required to live with integrity and 
confidence. It is in this sense, I argue, that the ethical implications of climate change are 
received largely as an existential threat. What would happen, for example, if we were to fully 
take in the fact that carbon levels now exceed 400ppm—a level the biosphere hasn’t been 
adapted to for countless millennia? And what happens when we begin to realize that climate 
change is inextricably bound to a plethora of other global dangers like ocean acidification and 
the sixth mass extinction in Earth’s history? All things considered, the ethical implications of 
climate change suggest that we humans need to adapt to the nonhuman world, rather than 
forcing nature to adapt to us. But this points to a profound and disturbing reversal in the 
Western psyche that contradicts centuries of socio-cultural momentum. And should one go 
further to examine the systemic relationship between the anthropocentric institutions driving 
climate change and the systemic social injustices organized by these same institutions, how 
does one cope with such a totalizing condition? 
Drawing on Norgaard, I argue that the signature of the existential problem inhibiting 
ethical normativity in the face of climate change has to be understood as a kind of denial in 
the face of such disturbing questions. In an effort to more fully grasp the existential problem, 
therefore, we turn now to her theory of climate denial. 
III. Norgard’s Theory of Climate Denial 
As Norgaard explains, climate denial takes multiple forms.10 The most well-known in the 
United States is the “literal denial” that dismisses the science of climate change. Even in the 
US, however, literal denial only accounts for a minority of the population. A more prevalent 
form is “interpretive denial,” where climate change is accepted as factual, but the facts are 
interpreted in ways that dismiss it as a serious threat. For example, a faith in historical 
“progress” can bring comfortable interpretations of climate change as a problem that will 
eventually be solved by the experts. 
The third form of denial, however, is the most subtle and perhaps most widespread. In 
what is called “implicatory denial,” climate change is acknowledged as real and it’s 
interpreted as a serious threat, but the moral implications of this issue are consistently 
minimized. As Norgaard puts it, implicatory denial reflects “a failure to 
integrate…knowledge [of climate change] into everyday life or transform it into social 
action.”11 Thus, this third form of denial has insidious consequences for climate ethics as a 
field of inquiry. 
Norgaard’s ethnographic research was conducted in Norway, a country she selected 
because of its largely educated and politically-involved citizenry with an impressive record of 
environmental action. Consequently, she believed, the more subtle aspects of climate denial 
could be investigated more clearly in this setting. In Norway, one can see that the dominant 
theories of climate denial (focusing on ignorance, ideology, apathy, or greed) miss the mark. 
Accounts of inaction that center on such phenomena tend to rely on problematic assumptions 
about human nature that stress either rational actor theories of behavior or see denial as a kind 
of passive impotence or indifference. The most widespread example of this is what’s known 
10  See Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001).  
11  Kari Marie Norgaard, Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life (Cambridge, Mass. 
& London, England: The MIT Press, 2011), p. 11. 
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as the “information deficit model,” where the so-called failure to respond to climate change is 
understood in terms of ignorance or misinformation—assuming, as it does, that if people only 
‘knew’ the science, they would take climate change seriously and act differently. The hope 
here is that educating the public or countering political ideologies and media reporting that 
cast doubt on climate change will be enough to motivate collective action. Other approaches 
assume that overcoming greed, apathy, and other vices will be sufficient to generate a 
response. Again, however, these conditions aren’t especially salient in Norway. 
Her observations suggest, on the contrary, that climate denial is more indirect than is 
commonly believed. For one thing, climate denial is “socially organized”—meaning that it is 
intersubjective before it’s subjective. In her own words, implicatory denial is “generated and 
maintained in response to social circumstances and carried out through a process of 
interaction.”12 Unconsciously motivated by disturbing feelings prompted by the implications 
of climate change, such as fear, guilt, and powerlessness, denial occurs when people employ 
certain norms of conversation and other social behaviors as a way of keeping the troubling 
implications of this ominous problem from surfacing. This involves any number of 
intersubjective strategies, most of which aim to micro-manage perception and ways of 
thinking in order to manage these feelings. 
To put it simply, we work with others to protect ourselves by keeping climate change out 
of the sphere of everyday reality. Examples of this include pressures to remain optimistic, 
keeping conversations light (and changing topics or using humor when this is violated), 
sticking to the technical facts of the matter as opposed to its deeper meaning, and focusing on 
the past or the present rather than the future, or on local problems rather than global ones. 
Norgaard also noticed denial at work in the form of an appropriation of various narratives, 
metaphors, and other cultural resources to help communities avoid taking in the troubling 
implications of this daunting issue. These collective strategies—at work as long as climate 
change disturbs and unsettles—may seem insignificant when considered in isolation. But if 
Norgaard is right, the intentional, if unconscious, product is a collective safeguarding that 
helps people live with something that would otherwise overwhelm them. 
Questions about how people “create distance” from information on climate change and “hold 
information at arm’s length” seem absurd if we take the everyday world at face value. But 
collectively constructing a sense of time and place, a sense of what is and is not appropriate to pay 
attention to or feel, is an important social and political process. In such constructions, we see the 
intersection of private emotions and the macrolevel reproduction of ideology and power.”13 
Again, implicatory climate denial is a collective accomplishment in response to concrete 
situations experienced in common, not just a psychological condition. We need to convince 
each other, not simply ourselves, that climate change doesn’t personally implicate us in any 
meaningful way. Given the epistemological authority of science in Western societies, and the 
wide availability of information about climate change today, covering up the deeper 
implications of this issue takes work. And apparently, the threat of climate change is enough 
to motivate this kind of work. Of course, to the extent that even outspoken believers in the 
science of climate change successfully convince each other that they aren’t really implicated 
in this issue, or that the experts will eventually solve it, the question of ethics never comes up. 
IV. An Existential Phenomenology of Climate  Denial 
Ultimately, Norgaard’s work suggests that it is a mistake to understand climate denial as a 
lack of response. Denial is indeed a response—but of a certain kind. And until we get clear 
about how climate change is experienced as a public issue, grasping the full scope of climate 
12  Ibid, p. 9. 
13  Ibid, p. 97. 
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denial will continue to elude us. Yet putting the matter in terms of “experience” is also 
misleading. Because what has to be understood about climate change is that it doesn’t speak 
to one’s concrete experience of the world, but rather to the background against which one 
experiences things—what I referred to earlier as the lifeworld. This is what makes climate 
denial amenable to phenomenological analysis. Norgaard’s ethnographic research, moreover, 
suggests that this issue is received as a disturbance to this background, and this is what 
recommends climate denial to the existentialist. 
In an attempt to offer a phenomenology of the existential problem in light of Norgaard’s 
work, it would be helpful to clarify what we mean by the lifeworld. The term comes from 
Edmund Husserl, and it simply denotes the context we share with others to help us make 
sense of things. Ultimately, it is the shared medium informing a culture’s relationship to the 
world of its experience. It is because of the lifeworld that things appear self-evident or 
obvious, as opposed to the products of interpretation. 
Lifeworlds make experience reliable by offering a coherence and continuity to our basic 
intuitions. Yet they are also heterogeneous and open to the material world beyond them, 
which allows them to constantly develop and change over time. As collective sensibilities 
develop in response to concrete problems, moreover, they both cohere and conflict with other 
ways of making sense of things at various levels of generality and specificity. Specific forms 
of meaning, for instance, enable a given culture to make sense of particular things of 
significance like chairs, magpies, edible plants, and Coke bottles, while the more general 
constellations of meaning embody answers to the existential questions in life that concern all 
cultures—those that articulate, for example, the basic relationship between self, society, and 
nature.  
To the extent that specific and general forms of meaning cohere with one another as 
comprehensive gestalts and survive the test of time by enabling a society to successfully cope 
with life’s challenges, they become institutionalized or backgrounded. Hence, the experiential 
world they contextualize is largely beyond question. A linear conception of time—and hence 
historical intuitions of progress vs. decline—is probably a good example of a general 
lifeworld assumption in Western cultures that’s difficult to question. 
Lifeworlds cannot be understood in the abstract as, for example, inherently conservative 
or radical. A given lifeworld might privilege cultural identity or security, while another 
privileges transformation and creativity. It all depends on the meaning structures inherited 
from the past and the concrete problems confronting the community as it works to realize its 
future. But like ecosystems, rapid systemic changes to a people’s lifeworld can make viable 
adjustments difficult, if not impossible. In enabling people to make sense of things in 
meaningful ways, their lifeworld affords them the identity and security necessary to live with 
purpose and confidence. Accordingly, we rely strongly on a shared background to give our 
lives continuity and integrity. For this reason, when the lifeworld we share with others is 
threatened at a general level, we are compelled to work with others to safely address this 
threat. This, I believe, is what Norgaard observed conducting her ethnographic research on 
climate denial. 
Martin Heidegger’s synthesis of Husserl’s phenomenology and Søren Kierkegaard’s 
existentialism in Being and Time explains this more concretely by carefully distinguishing 
secure from insecure ways of being in the world.14 First, notice that when life’s routines are 
running smoothly, people tend to take things for granted. Thanks to the skills, habits, and 
sensibilities integrated by the lifeworld, we know intuitively that what worked last time will 
probably work next time as well. Hence, there’s no need to constantly notice things we’re 
already familiar with and reflect on them. For this reason, unless we’re dissatisfied with 
14  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), ch. 3. 
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something or think we can improve it, we’re often not conscious of the particularities of 
experience so long as everything is happening as expected. To take Heidegger’s famous 
example, when hammering, the hammer itself isn’t experienced as a thing of wood and metal. 
Rather, we simply take up the hammer unreflectively and relate to it almost as if it were an 
extension of our own bodies. Similarly, it’s revealing that when we experience a fender-
bender, we usually say “I got hit”—not “my car got hit while I was in it.” If the car or 
hammer is an integral part of the lifeworld that makes us feel at home in the world, we 
naturally experience it as part of us. 
As long as things make sense and our expectations in life are largely met, we usually 
identify with the world we belong to. So what distinguishes secure from insecure ways of 
being in the world? This can be discerned, among other ways, by how people cope with the 
unexpected in life. Consider first, Heidegger says, that it’s often not until some disruption 
occurs, as when the hammer breaks, that we become fully conscious of it. Usually, it’s only 
when the flow of our projects get interrupted by something unexpected that we experience the 
hammer as indeed separate from us—as a thing of wood and metal, for instance, that needs 
repair. Yet, breakdowns occur at different levels in life and require different responses. And 
this is the point I want to drive home with regards to climate change. Just as we have to make 
a distinction between ‘climate’ as a background condition and ‘weather’ as a foreground 
expression of it, so too we need to make a distinction between the general structures of the 
lifeworld that order experience and the particular things that make sense to us against this 
larger background. For example, when particular things like hammers or cars break, I can 
simply fix them or get new ones. Specific problems at this foreground level can be handled 
consciously by the individual. But what happens when the hammer works fine, but using it to 
add on to the house becomes an issue because a larger house—requiring more energy to 
heat—will increase carbon emissions? This is a different problem, requiring a different kind 
of response. Or what happens when the car works but the everyday act of driving becomes an 
issue because it contributes to climate change? Connect enough dots and you’ll discover that 
these more general problems cannot be handled by individuals alone because here it is the 
lifeworld practices we share with others that are questionable—not the particular things that 
stand out against this larger background. 
Because the normative implications of climate change challenge our most basic 
background assumptions, we cannot simply treat this deeply systemic issue as a problem to be 
handled consciously and deliberately, if only people had sufficient knowledge and will-
power. Unlike broken hammers and cars, we don’t simply become conscious of existential 
problems affecting the lifeworld in order to fix them. Instead, as Heidegger explains, we 
become insecure and anxious—often without knowing why or even noticing. 
As Norgaard’s ethnographic findings suggest, this is why we have to work together to 
deal with the disturbing implications of a comprehensive issue like climate change. If these 
implications do indeed threaten the continuity of life by disrupting lifeworld integrity, the 
anxiety that signals this existential insecurity isn’t something we can cope with by ourselves. 
Precisely because the lifeworld is intersubjective, problems that affect it cannot be addressed 
in direct, unmediated ways.  
Climate change is an intersubjective issue to the extent that it uproots existential 
assumptions shared in common. Consequently, any viable ethical responses to it must 
likewise be intersubjective. Bottom-up community dialogue, rather than the top-down 
monologue issued by experts and politicians, is the appropriate response to a problem like 
this. Dialogue is not a substitute for action. It’s the wisest path to it. 
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V. Responding to Climate Anxiety 
In comparison to other issues, the notion of climate change appears especially conducive 
to anxiety. What could be more all-encompassing, more God-like in nature, than the climate? 
Climate affects the most basic character of the places we live in, and the thought of an 
unstable climate seems to portend an uncanny or perhaps disorderly world that throws our 
future into doubt. Or perhaps climate change signifies for some a power of nature somehow 
against us with a mind of its own. In any case, what issue could make us feel smaller, more 
lost and more powerless? Mike Hulme makes this point quoting Lucian Boial. 
Indeed, throughout the human experience of realised climate and portended climates, there runs a 
thread of anxiety and fear. “The history of humanity is characterised by an endemic anxiety…it is 
as if something or someone is remorselessly trying to sabotage the world’s driving force—and 
particularly its climate.” The persistent use of visual icons of glaciers…as signifiers of climate 
danger reveals such anxiety.15 
According to sociologist Anthony Giddens, moreover, anxiety is endemic today. The 
globalized, post-traditional institutions that constitute modern social existence, he explains, 
perpetually challenge our basic trust in the world we share with others, and this threatens 
“ontological security.” “To be ontologically secure is to possess…‘answers’ to fundamental 
existential questions which all human life in some way addresses…The prime existential 
question…concerns existence itself, the discovery of an ontological framework of ‘external 
reality.”16 To the extent that traditional answers to existential questions are repeatedly 
undermined by rapid social change, however, the continuity of our existence—and hence our 
very identity—is in constant danger of destabilizing. 
Citing psychological experiments in which subjects react in “dramatic and immediate” 
fashion when deep social conventions are breached, Giddens explains how disturbances in our 
“emotive-cognitive orientation towards others, the object-world, and self-identity” produce 
anxieties that we’re profoundly motivated to avoid.17 As psychologist Helen Lynd put it: “We 
experience anxiety in becoming aware that we cannot trust our answers to the questions, 
‘Who am I?’ ‘Where do I belong?’…with every recurrent violation of trust we become again 
children unsure of ourselves in an alien world.”18 Anxiety can paralyze our ability to comport 
ourselves with integrity, think creatively and consistently, and act with purpose in anticipation 
of future possibilities. For psychologists Immo Fritsche and Katrin Häfner, perceived 
existential threats implicated in issues like climate change often compel people to reinforce 
their cultural worldview and even deny that humans are part of nature. “This symbolically 
releases humans from the realm of mortal nature and may thus induce a sense of immortality 
and thereby buffer existential anxiety.”19 Even in less extreme forms, anxiety seems a likely 
prompt for denial. 
Despite all of this, however, some communities do seem empowered to address climate 
change ethically. The “transition towns” movement is a particularly salient example of 
empowered, bottom-up change in the face of climate change.20 The city of Freiburg, where 
15  Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction, and 
Opportunity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 13. 
16  Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 47. 
17  Ibid, p. 38. 
18  Ibid, p. 66. 
19  Immo Fritsche and Katrin Häfner, “The Malicious Effects of Existential Threat on Motivation to Protect the 
Natural Environment and the Role of Environmental Identity as Moderator.” Environment and Behavior 
44:4 (2012), pp. 570-590, at p. 572. 
20  See Isis Brook, “Turning Up the Heat on Climate Change: Are Transition Towns an Answer?” 
Environmental Values 18:2 (2009), pp. 125-128. 
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Heidegger taught, is a prominent example, but there are hundreds of others emerging 
worldwide. Apparently, some communities have indeed learned to work through the 
disturbing implications of climate change. Understanding how, I suggest, points the way 
towards an existentialist climate ethics. 
Here we return to the question of what distinguishes existential security from insecurity. 
For Heidegger, there are two ways of dealing with anxiety. The first can be described as 
reactive, the second as responsive. The reactive approach shows itself as a willful clinging to 
the social norms that brought lifeworld (ontological) security in the past. This defensive 
reaction is defined by its attempt to keep one’s world intact by any means. This takes place in 
various ways depending on the community—including traditions that place all faith in some 
external power like God, the government, the free market, or Gaia to work out our biggest 
problems. Social privilege is also relevant. Psychologists Irina Feygina et. al. draw on 
“system-justification theory” to explain climate denial as a defensive reaction against 
perceived threats to “the very foundations of our socioeconomic system,” which privileged 
groups tend to identify with as beneficiaries of the status quo.21 As seen in Norgaard’s 
analysis, all such tendencies offload ethical responsibility by abstracting problems like 
climate change in order to dissociate them from the moral fabric of everyday life. 
But what do we do with our anxiety if we don’t have an external source to cling to? For 
example, what happens to someone who identifies with a community that accepts the science 
of climate change, and yet is distrustful of big corporations and big government to solve this 
problem? Or how might a community cope if they’re already suspicious of the mechanistic 
logic and technological optimism defining mainstream climate discourses? In communities 
that hold to these lifeworld assumptions, the fundamentalisms that enable others to keep 
anxiety at bay may not be compelling options. 
In any case, should we find ourselves without recourse to the easy comfort of traditional 
lifeworld norms and sensibilities, we have the opportunity to prepare for the second way of 
dealing with anxiety—what Heidegger calls the “authentic” response. Once intuition tells us 
that the background assumptions we counted on in the past fail to serve us going into the 
future, the search for a new identity begins with the hope that more secure ways of being in 
the world can be developed. 
Although authenticity as an ethical concept has rightly come under fire, it is nevertheless 
instructive in this context. For Heidegger, authenticity requires one to step back from the 
comforting world of social norms in order to see them for what they are—as expressing just 
one way of life amongst possible others. Once communities develop the ability to learn from 
their anxiety and ultimately accept it—rather than engage in strategies of denial to contain 
it—people can experience an empowering liberation from fear that allows them to, once 
again, take a stand in life. This time, however, they address a world that they have, in a sense, 
owned up to and earned with the insight that meaning is created rather than simply given. As 
previously invisible background assumptions become foregrounded, communities can begin 
to recognize general lifeworld structures for what they are—historical guidelines and nothing 
more. Although it takes vigilance, confronting anxiety by accepting it (i.e. working through it 
with others) allows one to resist the gravitational pull of falling into the traditional security of 
mainstream everydayness. 
A good example of this is found in the climate activism of Tim DeChristopher. He was 
sentenced to two years in prison after disrupting an oil and gas lease auction by falsely 
bidding on 116 parcels of public land. But what’s significant here is the existential crisis that 
brought DeChristopher to this decisive moment of action in the first place. In an interview 
21  Irina Feygina, John T. Jost, and Rachel E. Goldsmith, “System Justification, the Denial of Global Warming, 
and the Possibility of ‘System-Sanctioned Change’.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36:3 
(2010), pp. 326-338, at p. 327.  
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with Terry Tempest Williams, he speaks of an anxious mourning-for-the-future period after 
talking at length with one of the lead authors of the fourth report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. It’s worth quoting at length. 
 
TIM: I said [to the scientist]: “So, what am I missing? It seems like you guys are saying 
there’s no way we can make it.” And she said, “You’re not missing anything. There are 
things we could have done in the ’80s, there are some things we could have done in the 
’90s—but it’s probably too late to avoid any of the worst-case scenarios that we’re talking 
about.” And she literally put her hand on my shoulder and said, “I’m sorry my generation 
failed yours.” That was shattering to me. 
 
TERRY: When was this? 
 
TIM: This was in March of 2008. And I said, “You just gave a speech to four hundred 
people and you didn’t say anything like that. Why aren’t you telling people this?” And she 
said, “Oh, I don’t want to scare people into paralysis. I feel like if I told people the truth, 
people would just give up.”…But with me, it did the exact opposite. Once I realized that 
there was no hope in any sort of normal future, there’s no hope for me to have anything my 
parents or grandparents would have considered a normal future—of a career and a 
retirement and all that stuff—I realized that I have absolutely nothing to lose by fighting 
back. Because it was all going to be lost anyway. 
 
TERRY: So, in other words, at that moment, it was like, “I have no expectations.” 
 
TIM: Yeah. And it did push me into this deep period of despair.  
 
TERRY: And what did you do with it? 
 
TIM: Nothing. I was rather paralyzed, and it really felt like a period of mourning. I really 
felt like I was grieving my own future, and grieving the futures of everyone I care about. 
 
TERRY: Did you talk to your friends about this?    
 
TIM: Yeah, I had friends who were coming to similar conclusions. And I was able to kind 
of work through it, and get to a point of action. But I think it’s that period of grieving that’s 
missing from the climate movement.  
 
TERRY: I would say the environmental movement. 
 
TIM: Yeah. That denies the severity of the situation, because that grieving process is really 
hard. I struggle with pushing people into that period of grieving. I mean, I find myself 
pulling back. I see people who still have that kind of buoyancy and hopefulness. And I 
don’t want to shatter that, you know? 
 
TERRY: But I think that what no one tells you is, if you go into that dark place, you do 
come out the other side, you know? If you can go into that darkest place, you can emerge 
with a sense of empathy and empowerment.22  
 
22  Terry Tempest Williams, “What Love Looks Like.” Orion Magazine: January/February 2012 
issue, online at www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/6598 (accessed 2013-11-11). 
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As DeChristopher’s story suggests, the difference between reacting to ontological 
insecurity and authentically responding to it is the difference between covering up anxiety via 
denial and accepting it as a signal that we need to seriously re-evaluate things. Just as pain 
teaches us what is physically harmful in the world, anxiety should teach us what is 
existentially harmful about our relationship to it. Should a community find itself with some 
meaningful purchase on the normative implications of climate change, it probably has a better 
chance of truly responding to anxiety than a community whose lifeworld is under-prepared to 
make sense of this problem for what it is. 
We should be clear that the authentic response doesn’t involve the “authentic” freedom of 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s egocentric brand of existentialism. Cultivating an authentic stance requires 
collective projects of meaning-making just as much as the forms of denial analyzed by 
Norgaard. On Hubert Dreyfus’s reading, the moment of transformation from the anxious 
cover-up of denial to the resolve of authenticity does not involve a willful choice, but happens 
to one rather as if by a gestalt switch. Suddenly, new possibilities open up as structures of 
meaning instituted in the past (for the sake of realizing a certain future) lose their invisible 
grip. 
[One] must arrive at a way of dealing with things and people that incorporates the insights gained 
in anxiety that no possibilities [for us] have intrinsic meaning…yet makes that insight the basis for 
an active life. Precisely because [one] is clear that [one] can have no final meaning or settled 
identity, [one] is clear-sighted about what is actually possible.23 
The existential clarity articulated here appears to parallel DeChristopher’s emergence 
from shattered expectations. Learning to be at home in a world we have owned up to and 
earned, we become secure and hence receptive in the face of possibility, rather than willful in 
the face of alienation. If this reading of Heidegger is sound, the authentic response to anxiety 
should enable us to openly respond to the unique situation for what it is—as in the historically 
unique situation we call climate change. 
VI. Conclusion: Prologomena to An Existential Climate Ethics 
Does an existential rendering of Norgaard’s research suggest new approaches to climate 
ethics? If anxious denial keeps us from recognizing the ways in which our everyday lives are 
implicated in climate change, we need ethical approaches that address this background 
condition for what it is. 
Moreover, if the existential problem signaled by climate denial is indeed a fundamental 
barrier to action, we cannot simply reason our way to normativity. In this respect, perhaps we 
should take pains to avoid overly abstracting climate change if this means ignoring how it 
actually affects the public. For example, a de-historicized focus on ethical clarity in the form 
of universal principles risks leaving lifeworld conditions unquestioned and unattended to. 
Likewise, hopes of individual responsibility might fall flat if ethical reflections concerning 
climate change occur against the background of intersubjective sensibilities. 
In contrast to rationalistic ethical traditions like consequentialism where normativity takes 
the form of calculating moral results in the external world, or those like deontology where 
normativity expresses the autonomous will within, the existential problem recommends that 
we tend to the intersubjective relationship people have to the world of their experience. In this 
respect, it has a common orientation with care ethics and the practical wisdom (phronesis) 
basic to virtue ethics, but fortified with phenomenological and existential insights. In these 
traditions, ethical decisions are driven by the contingent—and sometimes ambiguous—
situation given past experience and goals worthy of realization. What existential 
23  Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 320. 
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phenomenology adds to this focus on relationality (and here Simone de Beauvoir and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty are more edifying than Heidegger) is an ability to mediate micro-level 
situations involving individual agents and macro-level structures. The latter include historical 
sensibilities and tendencies, as well as institutional forms of power. Hence, “the situation” 
calling for decisive ethical action can be interpersonal or it can be socio-cultural and historical 
in scope. Either way, the lifeworld structures constituting the background of experience play a 
significant role in the collective decision-making process. In this way, I submit, an 
existentialist approach can help us grasp the “collective action” problem confounding climate 
ethicists. Ultimately, creative forms of collective meaning-making are needed in the context 
of the lifestyles and power structures perpetuating climate change and obstructing progress—
forms of meaning that promise new answers to old existential questions in an effort to open 
communities up to an uncertain world. 
An existential ethics of this kind, however, requires a receptivity to change that is in short 
supply today. Two opposing strategies seem available to address this, both of which have 
merit but remain problematic. The first seeks to motivate public responsibility by presenting 
the grave implications of climate change as “hard medicine” that needs to be injected directly 
into the veins of a society that otherwise refuses to swallow it. Perhaps the case of Tim 
DeChristopher lends credibility to this approach. If one is ill-prepared to receive this news, 
however, this strategy risks threatening ontological security—thus inviting forms of denial 
bent on containing the anxiety that results. Those sensitive to this problem, therefore, 
typically opt for a “positive vision” message to motivate action. Perhaps rhetorical frames, 
narratives, and symbols that make ethical change more palatable should be encouraged 
instead. Giddens, for example, agrees with Michael Shellenberger and Ted Norhaus who 
remind gloom-and-doom environmentalists that Martin Luther King Jr. inspired the American 
civil rights movement with an “I have a dream” speech, not an “I have a nightmare” speech.24 
A full defense of the positive vision approach is found in climate scientist Mike Hulme. 
He argues that we need to find ways of mediating the idea of climate change to empower new 
ways forward. For one thing, we cannot successfully address climate change if we continue to 
approach it scientifically as a physical problem in need of policy solutions. Technical thinking 
that jumps from problems to solutions, he says, limits our imaginations by effectively 
hollowing out cultural forms of meaning that could help us confront this condition more 
comprehensively. At the same time, however, he also believes that using cultural symbols—
the “dominant trope [of which] has been one of climate change as a threat”—to motivate 
individuals by fear is equally unproductive.25 
Common to both approaches, Hulme explains, is a dualism that ignores socio-cultural 
experience as the middle ground of ethical reflection. Hence, instead of relying on reason or 
fear as the lynchpins of social change by presenting this issue as an ominous threat to be 
averted, he suggests that we creatively mobilize the idea of climate change to redefine the 
human project itself by asking what climate change “can do for us.” Such a reversal in logic, 
he maintains, would treat climate change as “a stimulus for societal adaptation, a stimulus 
that—rather than threatening a civilization—can accelerate the development of new complex 
civil and social structures.”26 
Despite important insights, Hulme’s positive vision approach remains problematic from 
an existentialist perspective. By turning the implications of climate change around so that this 
issue “works for us,” the anxiety stage risks being comfortably bypassed. To the extent that 
climate change is indeed a crisis that our culture is not prepared for, a certain measure of 
24  Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the 
Politics of Possibility (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007), p. 2. 
25  Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change, p. 33. 
26  Ibid, p. 31. 
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anxiety is appropriate as a sign that we are indeed in a bad situation that calls for courageous 
change. We need this signal. So in contrast to those who encourage us to present climate 
change in a positive light, we might agree with Speth’s hard medicine rejoinder to 
Shellenberger and Norhaus that sometimes we need to be “reminded of the nightmare ahead.” 
As Speth remarks, African Americans during the civil rights movement were already living in 
a nightmare—they needed the dream to pull them forward. Many of us comfortable in denial, 
by contrast, are simply living a dream. 
My own view is that adequate ethical reform for an issue like climate change requires a 
lifeworld shift in values and perception that will compel us to own up to the various 
mitigation and adaptation efforts demanded by this issue in authentic ways. If positive visions 
for the future end up softening the implications of climate change too much, they could 
undermine the need to reform lifeworld sensibilities and norms in more responsible 
directions. And yet it’s also true that clear and compelling visions are needed to collectivize 
action towards lifeworld futures worthy of realization. The historic challenge of climate 
change, as inextricably bound to innumerable other pressing social and ecological issues 
today, calls for new narratives. This tension between the hard medicine and positive future 
approaches, it’s worth adding, is precisely the kind of problem that demands practical wisdom 
and care over uniform prescriptions. 
Ultimately, ethical discourses have to walk a tightrope in which background assumptions 
that preserve lifestyles inimical to a healthy climate are squarely challenged, yet without 
triggering an avalanche of anxiety impossible to cope with. Hence, the challenge of an 
existential climate ethics is to approach the “the nightmare ahead,” but without getting stuck 
in it as a paralyzing situation with no meaningful alternatives.27 If done well, perhaps ethical 
discourses can invite communities to confront, work through, and ultimately accept the 
anxiety appropriate to the situation they find themselves in. What this largely comes down to 
is collectively cultivating the lifeworld wisdom needed to confidently respond to anxiety in 
ways that lead to consistently good decisions. 
An ethical approach to climate change that took the existential problem seriously would 
commit itself to working through anxious reactions that shut us down in denial, while 
cultivating responsive relationships to anxiety that open us up to ethical horizons of 
possibility. The difference between the reactions we call denial and the responses we call 
responsibility is an existential one. If the big questions in life conjured up by the implications 
of climate change are answered defensively, ethical considerations will never surface. 
However, if meaningful relationships to the socio-ecological world are actively cultivated and 
earned by communities themselves, perhaps the ethical implications of an issue as totalizing 
as climate change can be taken up and responded to with purpose. 
  
27  Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World, p. 234. 
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Abstract 
There is abundant literature detailing the decline in biodiversity, the loss of wild places 
and habitats, and a changing climate with all the attending affects to the health and 
sustainability of the planet and human populations worldwide.   While continued monitoring 
of the health of our planet is necessary, along with literature conveying the scope of the 
problem, there is a greater need now for solutions that motivate individuals and communities 
to respond willfully and optimistically to confronting the staggering challenges raised by 
global climate change.  All too often the response to dire predictions of endangered natural 
resources, climatic disruption, and ecosystem collapse is a kind of shock-induced paralysis.  
The problem we face is not that people are unaware of, or unconcerned about the threats 
posed by climate change (although certainly there are such people), but rather that it is 
difficult to make the lifestyle changes that are needed to ensure a healthy and secure planet for 
future generations.  This paper brings interdisciplinary literature on the problem of moral 
motivation to bear on the issue of motivating people to make the transition from simply 
knowing about climate change to consciously adopting habits and making choices that can 
facilitate more sustainable lifestyles. 
 
Keywords: moral motivation, moral responsibility, akrasia 
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I 
Climate change is still a relatively recent issue.  In his history of the climate change 
debate, Donald Brown cites scientific studies documenting changes to our planet’s 
atmosphere that go back as far as 200 years (2013, 21).  It is only within the last 35 years 
however, that climate change has been subject to serious and global debate (Brown 2013, 20).  
While Brown downplays and in fact questions the sincerity of much of the current skepticism 
over climate change, it remains a controversial and contested issue. 
In the past couple of decades, there has been a tremendous growth in the amount of 
academic, scientific, and popular literature on climate change, along with films and policy 
pieces.  This literature details a variety of concerns affiliated with the larger issue of climate 
change, such as the decline of biodiversity, shrinking glaciers, rising and warming seas, more 
frequent and more intense storms, and others.  The message has had an impact on people 
across the globe.  A 2007 analysis by World Public Opinion of 11 international polls found 
that a majority of respondents considered climate change (or global warming) a “very 
serious” problem, and “large majorities” believed that human activity is a major cause of the 
problem (World Public Opinion 2007).  Furthermore, the surveys demonstrated a majority of 
respondents in 15 of the 21 countries surveyed were in support of “‘major steps, starting very 
soon’ to address climate change” (World Public Opinion 2007).   
The above mentioned study was conducted in advance of the 13th Conference of the 
Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (or COP 13) in 
Bali.  Steven Kull, the director of World Public Opinion, the organization that conducted the 
2007 analysis, stated at the time, “Leaders in Bali do not need to worry that they will face a 
difficult job of selling their general publics on the need for action.  Rather, publics around the 
world are signaling that they are ready to do more than their own governments have been 
asking them” (World Public Opinion 2007). 
These 2007 polls were prior to the 2008 financial crisis that triggered the recent “Great 
Recession.”  Public support for climate change waned in the face of concerns over the 
financial markets.  Lyle Scruggs and Salil Benegal analyzed this trend in a 2012 article and 
forecasted a rebound in support for climate change when the labor and financial markets 
regain their footing (Scruggs and Benegal 2012).  A recent Pew Research survey showed that 
while in the United States global climate change is perceived as less of a threat—with only 
40% considering it a major threat to the nation—on average climate change was perceived as 
the greatest threat to nations worldwide, just edging out Intentional financial instability, which 
was a close second (Pew 2013). 
These surveys suggest that the general public is not ignorant about climate change.  At 
this point in time, it does not seem that what is called for is more information about the threats 
posed by global climate changes.  People appear to have gotten that message.  The question 
then is how can we explain our slow and halting response to climate change?  How can we 
effectively transition from knowledge about climate the dangers of climate change to effective 
actions to combat it? 
II 
Many attempts to change behavior appear to have been driven by the assumption that 
there is a link between knowledge and action.   Conservation Psychologists Susan Clayton 
and Gene Myers claim, “The main principle of environmental education, as well as of many 
persuasive attempts, is that knowledge matters: people are more likely to act in 
environmentally sustaining ways if they understand the threats faced by the environment and 
the implications of their behavioral choices” (2009, 151).  They refer to the work of Jody M. 
Hines et al, whose research found a connection between environmental knowledge and pro-
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environmental behavior (1987).  However, Clayton and Myers note that this connection is 
especially strong when there was previously low levels of awareness, but appears to taper off 
and perhaps reach a limit even where increased knowledge has no further impact on action 
(2009, 151).  Concluding on this point they claim, “In the absence of clear information about 
the consequences of different behaviors, an intention to protect the environment will not be 
translated into effective action” (2009, 151). 
The link between knowledge and action has been a topic under philosophical 
investigation since at least the time of Plato and his treatment of akrasia in the Protagoras.  In 
that dialogue, Socrates rejects the idea that someone can have knowledge of the right course 
of action, and fail to do it.  Socrates would take issue then with the person who says, “I know 
I should recycle” or “I know I should walk rather than drive to work,” but fails to do these 
things.  For no one would willingly follow the worse course of action when it is possible to 
follow the better course in Socrates’ opinion.1 
If a majority of the world’s population is aware of the threats posed by climate change 
and believes that action should be taken to confront the challenge, if Plato and environmental 
education experts are right, we should see more action to combat climate change.  However, it 
seems that people do not always act on this information.  Either Plato and environmental 
education experts have it wrong, or there is some other problem that needs to be accounted 
for. 
Perhaps the problem is that the message on climate change has been framed as a scientific 
and technological problem, or an issue to be dealt with at the state level rather than the 
individual level.  Recent work by some philosophers has sought to emphasize the moral 
dimensions of climate change to supplement the predominant focus on the economic, 
scientific, and technological dimensions of climate change.  Donald Brown’s recent book 
does a fine job of highlighting the various types of arguments and considerations made 
regarding climate change, but laments that ethical arguments are often absent in climate 
debates (2013).  Kathleen Dean Moore and Michael P. Nelson’s Moral Ground: Ethical 
Action for a Planet in Peril shares a similar goal (2010).  Here the editors note that while 
scientists around the globe have reached a scientific consensus on climate change, it has not 
been clear that there is a moral consensus on climate change.  Their book brings together 
moral leaders from a variety of backgrounds to try to demonstrate that there is such a moral 
consensus.     
Underlying the goal of Moore and Nelson’s text is the belief that knowledge alone is 
often insufficient to motivate behavior.  In their introduction they claim, “No amount of 
factual information will tell us what we ought to do.  For that, we need moral convictions—
ideas about what it is to act rightly in the world, what it is to be good or just, and the 
determination to do what is right.  Facts and moral convictions together can help us 
understand what we ought to do—something neither alone can do” (2010, xvii). 
Moore and Nelson appear to be roughly in line with Plato’s rejection of akrasia.  People 
will act if they understand the proper moral arguments.  The assumption is scientific 
information is insufficient, but solid moral arguments are sufficient to motivate individual 
action.  Critics of Plato’s position vis-à-vis moral motivation may take issue with this 
underlying assumption, which then questions the ability of this fine text to achieve its desired 
outcome. 2   
1 See the following passages from Protagoras: “I am pretty sure that none of the wise men thinks that any human 
being willingly makes a mistake or willingly does anything wrong or bad.  They know very well that anyone 
who does anything wrong or bad does so voluntarily” 345e.  “No one who knows or believes there is something 
else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be 
doing what is better. 
2 William Grove-Fanning engages these authors on this point in his PhD dissertation, Biodiversity Loss, the 
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Philosophers that work to highlight the moral dimensions of climate change have been 
doing good work.  It is true climate change has not always been framed as a moral issue, and 
moral arguments can have an impact on individuals to inspire them into action.  It is one thing 
to be told that our water supply is contaminated with certain toxins, it is another to be told that 
we ought not to over-fertilize our lawns because doing so ultimately harms other humans and 
nonhumans.  A good moral argument can have a greater impact on motivating action than 
scientific data alone.  However, it seems equally true that moral arguments are not always 
sufficient to motivate action.  David Hume is famous for his position on this issue. 
Hume rejects the idea that knowledge alone is sufficient for action and claims that in 
addition to knowledge, an individual must also possess a desire to act.  Connie Rosati claims 
that it “would be fair to say that Humeanism continues to be the dominant view” (2008).  This 
is interesting, if true, given that environmental education and environmental campaigns often 
appear to operate under the Platonic position that knowledge is sufficient for action.   
There are any number of desires that could be coupled with knowledge that could serve to 
motivate pro-environmental actions in the Humean conception of moral motivation—the 
desire to be a responsible environmental citizen, the desire to provide a healthy environment 
to one’s children and grandchildren are just some examples.  Reporter Alan Weisman 
provides a startling example when he suggests that people are easily and readily motivated by 
the desire to advance their self-interests, so we should simply encourage individuals to follow 
their natural impulse to be self-interested and demonstrate how pro-environmental behavior is 
in fact in our collective self-interest (Moore and Nelson 2010, 32-37).   
The goal of this paper is not to attempt to resolve the conflict between the positions on 
moral motivation as represented by figures like Plato and Hume.  In fact, assuming there to be 
elements of truth in both positions yields practical benefits to motivating action on climate 
change.   
III 
Echoing United States President Barack Obama’s “All of the Above” energy plan that 
calls for action on a variety of fronts instead of targeting efforts at one specific issue, I think 
we need a similar all of the above plan to motivate individual citizens to confront the 
challenges raised by climate change.   The President’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan is 
notable for acknowledging a “moral responsibility” to future generations and an obligation to 
leave them “a planet that is not polluted and damaged” (2013).   
As is perhaps fitting, this plan focuses on what actions the state can take to confront 
climate change, the word “individual” does not appear once in the document.   When scholars 
like Donald Brown focus on the climate change debate over the past thirty years, the focus of 
attention is often international meetings among state actors.  While there is reason to be 
pessimistic about the results of those meetings, certainly negotiations at the state level are and 
will remain a necessary focus of strategies for confronting climate change.  That would 
remain part of an “all of the above” strategy, what warrants greater attention however is 
motivating effective action among global citizens at the individual level. 
The reason for the focus on individuals is that individuals, as we saw in the surveys 
mentioned earlier, generally are readily willing to say that climate change is a serious problem 
and demands a serious response.  Allowing the debate to focus on government commitments 
to emissions reductions has the unhelpful result of taking some of the responsibility off of the 
hands of private individuals.  We certainly ought not to abandon climate efforts at the state 
and international level—there are certainly things out of the hands of individuals that can be 
accomplished by governmental bodies, however there clearly is potential in the effects that 
Motivation Problem, and the Future of Conservation Education in the United States, pp. 42-42. 
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individuals can have on more sustainable futures if two things can happen: 1) A clear message 
can be crafted that tells people how they can act in ways to confront climate change and 
cultivate a sustainable future; and 2) Creative ways to inspire and motivate people to act on 
that knowledge. 
We can see a change from efforts invested into top-down government and legislative 
action to a more bottom-up individual response to environmental problems in the life story of 
Aldo Leopold.  In the mid to late 1920s, soon after Leopold made the move from New 
Mexico to Wisconsin, he became involved in the conservation politics of Wisconsin.  In 1926, 
he was acting as a state director and serving on important committees for the Izaak Walton 
League (Meine 1988, 250).  Working in tandem with other members of the league, Leopold 
worked on a bill that would appoint a “six-member unpaid conservation commission, who in 
turn would choose a trained director to run a new Wisconsin Conservation Department” 
(Meine 1988, 251).  The newly elected governor, who supported the bill during his campaign, 
did approve the bill, which had undergone a number of revisions in the meantime (Meine 
1988, 251).  However, much to Leopold and other members’ disappointment, the governor 
turned on those who fought for the bill and used the appointments to “pay off political debts” 
(Meine 1988, 252).  Writing to his wife, Leopold said at the time, “Apparently, we are 
entirely sold out and worse off than before we started.  I feel pretty sick about it—especially 
about egging on my friends to do such a terrible lot of work for nothing” (Quoted in Meine 
1988, 252).  There was an initial hope that Leopold would be selected to serve as director of 
the newly formed Wisconsin Conservation Department, however an assistant to the newly 
elected governor, inexperienced with conservation matters, was chosen for the position 
(Meine 1988, 253).  Leopold’s biographer, Curt Meine, writes that this was not only 
personally disappointing to Leopold, this event served to disillusion Leopold with politics 
(1988, 253). 
One way of interpreting Leopold’s story is a rejection of top-down governmental action 
on conservation in favor of the development of an ethic of individual responsibility towards 
the health of the land.  In one summative statement in his famous Land Ethic, Leopold claims, 
“A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects 
a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land” (1949, 221). 
He had witnessed the ineffectiveness of government conservation programs in the 1930s 
that provided resources to farmers to implement conservation practices, only to see farmers 
abandon those practices once the resources vanished (Leopold 1949, 208).  Without the 
internal change of heart required on the part of the farmers themselves, even the best 
government polices and programs were doomed to be ineffective.  The solution to this 
problem, according to Leopold, lies partly in education—“education must precede rules”—
but largely in cultivating a sense of ethical obligation towards the land on the part of the 
landowner (Leopold 1949, 209).   
Leopold himself was highly knowledgeable about his environment and how it functioned.  
This was probably also true of many of the farmers he was directing his efforts towards.  
What they needed more than education was an ethic.  The situation may be somewhat 
reversed for many citizens of developed countries today who apparently have a sense of 
obligation towards the environment and seem motivated to take action, but perhaps lack the 
understanding of ecology and how their actions and choices are related to climate change. 
IV 
To effectively confront the challenge of climate change we need an all of the above plan 
that includes continued efforts to coordinate responses at the state level, however we also 
need action at the level of the individual.  To generate more sustainable action on behalf of 
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individuals, we need continued efforts that are in line with both the Platonic and Humeian 
approaches to moral motivation. 
On the Platonic front, we need more knowledge on how to live sustainably.  Moore and 
Nelson’s Common Ground attempts to generate a sort of moral consensus on climate change 
that parallels that scientific consensus on climate change.  What is lacking, in my opinion, is a 
consensus on what actions individuals in different locations can take to be responsible and 
ethical environmental citizens.  We need more information on this front that could impact and 
be put into practice by those that are already willing to admit that climate change is a moral 
issue and are prepared to act on that belief.   
We also need to continue to find creative ways to inspire individuals to act on their 
knowledge and convictions.  To accomplish this goal, there are fruitful pathways to be 
explored by philosophers and conservation psychologists working in tandem.  Too much 
information pertaining to climate change in the past has been close to apocalyptic, which does 
not appear to be the most effective way to motivate action, and in fact may have the adverse 
effect of resigning individuals to inaction.  We need to bring climate change, which is a 
problem of such great magnitude, down to a smaller scale and target activities with which 
individuals can engage, finding ways to motivate individuals to take actions at the local and 
daily routine level to make meaningful changes to their lifestyle.  Of course, by itself, these 
small changes may not constitute a sufficient response to the problem of climate change, 
however as a component of an all of the above plan that includes continued negotiations at the 
state level, it represents one way to capitalize on the apparent desire and will of individuals 
around the world to take action to confront global climate change. 
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Utility discount rates in intergenerational economic modelling have been viewed as 
problematic, both for descriptive and normative reasons.  However, positive discount rates 
can be defended normatively; in particular, it is rational for future generational utility to be 
discounted to take uncertainty about radical societal re- construction into account.  Social 
discount rates are defended against objections from Parfit (1986) and Broome (2005, 2012). 
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1 Introduction 
A moral commonplace in everyday life is that one is not morally responsible for all the 
consequences of one’s actions.  If cashed out in terms of reactive attitudes, we might say 
that one is not blameworthy for indefinitely many effects one’s actions lead to.1 It is true that 
one is responsible for the immediate and predictable consequences, but as one’s knowledge of 
the effects lessen, it is less and less reasonable to hold one responsible. This is a vague 
intuition, but it is widely shared.  When I call in sick to work, I am responsible for the 
probable and expected consequences—my colleagues having a larger workload, my boss having 
to reschedule a meeting, etc. The unexpected effects of these effects I am less responsible for: 
that my harder working colleague has to miss a date; that my boss ends up having to stay 
overtime as a result. The effects of these effects I am even less responsible for. And so, when 
I am deciding whether to call in sick, I do not have to include these further knock-on effects in 
my calculation, both because (a) it would be irrational and impossible for me to consider them 
all; and because (b) I have no or diminished responsibility for these effects. 
What is the import of this observation? I argue that it can be used to defend an important 
aspect of intergenerational justice—the utility discount rate2 (or just “discount rate”)—δ, 
which indicates the level of discounting for future generational utility.3 The discount rate is 
an important aspect in modelling the value of policies on future generations, and is a 
consequential topic for climate policy. The level of discounting may influence the urgency of 
actions both to mitigate and to adapt to climate change (cf. Dasgupta 2012; Dietz et al. 2007; 
Godard 2009; Wahba and Hope 2006). With high rates of discounting, future generations’ 
harms have less weight in decision-making, whereas low rates of discounting raise the 
valuation of future utility. However, discounting has been objected to on grounds both 
descriptive (Frederick et al. 2002; Nordhaus 2007) and normative (Broome 2005; Cowen and 
Parfit 1992; Parfit 1986; Ramsey 1928). Roughly, the descriptive objections are rooted in 
market and psychological data, whereas the normative arise from principles and intuitions 
about moral value (Arrow et al. 1996). 
In this essay, I argue that, on normative grounds, a (non-zero) discount rate is defensible 
for the purposes of decision-making, which is how it is used in economics. In economics, 
discounting does not imply that some items are objectively worth less: it is used to evaluate 
or weigh some objects more highly. For instance, when offered two goods of £x—one now 
and one in a year—it is not true that one is worth more than the other.4 They are by 
hypothesis worth the same, i.e. £x. But we discount to show that they are not equally 
valuable to me in my temporal position, since I can use the intervening time to take 
advantage of possession of the good and the productive nature of capital. Discounting does 
not change the objective value of either good, it is used to guide decision-making. 
Similarly, I argue that discount rates are temporally and agentially relative. In particular, 
an agent’s limited epistemic access is a primary salient factor. The appropriate discount 
1  Moral responsibility is thus not the same as responsibility simpliciter. Moral responsibility is the extent of 
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Responsibility may correspond roughly to being in the causal chain 
of an effect. So it may be that something issued from my actions (i.e. I am responsible for it), but it is 
unreasonable to praise me for this effect (i.e. I am not morally responsible for it). For instance, this might 
happen if the effect was unintended or unexpected. 
2  This is sometimes called the “social rate of time preference” or “pure time preference” but these locutions 
suggest a single agent with preferences over times. I avoid such phrases since my argument paints a very 
different picture: δ acts as a heuristic for evaluating policies and is not a function of preferences at all. 
3  I do not address the complex issue of how generations are meant to be delineated; the arguments in this 
paper do not depend on any particular specification. A helpful discussion of the range of possibilities can be 
found in (Gardiner 2011, esp. Ch. 5). 
4  Abstracting away from phenomena like inflation and deflation, &ct. 
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depends on the actions or policies being evaluated as well as the epistemic reasons at play; 
it is not a measure of objective value. Ultimately, this analysis will not justify high discount 
rates, but it will justify limited positive discount rates. 
In §2, I lay the moral groundwork for my argument. I argue that our status as agents with 
bounded epistemology limits our moral responsibility. In §3, I discuss the discount rate, its 
relation to temporal discounting, and several attempts which have been made to defend it. In 
§4, I argue that, given epistemic limitations, it is both normatively and rationally defensible 
to discount intergenerationally due to our uncertainty with respect to future radical societal 
reconstruction. I then apply this as a defence of δ =F 0. In §5, I consider objections from 
Parfit and Broome. Parfit’s objection is that it is immoral to discount the utility of other 
individuals simply in virtue of the fact that they are temporally distant. Broome’s objection is 
that discounting introduces objectionable time-relativity into judgments of goodness. I also 
briefly suggest a method for determining utility discount rates in accordance with the limited 
epistemic status that we have. 
2 Examining the Intuition 
In order to determine what is motivating this intuition, it is necessary to examine moral 
responsibility. Moral responsibility is a complex concept, and is clearly a function of several 
factors. My intention is not to provide an analysis, but merely to defend one particular 
claim about it, viz. epistemic uncertainty limits responsibility, so epistemic uncertainty 
should be factored into moral deliberation. 
To motivate my claim—which I suggest is generally held and intuitive—I want to go out 
of my way to consider an everyday case, which is less likely to generate confused or distorted 
intuitions. If it works in every day cases like the following, I submit that the intuition is 
more robust than an intuition generated by an esoteric or science-fiction example. 
Sick: I am considering whether to call in sick to work, and eventually decide to. This leads 
to an increased workload for my colleague. Furthermore, I miss a meeting that was 
scheduled with my boss Margaret, where I was supposed to give her some report. However, 
unbeknownst to me, as Margaret needed this report in order to ship a product urgently, she is 
forced to stay overtime. But, due to this overtime, she is unable to have her scheduled date with 
her partner Rosa. Rosa gets angry with Margaret, and they have a fight.5  
In Sick, I clearly have moral responsibility for some of the consequences of failing to 
show up for work: I am morally responsible for the workload of my colleague (and 
blameworthy with respect to this effect). I am morally responsible for missing my meeting and 
failing to hand in the report, both of which were foreseeable consequences of not showing up 
for work. It is less intuitive that I am morally responsible for Margaret’s overtime stress, and 
even less intuitive that I am morally responsible for Rosa’s anger with Margaret, even though 
these effects are caused by my calling in sick. 
Why might this be? I suggest that there is a natural criterion which affects my 
responsibility with reference to different effects of calling in sick: how foreseeable those effects 
are for me. It is easy for me to recognize that my colleague will have to do my work, and 
that I won’t be attending the meeting I planned with my boss. However, as I stipulated that I 
am not aware that the report I am scheduled to give to Margaret is so important (I do not 
think that this importance is impossible, but I think it extremely unlikely). It’s even less 
5  I wish to emphasize that (perhaps apart from me) no one need have acted wrongly in this instance. It might 
have been that Margaret could not have told me how important the report was because the product details 
were supposed to be kept secret from me. And while it was a breach of arrangement to miss the date, 
Margaret was clearly reasonable in staying in to work if the product launch and months of preparation 
were in jeopardy. As well, it’s reasonable for Rosa to be disappointed and to get angry, even if Margaret had 
good work-related reasons to miss the date. 
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foreseeable that my calling in sick would lead to Rosa being angry with Margaret, under the 
assumption that I do not know that Rosa and Margaret have a date (or even that Rosa exists). 
We can test this criterion by holding most details of the case constant, except that, in a 
modified case, I am aware of the import of my report for this product. In this case, I am now 
clearly morally responsible for Margaret’s overtime stress, but still not morally responsible for 
Rosa’s response. Finally, we can consider the case where I am deciding whether to call in sick 
and I know all of these consequences that will result from my calling in sick. I know that 
Margaret needs the report to ship the (urgent) product and that she has a date with Rosa for 
the evening. Then I am morally responsible for Rosa’s disappointment and for Margaret’s 
overtime stress. If so, the key difference is how predictable these outcomes are for me. 
We can codify these intuitions into a principle about moral responsibility: 
Principle 2.1 Moral responsibility for the effects of one’s actions is diminished by low 
subjective epistemic probability in the likelihood of those effects obtaining. 
This principle does not imply that I have no moral responsibility for those outcomes for 
which I have low certainty; it implies that I have less. But as the likelihood of certain 
outcomes falls lower and lower, at some point I have—practically speaking—no responsibility 
even if—theoretically speaking—I may have infinitesimal levels of moral responsibility. In 
what follows, I sometimes use “not responsible” as a shorthand for “practically speaking not 
responsible” for simplicity. 
Note also that this principle does not require that one explicitly performs a prediction when 
deliberating; the issue is the probability that the agent would assign to an outcome as a function 
of their current information state. As finite agents of the type we are, we do not have access to 
enough causal information to determine precisely what our actions will lead to. But we must 
take something to guide our actions and what we have are subjective probabilities.6  
This leads to my second claim, about moral deliberation. I think that consideration of 
Sick leads us to another principle of deliberation. Suppose I am planning whether to call in 
sick for the day (and that I think that the consequences of my action are morally relevant to 
the decision). I could try to enumerate every contingency, assign them probabilities (while 
trying to avoid continuum problems), and then calculate expected value. But this is going to 
make living pretty difficult—by which I mean impossible. 
If we think that ought implies can, then it cannot be that we ought to include every 
contingency in our deliberation over actions. This follows if it is impossible for beings like us 
to do such calculations. I want to say something stronger, which is that it would be irrational 
for us to try to do such calculations, given that we are beings with limited cognitive 
capacities.7 But this leads to the need to remove some of the complexity of our deliberation 
process. 
Here is a suggestion: it is rational to limit deliberation to that which one is morally 
responsible for:8  
6  Lenman (2000) discusses the problem of indefinite (and radically unforeseeable) consequences. He takes it 
to be fatal to the consequentialist. One can view Principle 2.1 as an olive branch to the consequentialist in light 
of Lenman’s objections. If the consequentialist accepts a principle of this sort, then they are able to address 
Lenman’s worry about consequentialist inaction in the face of indefinite and indeterminate consequences. 
7  If we were beings with unlimited cognitive capacities, or with sufficient capacities to execute such 
calculations, then I would not think it would be irrational. In such scenarios, it might even be required. 
8  It may be that in a sufficiently complex situation, all the morally salient effects are overwhelming for 
deliberation purposes. Then further restrictions may be necessary. Furthermore, I hold that individual and 
group decision-making should be parallel in this respect since they share the relevant characteristics: both are 
finite, bounded decision-makers that can in appropriate circumstances be morally responsible. 
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Principle 2.2 When morally deliberating (either as individuals or groups), it is rational to 
limit consideration to the effects which one is morally responsible for. 
Why is this? I think this principle gives us the right result in Sick. Since I am aware 
that I am inconveniencing my colleagues and that I will miss the meeting with my boss 
Margaret, I am morally responsible for these effects. By this principle, I should weigh and 
consider these when I am choosing whether to call in sick. In contrast, I am not aware (or 
almost unaware) that this action will lead to Margaret’s agenda filling up, or that it will lead to 
Rosa’s anger with Margaret. So it is reasonable for me to ignore these possible effects when 
deciding to call in sick. 
One might offer an objection: maybe we should not limit our consideration to the effects 
which we are responsible for—i.e. that we give sufficient subjective probability to—because 
our subjective probabilities may be mistaken.9 This objection is built on the idea that what 
really matters are objective probabilities, not subjective. For example, consider a doctor who 
thinks that a medicine lacks harmful side-effects, but is not completely sure. In such a case, 
they assign low probability to this harmful outcome, but we are readily likely to assign blame 
to them if there are side-effects despite this low probability. 
There are at least two styles of response that could be offered; I am agnostic between them. 
The first response to this objection is that one is epistemically responsible for assigning the 
right subjective probabilities, but this is distinct from moral responsibility from acting upon 
these probabilities. So we can epistemically criticize the agent for having the wrong 
probabilities, but—as the first principle states—the moral responsibility is a function of the 
subjective probabilities the agent assigns. 
Another response would be to distinguish between who is responsible and the extent of 
their responsibility. We are interested in the latter, but this objection might conflate the two. 
When someone has a low credence in a bad outcome from their action, we still want to hold 
them responsible, but this is distinct from holding them fully or largely morally responsible. 
It may be that their epistemic status mitigates their moral culpability. 
Regardless, it very well may be that one may be obligated to act to improve one’s 
epistemic position. There are certainly situations where one should act to improve one’s 
epistemic position. But failing to check medical details is not always blameworthy; we do 
not always need to be improving our epistemic position. In particular, we are responsible 
for failing to do so when we have a high subjective epistemic probability that doing so 
would affect our levels of moral responsibility. We do not blame doctors for failing to check 
things that they are (almost) certain of, and this is what my principle predicts. 
3 Introducing δ 
In this section, I begin by defining and discussing discounting. I then discuss a couple 
normative methods of determining the value from the literature in order to contrast my own 
suggestion. 
I take discounting to be a very thin concept: a discount rate (e.g. δ) is a time-indexed 
mathematical factor which is used to weight temporally disparate consequences. The 
justification for a certain value of δ is not itself a discount rate. So to say that I take a 
positive discount rate does not tell you anything about why or what justifies that discount rate. 
There are also different kinds of discount rates, meaning discount rates for different streams, but 
primarily discount rates are used for consumption (measured in currency units) or utility 
(often measured in utils or QALYs). 
9  I thank Alison Hills for suggesting this objection. 
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So I might have a consumptive discount rate that I justify using psychological data about 
impatience, or I might have a consumptive discount rate that I justify by appeal to empirical 
market prices (i.e. productive nature of capital), or I might have a utility discount rate that I 
justify using a politically democratic rationale, or I might have a utility discount rate that I 
justify by appealing to uncertainty. 
The point is that there is the value of the variable δ in the cost-benefit analysis and then 
there is the defence of that value, and that conflating them is a problem. Unfortunately, this 
problem occurs in both philosophy and in economics. For instance, Damon et al. (2013, p. 47) 
write that “Discounting builds on the simple fact that money earns interest” which neglects 
alternative reasons one might discount consumption. In response to the arguments of 
Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Broome (1992, p. 102) simply asserts that “Uncertainty is to be 
accounted for separately. It cannot affect the value of [the utility discount rate] r”. Both of 
these writers take discounting to be intrinsically tied to some justifications and not capable of a 
variety of defences. 
With this in mind, it is necessary to consider what value of δ to take, but also what the 
justification for that value is. The value is important, but the justification is of more 
philosophical import. The primary concern with this essay is with the justification for a 
discount rate for utility, but first it is worth surveying some previous arguments about 
justifications in order to contrast my view. 
Why let δ > 0? Here are two significant normative arguments that have been offered in the 
literature: we might think that future generations are less valuable or less valuable to us 
(Beckerman and Hepburn 2007), or that future generations might not exist (Stern 2007). Let 
us consider these considerations in reverse order.10  
The second consideration is that we should discount because this implies odds about the 
survival of humanity. Stern (2007) famously argued that this is the only legitimate reason 
to have a discount rate, generating a comparatively small value for δ (i.e. δ = 0.1).11 There is 
uncertainty about the existence of future human beings, and this uncertainty is time-
dependent. If future generations will not exist, then certainly their utility should not be 
counted. 
In fact, I endorse a similar reason to have a positive value for δ, although my argument 
differs importantly from Stern’s. Stern takes us to be decision-making under risk, whereas I 
take us to be decision-making under uncertainty over the long term. This uncertainty has roots 
including the possibility of existential risk (i.e. population collapse), but I take the sources of 
uncertainty to be considerably larger. Part of the impetus for my argument comes from the 
variety of pertinent outcomes: extinction is just the beginning. The variety of outcomes makes 
the type of risk analysis that Stern endorses to be far more complex than he allows for; I 
suggest that our limited epistemic status prevents us from being able to explicitly assess these 
outcomes. This will be my response to Broome and Parfit in §5. 
The other defence of a positive δ is due to Beckerman and Hepburn (2007), who argue 
that one possibility is that we should only care (or care more) for those with whom we 
have privileged relationships.12 Traditional economics has a tacit utilitarian and impartial 
underpinning, but this need not be. If we consider a sentiment-based ethics (a` la Adam Smith or 
David Hume), then it is natural to discount because we justifiably care for those with whom 
we have closer bonds. 
10  I am not including the account of Rawls (2001) since it bypasses arguments for δ, arguing instead about 
values of the social discount rate δ + ηg. 
11  This echoes an argument by Dasgupta and Heal (1979), which held that external existential risk of 
population collapse can be appealed to in defence of a discount rate. 
12  Dasgupta et al. (1999) survey the different economic models that take this approach. 
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It is certainly true that many accept that it is permissible (or even obligatory) to treat 
one’s family members in a preferential manner, even if that means slightly more appropriate 
candidates receive less goods as a result. But this should not be applied to the case at hand. 
For one thing, such preferential treatment is allowed—if it is so allowed—only in the 
private sphere.13 So the fact that we will know (and care about) the coming generation or 
two, but will not know succeeding generations is not of moral import from a public 
perspective. This important disanalogy between the two cases shows that treating close 
generations closer as a matter of public policy is ethically problematic. 
4 Defending δ by Appeal to Normative Responsibility 
So can a positive value for δ be morally defended? I suggest it can. If we accept Principles 
2.1 and 2.2, then it is rational to discount when considering those actions for which we have 
uncertainty. Intergenerational effects have decreasing levels of certainty, and increasing 
levels of uncertainty. In the context of climate change, we should discount future utility 
since the policies we select may have different or trivial effects on future utility in the face of 
radical societal reconstruction, leaving us with uncertainty about how those effects will 
obtain. Since this uncertainty limits our moral responsibility for those effects, it is rational for 
us to discount to the extent that we are uncertain. That uncertainty increases with respect to 
time. These remarks justify a positive discount rate for future well-being. 
Uncertainty with respect to climate change is often mentioned in concert with climate 
denialism. Many denialist doctrines rely upon discrepancies between various modelling 
forecasts for climate change impacts (often while highlighting those forecasts which are 
least troubling). While it is true that there are significant uncertainties about the probabilities 
we should assign to different scenarios, that does not mean we should deny that climate 
change will have significant and almost certainly negative effects. What it does mean is that 
we should be aware that we have epistemic attitudes about our credences: sometimes we are 
highly certain of the value of assigned probabilities and sometimes we are almost fishing in 
the dark. In the near term, there is more convergence, but in the long term, we should accept our 
epistemic limitations and try to report them more explicitly (cf. Sluijs 2012, reprinted in this 
volume). 
But I will make a stronger claim, which helps to emphasize the implications in a 
climate policy context.  Even if we were deciding under scientific certainty about the effects 
that climate change would lead to, we would still have significant sources of uncertainty 
which are often overlooked. I argue that this would hold even if we knew precisely the 
increased probability of sea level rises, extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, and other 
consequences. In short, if we had certainty about our risk. 
That is because the shape of society that these effects impact may differ considerably from 
our own today; society might be radically reconstructed. One might think that no matter what 
shape society takes, we can predict that the consequences of climate change policy will have 
strongly negative consequences on future peoples regardless of how their society looks. 
But this is false. As Stern (2007) notes, it impacts our calculations if there are no future 
human beings extant at some point. From that point, we would not adduce any value from 
human beings. So this is the first radical societal reconstruction: extinction (or a similarly 
catastrophic population outcome). 
13  Although it may be permissible for governments to favour their own citizenry, this is because the 
governments are usually meant to represent their citizens. If they were meant to represent more than one 
nation, they should also treat the larger group impartially. Since climate change is an issue where policies 
are determined internationally, we should not be preferential. This comment is not conclusive, but 
addressing this issue in full would take me beyond the scope of this essay. 
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One might think that it is so unlikely as to be negligible that humanity goes extinct. A 
naı¨ve argument might make an inductive appeal to our lack of extinction thus far, but just 
as my existence up until this moment gives me no reason to generalize that I will always 
exist, neither does our species’ survival amidst the background of species extinction. 
But we can adduce positive reasons to think that our risk of extinction is significant. As 
Bostrom (2013, p. 15) notes, “Estimates of 10–20 per cent total existential risk in this 
century are fairly typical among those who have examined the issue”. These are obviously 
dependent on assumptions and subjective assessments, but we have rea- sons to suppose that 
this is a non-trivial risk. Rees (2003) concurs that, in light of our increasing ability to 
harness technological, biological, and chemical science, the risk of catastrophic use is 
growing. Ultimately, Rees thinks that the odds are no bet- ter than even that society will 
survive this century. Finally, Quammen (2013) argues that zoonoses—microbes which break 
the species barrier—are increasingly dangerous as humanity disrupts and expands into new 
habitats, thus coming into contact with new zoonotic agents while being increasingly globally 
interconnected. These types of risks are relatively new, making our past survival less 
predictive. 
It might seem that if we do not go extinct, then we do know how climate change effects 
will affect future humans. But this is not true, either. When considering long-time scales, and 
assuming a surviving homo sapiens, it becomes plausible that humanity relocates partially (or 
significantly) to other planets. This is our second family of radical societal reconstructions, 
since climate change policies will be ineffectual if humanity is not located on the planet 
Earth.14  
Finally, it might appear that if we survive and stay on Earth that we would be certain of the 
effects of climate change policies. But once again, there are scenarios of radical societal 
reconstruction. This scenario is that we will be able to generate self-replicating machines, or 
that we will be able to augment ourselves in significant ways, uploading our “software” into 
supercomputers. This could lead to intentional evolution, and possible transhuman states 
(Kurzweil 2005). If this occurred, the environmental conditions of Earth might have very 
little effect on the beings we would become since our cur- rent biological needs could be 
lessened or eliminated.  Future technological advances could change us in ways we are 
unable to imagine at present (Ord et al. 2010). Such possibilities are highly speculative, but 
they are instances of radical societal reconstruction which would become more probable as 
technological ability increases (almost by definition). 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, nor is it meant to present likely scenarios. It is 
meant to demonstrate that—even if we removed all scientific uncertainty—there are 
important sources of uncertainty about how our policies will affect others. This is because 
we do not know for certain what future generations will look like, and that uncertainty 
grows with respect to time. Furthermore, radical societal reconstruction may not exhaust 
the outcomes that a complete climate change accounting of expected utility would have to 
include. 
If radical societal reconstruction occurs, then we would be indifferent between climate 
policies at the point which it occurred. These scenarios have a non-negligible chance of 
occurring, but quantifying the probabilities is hard to impossible. We lack the epistemic status 
to be able to give informed probabilities of these outcomes. Since we are more and more 
uncertain of the consequences of our climate policies further into the future, by Principle 2.1, 
we are less morally responsible for those effects. As Principle 2.2 states, it is rational to decide 
on policies while ignoring the effects for which we have less responsibility. This justifies 
14  Here, I am operating under the assumption that climate change effects are relegated to this planet. 
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counting those policies less with respect to time, to the extent that we are uncertain about their 
impact; hence, a positive δ. 
Does this argument support a particular value of δ? No, it is just supposed to justify a non-
zero δ on normative grounds. The argument indexes δ to our current epistemic state with 
regard to outcomes like radical societal reconstruction. Given that we think that we are quite 
certain about our effects in the short to medium term (roughly, less than fifty years), it supports 
a relatively small value of δ. Note, however, that this argument suggests that δ should be 
strictly larger than the value of δ chosen in (Stern 2007), since Stern considers only a 
subset of the scenarios in radical societal reconstruction. A consequence of my claim is that, 
if our knowledge about the future increases, our valuation of future generations would rise or 
fall accordingly; for instance, because we might have a better idea of whether there will be 
future generations.15 The indexing means that it is possible that δ fluctuates over time; for, 
instance we should increase δ if some rogue individual manages to control weapons of mass 
destruction or engineer a deadly fast-spreading virus. 
As noted before, this is different from previous defences, such as those of (Dasgupta and 
Heal 1979) or (Stern 2007). That is because they claim that discounting is reason- able since 
we are decision-making under risk with the risk of existential threats. My claim is that we 
are decision-making under uncertainty and that the range of pertinent outcomes is far wider 
than death. With this range of outcomes, I suggest that it is rational to count those outcomes 
less in our reasoning for which we have limited epistemic status. This is because we have 
reduced moral responsibility and accounting for that reduced responsibility justifies a 
discount rate. 
Is it reasonable to model these vague epistemic uncertainties with an annual percent- age 
discount rate? Parfit (1986) phrases the objection in this manner: if the point of δ is to reflect 
uncertainty, why not just introduce a value that is uncertainty? Uncertainty and an annual 
discount rate may sometimes, even often, coincide, but there is no necessary connection. 
But this makes the mistake about discount rates that I mentioned before: the value of a 
discount rate (positive) and its justification (uncertainty) are distinguishable. There is not some 
overriding justification for a value of δ. Since I defend δ with a justification of uncertainty, the 
question is whether my justification is reasonable, not whether discounting can be for 
uncertainty. It is worth noting that the discounting does not depend on whether the uncertainty 
comes from sources that generate positive or negative utility, compared with our envisioned 
outcome. Insofar as scenarios reduce our certainty, they reduce our moral responsibility, 
regardless of the valence of changes. 
On the more technical question of whether a discount rate is the appropriate tool for 
modelling what I want to express—growing uncertainty with respect to time, I suggest that it 
is an excellent fit. Of course, δ is at best an approximation. Uncertainty does not necessarily 
generate smooth curves. But there are certain properties uncertainty will have relative to time: 
it will have a positive first derivative, since uncertainty increases with (future) temporal 
distance.16  Second, it is likely to have an asymptote, because it seems implausible to assign 
absolute uncertainty about even the distant future. We cannot have more than 100% 
uncertainty, and it would be arbitrary to imply that there is a particular date beyond which we 
know nothing. Beyond this arbitrariness, it appears empirically false. Society knows some 
things about even the distant future, e.g. functions of nomological facts like that gravity 
won’t repel and thermodynamics will hold. With these criteria, an exponential or hyperbolic 
function is a natural fit, since they have asymptotes and are increasing. 
15  Under the assumption that Stern generates the right probabilities for the scenarios he considers. 
16  At least for beings like us who tend to experience time in a linear fashion and can more easily predict the near 
term than the far term. 
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5 Objections 
Many objections can, and have been, raised against arguments of the preceding type. In 
this section, I address three. 
The first objection is raised by Parfit (1986). He claims that it is morally abhorrent to 
discount future people (or their utility) simply in virtue of the fact that they are temporally 
distant. Would it be morally permissible to discount people who are spatially distant? 
Modulo the details of what occurs in a life, it is worth as much as any other no matter when or 
where it occurs. 
Of course this last point is right. But the conclusion (that we should not have a social 
discount rate) does not follow from the premise (that future people’s utility are worth the 
same as present people). Discounting is a technique used for modelling and for assessing 
policy or decision choices. It is not, nor is it meant to be, an objective picture of the moral 
status of people. Discounting for uncertainty is compatible with the claim that people in 
different time periods have the same objective value. I am defending the claim that, despite 
(possibly) equal objective value, evaluating with temporal differences is defensible. The 
discounting I defend is for the sake of decision-making; it is not a moral judgment. 
This is directly analogous with the economic case. As I wrote in § 1, when given the 
choice between two equally priced goods at different times, we do not discount to indicate 
that the goods are different. They have equal prices, and that is unaffected by when they are 
given. However, we discount to indicate that we should evaluate those good differentially. 
This leads to a second objection. Broome (2012); Cowen and Parfit (1992) argue that 
the modelling of uncertainty should be in terms of different scenarios which have different 
probabilities attached to them, i.e. using traditional expected utility. Once we take the 
different options, we can evaluate options by the weighted sum of the outcomes that may result. 
In private correspondence, Broome reiterates this point, writing that if we are not discounting 
purely for time, that should be made clearer. 
The reasons that I favour using δ > 0 are mentioned in §4. It may be a simplification to use 
exponential curves, but the alternative—expected utility—demands more than our epistemic 
or cognitive conditions can bear when dealing with an issue like climate change. 
This requires some defence. Let us begin with the observation that in order to include 
outcomes in a formula of expected utility, it is necessary to be able to enumerate those 
outcomes.  This first step is already extremely hard: most of the outcomes that I considered 
under the rubric of radical societal reconstruction have been overlooked, and I have no 
confidence that I am aware of all of the outcomes which would change our calculations for 
climate policies. This is already under the implausible assumption that we have removed any 
uncertainty or confusion with climate impacts which, as we know, are subject to tipping points 
and perturbations that are already unforeseeable. 
But the problem has another order of complexity to add: once we have enumerated these 
outcomes, it is necessary to provide them with credences or probability values (or ranges). 
Here, I wish to emphasize once again that we are creatures with very limited epistemic 
status: we have difficulty determining what will happen in our world in the coming months, 
let alone years. When it comes to centuries, any credences offered for outcomes like the 
possibility of a technology Singularity should be ridiculed. It is tempting to bring to mind 
how likely the shape of our society today would have looked to those a century ago or even 
fifty years ago. Just because we might be able to generate some credences (e.g. by finding the 
mean or mode of some “expert” opinions) should not give us any credence in those 
credences. As Dasgupta (2008, p. 164) warns, “We shouldn’t believe any model that 
explicitly models risk when the time horizon extends 100–200 years into the future. We 
simply don’t know what the probabilities are”. 
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But this isn’t the end of the complexity for the expected utility model. Let us say that 
we are able to identify the types of scenarios that would impact our accounting of climate 
policies and are able to give some credences for those outcomes. Then we have to repeat this 
process for each different temporal unit: the calculation that presumes we go to Mars in 2100 
is a very different calculation from one which presumes we go to Mars in 2150 which is also 
different from going to Mars in 2125, and so forth. This process should be repeated for all of 
the relevant outcomes (with appropriately varying credences). 
In short, it is implausible that such outcome enumerations and probability-ascriptions are 
tractable, either epistemically or cognitively. Assigning an exponentially increasing discount 
rate is far more mathematically tractable. 
That’s the negative work. But the more positive (and fundamental) response is that we are 
and should be discounting for time. This is because, the further into the future we model, the 
less we know. The less we know, the less we can be held responsible. This follows from the 
decision-making principles from §2. 
A closely related objection is that I am not making calculations more tractable, be- cause 
the discount rate is just a summary parameter of all of the probabilities of various radical 
societal reconstructions. The final formulation looks simpler, but that is because all the work is 
done behind the scenes to generate a value of δ.17  
I was not intending to have δ be a summary of these probabilities, as I doubt that we 
have access to such probabilities at long timescales. But the obvious question this raises is 
how to determine δ in light of our epistemic limitations. Here is a suggestion. I do think that 
on shorter timescales (e.g. less than a century), we can assign probabilities of societal 
reconstruction. If so, the way to set a value for δ is by giving explicit probabilities for 
various societal reconstruction outcomes at shorter timescales, adding these probabilities at 
different time points, and then fitting an exponential discount curve through these points. Since 
discount rates are such blunt tools, once one fits the curve to data points close to the present, 
there is no need to find data points beyond a century out, which is good because I deny that 
explicit risk values are reliable so far in the future. 
The final objection also comes from Broome (2005, 2012). His objection to temporal 
discounting is that it introduces temporal relativity, and that such relativity is absurd. Since 
discounting is only with respect to future persons, he claims that a model that includes 
discounts can (correctly) value a future person less than an individual who lived after that 
person would (correctly) value that person. Broome’s example is people who die in war. 
Individuals prior to Caesar’s wars (call them Early Individuals) would judge the utility lost in 
the World Wars as less bad than Caesar’s wars since the discount rate would lead to heavily 
discounting the harms from the World Wars due to their large temporal distance. But to us 
(Later Individuals), this seems absurd. Surely the World Wars are many times more harmful 
than Caesar’s wars. So the relativism of discounting is problematic. 
But the difficulties compound, Broome continues. The Early Individuals could be aware 
that the World Wars would be so much larger and that they (were they in our shoes) would 
view the Early Individuals’ judgment as absurd. So the relativism is genuine; there is no 
factual information that differs—just temporal placement. 
But how do we explain our Later Individual judgments about the World Wars’ 
(much) greater disutility when compared to Caesar’s wars? Well, recall that we discount for 
epistemic reasons. Being the type of creatures that we are, we do not have uncertainty about 
the past. So it is irrational for us to discount the utility of events we are certain of. If we 
were beings that knew only the future, and did not remember any of the past, this would be 
reversed. Thus, a being with supreme knowledge—i.e. one for whom nothing was 
17  Thanks to Teru Thomas for suggesting this. 
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uncertain—any discounting would be irrational, since everything would be an effect of their 
action and they would know all of their effects. 
When Broome claims there is no factual difference between the Early Individuals and 
the Later Individuals, he is begging the question. For the Later Individuals, the past is a fact, 
whereas for Early Individuals the future is only conjecture, which they can assign 
probabilities to as best they can. So the relativism is not surprising or problematic at all: it is 
united in the epistemic capabilities of the different agents. The Later Individuals count past 
lives equally, since these past lives are unaffected by the policies of Later Individuals; the 
Early Individuals discount in line with their uncertainty over how and whether their actions 
will affect those yet to come. Just like the simple case of deciding whether to call in sick, if 
we forget our bounded epistemic status, we are bound to make irrational choices. 
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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the diversified climate action the international community is 
currently witnessing. Besides examining possible reasons for the failure of the top-down 
approach to effectively halt rising emission levels, the development of bottom-up initiatives is 
discussed. In addition, this paper evaluates the European Union’s emissions trading system 
(EU ETS) according to two criteria of justice, with a special focus on two characteristics of the 
EU ETS: grandfathering and offsetting. The final section of this paper addresses the rise of 
emissions trading systems and considers the claims made by prominent commentators who 
believe emissions trading to be inherently unethical. The paper concludes, first, that whether 
emissions trading is morally reprehensible depends on its design and, second, that the EU ETS 
fails to respect justice-based criteria and points to the unwillingness of EU leaders to mend a 
flawed climate policy tool.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2012, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions exceeded a 30% increase relative to 
1990 levels1 and on May 9th 2013 the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii recorded a daily 
mean concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere surpassing the climate milestone of 
400 parts per million (ppm).2 350 to 450 ppm are deemed to be critical thresholds that can 
possibly trigger runaway climate change.3  
 
The Conference of Parties of The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) have pledged to decrease global emissions ‘so as to hold the increase in 
global temperature below 2°C’ above pre-industrial levels, in order to prevent ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.4 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that, to prevent a 2°C rise, emissions would have to be 
reduced by 50–85%, relative to 1990 levels, by 2050.5 The prevention of a 2°C rise is also 
mentioned in the EU’s climate policy. The EU has pledged to increase the share of renewable 
energy by 20% by 2020, to reduce emissions levels by 20% by 2020, and by 50% by 2050, 
relative to 1990 levels.6 It has also considered moving from the 20% emissions reduction 
target to a 30% target, provided that other industrialized countries commit themselves to 
comparable emissions reductions and that the more advanced developing countries contribute 
adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.7  
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) assessed six scenarios of future GHG 
emissions that do not take into account any specific policies to reduce emissions. Currently 
GHG emissions remain on track to meet the IPCC’s most fossil fuel intensive GHG emissions 
scenario, which would constitute a 4°C temperature rise by 2100.8 
While global leaders have delayed negotiations on the successor of the Kyoto Protocol 
(KP) to 2015, with it to come into effect no sooner than 2020 (UNFCCC 2011), research 
indicates that, in order to have a reasonable chance of limiting global warming to 2°C, global 
emissions would have to peak and decline before the end of the present decade.9 Although a 
temporary successor, entitled the Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment Period (KPII), was 
installed, it is argued that the effort is futile in view of the 2015 negotiations. Because the 
KPII omits the US and Canada and demands no binding reduction pledges from the emerging 
1  UNEP, “The Emissions Gap Report 2012,” p. 10. 
2  Tans and Keeling, “Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide,” (2013). 
3  Hansen, The Storms of My Grandchildren (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009); Rockström et al., “A 
safe operating space for humanity,” (2009); Helm, “The Kyoto approach has failed,” (2012). 
4  UNFCCC, “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 
19 December 2009, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth 
session,” (2009), p. 5. 
5  Gupta et al., “Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements,” Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of 
Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by B. Metz et al. (UK and US: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp. 746-807, at p. 775. 
6  European Commission, “Combating climate change: The EU leads the way,” (Brussels, 2007); European 
Commission, “Analysis of options beyond 20% GHG emission reductions: Member State results,” 
(Brussels, 2012b). 
7  Ibid., p. 4. 
8  Betts et al., “When could global warming reach 4°C?” (2011), p. 82; Le Quéré et al., “Trends in the sources 
and sinks of carbon dioxide,” (2009), p. 831; Peters et al., “The challenge to keep global warming below 
2°C,” (2013), p. 5. 
9  Arnell et al., “A global assessment of the effects of climate policy on the impacts of climate change,” 
(2013), p. 2; den Elzen et al., “Reduction targets and abatement costs of developing countries resulting from 
global and developed countries’ reduction targets in 2050,” (2013), p. 496; Rogelj et al., “2020 emissions 
levels required to limit warming to below 2°C,” (2012), p. 7. 
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economies such as China, Brazil and India, the countries under the KPII now account for less 
than 15% of global emissions.10 Even more worrisome is that at the latest meeting of the 
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), the Chair’s summary stated that 
‘some considered it would not be feasible to complete the process by 2015’.11 Postponing new 
efforts to curb GHGs will result in lower short-term costs but higher overall costs and steeper 
reduction pathways will be required to limit warming to below 2°C.12 Rogelj and colleagues13 
observe that, despite all the uncertainty regarding the geophysical, social and technological 
aspects of the climate problem, the dominant factor affecting the likelihood and costs of 
achieving the 2°C objective is related to politics. 
Whereas the politics that have to be agreed upon assume collective action, humanity is 
utterly divided in terms of wealth, health, living standards, education, and well-being.14 Of 
particular relevance in this regard is the inequity inherent to climate change: although the 
poorest of the world are only responsible for a small part of the emissions that contribute to 
climate change, they will suffer most of the consequences.15  
In this paper we address the failure of the top-down approach to effectively halt rising 
emission levels and discuss the emergence of bottom-up initiatives. Furthermore, in light of 
the development of emissions trading (ET) systems that are being deployed around the world 
we focus on the largest ET system currently in place, the EU ETS, and evaluate it according 
to two criteria of justice, namely effectiveness and fairness on the distribution of mitigation 
burdens.16 In the penultimate section we scrutinize the claims made by prominent 
commentators who deem ET to be inherently unethical.  
2. Climate Policy: the top-down failure and bottom-up emergence 
According to various commentators, it is clear that the top-down approach (i.e. a 
supranational institution mandating action by individual countries) has failed.17 Without 
attempting to be exhaustive, let us consider three reasons for the failure. First, in promoting a 
consensus-driven path, the pledges made under the KP have respected the stance of the least-
ambitious parties, while discussions have focused on ‘binding-or-nothing’ targets.18 It is 
argued that the KP ‘tried to do too much’, by introducing global markets from the top down, 
‘especially in the absence of binding legal frameworks to enforce contracts among parties 
who are not bound by other ties’.19 By doing so, the KP closed the path to the alternative 
approaches that were being pursued before it came into place.20  
Second, climate change is a multilevel governance problem. National leaders have 
ignored this insight for too long and now find themselves exposed to a growing number of 
cross-border interests and coalitions,21 and fragmented and blurred roles of state and non-state 
actors.22 Under the KP, the developing countries with emerging economies (Brazil, India, 
China, South-Africa) are listed in the non-Annex B list. As such, they have made no binding 
pledges to reduce emission levels. Although most of the industrialized world is unwilling to 
10  Grubb, “Doha’s Dawn?” (2013), p. 282. 
11  King, “UN climate change deal ‘may not be feasible’ by 2015,” (2013). 
12  UNEP, “The Emissions Gap Report 2012,” p. 28. 
13  Rogelj et al., “Probabilistic cost estimates for climate change mitigation,” (2013), p. 80. 
14  Biermann, “Planetary boundaries and earth system governance - Exploring the links,” (2012), p. 6. 
15  Costello et al., “Managing the health effects of climate change,” (2009), p. 1694. 
16  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change” (2010a). 
17  Prins and Rayner, “Time to ditch Kyoto,” (2007); Victor, “Plan B for Copenhagen,” (2009); Diringer, “Letting go of 
Kyoto,” (2011). 
18  Ibid. p. 291; Prins and Rayner, “Time to ditch Kyoto,” (2007), pp. 974-975. 
19  Ibid., p. 974 
20  Ibid. 
21  Andonova et al., “Transnational climate governance,” (2009). 
22  Bulkeley and Newell, Governing climate change (London: Routledge, 2010). 
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one-sidedly assume binding targets, developing countries insist on precisely that.23 
Nevertheless, the emission levels from the emerging economies together with the rest of the 
non-OECD countries will top those of the industrialized countries in the third decade of this 
century.24 Third, the poor results achieved by the top-down approach are a consequence of the 
fact that existing multinational institutions are simply not designed for, and did not evolve in 
response to, global environmental problems. These environmental problems transcend both 
the lifespans of many generations and the conventional international reciprocal ties that 
countries know today.25  
In contrast to the top-down failure, the development of bottom-up initiatives is beginning 
to take shape. Cross-national projects are emerging which focus on subnational, regional or 
urban mitigation and adaptation initiatives. For example, the Covenant of Mayors joins 
together over 4000 signatories and aims to exceed the EU’s 20% reduction target, with targets 
ranging from 20 to 45%.26 Another example is the C40 group, which involves major cities 
around the world sharing experience in areas such as waste management, water supply, food 
and urban agriculture, climate adaptation, and so on.27 We deem these initiatives to be crucial, 
since they promote learning-by-doing, build ‘coalitions of the willing’, break up complex 
problems into more manageable elements, disseminate knowledge, showcase best practices, 
and contribute to policy learning. We think that these initiatives are essential to help build 
domestic support for climate policies, as the lack of such domestic support will fatally 
undermine future action and international commitments.  
Besides these initiatives a number of countries28 are voluntarily deploying ET systems.29 
Although these initiatives differ from one another in reduction targets and the sectors they 
cover, they have looked to the largest ET system in effect, the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS), as a model for their own ET systems. Nevertheless, ET is heavily 
contested and is considered to be morally reprehensible. We argue that whether ET is morally 
defensible depends not only on (1) the variant of ET being implemented, but also on (2) the 
extent to which a particular ET system is an effective climate policy tool and (3) the extent to 
which it respects justice-based criteria. The two latter conditions correspond to two criteria of 
justice put forward by Caney.30 The second condition relates to the question whether the 
policy actually lowers emissions. Formulated as such, it might be regarded as merely a matter 
of effectiveness, not one of justice. However, anthropogenic climate change threatens several 
key human rights.31 Any policy that does not sufficiently lower emission levels will not 
manage to avoid harm caused by the devastating consequences of climate change. Hence, 
while such a policy may be ineffective it will also, to this extent, be unjust from the 
perspective of entitlement-bearer justice.32 The third condition relates to the fair burden 
distribution of burdens or mitigation costs (i.e. duty-bearer justice). In the following section, 
we shall introduce the EU ETS and evaluate it according to these criteria of justice. We will 
return to the first condition – the variant of the ET being implemented – in the fourth section.  
23  Diringer, “Letting go of Kyoto,” (2011), p. 291. 
24  van Vuuren et al., “Comparison of different climate regimes” (2009). 
25  Jamieson, “Ethics, public policy, and global warming,” Climate ethics, essential readings, edited by S.M. 
Gardiner et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 77-86. 
26  CoM, Covenant of Mayors, (Brussels 2008). 
27  C40, Climate action in Major Cities: C40 cities baseline and opportunities, (2011). 
28  Emissions trading systems are being, or have been deployed in the EU, Australia, California, RGGI (nine 
US states and two Canadian provinces), New Zealand, Quebec, Alberta, Mexico, China, Brazil, South 
Korea, Kazakhstan, UK, Norway, Switzerland, Tokyo, Japan, and India. 
29  EDF, “Emissions Trading System Comparison Table,” (2013). 
30  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a). 
31  see for example Caney, “Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds,” Climate ethics, essential 
readings, edited by S.M. Gardiner et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010b), pp. 163-173. 
32  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a) 
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3. The EU ETS 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the centrepiece of the EU’s 
climate policy. Established in 2003, put into operation in 2005, and to be implemented over 
15 years in three phases, the EU ETS aims to reduce emissions, relative to 1990 levels, by 
80% by 2050 by an annual reduction of 1.74%.33 Through the ETS, the EU aims to reduce its 
emissions by 20% by 2020.34  
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade market-based mechanism, which implies that the EU 
places a cap on emissions, creates emissions allowances in correspondence with the cap, and 
distributes those allowances to the users mandated to comply with the cap.35 Through the 
imposition of a carbon price the EU ETS aims to incentivize emission reductions as well as 
the development and acquisition of renewable energy sources. To avoid competitiveness loss, 
or ‘carbon leakage’, on the international market or relocation of companies to regions outside 
its borders, the EU grandfathered, or handed out cost free, allowances equivalent to the 
emissions of the corporations in the sectors covered. Corporations in need of further 
allowances are allowed to buy from other companies that have not used theirs, or they can 
offset their surplus by obtaining additional emission credits via investment in abatement and 
adaptation initiatives in other countries through the KP’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).36  
In 2009, the EU pledged to auction emission allowances as of 2013, thus creating 
revenues that could be spent on tackling climate change or on developing and supporting 
adaptation initiatives in the EU and developing countries.37 In the (current) third phase, at 
least 50% of the allowances are to be sold by auction instead of being grandfathered, a phase 
out of grandfathering should result in 30% cost-free allocation by 2020, and by 2027 a full 
auctioning of all allowances should be put in place.38 From 2013 onwards, the EU ETS is 
supposed to cover around half of the GHG emissions in the EU.39 
3.1 Grandfathering 
As mentioned, industries covered by the EU ETS received emission allowances free of 
charge at the start of the system, and a significant number of companies are still eligible for 
free allocation. However, during the initial phase of the EU ETS emissions data showed that 
the sum of emissions allowances was likely to exceed actual emissions.40 Because of the 
initial overallocation of allowances, the possibility of banking allowances, the large amount of 
international (CDM) credits entering the market, and the reduced demand due to the economic 
crisis, a large number of surplus allowances remain on the carbon market, to such an extent 
that yearly caps are rendered futile. As a consequence, low allowance prices have prevailed 
and it is estimated that the effects of the flooded market will be felt throughout the third phase 
and possibly afterwards.41 
Moreover, grandfathering emission allowances is an unjust allocation method. 
Grandfathering is based on a benchmark year, or baseline, which is historically arbitrary since 
it takes no account of who has been responsible for the emissions, the conditionality of the 
33  European Parliament and the Council of the EU, “Directive 2003/87/EC,” (2003). 
34  European Commission, “EU action against climate change. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme,” (2009). 
35  McAllister, “The overallocation problem in cap-and-trade: moving toward stringency,” (2009). 
36  European Commission, “EU action against climate change” (2009).  
37  European Parliament and the Council of the EU, “Directive 2009/29/EC,” p. 71. 
38  European Commission “EU action against climate change” (2009); European Commission “The State of the 
carbon Market in 2012,” (2012a). 
39  Ibid. 
40  McAllister, “The overallocation problem in cap-and-trade: moving toward stringency,” (2009). 
41  Ibid.; Morris, “Drifting Towards Disaster?” (2013). 
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emissions, or the mitigation efforts made by first-movers.42 In addition, as Vanderheiden 
argues, grandfathering violates the ideals of equity and responsibility that are expressed 
within the KP.43 Grandfathering thus ignores both the ‘polluter pays’ principle and the 
‘ability-to-pay’ principle.44  
From these critiques, it should be clear that the grandfathering principle violates the 
second – fair burden distribution – of Caney’s criteria of justice. Moreover, because of the 
overallocation and the possibility of banking allowances, the EU ETS might delay mitigation 
action and therefore may violate the first – effectiveness – criterion of justice as well. 
Although the EU ETS did manage to reduce emissions in its pilot phase 45 and in consecutive 
years, it is argued that the system might actually have driven negative abatement. Indeed, 
because of the reduced demand due to the economic crises and the flooding of the carbon 
market due to inexpensive CDM allowances, the EU ETS now risks cancelling out 700 
million tonnes of emission reduction delivered by other policies within the EU climate 
package.46  
3.2 Offsetting 
At least six objections have been made against offsetting (i.e. the emission reduction 
investments in developing countries for which the investors receive emission credits that can 
be used or traded as allowances). First, the credits that result from offsetting are only 
estimated – the developer of a project in a low-emitting country compares the estimated 
hypothetical baseline of existing emissions with the predicted emissions from the completed 
project. That is, carbon accountants calculate what the emission rates would have been if no 
investment had taken place. This process of determining the so-called ‘additionality’ of a 
project is highly questionable.47 Furthermore, it is argued that the majority of international 
credits entering the EU ETS are environmentally questionable, with only 7% having no 
additionality concerns.48 Second, offsets can account for, inter alia, planting trees, setting up 
wind farms, burning methane from landfills to generate electricity, and even investment in 
‘new coal’ plants.49 However, it is far from certain that these offsets are actually the ‘climatic 
equivalent’ of the surplus emissions of investors.50 
Third, offsetting can create the wrong kind of incentive for beneficiaries of the scheme: in 
order to receive investment from the North, third-world countries could benefit from emitting 
vast amounts of GHGs because the more they emit the more emissions are eligible for 
mitigation project investment.51 Fourth, when participation in mitigation efforts is broadened 
so as to include non-OECD countries, the future generations of these countries will find 
themselves trying to buy back, at a much higher price, the allowances that they have, 
inexpensively, sold only ‘yesterday’ to Annex B countries or corporations under the EU 
ETS.52 Fifth, one of the two core objectives of the CDM states that the flexibility mechanism 
42  Caney, “Justice and the distribution of greenhouse gas emission,” (2009). 
43  Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 238.  
44  Bührs, “Sharing the atmosphere,” (2010). 
45  Anderson and Di Maria, “Abatement and allocation in the pilot phase of the EU ETS,” (2011). 
46  Morris, “Drifting Towards Disaster?” (2013), p. 11. 
47  Haya, “Measuring emissions against an alternative future: Fundamental flaws in the structure of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism,” (2009); Schneider, “Is the CDM fulfilling its environmental 
and sustainable development objectives? An evaluation of the CDM and options for improvement,” (2007). 
48  Morris, “Drifting Towards Disaster?” (2013), p. 11. 
49  Lazarus and Chandler, “Coal power in the CDM: Issues and options, Executive Summary,” (2011). 
50  Hansen, The Storms of My Grandchildren, p. 206. 
51  Hansen, The Storms of My Grandchildren, p. 183; Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a). 
52  Agarwal, “A southern perspective on curbing global climate change,” Climate change policy: A survey, 
edited by S. Schneider et al. (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002), pp. 373-391.  
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is to help the developing countries reach sustainable development. Although the literature 
concerning sustainable development deems its social dimension to include poverty 
alleviation,53 research shows that CDM projects are rarely found amongst the poorest (with 
less than 2% in sub-Saharan Africa) and 71% of the credits obtained through the CDM are not 
found in the poorest countries, but are instead found in the rising economic powers.54 The 
CDM’s contribution to poverty reduction thus appears to be limited.55  
Sixth, because of the amount of offsets being surrendered by a number of EU Member 
States to comply with mitigation targets, these international credits may well be the largest 
contributor to some Member States’ reductions. This would constitute a clear breach of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s supplementarity rule, which states that international offsetting credits are 
supposed to be ‘supplemental to domestic actions’.56 From these critiques it should be clear 
that offsetting could severely postpone emission reduction efforts. Hence, it violates the first – 
effectiveness – criterion of justice. Furthermore, with CDM projects rarely found amongst the 
poorest states, and with EU Member states violating the KP supplementarity rule, offsetting 
breaches the second – fair burden distribution – criterion of justice as well.  
In sum, the EU ETS does not meet the criteria of entitlement-bearer or duty-bearer 
justice. Consequently, we cannot but conclude that the market mechanism, in its current state, 
is an unjust climate policy tool. In the following section, we will return to the first issue 
mentioned above: whether ET is morally reprehensible is dependent on the variant of ET 
being implemented. Summarizing the key arguments of the debate, we will critically reflect 
upon the ethics involved in ET.  
 
4. Emissions trading and ethics 
In this section we shall address some of the fundamental objections to ET that have been put forward 
in the debate. The criticisms of ET can be divided into two groups: commodity-centred objections; and 
person-centred objections.57 
4.1 A priori objections to emissions trading: commodity-centred objections  
The commodity-centred objections share a rejection of private ownership of the 
atmosphere (which the buying of allowances would allegedly result in), but a differentiation 
can be made between the non-ownership argument and the price/dignity argument. First, the 
non-ownership argument argues that since the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere is a 
common good, it cannot be owned by a single agent. ET thus creates false commodities, since 
an emission allowance does not possess all the properties of a legitimate commodity.58 Hence, 
trading emission allowances is an illegitimate practice in which we are selling/owning that 
what is not ours to sell/own.59 Should we choose to damage the property we buy, we would be 
despoiling a good upon which the interests of future generations depend. Furthermore, as 
stewards of the natural world, we have clear responsibilities towards nature or towards future 
generations and their interests in the natural environment. Therefore, by selling environmental 
53  Olsen, “The clean development mechanism’s contribution to sustainable development: a review of the 
literature,” (2007). 
54  Bulkeley and Newell, Governing climate change, p. 44. 
55  See for example Crowe, “The potential of the CDM to deliver pro-poor benefits,” (2013). 
56  UN, “Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change,” (1998), p. 15; 
Morris, “Drifting Towards Disaster?” (2013), p. 12. 
57  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a), p. 203. 
58  Page, “Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading,” (2011), pp. 58-9. 
59  Goodin, “Selling Environmental Indulgences,” Climate ethics, essential readings, edited by S. M. Gardiner 
et al. (New York: Oxford University Press; 2010), pp. 232-246, at pp. 234-5. 
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‘indulgences’, stewards would be permitting the destruction of the good they have a duty to 
protect.60 Since being allowed to emit a certain level of GHGs is literally of vital importance, 
the objection to ET here is not that the impermissible is permitted, but rather that the 
unsellable is sold.61  
However, it has been observed that the non-ownership argument overlooks the difference 
between ‘property rights’ and ‘user rights’.62 Rather then owning the asset, an allowance 
buyer only has a right to use it. The temporary nature of both the allowance and the good 
covered by the allowance, and the fact that not the use but the overuse of the common 
resource is priced, imply that no acquisition of property is involved.63 By definition, a user 
right implies the use of the good and hence a user does not have the right to destroy the good 
in question.64 The only good that the buyer of allowances can destroy is the allowance itself, 
yet doing so would decrease the supply of allowances and accelerate the protection of the 
underlying asset.65 Since allowance holders are not private owners, and thus have no right to 
destroy the asset underlying the allowance, those who advocate stewardship responsibility can 
perfectly endorse ET as a means to protect the natural world in the interest of future 
generations since ET simultaneously enables and limits the use of a common resource.66 That 
is precisely what ET seeks to achieve through the imposition of a cap and where alternatives 
to cap-and-trade fail to meet the requirements that intergenerational justice demands.67  
Second, the price/dignity-argument states that ET employs a price mechanism to 
determine what has value. However, since nature has intrinsic value it cannot be captured by 
monetary estimates. Treating it as if it is equivalent to other goods disrespects its intrinsic 
value and would result in valuing nature instrumentally.68 However, as Caney argues, from a 
policy perspective, the market is merely an instrument to protect what has value and it does 
not entail a statement about why the natural world has value.69 As noted by Page, agents can 
act in response to financial incentives to preserve the atmosphere while also valuing nature 
intrinsically.70 The price mechanism then becomes a vehicle of an agent’s expression of her 
intrinsic regard for a good and not its denunciation.71 In other words, to put a price on the 
right to use the atmosphere is not the same as putting a price on the preservation of the 
climate system.72  
4.2 A priori objections to emissions trading: person-centred objections 
The person-centred objections can be divided into three: the crowding-out argument, the 
fine/fee argument, and the civic-responsibility argument. Concerning the crowding-out 
argument, it is argued that ET unintentionally dictates a hierarchy between two non-additive 
motivations; extrinsic motivations (e.g. the possibility of offsetting pollution) will crowd out 
60  Ibid., p. 234. 
61  Ibid., p. 235. 
62  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a), p. 204. 
63  Ott and Sachs, “Ethical Aspects of Emissions Trading,” (2000), p. 14. 
64  Ibid., p. 14.  
65  Page, “Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading,” (2011), p. 62. 
66  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a), p. 204; Caney and Hepburn, “Carbon trading: 
unethical, unjust and ineffective?” (2011), p. 212. 
67  Page, “Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading,” (2011), p. 55. 
68  Goodin, “Selling Environmental Indulgences,” p. 236; O’Neill, Markets, Deliberation and Environment 
(London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 5-7; Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, the Moral Limits of Markets (United 
Kingdom: Allen Lane, 2012), p. 75. 
69  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change” (2010a), p. 206; Caney and Hepburn, “Carbon trading: 
unethical, unjust and ineffective?” (2011), p. 220. 
70  Page, “Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading,” (2011), p. 62. 
71  Walsh, “Are market norms and intrinsic valuation mutually exclusive,” (2001), p. 532. 
72  Caney and Hepburn, “Carbon trading: unethical, unjust and ineffective?” (2011), p. 221. 
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intrinsic motivations (e.g. reducing one’s carbon footprint).73 In other words, financial 
motivations will predictably weaken the moral stigma of emitting greenhouse gases.74 This 
crowding-out process, so it is argued, will give rise to a lower overall level of environmental 
protection and will corrupt public morals.75 More specifically, Sandel warns that ET allows 
people to treat the fine to be paid as a fee to enable them to continue environmental 
destruction.76 The economic theory behind ET holds that environmentally damaging 
behaviour can be made socially optimal as long as the correct price is paid. However, as 
Goodin claims, there is no independent justification of the particular price charged.77 If ET 
does not result in the halting of environmental destruction, its proponents can insulate 
themselves by claiming that the price generated by the market was too low, or that the 
standards imposed were too meagre.  
The proponents of ET refute the crowding-out argument. First, the claim that ET will 
crowd-out intrinsic motivation to protect the environment remains to be empirically 
supported. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that other mitigation incentives will not crowd 
out intrinsic motivations as well. The real question to be asked is: ‘how much, not if, a 
particular policy is vulnerable to the crowding-out effect’.78 Moreover, many individuals, 
governments and businesses show little or no environmental concern, thus the question of the 
crowding-out effect might not be relevant since that which is not present can hardly be 
crowded out.79 Viewed from this perspective, ET might instigate a crowding-in effect, since 
those who are mandated to comply with the emissions cap might not have mitigated their 
emissions without the policy tool. With regard to Sandel’s fee/fine argument, Caney has 
argued that this argument holds sway when it involves the harm done by one individual. 
However, in the case of climate change harm results from a large number of individual 
actions. Whenever a particular person emits too many GHGs there is no wrong done if, as a 
result of the functioning of the ET system, another person emits less than the imposed quota.80  
According to a third person-centred objection, the civic responsibility argument, ET 
undermines the ‘spirit of a shared sacrifice’ that fighting climate change requires.81 Each 
agent, so it is argued, should bear a non-delegatable civic responsibility and partake in the 
collective sacrifice by personally lowering her own emissions, and should not pass the duty 
on to others as doing so would constitute immoral behaviour.82  
Whereas Sandel has stated that it is immoral to buy extra emission credits,83 Caney 84 
forcefully replies that claims about the alleged immorality of an action are claims about the 
ethical propriety of engaging in such an action; such claims do not show that ET is unjust.85 
Hence, although the civic responsibility argument represents a significant contribution to the 
discussion as to how people should behave, it does not contribute to a discussion regarding 
73  Frey, Inspiring Economics (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2001), pp. 55-70; Goodin, “Selling 
Environmental Indulgences”, p. 236.  
74  Page, “Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading,” (2011), p. 50. 
75  Goodin, “Selling Environmental Indulgences,” p. 236; Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, p. 78. 
76  Ibid., p. 76. 
77  Goodin, “Selling Environmental Indulgences”, p. 241. 
78  Page, “Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions trading,” (2011), p. 52, emphasis in 
original. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a), p. 209; Caney and Hepburn, “Carbon trading: 
unethical, unjust and ineffective?” (2011), p. 222. 
81  Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, p. 75. 
82  Ibid.; Sandel, “It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute” (1997). 
83  Ibid. 
84  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a), p. 207. 
85  Claims about the ethical proprieties of ET are considerations on the type of activities that ET governs, while 
justice claims focus on the definition of the right holder and the distributive principle(s) ET should reflect.  
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the rights that people possess.86 Furthermore, Sandel claims that ET violates the solidarity-
based scheme in which we all lower our personal emissions rather than paying others to 
perform our duty in place. When an ET system involves citizens as allowance traders, it 
would enable them to act in a self-interested way when they should be acting in a public-
spirited way in accordance with the background solidarity scheme.87 However, this critique 
does not apply to the ‘upstream accounting’ variant of ET, which is only addressed at firms 
and businesses. Unlike individuals or citizens, firms and business are not bound by a 
background solidarity scheme.88 Under the ‘upstream accounting’ approach, polluters – firms 
and businesses in sectors covered by the ET system – pay for auctioned permits to cover their 
emissions under a progressively tightening emissions cap.89 The revenues from such 
auctioned permits could fund and incentivize the development and use of clean technology, 
compensate climate victims, support adaptation initiatives, etc.90 However, it is noted that the 
market-based mechanism should also be complemented by regulatory measures so as to avoid 
market failure.91 Although Sandel’s argument is forceful with regard to some variants of ET, 
it cannot be said that, under the ‘upstream accounting’ variant of ET, individuals ‘can exempt 
themselves from a public service that others are bound by’92 nor do they violate the 
background solidarity scheme or disregard their duty of contributing to the shared sacrifice.  
Hence, we can conclude that the critiques of the ET opponents are adequately addressed, 
and that the upstream accounting variant of ET in which emission allowances are auctioned is 
acceptable from a justice-based perspective.  
5. Conclusion 
In February 2013, a group of approximately 90 NGOs launched a joint declaration 
entitled ‘It is Time to Scrap the EU ETS’.93 The NGOs claim that the EU ETS closes the door 
to other, genuinely effective climate policies.94 However, this NGO consortium has neglected 
to propose an efficient and effective alternative that has sufficient political feasibility. 
Furthermore, stating that carbon markets are inherently flawed carries a risk, since the 
abandonment of carbon markets might well mean that no serious international abatement 
efforts whatsoever are undertaken.95 Bearing in mind that, in order to limit global warming by 
2°C, emissions would have to peak and decline before the end of the present decade,96 and 
that global leaders have postponed binding treaties to 2020,97 it seems highly unlikely that, 
should the EU ETS be abolished, a new climate policy tool would be put in place in time to 
avoid runaway climate change. 
Although the European Commission had proposed six options for structural long-term 
reforms of the EU ETS, the European Parliament has accepted only a short term, temporary 
intervention of changed auctioning timetables, termed ‘backloading’, which was fiercely 
opposed.98 Hence, it can be argued that because of the refusal by policymakers to structurally 
86  Ibid. 
87  Ibid., p. 208. 
88  Tickell, Kyoto2: How to manage the global greenhouse (London: Zed Books, 2008), pp. 90-2. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a), p. 209; see also Tickell, Kyoto2. 
91  Ibid.; Caney, “Markets, morality and climate change,” (2010a). 
92  Ibid., p. 208. 
93  Scrap the EU ETS, “It is time the EU scraps its carbon Emissions Trading System,” (2013a). 
94  Scrap the EU ETS, “Time to scrap the EU ETS-Declaration,” (2013b). 
95  MacKenzie, “Making things the same: Gases, emission rights and the politics of carbon markets,” (2009), p. 451. 
96  Rogelj et al., “2020 emissions levels required to limit warming to below 2°C,” (2012). 
97  UNFCCC, “Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its 
seventh session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the 
Conference of Parties at its seventeenth session,” (2011), p. 2. 
98  European Commission, 2013 “Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard welcomes the European Parliament’s 
positive vote on the carbon market “backloading” proposal,” (2013); Lewis and Chestney, “Parliament hesitates in 
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mend a flawed EU ETS, they have ensured the ineffectiveness of the system, and have 
allowed it to become an unjust climate policy. When policymakers are delegated the authority 
to set up a policy that will reduce emissions, avoid human rights violations related to climate 
change and thus reduce harm to future generations and the worst-off, but fail to do so, it can 
be argued that, ceteris paribus, those policymakers have acted unjustly.  
In this paper, we have addressed the failure of the top-down approach and have situated 
the emergence of bottom-up initiatives. Subsequently, we argued that whether ET is morally 
defensible depends on (1) the variant of the ET being implemented, (2) the extent to which a 
particular ET system is an effective climate policy tool, and (3) the extent to which ET 
respects justice-based criteria. When evaluating the largest ET system currently in effect we 
conclude that the EU ETS fails to respect both the effectiveness criterion as well as the fair 
burden distribution criterion of justice. Of particular concern are the EU ETS’s characteristics 
of grandfathering and offsetting. We have argued that EU ETS’s most pressing problem is the 
unwillingness of EU leaders to restore the centrepiece of the otherwise commendable climate 
policy. This, in our view, means that those leaders are acting in a morally reprehensible 
manner. Furthermore, we focussed on the development of ET mechanisms and scrutinized 
claims about the alleged inherent unethicalness of these trading systems. After evaluating the 
arguments of both sides of the debate, we conclude that the upstream accounting variant of 
ET, in which emissions allowances are auctioned to firms and business, and revenues fund 
mitigation and adaptation initiatives, can be satisfactory from a justice perspective.  
  
drafting law for CO2 fix,” (2013). 
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Abstract 
In this paper we evaluate how irreversible social change should be evaluated from an 
ethical perspective. First, we analyse the notion of irreversibility in general terms. We define a 
general notion of what makes a change irreversible, drawing on discussions in ecology and 
economics. This notion is relational in the sense, that it claims that a change can only be 
irreversible for a certain party. Second, we examine ways to evaluate irreversible changes, 
drawing on discussions from both ethics, particularly the Capability Approach, and economics, 
particularly Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Safe Minimum Standard. Insights from the field of 
development studies are also woven into the discussion. Third, we investigate why (adverse) 
social changes tend to be systematically undervalued in decision making by private actors and 
policy makers, and argue for applying the Safe Minimum Standard as a decision rule for 
dealing with irreversible social changes. Finally, we show how our framework can be applied 
by evaluating the land acquisition process of biofuel producers in Tanzania. 
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1. Introduction 
In discussions on the environment and global climate change, a special place is often 
reserved for changes that are considered to be irreversible, such as species extinction or the 
melting of the Greenland ice sheet. Such changes are considered to be ethically problematic if 
those changes lead to harm because of their structural nature. Though conceptions of 
irreversibility differ, they generally require that a change has a long duration, is impossible (or 
extremely costly) to revoke, and destroys or impairs something that cannot be substituted 
(Verbruggen 2013). Any harm caused by an irreversible change can thus be considered to be 
permanent. This has led to incorporation of the notion of irreversibility in some versions of 
the Precautionary Principle, for example, the explication in the 1992 UN Rio Declaration: 
‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ (Principle 15) 
It is noteworthy that, while the 1992 UN Rio conference was on the topic of environment 
and development, the irreversible damage alluded to in this principle is only applied to 
environmental degradation resulting from human action. Indeed, the concept has mostly (and 
successfully) been applied with regard to changes in the environment (Adger et al. 2009), yet 
there seems to be no good reason for not applying it to changes that could damage or hamper 
development as well, e.g. social changes such as degradation or destruction of social or 
cultural institutions. It could be even argued that society and environment are intertwined to 
such a degree, as suggested by the literature on socio-ecological systems (Berkes et al., 2001) 
that this distinction is artificial and should be abandoned.  
However, even if we maintain the distinction, there are at least two good reasons for 
applying the concept of irreversibility to social changes. First, irreversible environmental 
damages are considered problematic or harmful at least partly because they can threaten the 
availability of ecosystem services that are needed for human well-being. Irrespective of 
whether we regard social and environmental systems as distinct or not, they tend to be tightly 
coupled (Marten, 2001), especially in the case of the rural poor who are strongly dependent 
on local ecosystem services for their livelihoods (Barbier, 2005, 2012; Aggarwal, 2006). 
Irreversible environmental damages do not necessarily induce irreversible social 
damages, e.g. depending on whether adaptation is possible (Walker et al., 2006). However, 
adaptation always requires effort and energy. In some situations the requirements may exceed 
the capacities and resources that local populations can harness. An account of what constitutes 
irreversible social damages and when they are likely to occur could thus help in the ethical 
evaluation of irreversible environmental damages, at least from an anthropocentric 
perspective.1  
Second, many cultural and social institutions are valuable for, if not constitutive of, 
individual and group identity and self-realization. In addition, their structural degradation can 
in turn lead to further adverse impacts on the environment, for instance when mounting 
pressure on vital local livelihood resources causes the breakdown of cooperative local 
arrangements for resource maintenance that prevent structural overexploitation of the 
commons (e.g., Ostrom 2000). In this way, interactive ripple effects between the human and 
ecological parts of systems can greatly amplify the initial impact from, say, the introduction 
1 This is in addition to, rather than in the place of, any ethical reasons connected to the intrinsic value of natural 
entities or processes that could be lost or degraded in the change (McShane 2007; 2012). 
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of a new technology or a human intervention, giving rise to vicious cycles that can induce the 
systems to transgress their ability to cope (Barbier 2012). 
At the same time, even structural damages to those social institutions cannot be quantified 
easily and thus are often not taken into account when performing risk assessments or cost-
benefit analyses of policy measures (Adger et al., 2009). Attempts by economists to assign 
prices to so-called non-market values of (socio-)environmental systems (e.g., Costanza et al 
1998) capture this problem only imperfectly, since ‘not everything that is of value can be 
valued’ (Bergius 2012). This applies especially to so-called ‘non-use values’ associated with 
the functioning of an organism, such as protection against natural hazards, beautiful views, 
the sound of flowing water, or spiritual or religious associations with (aspects of) the natural 
environment (van der Horst and Vermeylen 2011).  
This is where ethical reasoning can make a contribution. A first step towards remedying 
the situation would be to investigate the notion of irreversibility and what it means for a 
change in social institutions to constitute an irreversible harm. This can help explicating these 
changes and increase awareness about their importance, allowing for a more inclusive 
evaluation. Our research question in this paper is thus: How should we evaluate irreversible 
social changes from an ethical perspective? 
We address this question in the following way. In section two, we examine what an 
irreversible change is, as conceived of in the literature on ecology and ecological economics. 
Building on these conceptions, we define a relational notion of irreversibility in social 
changes, which assumes that a change is always (ir)reversible for an actor (which may 
include an institution or natural system). In section three, we examine proposals on how to 
value irreversible changes from ethics, such as the Precautionary Principle, and from 
(evolutionary) economics, such as the Safe Minimum Standard. We spell out the various ways 
in which irreversible changes may be ethically relevant, and to which degree this necessitates 
going beyond traditional consequentialist analyses in ethics and cost-benefit analyses in 
economics. In section four we develop our theoretical framework on what irreversible 
changes are, and how they should be valued, in the social world. We use Habermas’s account 
of ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ to both explain why social changes are systematically 
undervalued in policy-making and suggest possible remedies, also drawing on complementary 
insights from the field of development studies. In section five, finally, we test our framework 
on a case study of biofuel developments in Tanzania. Following the publication of the EU’s 
2009 Renewable Energy Directive (EU RED; EC 2009) and its ambitious renewable energy 
target for the transport sector, various projects based on different business models were set up 
in many tropical countries, including Tanzania, in order to produce biofuels for export to 
Europe. Although their adverse social risks and impacts have been subject to review (e.g., van 
der Horst and Vermeylen 2011; Hodbod and Tomei 2013), the issue of irreversibility has 
remained implicit. We examine how these activities have impacted a.o. land ownership and 
smallholder farming practices; whether there are (potential) irreversible social impacts from 
these changes; whether these have been adequately considered by the initiators of the change; 
and try to give recommendations based on our framework. 
2. What is an irreversible change? 
Irreversibility can be defined in a number of potentially valid ways, though irreversible 
changes are generally acknowledged to give rise to long-lasting effects; are difficult to undo / 
have high revoking costs; and lead to the loss of substances or processes that are difficult to 
substitute. Rather than tackling the concept(s) head-on, we will start by listing four conditions 
that our definition should adhere to in order to achieve the purposes of this paper.  
First, the definition should be meaningful. That is, it should not yield a situation in which 
all changes are irreversible, e.g. because each change takes time, and the flow of time can 
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never be reversed (at least, not in our experience). Nor should our definition yield a situation 
in which no change is irreversible, e.g. because the effects of each change can in principle be 
undone, given enough time, energy and resources (cf. Humphrey 2001). Similarly, it should 
be able to deal with the fact that making a certain choice necessarily precludes making other 
choices at that moment, some of which would likely have beneficial effects. In economic 
terms, we could say that each act of choosing involves making opportunity costs, the costs 
incurred by losing the opportunity to do something else. For example, sending my children to 
school will likely (irreversibly) benefit them, but at the same time, deny them other benefits, 
such as those they would have gained by playing or sports during school hours. 
Second, the definition should be relevant for informing policy. The notion of 
irreversibility in environmental changes has been useful in informing UN policy through the 
Precautionary Principle. Similarly, the notion of irreversibility in social changes should at 
least be able to apply to practical cases and have the potential to play a role in policy-making. 
Third, the definition should apply to those cases where the change is a clear departure 
from the status quo. The notion of irreversibility is often applied to (eco)systems that have a 
relatively stable mode of functioning, that can be disrupted by some outside influence 
(Verbruggen 2013). This stable status quo is a prerequisite for an irreversible change to be 
morally relevant due to its irreversibility. For example, if the last tigers are about to kill the 
last antelopes, and killing the tigers would be your only way to save the antelopes, then 
irreversible changes will occur whether you act or not, and irreversibility thus cannot give you 
a reason to prefer one course of action over the other. 
Fourth, the definition should acknowledge that people value different things in different 
ways. There are many ways of valuing things, such as intrinsically, for the sake of itself, and 
instrumentally, as a means to achieve some valuable end (McShane 2012). Definitions of 
irreversibility that focus solely on system functions, such as Verbruggen’s (2013) are in 
danger of overlooking changes to entities that are valued intrinsically, and where authenticity 
is very important, such as holy places, particular species or areas of cultural or historic value, 
etc. While we should avoid a definition that acknowledges each entity as unique and its 
demise as irreversible (and thus, one that will be meaningless in practice), the destruction of, 
say, the Eiffel Tower or the demise of the Javan rhinoceros could be considered irreversible 
because of the particular nature of those entities. Even if the Eiffel Tower were rebuilt or 
another great herbivore were to fill in the gap in the Javan ecosystem, unique artefacts or 
species can still be valued in themselves, and thus considered ‘unsubstitutable’.  
Taking these conditions into account, we propose a notion of irreversible change that is 
fundamentally relational. That is, whether a change is reversible or not depends 
fundamentally on the capacities, values and resources of those affected. This has the 
advantage of anchoring notions such as ‘last long’ and ‘difficult to undo’ to a concrete 
perspective. For example, a change such as a new law coming into effect can be considered 
irreversible from an individual point of view, but not from the point of view of the 
government. Also, it allows us to make a distinction between the party that initiates the 
change and the one that is affected by the change, and thus, whether considerations of justice 
or paternalism come into play. Note that for irreversible changes in general, both the initiating 
and the affected parties can be natural events or processes as well as humans. While we aim to 
give a general definition of irreversible changes, however, our paper focuses on irreversible 
social changes, where both the initiating and the affected parties are human. 
We propose the following definition: 
“A change is irreversible for a party X if and only if the effects of the change can be 
expected to last for X’s lifetime or longer; if X does not have and is unable to acquire the 
capacities and resources to undo the effects of the change; and if the effects include the 
destruction or termination of something that X has reason to consider to be non-
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substitutable; or the creation of something that X has reason to consider to have no 
functional equivalent.” 
We briefly elaborate on this definition. First, the party X can range from a single 
individual to the whole of humanity. Indeed, the latter seems to be the party implicitly 
assumed in literature on irreversible ecological changes: while the extinction of a species or 
the melting of the Greenland ice sheet can be considered perfectly reversible processes, given 
unlimited time and resources, they are irreversible from humanity’s point of view. We can 
distinguish here between changes that are universally and locally irreversible: we consider a 
change to be universally irreversible if X can include all of humanity, that is, the change 
cannot be reversed meaningfully even if all of humanity were to attempt it. Examples include 
the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, or a language dying out when its last speaker passes 
away. We consider a change to be locally irreversible if it is irreversible for some subset of 
humanity (say, a local tribe or community) but not for all of humanity. Examples include 
local or regional environmental disturbances such as large-scale deforestation, or the drying 
up of large water resources due to structural drawdown for cultivation of crops requiring too 
much irrigation. These changes cannot be resolved locally but could be addressed by a 
coordinated international effort. Other examples include most legal changes, e.g. anti-gay 
laws that change the situation of a nation’s LGBT community for the worse, but that this 
community cannot itself repeal. Though such laws might be repealed by the government at 
some later time, as long as they do not have an explicit expiration date, policy-makers should 
evaluate them as they would other permanent changes: a locally irreversible change is still 
irreversible, all other things remaining equal. 
Second, the choice of X’s lifetime for the duration reflects the importance of perspective: 
the handing out of 99-year land lease contracts by the government of Tanzania to foreign 
investors (Sulle and Nelson, 2009) - see section 5 -, may not constitute an irreversible change 
for the country, but it can certainly be considered irreversible for the affected smallholder 
farmers. 
Third, whether something is substitutable depends on two factors. The first is how the 
entity is valued: if it is valued intrinsically, as itself, it can be considered to be unique or to 
have a strict identity (e.g. the Eiffel Tower). In that case, the entity is considered non-
substitutable. If it is valued instrumentally, as means to an end, its substitutability depends on 
the availability of alternative means to reach the end. Note that substitutability does not equal 
compensatability: Humphrey (2001) gives the example of a bread that may compensate me 
for the loss of a glass of water, yet is not a substitute.  
Fourth, while irreversible changes are usually considered in the context of destruction 
(species, entire ecosystems, the Greenland ice sheet), they can also take the form of creation. 
For example, the creation of nuclear waste or the coming into effect of a law that promotes 
injustice can be considered a change that introduces an irreversible harm. 
An irreversible change does not have to constitute a harm. Indeed, an irreversible change 
may well be a structural improvement, such as education, or it may be a ‘mixed bag’, where it 
has both beneficial and harmful effects, or the effects are valued differently by different 
affected parties - the effects of a 99-year land lease may be valued quite differently by the 
investor and the smallholder farmers using the land; or by those who get hired to work on a 
new plantation and those who merely get evicted from their ancestral homes without being 
offered a job. We define an irreversible harm as follows: 
“An irreversible change is also an irreversible harm for a party X if and only if that party 
has reason to consider one or more effects of the change harmful.” 
This definition is quite broad, in the sense that even a ‘mixed bag’-change is considered 
harmful under this definition. However, note that unlike the Precautionary Principle, this 
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definition does not yet forbid irreversible harms. It is set up rather broadly so as to ‘flag’ those 
changes that need further ethical attention. How to evaluate irreversible changes and harms is 
a question in itself which we address in the next section.  
3. How should we value irreversible changes? 
An irreversible harm has one obvious aspect in common with a reversible harm; that it is 
a harm. The primary ethical difference is that an irreversible harm permanently closes off 
options for action for a party, thereby limiting the ways in which a party can flourish - or 
survive.2 This can occur because of an external change, such as loss of resources, land or 
unique entities, or the introducton of an innovation into a natural environment where it can go 
out of control, such as a genetically modified organism (van Merkerk and van Lente, 2005); 
or it can occur because of internal changes, such as reduction of capacities or capabilities, or 
death. This is not a strict distinction, nor does it need to be so: especially the more complex 
socio-ecological systems are, the fuzzier the boundary becomes between system and 
environment. In addition, many changes affect both. For example, education on sustainable 
soil management can improve both the capacity of a community to care for its soil and 
thereby, the variety and quality of their agricultural options. Generally, however, both ethical 
and economic methods of valuation have focused on either of one side. 
While ethics tends to evaluate actions rather than sets of options for action, some work 
has been done in this area. The normative side of the capability approach has elaborated on 
the capabilities that allow people to do and be what they have reason to value (e.g. Sen 1992; 
Nussbaum 2006; Robeyns 2011). In the philosophy of technology, Illies and Meijers (2009) 
have called sets of possible actions ‘action schemes’, and argue that we have both the 
responsibility to perform morally right actions and bring morally right action schemes into 
existence. Illies and Meijers offer no criteria, though, for judging whether a given action 
scheme is morally better or worse than another. Intuitively, one could think that having more 
options for action available is always better, but this does not have to be true (Peterson and 
Spahn 2011). An example of this can be found in the debate on human enhancement, where it 
has been argued that cognitive enhancement (increasing our cognitive capacities) without 
corresponding moral enhancement could worsen rather than relieve current societal problems 
(Persson and Savulescu 2008; Pols and Houkes 2011). Similarly, in the philosophy of 
technology Jonas (1984) has argued that technology has enabled us to make drastic and far-
reaching changes, the consequences of which we cannot adequately foresee, let alone control. 
According to Jonas, this has given us an unprecedented responsibility to develop our 
capacities to anticipate and evaluate the possible (negative) effects of those changes. Also, the 
extension of an action scheme may be morally better for some affected parties and worse for 
others. For example, expensive moral enhancements may make those who undergo them 
‘better’ persons, while at the same time promoting inequality and disadvantageing the poor 
who cannot afford them. 
An important ethical consequence of irreversible harms is that they often leave people and 
communities worse off in their capacity to resist, adapt to, or mitigate the effects of further 
irreversible changes due to loss of resilience: the human capacity to reverse harms and 
recover from them. If some harm irreversibly damages this capacity for resilience, the 
affected party will be less able to reverse or recover from further harms on their own, 
increasing the likelihood of further losses of resilience, and so on. This notion carries special 
significance at the level of social groups. Norton (2005, ch. 3) explicitly argues that our goal 
2 Though our paper is human-centered, this definition of irreversible harm is not necessarily anthropocentric: as 
long as one can define survival and flourishing for an animal, a species or an ecosystem, and can argue that it has 
intrinsic value (or should be valued intrinsically), one can argue that it can suffer irreversible harm. 
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should not be the long-term survival of humans, but rather that of cultural communities. 
According to Norton, cultural and social institutions are vital for maintaining and updating 
knowledge about how to live within the limits of the land, and how to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Thus, a structural degradation of the resilience of a cultural community may 
not only be problematic in itself, but also for the long-term survival of humans as a species. 
In cases where the initiator of the change is another party than those most harmed by the 
irreversible change, this can lead to situations of structural injustice (Young 2004; 2006). 
Young defines this in the following way: ‘Structural injustice exists when social processes put 
large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the 
means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable 
others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their 
capacities’ (2006, p. 114). Structural injustices are particularly hard to rectify, as those parties 
who have most to gain by changing the system have no capacities to do so, while those who 
do have these capacities have the strongest incentives to maintain the system.  
This concern is echoed strongly in literature from the domain of development studies, 
where researchers have made widespread observations that the production and reproduction of 
poverty over long periods of time is closely connected to processes of adverse incorporation 
and/or social marginalisation. Some writers go so far as to say that there are causal relations 
running from the latter to the former, and claim that the existence of this causality is key to 
understanding how certain groups or individuals are kept poor even in contexts characterised 
by economic growth and accumulation (Smith, 2007; Hickey and du Toit, 2007). Yet, no 
explicit notion of irreversibility has been used in this discourse, so it has also not been singled 
out for reflection. The same can be said about a currently popular discourse in the field of 
disaster management that emphasizes the need to address risk of loss of resilience of people 
and communities after experiencing major shocks. In an attempt to make sense of that field, 
Manyena (2006) lists twelve distinct definitions, which reveal disagreement even over 
whether the notion of resilience refers to processes or outcomes.  
Perhaps most relevant for the purpose of this paper is the interprepation of resilience as 
the ability of communities to maintain their core values or assets through addressing non-core 
elements of their existence. Manyena gives an example of the substitution of drought-resistant 
crops for more rain-dependent crops such as maize. In this interpretation, resilience thus refers 
to a system’s ability to alter non-essential attributes—to adapt in order to keep functioning 
(Manyena, 2006). This shows a resemblance to the earlier-mentioned human capabilities 
approach developed by Sen, Nussbaum and others.3  
Valuation of irreversible changes has received more explicit attention in economics, 
especially for treating them inadequately. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), the often-used 
consequentialist way of valuing interventions, has been criticised for not being able to deal 
adequately with complexity and uncertainty (Verbruggen 2013). One especially problematic 
assumption is that every value can be converted to monetary value; that, while not everything 
may be substitutable, everything is compensatable. However, a significant section of the 
public is unwilling to put a price tag on e.g. parts of the natural environment (Spash 1997; 
Conant 2012). One prominent disagreement over values and valuation relates to the practice 
of discounting project costs and benefits expected in the future. This becomes highly 
problematic when the welfare of future generations needs to be weighed in, for example, 
when climate change impacts or biodiversity loss are at stake. However, some economists still 
argue that choosing a zero discount rate would result in too much early investment in low-
3 The application of the notion of resilience to disaster management is itself an interesting example of drawing 
inspiration from other disciplines, a.o. ecology (see also the discussion about the Safe Minimum Standard further 
below). 
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return climate measures, as compared to when one would employ a positive market interest 
rate (for a review of the controversy, see NOU 2012).  
Another valuation problem arises when there is a very small probability of a disaster 
scenario. In the standard CBA technique, this would have a negligible effect on a project’s net 
present value estimation, since this is derived as the average of the various possible scenario 
outcomes weighed by their probabilities. Given the huge impact of the destruction, if it does 
occur, one could argue instead in favour of a decision strategy where the loss of the worst 
case scenario is minimised. This is especially important in cases when the party at risk is 
different from the party that will receive the intervention’s benefits (cf. Hansson 2003). 
The concept of Safe Minimum Standard of Conservation (“SMS”) was introduced into 
CBA to address this issue. Resembling the maximin strategy in decision theory, the SMS is a 
rule to value changes in ‘flow resources with a critical zone’ (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1968): 
resources that are renewable unless depleted beyond a certain threshold, after which 
degradation or destruction becomes irreversible. Bishop (1978) gives the example of animal 
species that can survive unless their population drops below a certain number of individuals, 
after which extinction is inevitable. A similar example could be a deteriorating ecosystem that 
gradually loses resilience until a certain threshold is passed, after which it suddenly and 
drastically shifts into a new equilibrium (Scheffer et al. 2001). This, in turn, can lead to an 
irreversible reduction in the amount and quality of services the ecosystem can provide. 
Though Bishop focuses on natural resources, there seems to be no reason why the SMS could 
not be extended to social and cultural resources, provided they can also be classified as flow 
resources with a critical zone. One can think of socio-environmental systems that would be 
just as susceptible to equilibrium changes as the ecosystems they depend on, or cultural or 
knowledge institutions that can only function with a steady input of effort and/or resources. 
The simplest formulation of Bishop’s (1978) SMS states that a proposed project should 
not be implemented if the cost to society is so high that the estimated costs of preservation 
(labelled B) would exceed the expected economic benefits from the project, exclusive of its 
environmental effects (denoted A); in other words his minimum requirement is that A – B > 
0. A careful valuation of A and B is of course important.  
Bishop then goes one step further by arguing that the decision rule should also consider 
potential irreversible loss of environmental capital that is not yet considered valuable at the 
time of assessment, but that could become valuable at some point in the future (C), and taking 
account of the probability of this loss occurring (y). For example, a plant might turn out to be 
a source of medicine, or a bug might turn out to be valuable as a sustainable means for pest 
control. This leads to A – B > yC. However, since y is unknown, yC cannot be estimated. 
Therefore Bishop proposed that public decision makers may set a threshold value (X) to 
represent yC. This X is thus taken to represent what society considers an acceptable cost of 
preserving those environmental goods that are irreversibly threatened by a project, which is 
dependent on ethical as well as economic values. Consequently, the decision-making rule 
becomes that a project should not be implemented unless A – B > X.  
However, “…safe minimum standards will not in itself tell us what is an optimal or 
appropriate level of ambition, and these approaches therefore necessitate specific trade-offs in 
each individual case .” (NOU 2012: 119). Incidentally, this observation equally refers to the 
UN’s Precautionary Principle mentioned earlier. NOU (2012) puts considerable emphasis on 
the need to engage in thorough investigations of y, in order to try to reduce the uncertainties 
regarding the probability of diasterous outcomes, and on clearly defining the crucial 
knowledge gaps in approaching the value of y. Moreover, since knowledge gaps can 
sometimes can be reduced through more fact finding, economists tell us that there is in such 
situations a positive value attached to the postponement of go/no-go decisions concerning 
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investment projects. This is known as a(n) (quasi-) option value in economics (Claude 1974; 
Arrow and Fischer 1974; Fischer and Krutilla 1974). 
Alternatively, Van der Sluijs and Turkenburg (2006) argue that in dealing with extremely 
complex systems, such as the climate system, uncertainty reduction might only work to a 
limited degree. They rather argue that we should increase the resilience of ecosystems,  
reducing the likelihood of irreversible degradation. This is in line with Manyena’s (2006) 
emphasis on promoting resilience in disaster management, and the focus in the Capability 
Approach on enhancing human capabilities as being of prime moral importance. Van der 
Sluijs and Turkenburg argue that ecosystems’ resilience can be increased by implementing 
robust measures – measures that are expected to be beneficial over a wide range of possible 
outcomes, thus limiting the need for uncertainty reduction. 
4. Irreversible social change in theory 
4.1 Colonisation of the lifeworld 
In this section we go into why there is a need to value irreversible social changes and how 
this valuing can be done. Reaching back to our earlier definition, we propose a procedure for 
dealing with irreversible changes that should be followed as soon as certain criteria are met. 
In section five we use this procedure to evaluate a concrete case study regarding land 
acquisition for biofuel plantations in Tanzania. 
In section three we have established why irreversible changes are ethically relevant. In 
practice, however, cultural and social changes and the experienced world in general are 
‘systematically undervalued’ (Adger et al. 2009, p. 349) by current policy evaluation 
mechanisms; qualitative changes are difficult to capture using quantitative methods. This 
observation has also been made by the German sociologist and philosopher Habermas (1987), 
who offers the following general explanation of this systematic undervaluation. According to 
Habermas, the everyday social world or lifeworld is characterised by communicative action, 
where agents cooperate on the basis of shared understanding, communicating about common 
goals and values / reasons to achieve those goals. Systems, in contrast, are characterised by 
strategic action, where participants try to achieve their individual goals by using the system. 
Prime examples are free markets (that facilitate individual maximisation of profits) or 
bureaucracies (that facilitate maximisation of institutional power). Systems in themselves are 
not problematic: indeed, they can be very good at fulfilling their intended function. However, 
they can become pathological if they ‘colonise the lifeworld’, that is, if they incorporate more 
and more parts of the lifeworld and evaluate it according to its own standards, e.g. when they 
require small social organisations to be profitable or to be formally institutionalised. Another 
example of this could be the EU requirement that imported biofuels should be certified as 
being sustainable since Dec 2010, as laid down in its Directive 2009/28/EC, articles 17, 18 
and 194. In practice this has favoured the generally less sustainable plantations over 
decentralised or smallholder production. This is rather ironic, given that smallholders are de 
facto operating according to the asked-for sustainability principles, but lack the financial and 
organisational capacity to prove it (Romijn et al. 2013; Van Eijk et al. in press). 
This colonisation of the lifeworld entails a switch from communicative action to strategic 
action, where communication about goals, values and reasons is either adapted into the 
system, e.g. by various methods to convert non-monetary values to monetary values, or 
marginalised. Though Habermas does not explicitly connect this colonisation of the lifeworld 
to globalisation, the (physical) distance and power inequalities involved in globalisation can 
easily worsen the effects of this colonisation (cf. Mol 2007). For example, it has been shown 
4 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0028:EN:NOT 
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that essential features of systems that are designed within the context of one region tend to get 
transplanted to other areas without due regard for, and awareness of differences in local 
conditions, giving rise to misfits between system and local reality. The phenomenon has been 
identified as a major cause of failure in North-South technology tranfer projects (e.g., Stewart, 
1977). Physical distance makes it more difficult to communicate effectively and monitor and 
control the effects of one’s actions, while power inequalities remove incentives to go for 
communicative rather than strategic actions. Cultural and social institutions are especially at 
risk here because they tend to be less tangible and changes to them are less easy to measure 
quantitatively than e.g. physical or ecological changes (Adger et al. 2009). 
As a way to counter this colonisation of the lifeworld, Habermas proposes strengthening 
democratic institutions and practices where citizens can actively deliberate - and thus, engage 
in communicative action - about public issues, including systems, their boundaries and their 
place in society. This does not imply that Habermas believes democratic practice could take 
full control of a complex and globalised society, but he does claim that it can influence and 
(de)legitimise policies and particular social processes (Habermas 1996, Ch. 8; Bohman and 
Rehg 2011).  
Highly similar ideas find expression in the literature about industrialisation and 
development, agricultural innovation, and organisational/managerial capacity building in the 
South. Here, researchers and practitioners alike have widely advocated policies and strategies 
that are reminiscent of the capability approach discussed earlier: namely, to foster the 
strengthening of local human skills and knowledge for selecting, operating, maintaining and 
adapting innovations designed outside their local domain, in order to reduce the risks of misfit 
and to ensure that local people gain or maintain some degree of local control over the nature 
and direction of externally-driven change processes that affect them. Iterative social 
interaction is seen to be a particularly fruitful mechanism of such learning, with an especially 
important role envisaged for (potential) local innovation users (e.g., UNDP 2000; Lall 1992; 
Hall et al. 2012; Bond and Hulme 1999). In this way of thinking one can also see that 
democratisation and iterative social interaction may be regarded, among other things, as 
means to increase social resilience; the capacity of human systems to adapt to (major) change 
while being able to safeguard the functioning of their core functionalities. 
4.2 Extending the Safe Minimum Standard 
In the last sections we have encountered two strategies that could be used to deal with 
irreversible social harms. The first was derived from Habermas’ work and various 
development-studies approaches, all of whom focus on social changes and colonisation of the 
lifeworld in general and propose strengthening democratic (innovation) practices and 
capacities for constituting and implementing such practices as a remedy. While this would 
certainly be a welcome development, there are at least two reasons to build in extra protection 
for vulnerable parties. The first is the severity of the harm arising from its possible 
irreversibility; the second is the more practical problem that the processes of stakeholder 
selection for and involvement in policy discussions often are hardly just or fair. This holds 
especially in developing countries and/or where the initiator is a foreign investor, and the 
facilitator is a powerful government some of whose bureaucrats and politicans pursue private 
interests.  
The second strategy to deal with irreversible social harms was the Safe Minimum 
Standard, developed to deal with irreversible ecological changes, particularly, species 
extinction (Bishop 1978). The Safe Minimum Standard said that we should avoid irreversible 
harms unless the social costs are unacceptably large. Given the fact that social institutions can 
be valuable as instruments and as themselves, and given the fact that they are systematically 
undervalued by the classical tools of policy analysis (Adger et al. 2009), we argue that the 
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Safe Minimum Standard can - and should - be applied to social changes as well. This standard 
could be formulated as a decision-rule for policy-makers who consider whether to implement 
policies with irreversible effects: 
Safe Minimum Standard for Social Change (SMS-SC): “If a party X proposes a policy 
that is anticipated to lead to irreversible social harms for one or more stakeholders, then 
that policy should not be implemented unless the costs to society to which those 
stakeholders belong is deemed to be unacceptably large by that society.” 
The remainder of this section will elaborate on and support the SMS-SC. The word 
‘anticipate’ is used here to indicate that this principle only applies in cases of relative 
certainty with regard to the harms; in cases of fundamental uncertainty rather than situations 
of risk, other principles, such as the Precautionary Principle, may apply. 
Theoretically, a straight-out prohibition is not so different from the decision process that 
would result in Habermas’ ideal speech situation. Presumably, if stakeholders were to 
deliberate in a rational process with no power differences, they would also reject any policy 
that would inflict irreversible social harms on them, unless this were the only case in which an 
even worse harm could be avoided. In practice, though, ‘merely’ having a process for 
stakeholder involvement might not always lead to a just or even an acceptable outcome for 
those stakeholders, as the Sun biofuels case illustrates (cf. Greenwood 2007). The SMS-SC is 
therefore meant as the strongest possible protection for those stakeholders who have 
legitimate and urgent claims, but not the power to adequately back them up during the 
decision-making process (Van Buren 2001).5 
The wary reader will no doubt have noted that this protection still depends on the 
willingness and ability of the policy-maker to implement the SMS-SC and make sure it is 
upheld. However, given the ethical severity of irreversible harms, the SMS-SC would often be 
supported by such high-level policy instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the UN Millennium Development Goals, and more specifically by the UN Final draft 
of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights, which states that ‘No policy, 
in any area, should exacerbate poverty or have a disproportionate negative impact on persons 
living in poverty.’6 In other words, in practice the SMS-SC is more a specification of already 
accepted high-level policy principles than a fundamentally new proposal. 
A question one might have at this point is: how can we determine objectively whether a 
socio-cultural change, irreversible or not, actually constitutes a harm? The short answer is that 
we can’t. This is because the notion of what constitutes a ‘harm’ may itself differ between 
stakeholders (cf. Boons and Mendoza 2010). Defining an ‘objective’ notion of harm runs the 
risk of propagating the system’s colonisation of the lifeworld again, where the lifeworld has 
to adhere to the demands of the system in proving harm or be marginalised, for example with 
respect to land acquisition in the global biofuel trade (Silva-Castañeda 2012). As Norton 
(2005) argues, policy discussions should not only be about goals, but also about values and 
indicators. Stakeholders should be able to bring their own notions of harm into the discussion, 
though these notions can and should be open to discussion as well. 
5 Van Buren’s claim that the most vulnerable stakeholders should be the focus of discussion resembles the 
‘primum non nocere / first, do no harm’ principle in medical ethics, that demands the strongest possible 
protection for the most vulnerable stakeholder, the patient. Rawls (1971) similarly argues that, if people were to 
reason from the original position, where they would be ignorant of their place in society, they would naturally 
maximise the situation of the most vulnerable stakeholder by adopting the maximin rule in the distribution of 
primary goods. 
6 Foundational principle A 17. 
 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-39_en.pdf. 
Accessed 14 November 2013. 
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One possible criticism of the SMS-SC is that it, in its current form, offers little action 
guidance. It tells us what policy-makers may not do, but not what they should do instead. We 
offer two suggestions here. Our first suggestion would be to focus on strategies that prevent 
the SMS-SC from being applicable. That is, whenever a policy would lead to irreversible 
social harms, that policy should be amended in order to not bring about harm, or, if that is 
impossible, to make the harm reversible. In practice, this would often mean addressing one of 
irreversibility’s three components: long duration, high revoking costs or substitutability. Our 
second suggestion would be to explicitly take the (quasi-)option value of waiting and 
reducing uncertainty into account, both with regard to whether a change will be irreversible, 
as well as with regard to whether a change will constitute a harm. While there can be value in 
‘being the first’ and loss in ‘missing the boat’, threats of possible irreversible harms should 
lead to an implementation of the Precautionary Principle, which in this case may well entail a 
combination of uncertainty reduction, implementing robust precautions and a wait-and-see 
approach to determine whether a new development has the potential to truly contribute to 
sustainable development or will be a short-lived hype. Anticipation and responsiveness might 
be hallmarks of responsible innovation (Stilgoe et al. 2013), but sometimes postponing 
innovation might actually be the more responsible option. 
5. Irreversible social change in practice  
This section hones in on an important recent phenomenon, the establishment of large 
biofuels projects by foreign actors in poor developing countries, with the objective to grow 
biomass for western energy markets. Through many of these investments, local rural 
populations have been (at risk of being) dispossessed from their land and resources on which 
they depend for their livelihoods. Although biofuel-induced ‘land grabbing’ lately has been 
subject to intense scrutiny (e.g. Matondi et al. 2011; Cotula et al. 2009), the question to what 
extent its consequences constitute irreversible impacts in the social domain have not been 
addressed explicitly as such. Our first objective is, then, to identify those social changes that 
could be considered socially irreversible for the concerned actors in this context, and to 
answer the question to what extent our framework is capable of identifying their ethically 
problematic aspects. We focus on Tanzania, a country in sub-Saharan Africa where several 
such projects were initiated in the early years of the 21st century. We will round off by by 
raising suggestions for possible recommendations for action based on on our ethics-based 
framework. 
Modern-day land grabbing is being facilitated by a constellation of factors which can be 
analysed well with Habermas’ conception of the colonisation of the life world. In particular, a 
continued persistence of the neo-liberal economic paradigm in world economic affairs has 
contributed to a widespread belief in the benefits of a development model for poor countries 
premised on western private-sector driven investments for the purpose of building exports to 
western markets. In this climate there is also a big role for the world’s powerful international 
institutions, notably the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation, who try to promote 
unimpeded transnational investment and trade through ensuring that host governments 
observe “good governance” principles. In practice, “good governance” is not an ideologically 
neutral concept. Under its banner, frugal governmental involvement with the affairs of the 
private business sector has been widely pushed, among other things through making the 
continued reception of international aid and debt relief conditional upon host governments’ 
cooperation with respect to the adherence to these principles (Cotula et al. 2009).  
In this climate, investments in biofuels in poor countries began to be promoted in the 
early years of the 21st century as a ‘package solution to energy security, environmental 
protection and rural development’ (Widengård, 2011, p. 51); in other words as “win-wins”, in 
which both the investing company, and the host country with its people would reap benefits 
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(Bergius 2012, emphasis added). Another, older strong development paradigm can also still 
be seen to influence important actors on the world biofuel scene: that of development-as-
modernisation. In this paradigm, development is conceived as a top-down process initiated by 
elites, with its benefits gradually spreading downwards and outwards until the entire society 
has been enfolded into it.  
It should therefore hardly be considered surprising that risks of social harms from biofuel 
projects initially remained substantially out of focus: It was essentially defined away as a non-
existent scenario in the minds of leading development and business actors. Initially, the 
weight of regulation was on private sector facilitation through creating transparent 
frameworks and minimizing bureacratic obstacles in order to maximise the possibilities for 
“win-win” outcomes (Bergius, 2012). Some actors undoubtedly did possess relevant 
awareness but preferred to pursue their own shor-term corporate interests by seeking out the 
room for manoeuvre afforded by the prevailing economic environment, until such time when 
actual evidence of social harms began to accumulate before the public eye.  
The investors that came to Tanzania entered a country with approximately 4 million 
peasant families, among whom poverty and malnutrition are high.  Farming and nomadic 
herding are the principal economic activities (WWF, 2009; van Eijck et al. in press). Most 
rural households tend to diversify their livelihood sources in order to decrease their 
vulnerability in case of crop failure or irregular weather conditions. Products from common 
property resources are highly important in this scheme of things. A World Bank report 
estimates that between 25% and 50% of local people’s ‘income’ comes from such non-
marketed resources (World Bank 2008). 
In Kisarawe district, which was targeted by Sun Biofuels UK, marginal agriculture on 
poor-quality land was the main livelihood source for about 80% of the population consisting 
of approximately 3000 households. Much of this area was already in a degraded state because 
of the proximity of Tanzania’s huge port city, Dar es Salaam, which generates an enormous 
demand for cooking charcoal – the major source of forest clearance. Local communities had 
great difficulties trying to manage their local natural resources (WWF, 2009). Sun Biofuels 
negotiated a land lease for cultivation of close to 2000 ha Jatropha, an oilseed shrub. 
Subsequent research among local villagers has noted many harms from this development 
that cannot be reversed: Worst of all, Sun destroyed a local swamp that was a crucial water 
source for local people during dry months. After the establishment of the plantation they now 
have to walk up to 10 km (previously a 15-30 minutes’ distance) for their basic water needs, 
which has adversely affected their agricultural productivity and their quality of life more 
generally (Bergius, 2012). Wages earned from plantation work proved so low that the money 
is insufficient to buy the provisions that were previously self-produced through subsistence 
activities. It proved impossible to combine a full-time wage job on the plantation with own-
account farming (Kitabu, 2012), but people could not revert back to the old situation due to 
the loss of the land and water resources.  
Monetary compensation paid by Sun was grossly deficient. Valuation practices were 
aimed at minimising compensation values, and illiterate villagers also had insufficient 
knowledge about their land rights and could not negotiate adequately. There was also 
considerable pressure put by a local MP, while Sun misrepresented prospective benefits and 
played down risks, to the point where strategic “divide and rule” tactics involving the 
populations from different villages in the area were used to coerce villages into agreeing to 
the proposals (Bergius, 2012).  
Compensation was also promised (verbally) in the form of improved public infrastructure 
such as a better equipped maternity clinic. While in themselves beneficial, the services 
provided by these human capital assets are obviously no direct substitutes for ecosystem 
services derived from land-based activities that are crucial for maintaining food security of 
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local people, like beekeeping, charcoal making, hunting, and medicinal and food plants 
gathering (World Bank 2008; Msuya et al. 2010). Moreover, the promises never materialised. 
Sun also included an ancient ancestral graveyard site into its plantation, and subsequently 
forbade public access to it. According to enthnographic local research by Bergius (2012), 
graveyards are always placed in the common village land, and related practices are deeply 
embedded in traditional culture and beliefs. The site in question was often frequented by local 
people. Some years later the access constraint was eased, but only with considerable effort 
from locally-operating NGOs and helped by wide public journalistic exposure of the problem. 
The second investor in focus is Bioshape from the Netherlands. In contrast to Sun, this 
investor targeted a remote coastal area (Kilwa) with plenty of so-called “unused” land. It 
planned to establish a jatropha plantation of 81,000 ha. In the first instance it convinced local 
villagers to give up approximately 34,500 ha of their village land. According to both the 
villagers and the company, the land was not in current use by the local population, and thus 
left them with sufficient resources for their day-to-day farming needs. However, some time 
after the land lease took effect, problems began to be reported (WWF, 2009; Sulle and 
Nelson, 2009; Chachage and Baha 2010; Valentino 2011), drawing attention to loss of 
hunting grounds due to clear felling of forest. The Bioshape business plan leaked out, which 
was found to include an estimate of 200,000 and 800,000 cubic metres of valuable hardwood 
harvesting potential on its concession, worth 50-150 million dollars (Valentino, 2011.). Those 
grounds were reported to be used by the local people for firewood gathering, charcoal 
making, medicinal plant gathering, etc., all of which were important for people’s caloric 
intake or their broader livelihood. Poverty in the region is high; 30% of people are reported to 
be either chronically food insecure, or highly vulnerable to food insecurity (van Eijck et al. in 
press).  
Bioshape did not engage in direct arm twisting of the local people, but it somehow 
managed to get its compulsory Environmental Impact Assessment officially approved by 
putting the name of a reputable scientist on its cover, without this individual’s involvement in 
the study (Valentino, 2011). Also, its permissions to start clear-felling were issued by a 
Minister who did not have the juristiction to do so (he was later removed from office, after the 
discovery of a raft of other scandals).7 Community members did not receive adequate 
compensation for the reduction in commons access, thus, they could not compensate for the 
loss of those resources in other ways (Chachage and Baha 2010; van Eijck et al. in press.).  
The compensation paid by Bioshape was a mere US$ 12 per ha for a 99–year lease 
period. Moreover, the arrrangement entailed the permanent loss of all land rights for the 
villagers, since the land would revert to the central government after that. When they were 
negotiating, the villagers were not aware of that fact (Valentino, 2011). To make matters 
worse, the local District government later creamed off 60% of the compensation amount 
(which however, they had no legal right to do).  This could happen because the money was 
being transferred from the company to the villagers through their offices (Ibid 2011). Some 
village communities both in Kisarawe and in Kilwa say that none of the agreed-upon 
compensation money ever reached them. Others did not even know what to do with their 
claim forms, and never received any money because they did not file any claims (Bergius, 
2012). And just like  in the case of Sun, there were also verbal promises of upgraded public 
infrastructure, which did not materialise. 
Villagers also pointed out that, to the extent the plantations had brought “mixed bags of 
goods and harms”, the benefits were short term in nature whereas the bads are enduring 
(Kitabu, 2012). As it turned out, the benefits proved highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the 
global economic system that suffered a big implosion in 2008. In that same year both 
7 Personal information  obtained by Romijn during field trip in Tanzania, 2012. 
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plantation firms withdrew due to bankruptcy induced by disappointing harvests, crashing 
world oil prices, and inability to attract fresh finance from risk-averse banks. This left the 
villagers high and dry, without their new wage jobs, without their former land resources, and 
without the maternity clinic, school, improved road, or water well they had been promised 
(Carrington, 2011; Eijck et al. in press). In both cases, the transfer of land rights has been 
permanent; no legal procedure exists for a reversal. So far, strenuous efforts by Tanzanian 
lands rights NGOs to address this problem have been to no avail, so we see good reason to 
speak of irreversibility here.  
The loss of vital land resources is bound to affect the livelihood opportunities of future 
generations even worse than the current one. Tanzania’s population is growing fast, while 
climate change effects and structural over-utilisation are steadily reducing land productivity. 
These trends are not confined to Tanzania either. Land pressures are steadily increasing as a 
result of these factors throughout much of Sub-saharan Africa (von Braun et al. 2013). When 
projects like those of Bioshape and Sun are allowed to add to this already heavily stressed 
environment, crucial tipping points could be reached, inducing structural loss of social 
resilience: we should expect the uprooting of local communities in search of survival, 
aggravating rural-urban migration and destitution in urban slums, and to the break up of 
traditional ways of family and community life. 
When we compare Kilwa to Kisarawe, the latter case shows the least resilience: The 
starting point was a community already under severe stress due to a degraded ecological 
system. Its chances of recovering from the Sun experience and its ability to adapt to the new 
situation in a way in which their core social and spiritual values are preserved are dim. But 
also in the case of Kilwa, the consequences should not be underestimated due to the very 
large land area involved, and the severe poverty of the local people.  
In both cases, the lessons from Bishop’s Safe Minimum Standard and the theory of option 
values have relevance because of the scale of the envisaged projects and the fragility of the 
socio-economic systems in whch they were introduced: First, there would have been value in 
the government giving out substantially shorter lease periods (a measure that Tanzania in fact 
implemented in 2012); legally requiring the companies’ to draw up an exit strategy detailing 
compensation in case of financial trouble, thus mitigating potential harms (van Eijck et al. in 
press); and requiring them to correct unforeseen negative effects from the lease such as re-
allowing villagers to access those parts of the leased land considered non-substitutable, such 
as neighbourhood water points and ancestral grave sites. Even better, the government could 
have insisted on arrangements in which local people retain their land rights and share in the 
benefits from the plantation as co-owners; and mandating that maintenance of adequate food 
supply and water access for local communities become essential parts of such investment 
deals (van Eijck et al. in press). A strict land zoning strategy and upper ceilings on the size of 
the leased land could also help to some extent (these two measures are in fact currently being 
implemented in Tanzania). All these strategies could remove or mitigate potential irreversible 
harms and thus, could prevent the SMS-SC from coming into effect.  
Following option value theory, there also would have been value in postponing full-scale 
implementation. Instead, one could have opted for a more cautious, gradual and flexible 
approach, which could have generated lessons and thus afforded space for course-corrections 
along the way. Such a gradual approach should be grounded in more deliberative, democratic 
project organisation and management principles, so that collective learning by all concerned 
stakeholders can be allowed to happen through iterative social interactions in the spirit of 
Habermas and development studies researchers such as Hall et al. and Bond and Hulme. At 
the same time, we should not be naive in advocating more communicative over strategic 
action without caution. As observed by Borras Jr & Franco (2010, p. 31), a decentralized 
negotiation process may even aggravate problems for the rural poor, because it is in the rural 
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communities that the political and economic power of the dominant classes and groups are 
most entrenched. Communities are not homogeneous groups. Indeed, the strengthening of 
‘democratic’ practices in this context is as vulnerable to being colonised by the system as any 
other social practice, and needs to be given flesh or risk being hollowed out as well. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the notion of an irreversible change and its ethical 
significance. We have argued that irreversible harms can be ethically problematic for several 
reasons, most importantly that they reduce the options for action open to a party, which may 
include foreclosure of opportunities for flourishing and survival as well as for responding and 
adapting to further detrimental changes (i.e. a loss of resilience). We have investigated 
economic methods for evaluating irreversible changes, most notably Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and the Safe Minimum Standard, and used Habermas’s theory on colonisation of the lifeworld 
to explain why social harms are systematically undervalued. Finally, we have extended the 
Safe Minimum Standard to be able to evaluate irreversible social harm and formulated 
recommendations for policy-makers on how to deal with threats of irreversible harm. The 
application to the case of Tanzanian biofuel projects brings out that our framework is indeed 
useful for pointing up problematic social irreversibilities, as well as the key forces that 
produce them, and can also suggest a range of ways of countering them. 
As suggestion for further research and action, we suggest that the most pressing issue 
identified in this paper is that social harms are systematically undervalued, especially at the 
time when investments are being considered or just starting off. This was also clearly 
illustrated in the Tanzanian biofuel story – the vantage point of the government and the 
investors who are supposed to weigh these effects is too dramatically different from the 
perspective of the local people. As one Tanzanian journalist put it, “It is hard for most people 
in the industrialised world to imagine the level of desperation that many Tanzanians 
experience” (Mutch, 2010). In such complex situations, coupled with a dominant neo-liberal 
mindset and institutional set-up, there are plenty of opportunities for Young’s structural 
injustice to develop and become deeply entrenched. The consequences thereof became clearly 
manifest in the unequal negotiation positions and the ability of powerful players to twist the 
system to its benefit. 
One possible way in which the undervaluation issue can be tackled is to further develop 
the notion of socio-ecological systems. If this notion were to replace or accompany the 
classical notion of ecosystems in e.g. environmental sciences, the methodological toolkit of 
this field might be adapted and applied to measuring and valuing social changes as well, 
especially those caused by environmental changes and vice versa. This could also inspire 
further relevant development in Cost-Benefit Analysis, by for instance increasing the realism 
of ex-ante project impact assessments through improved valuation.  
There is however, also a limit on what such economic approaches can achieve. Their 
focus on monetary valuation and compensation reflects the tendency of the increasing 
commodification of natural resources within a neoliberal framework. This tendency, and the 
underlying value system that promote it, should be viewed with a healthy dose of caution. As 
the Tanzanian case study shows, not only are people in rural areas vulnerable because they are 
constrained in how they can make use of this (little) money in a relatively undeveloped rural 
economy reliant on subsistence land use, but economic approaches also fail to recognize the 
social, spiritual and political significance of the land that they depend on, and that sustains 
them in so many ways (Sulle & Nelson, 2009).  
Another way in which social harms could be made more salient is by further investigation 
into the ethical relevance of maintaining sufficient options for action available, and how this 
could be achieved through ‘robust policies’. While the Capability Approach currently is 
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particularly good in pointing up salient issues, it could benefit from connecting further with 
human ecology literature and the incorporation of notions such as resilience and 
irreversibility. Especially now that the UN has the Millennium Development Goals high on its 
agenda, identifying and valuing those changes that could constitute irreversible social harms, 
and thus work directly and structurally against sustainable development, is part of a much-
needed political and scientific discussion. 
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taken. Some of these measures might be too costly for the country to finance and its population 
will have no other choice but to migrate to another country. This contribution considers this 
kind of problem from the point of view of political philosophy. My arguments will rest on two 
fundamental assumptions: the State’s duty to protect and the individual’s right not to have to 
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1. Introduction 
When climate change is being discussed, whether in the academic world or in the society 
at large, one often tends to focus on what should be done in order to prevent the risk of an all 
too massive climate change1 in the decennia to come.  So-called climate skeptics either deny 
the very existence of a permanent climate change or, if they admit its existence, tend to think 
that it is not provoked by human activities or their consequences, but that it should be seen as 
a purely natural phenomenon. Against this position, the great majority of scientists working in 
the field of climatology or of related disciplines maintains that the global rise of temperatures 
we are experiencing since at least the beginning of the 20th century is due to the presence of 
so-called greenhouse gases in our atmosphere and that the massive presence of such gases is a 
direct outflow of human activities. If the industrial revolution had not happened or if its pace 
had been much slower than it has been, we would not be faced with the risk of a massive 
climate change. For these scientists, these activities should be globally reduced2, so as to 
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, thus preventing a further rise of global temperatures 
with probably dramatic consequences in a not too distant future. With what has already been 
emitted, the future is not bright, but it is still time to prevent its becoming totally obscure. 
While these discussions go on and while politicians, scientists, philosophers, theologians, 
etc. insist on the necessity to do something in favor of a sustainable future, i.e. of a future in 
which human activities do not risk to make the planet earth a place where living will no more 
be worthwhile, at least for many people, millions of people have to leave their usual places of 
residence because of the consequences of climate change. Between 2008 and 2012, about 144 
million people became climate migrants, i.e. they had to migrate because climatic phenomena 
made the place where they used to live inhospitable. Some were the victims of hurricanes and 
massive rainfalls which destroyed their houses and villages, others were the victims of 
draughts, and still others were confronted with the global rising of sea-levels due, among 
other things, to the melting of ice in the Arctic. 144 million people is roughly equivalent to 
2,5 % of the world population or to the sum of the populations of Germany and France. 
Thus, while discussions concerning the impact of climate change on future generations go 
on, a relatively important number of people belonging to the present generation are already 
confronted with the problem. They are not the virtual victims of alternative scenarios for the 
future, but many of them are the actual victims of actions done in the past or they will be such 
victims in the years or decennia to come3. Their fate foreshadows what is going to happen to a 
still more important number of people if no concrete and energetic measures are taken in the 
years to come. Had the problem of climate change due to human activities already been put 
on the agenda a hundred years ago and had the necessary measures been taken at that time, 
the number of climate migrants would probably have been much smaller. 
If there is no denying the fact that we should discuss the question of what to do to reduce 
the global rising of temperatures in the decennia to come in order to provide a sustainable 
future for our great-grandchildren, this discussion should not prevent us from confronting the 
1  There has been some debate concerning the question of how to call the phenomenon (see Gardiner 2010a: 
4). I will generally use the term “climate change”, as it leaves open the possibility of a global cooling, 
induced by phenomena which first were provoked by a global warming. As many scientists point out, the 
climate is dependent on many factors.   
2  A global reduction does not necessarily mean that everybody should reduce his or her emissions. Some 
argue that developed countries should reduce their emissions massively, so as to allow developing nations 
to augment their emissions, this augmentation being seen as necessary to allow development in those 
nations. On this question, see for example Shue 2010c.   
3  The so-called identity-problem (see Parfit 1985) is irrelevant in their case. If Kiribati, Vanuatu or the 
Maledives are to be submerged by 2050, we already know the persons who will have to migrate by 2050. 
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problem of those people who are already the victims of climatic phenomena or who are very 
likely to become such victims in a near future. Climate migration is a fact, and any society 
pretending to be a decent or even only an ethically responsible society must ask itself how it 
must respond to the situation of climate migrants. Can something be done to prevent 
migration though the sea-levels will rise to a point where, if nothing is done, migration will be 
the only option left? And if nothing can be done, which country should accept the migrants on 
its territory?  
If we consider the geographical origin of climate migrants, we can see that most of them – 
98% in fact – are from underdeveloped or developing countries, whereas only 2% live in 
developed countries. Developing countries thus pay the highest toll. As long as climatic 
events are simply seen as natural events, i.e. as events which happen without any human 
intervention, we may feel sorry for the victims, maybe even think that we, who have the 
means to help at no excessive cost to ourselves, stand under a duty of beneficence to help 
them in some way, but we will probably not admit that we stand under a duty of strict justice 
to help them. Things are a bit more complicated if we suppose that though nobody is 
responsible for bringing about the climatic events, these events could nevertheless have been 
prevented or can still be prevented, for example by geoengineering4. Helping climate 
migrants as climate migrants is not the same as helping people not to become climate 
migrants. We must thus distinguish between at least the following cases: 
 
(1) Climate migration due to purely natural phenomena nobody could prevent 
(2) Climate migration due to purely natural phenomena which could have been prevented 
(3) Climate migration due to human-induced natural phenomena 
 
In this contribution, I want to concentrate on people who have become or will become 
climate migrants because of the consequences of climatic events provoked by human 
activities, and I will concentrate on those populations who are the victims of the impact of 
climate change on the rising of waters, and even more especially on the rising of global sea 
levels5.  
Climate migration may be temporary or permanent, and if temporary, it can be recurrent 
or non recurrent. If the global sea-level were to rise by 2 meters, not a few islands in the 
Pacific as well as many coastal regions all over the world would become permanently 
inhabitable6. And if in some regions extraordinary climatic events – say hurricanes – were to 
become ordinary, bringing about massive inundations every two years7, these regions would 
also become practically inhabitable, or the cost of continuing to live there would be such that, 
if a rational person had the choice to go and live somewhere else, he or she would do so. You 
may accept the risk of having to rebuild your house every 50 years or so, but not of having to 
do so every 2 years. 
My arguments rest on the presupposition that at least some of the climatic events which 
place people before the option – not to say: the necessity – of having to migrate are human-
induced events. I will also presuppose that the activities responsible for these climatic events 
4  For a skeptical approach to geoengineering, see Gardiner 2010c. 
5  According to a recent study, global sea levels didn’t change between the lifetime of Jesus Christ and 1900 
but since the beginning of the 20th century, it is “rising at an increased rate” and “it is projected to rise at an 
even greater rate in this century” (Bindoff, Willebrand, Artale e.a. 2007: 409).  
6  To quote Shue: “Some island nations in the South Pacific are already well into the process of being 
submerged by rising sea levels” (Shue 2010b: 147). In the case of these nations, the most pressing question 
is not so much: “What should be done to reverse the process?” – though this question remains of course 
important –, but “What should be done to help those who are going to be the victims of the process?”.   
7  According to a recent estimation, 1,2 % of the world population will be exposed to yearly inundations by 
2100 against only 0,1 % today (Science et Vie 1152: 35). 
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have been and are still going on in a limited number of countries, first and foremost the 
United States of America8, China, most EU countries, Japan or Russia – the list is of course 
not complete. As it is virtually impossible to say which activities produce exactly which 
climatic events and, hence, which activities are responsible for which consequences, I will 
work with the presupposition that the group of countries most contributing to the emission of 
gases provoking climatic changes should be held collectively responsible. As I will not make 
a case for criminal responsibility but only for what might be called civil liability, the 
presupposition of collective responsibility should not provoke too many horrified reactions9. I 
will also only focus on the negative consequences of climate change. According to some 
scenarios, global climate change could lead to a displacement of rainfalls due to monsoon and 
through this displacement many tracts of desert land could become fertile and thus allow 
people to live there permanently. If this were the case, many migrant populations of the desert 
would have the possibility to settle down, so that in their case climate change would 
contribute to the reduction of migration. If new territories were thus to become inhabitable, 
they should be reserved for climate migrants, even for climate migrants from other countries. 
2. Climate migrants and other migrants 
Though the problem discussed in this contribution falls under the general topic of 
migration10, climate migration must be distinguished from other types of migration, as for 
example political or economical migration, to name only the two most frequent types11.  
A political migrant, in a broad sense of the word12, is a person who has to leave her 
country because the government oppresses her on account either of her political or religious 
ideas, or because of her ethnic origin or sexual orientation – to name only the most important 
factors –, or because the government does nothing and maybe even does not want to do 
anything to protect the person against social oppression exercised on account of one of these 
factors.   
An economical migrant is a person who leaves his or her country because of the hope to 
find better economic conditions – a job, higher wages, etc. – in a foreign country. Economic 
migration may sometimes be favored by a country which needs workers of a certain type13. If 
economic conditions in a country or region deteriorate because of climatic consequences, 
economic and climate migration may coincide. 
8  The US contribute approximately one quarter of all greenhouse gas emissions (see Gardiner 2010a: 21). At 
the risk of being cynical: When future generations will learn that Barack Obama intended to bomb Syria for 
its use of chemical weapons against its civil population, they will probably think that they would have had a 
very good reason to bomb the United States of Barack Obama for its emission of greenhouse gases. Without 
downplaying the deaths which occurred and still occur in Syria, we must be honest enough to acknowledge 
that the consequences of our economic activities cause and will many more deaths. 
9  On this point, see Shue (2010a: 104) 
10  “Migration” is here used as a general term to cover emigration as well as immigration. Basically, every 
emigration is also an immigration: you leave one place to enter another place. In common parlance, the 
notions of emigration and immigration are usually reserved for international migration. Thus, if I were to 
leave Northern France to settle down in Southern France, I would hardly be called an emigrant or an 
immigrant.  
11  One could also mention nuclear migration, i.e. migration due to massive accidents in nuclear plants. 
Czernobyl and Fukushima are two examples for this type of migration. Fiscal migration can be seen as a 
form of economic migration, with the only difference that traditional economic migration mainly concerns 
the poor, whereas fiscal migration mainly concerns the rich. 
12  I don’t want to quarrel with those who think that the term “political migrant” should only be used for people 
who have to leave their place of origin because they are threatened in life and limb on account of their 
strictly political opinions. As I use the term here, it simply denotes oppression by government or by society. 
13  In the 1960s and 1970s for example, Luxembourg induced thousands of Portuguese to immigrate into the 
Grand-Duchy, as they were needed in the building sector.  
104 
                                                          
As this last case shows, there is no radical or essential difference between these types of 
migration. Nevertheless, some lesser and morally relevant differences must be pointed out. 
One such difference is that political and economical migration are generally only due to 
internal factors. Usually, the political regime of a country is not imposed by an outside State, 
and the economic orientation of a country is not dictated by an outside State. I want to stress 
“usually”, as it is undeniable that a political regime, though not imposed by an outside State, 
may nevertheless be supported by an outside State. The weapons used for oppressing the 
population may have been sold to the government by an outside State or with its 
authorization. In such a case, one may wonder whether that State is not also responsible for 
the migration. And in the economic case, decisions by the International Monetary Fund may 
contribute to massive waves of emigration from countries which have to structure their 
economy along the lines imposed by the IMF. 
But even if we suppose that external factors can also play a substantial role in the cases of 
political and economic migration, there still exists a difference with regard to the bearer of 
responsibilities. In the case of political oppression by government A, we can relatively easily 
identify the country or countries which sold weapons to that government. And in the case of 
externally-induced economical migration, we can also generally determine responsibilities in 
a fairly easy way. Thus, if the economy of Ghana declines because the country cannot sell its 
cocoa anymore, this is generally due to the fact that countries needing cocoa to produce 
chocolate have at their disposal an artificial ersatz which is much cheaper. The direct link 
between the causes and effects can usually be more clearly established than in the case of 
climate change.   
But there is still a more fundamental difference. When a chocolate-producing nation uses 
artificial cocoa, it creates economical problems in a cocoa-producing nation, yet it does so 
without destroying the cocoa-plants or the country in which they grow. In the case of climate 
change, it is different. Suppose that the production of artificial cocoa resulted in the massive 
emission of greenhouse gases and suppose that due to this emissions, climate in Ghana were 
to change to such a degree that cultivation of cocoa would become impossible in that country. 
As a result, the economy of Ghana would break down. Though the ultimate consequence is 
the same, what brought about this consequence is very different. Outdoing a competitor 
without destroying his instrument of production is not the same as outdoing a competitor and 
destroying his instrument of production, even where this destruction is not positively willed 
but only accepted as a consequence.  
One could still mention a further difference. The causes of political and economical 
migration may generally be more easily changed than the causes of climate migration. 
Though it may be difficult to get rid of a tyrant and though it may be difficult to change 
economic conditions, the difficulty is in both cases utterly different from that linked to 
changing the climate. And the same holds true for reverting to previous conditions. Once a 
coastal region is under water because of the rise of sea levels, it is very difficult, if not nearly 
impossible, to get rid of the water again. Or imagine a South Pacific island: You can 
reestablish a democratic government after having gotten rid of the tyrant; you can rebuild an 
economy which has collapsed; but can you “desubmerge” it again after it lies under four or 
five meters of water? 
3. A State’s duty to protect 
I take as a starting point of my argumentation the political notion of a State’s duty to 
protect. Whatever else a State may be there for, it has a general duty to protect its citizens, this 
protection being the minimal condition that has to be fulfilled for citizens having a duty to 
obey. There is thus an exchange: obedience in exchange for protection. This vision of the 
State has its roots in the social contract theory as it was elaborated in the 17th century, notably 
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by Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan. The State’s duty to protect is primarily a duty to protect 
its own citizens against each other. However much civic friendship may be extolled as a 
virtue, real human beings living in political communities will be prone to acts of violence and 
they will thus need protection from that violence. These acts of violence may result from 
purely criminal motives, but they may also result from ideological motives, and the absolute 
State, as it was defined by Jean Bodin in France and Thomas Hobbes in England, had to 
protect its citizens against civil war.  
But besides protecting its citizens against each other, the State has also the duty to protect 
them against foreign aggression. There is first of all the State’s duty to protect its citizens 
against a foreign invasion, especially if the invader is likely to impose another religion or 
another political system. But there is also the State’s duty to protect those of its citizens who 
happen to be in foreign States, for example because they do commerce with foreign 
merchants. If you are a citizen of a State, the State has the duty to protect and to help you 
wherever you are – provided you haven’t committed some action depriving you of that 
protection, as for example a crime14.   
Has a State also a duty to protect citizens of another State? This seems to be so in the case 
of ambassadors or legates. These persons act in an official capacity as intermediaries between 
States. As such, the State which accepts them on its territory for a transaction has also a 
special duty to protect them. If the government of State A knows that the legates of State B 
are likely to be lynched by an angry mob if they come for peace transactions, it has to protect 
them against that mob if it wants peace transactions to take place.  
So State A has to protect the citizens of State A against the citizens of State, and State B 
has to protect the citizens of State A against the citizens of State B if State B has to transact 
with citizens of State A. But has State A a duty to protect citizens of State B against the 
government of State B or against citizens of State B? 
In the 16th century, Spanish theologians, first among them the Dominican friar Francisco 
de Vitoria, founder of the School of Salamanca, maintained that though the world was split 
into nations, nationhood did not cancel or destroy the common tie existing between all human 
beings15. And in virtue of this common human tie, human beings had not only the right, but 
also the duty to help each other, irrespective of national borders. The paradigm case involved 
citizens who were persecuted by their own government or whose government did nothing to 
protect them against persecution. If the persecutions were massive and threatened the very life 
of the victims16, then any nation could intervene to put an end to these persecutions, if 
necessary by military force. Any State had a duty to protect any large group of human beings 
against massive persecution. When a State stopped protecting its own citizens or even 
persecuted them massively, it so to say lost the rights linked to sovereignty. Sovereignty was 
not the object of an absolute and unconditional right, as it became after the Peace of 
Westphalia, but it was only conditional – as it is again today17. 
In contemporary political theory, a State failing to fulfill adequately its duty to protect is 
called a “failed State”. The public institutions may still exist, but they are inefficient and the 
real power lies in the hands of political groups fighting against each other for gaining political 
power – not in order to reestablish protection, but so that the leaders of these groups may 
enrich themselves. 
If the duty to protect has traditionally been understood as the duty to protect against overt 
acts of violence, one may legitimately ask whether it should be restricted to protection against 
14  But even then, your State of origin has the duty to look to it that you will receive a fair trial. This kind of 
duty is usually fulfilled through diplomatic channels.  
15  See Vitoria 1967 and 1981. For a recent discussion of Vitoria, see Campagna 2010. 
16  The paradigm case in the 16th century debates were human sacrifices. 
17  On the question of sovereignty, see Shue 1997. 
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such acts. If my neighbour can kill me by voluntarily shooting at me, he can also kill me by 
negligently emitting toxic gases, without any intention do to me any harm and in pursuance of 
some activity which will bring him some kind of economic benefit. Should the State only 
protect me against his shooting me or should it also intervene to prevent my being a victim of 
his polluting activities? As a matter of fact, many States protect their citizens against at least 
extreme forms of pollution by imposing the use of filters or even by prohibiting the polluting 
activities. And many States also protect their citizens against some of the consequences of a 
free-market economy by providing them with financial help in case of unemployment. 
Imposing an obligatory health insurance can also be seen as a kind of protection. In some of 
these cases, the duty to protect can also be seen as a duty to help. Thus, though the State 
cannot guarantee me a new job if I lose my old one, it nevertheless helps me while I have no 
job.     
Given these developments of the duty to protect, we may wonder whether a State has also 
a duty to protect against some of the consequences of climate change, and more especially 
against the rise of sea-levels. And if it is no more possible to protect a population against the 
rise of sea-levels so that the population will have to migrate, what are the duties of a State 
with regard to climate migrants? Has State A the duty to protect its own citizens against 
climate migration, and if it has no possibility to protect them against climate changes as such, 
does it have a duty to help them face the consequences of having to migrate? Has State A the 
duty to make sure that no activity going on within the borders of its territory contributes to 
climate changes very likely to provoke migration of citizens living within the borders of State 
B? And if it is already too late to prevent the phenomena causing migration, as for example 
the rising of sea-levels, has State A the duty to help citizens of State B who have no other 
choice left but to migrate? And if so, how?  
4. A right not to have to migrate 
According to Simon Caney, the human rights discourse, though it should not be the only 
kind of discourse deployed in the context of a global strategy against climate change and its 
consequences, should nevertheless occupy a central place in such a strategy. Whatever else 
climate change may do, it also leads to the violation of some basic human rights. Caney 
insists on three such rights: the right to life, the right to health and the right to subsistence. In 
order to make his case as universally acceptable as possible, Caney proposes a very weak 
reading of these three rights and conceives them only as negative rights. 
Though he concentrates on these three rights, Caney nevertheless suggests that other 
rights might also have a role to play. One of these is a right to be protected against forced 
migration: “Furthermore, one might argue that there is a human right not to be forcibly 
evicted (HR 5) and that climate change violates this because people from coastal settlements 
and small island states will be forced to leave”18. 
In the traditional sense, forced eviction happens when the government displaces people. 
We will here concentrate on forced eviction of great numbers of people. This may happen for 
example when the State intends to construct a barrage where people used to live. In such 
cases, thousands of people are asked to leave their houses and to settle somewhere else. But 
forced eviction may also happen when a certain population – for example an ethnic minority – 
is declared populatio non grata on a given national territory. The crucial difference between 
the two cases is that in the first case, the evicted population is allowed to resettle somewhere 
else within the national territory, whereas in the second case, the evicted population has to 
find a State which accepts it on its national territory. 
18  Caney (2010a: 169)  
107 
                                                          
In modern liberal democracies, forced evictions, especially of large numbers of persons, 
is very rare. It may happen with individuals who have no valid authorization to stay on the 
national territory. It sometimes happens that such people are forcibly evicted from the 
national territory by being put on a plane and flown back to their country of origin. It also 
sometimes happens that some persons are evicted from their houses because a motorway or a 
railway line will pass exactly where they happen to live. In a case like that, the persons 
concerned will be financially compensated for their loss and they will also generally be 
helped by government. 
In the case evoked by Caney and which is also the topic of this contribution, the eviction 
is forced not because the government forces people to leave their place of residence manu 
militari, but because the people have apparently no other choice left but to leave their place of 
residence. When your house stands completely under water, you won’t wait until military 
forces come and chase you from there. You just leave by yourself because it is so to say 
physically impossible for you to continue living where you used to live. Though migration is 
in a certain sense voluntary – you are moved by a decision of your own will and not by 
soldiers or the police carrying you away –, it is nevertheless not voluntary in the sense of free, 
as freedom, if it means anything, means at least that you can choose between several options. 
At this stage, someone might wonder why forced eviction is a bad thing which one must 
be protected against. Or to put it in more neutral terms19: Why is it bad to have to go and live 
somewhere else? After all, many people all over the world freely and voluntarily leave their 
usual places of residence to live somewhere else. Or to put it still differently: What values 
does the right not be forcibly evicted protect? 
In the case of forcible eviction manu militari, the answer is rather simple, as such an 
eviction violates the right not be subjected to violence. The answer is more complicated when 
we turn to the case of the persons who will have to leave coastal regions submerged by rising 
sea-levels. They are not subjected to any kind of physical violence. So what is wrong with 
their having to go and live somewhere else? 
Many people, so it can be argued, are sentimentally attached to their place of residence, 
especially if they have lived there for a long time. Having to leave a place where your parents 
and grandparents already lived, where you spent most of your life and where you “feel good” 
is not always an easy matter. They also have adapted to that place and they have also adapted 
that place to their needs and interests, at least insofar as such adaptations are possible. By 
having to leave their usual place of residence, they will have to readapt to a new place, which 
will take time and energy. Then, even if we assume that it may be easy to leave a place of 
residence, it may not be so easy to find a new place of residence which has more or less the 
same advantages as the old one. Thus, having to leave a very fertile coastal region with a 
moderate climate, to resettle in a sterile mountain region with severe winters is not really 
attractive. Another point to be mentioned is the risk that one will not be accepted by the 
population of the new place of residence, especially if that population suffers economic 
distress or if there are important cultural differences between the migrants and the 
autochthones. This may create social tensions or even conflicts. 
Besides all these problems, there is the more fundamental problem of finding a place to 
go to. In the case where internal migration is an option, this problem is not too acute, as there 
is at present no country that is so densely populated that it would be physically impossible to 
resettle the population of its coastal regions. The problem becomes acute, however, once we 
envisage the disappearance of a whole State, as it will be the case with some island States in 
the Pacific Ocean. Once sea-levels will have risen above a certain threshold, their inhabitants 
will have no other choice left but to migrate to another country if they want to survive. If it 
19  “Forced eviction” contains already an implicit moral condemnation. 
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would be possible to prevent these islands being submerged by stopping greenhouse gases at 
once, then we would at least have a prima facie duty to do so. Yet it is to be expected that 
even if we stopped all such emissions hic et nunc, the sea level would still rise to such a 
height that at least some of these islands would be completely submerged. So the question is: 
Which countries have a duty to help the populations of countries very likely to exist no more 
in a not too distant future? 
5. The duty to protect against forced migration 
As a principle of international public law, the first addressee of the duty to protect citizens 
of State A is the government of State A20. Let us suppose that State A is Kiribati, a 
conglomerate of South Pacific islands covering about 900 square kilometers. In a few 
decennia, these islands are likely to be submerged, so that about one hundred thousand 
persons – its actual population – will have to find a new State of residence. If a massive 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions could still prevent the submersion of Kiribati, the 
government of Kiribati would have the duty to make itself heard on the international scene in 
order to convince other governments to take the necessary measures for such a reduction. 
Kiribati would certainly find allies as it is not the only State to risk partial or even total 
submersion. Yet it is doubtful whether even with these allies, Kiribati would be able, just with 
arguments21, to bring about a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
One of the major characteristics of a State is its national territory, and whatever else a 
State must do, it must protect the integrity of its national territory, as this territory is the place 
where its citizens can live. This protection means, on the one hand, that the government may 
not cede a part of the national territory and, on the other hand, that it must protect its territory 
against other States wanting to annex a portion of it. But it should also mean that the 
government must take the necessary steps to prevent the territory to disappear. Preventing this 
disappearance is preventing the disappearance of a State. 
If Kiribati is submerged, it will cease to exist as a State. But Kiribati has, like any other 
State, a right to exist. And all States have the duty to respect Kiribati’s existence, which 
means among other things that no State should tolerate on its territory activities likely to have 
the disappearance of Kiribati as a consequence. Or we they tolerate such activities, they have 
duties of compensation. 
Is there a possibility for Kiribati to continue to exist despite rising sea levels? Suppose 
that we know that whatever we do, sea levels will rise to a level that will place Kiribati below 
sea level. Is it possible to have Kiribati continuing in existence below sea level? 
Let us imagine that dams with a height of about ten meters are placed all around the 
islands composing Kiribati and let us suppose that these dams are efficient to protect the 
islands. If this is the only possibility for Kiribati to continue to exist as an independent State, 
the government22 of Kiribati has a prima facie duty to have such dams built. To take another 
example: If a much frequented road is threatened by falling stones, public authorities must 
protect the users of the road against these falling stones, for example by putting nets or 
whatever else prevents the stones from killing automobile drivers. 
It is important to note that it is only a prima facie duty. For it might well be that the 
inhabitants of Kiribati would prefer to go and live somewhere else rather than live in what 
might be seen as a kind of prison-island. If in a referendum a majority of the inhabitants of 
Kiribati reject the project of building dams, the government does no more have the duty to 
build dams. 
20  It is the so-called principle of subsidiarity. 
21  And States like Kiribati generally have nothing else but arguments to offer.  
22  Such dams exist in the Netherlands. Shue imagines a “Great Sea Wall of China” (Shue 2010c: 205). 
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But suppose that the inhabitants want dams to be built. Who is to bear the probably 
astronomical costs? It is very unlikely that the budget of Kiribati will suffice. In that case, it 
might be just to turn towards those nations which have until now most benefited from 
greenhouse gas emissions. As was said before, their contribution is not to be seen as a 
punishment, but as a measure of compensation. Some countries have hugely benefited from 
greenhouse gas emissions, whereas other countries will have to bear the negative 
consequences of these emissions, consequences which, for some countries, amount to their 
disappearance as independent nations. Fairness requires that the latter countries should at least 
be helped in preventing the worst consequences and that they be helped by those countries 
which, because they allowed the massive emission of greenhouse gases on their territory were 
able to get wealthy. In order to finance a project of dam building, the countries hosting the 
entities mainly responsible for greenhouse gas emissions could tax those emissions more 
heavily than they do today. 
In this context one could also mention a fundamental duty of the community of States to 
protect the independence of one of their members. This duty should not be restricted to the 
protection of independence when a country has been invaded – like Kuwait by Iraq –, but it 
should also at least be extended to cases where the very existence of a State is in danger 
because of human activities.  
But suppose that for technical reasons the dams cannot be built23. In that case, there is no 
other option but to emigrate. If there were still habitable territories belonging to nobody, the 
population could go to these places and colonize them. But such territories don’t exist 
anymore – at least not on our planet. Hence if the population of Kiribati has to emigrate, at 
least one State must accept that population on its territory. Is any State more obliged than 
another to accept the emigrants on its territory? 
Here again it seems as if fairness is required to look first to those countries which are 
responsible for the climate change. If we are in a situation where population of country A 
must emigrate and where it can emigrate either to country B – which doesn’t bear any causal 
responsibility with regard to the necessity to emigrate – or to country C – which bears a 
causal responsibility –, tertium non datur and ceteris paribus, there is one morally relevant 
reason more for saying that C should accept the migrants on its territory.  
But what if the country mainly responsible cannot bear the burden of massive 
immigration? Or what if the cultural differences between the migrants and the autochthones is 
so important that an integration seems impossible or at least extremely difficult, creating the 
risk of social tensions and conflicts? In such a case, a third country24 might decide, or might 
even be morally obliged, to accept the migrants on its territory, but it would be justified in 
asking financial support from the country responsible for the consequences which led to 
migration. 
If we assume that any nation has a right to exist as an independent nation, we might even 
come to the conclusion that the fact of having contributed, even unknowingly, to the 
disappearance of the national territory of a nation involves the duty of giving that nation a part 
of one’s own territory so as to allow it to continue to exist as an independent nation. In our 
concrete example this would mean that the United States should part with some 900 square 
kilometers of their national territory so as to allow the inhabitants of Kiribati to live there as 
23  One could also assume that the inhabitants of Kiribati do not want to live imprisoned by high dams. Though 
it that case they would have an alternative option to migration and the question would be whether this 
alternative option to migration is so bad, that it couldn’t just be imposed on Kiribatians. 
24  Or a few countries. Yet here there is a further problem. Should the Kiribatians be grouped together or 
should we accept that they be separated so as to form a diaspora? Grouping them together may allow them 
to perpetuate their traditions, whereas spreading them may lead to a disappearance of these traditions. At 
the very least, the Kiribatians should have their word to say. 
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an independent nation once their own national territory has been submerged. And these 900 
square kilometers should be such as to allow at least a minimally decent life.  
6. The strength of nations 
Suppose that on one of the many islands of Kiribati a very huge industrial plant emits 
greenhouse gases in massive quantities. And suppose further that American scientists 
analyzing the effects of these emissions come to the conclusion that if nothing is done to stop 
them, the whole West Coast of the United States will be submerged, provoking the migration 
of millions of people and economic damages likely to amount to thousands of billions of 
dollars. What would the United States do?  
They would probably begin by using the diplomatic way and ask the government of 
Kiribati to close the plant. If it would refuse, the government would probably be promised 
billions of dollars to compensate the financial losses from a closing. If it were to refuse this 
many as well, maybe because it does not want to be “bought”, the United States government 
would exercise economic pressure upon Kiribati. But suppose that Kiribati remains 
insensitive to all promises and pressures. And suppose also that the UN Security Council 
cannot agree on any resolution, Russia blocking any initiative by using its veto-right. It is to 
be expected that in such a situation the US will launch several missiles and destroy the plant 
on Kiribati, with Kiribatians having nothing else but their eyes to weep. 
Now reverse the scenario. Due to the pollution of industrial plants in the US, Kiribati is 
threatened in its territorial existence. What means of pressure does Kiribati have? Whereas the 
American government can protect its citizens by using military means, this is not the case for 
the government of Kiribati. And what holds true for military means also holds true for 
economic threats and promises. The government of Kiribati just has no efficient means to act 
on the US government. Kiribatians may appeal to public opinion in the US and worldwide, 
but it is hardly to be expected that this will change the politics of the US government vis-à-vis 
its national industry.  
From the standpoint of international law, at least as I interpret it, a military intervention 
by Kiribati against the United States would have a higher degree of justification than an 
intervention of the United States against Kiribati – in the hypothetical case of the massively 
polluting plant on an island of Kiribati. Whereas the United States will only be deprived of a 
part of their territory by submersion, so as to allow the victims to move to other places within 
the United States, this is not the case for the inhabitants of Kiribati25. There is a huge and 
morally relevant difference between a mere violation of territorial integrity and a violation of 
a State’s territorial existence. And as long as there will be a huge difference between the 
power of nuisance of Kiribati and the United States, there is hardly any hope that Kiribati will 
survive. 
Conclusion 
In this contribution, I have tried to show that climate change already produces and will 
continue to produce – even if we immediately stopped greenhouse gas emission – climate 
migrants. Some of these climate migrants will have the opportunity to resettle within their 
own countries, whereas others will have no other choice but to migrate to another country. 
25  It is not only, as Singer notes (Singer 2010: 183) richer nations which can more easily remove people from 
flooded areas. One must also consider the dimension and the topography. Luxembourg is a rich nation, but 
if 2586 square kilometers of its national territory were to be submerged, there would be no place left to 
resettle the country’s population. But if 2586 square kilometers of Nigeria were to be submerged, the 
victims could be removed to some other place within Nigeria. 
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I showed that we have good reasons to accept the idea of a human right not to have to 
migrate. If this is the case, then this right should be protected. At the very least, every country 
has a prima facie duty of not allowing on its territory activities which, through their 
consequences, will force people to migrate another country. If such activities have already 
taken place in the past and if the consequences cannot be stopped, then the countries which 
authorized the activities have a duty to help those populations who are placed in front of the 
option of migration. Wherever possible, these populations should be presented with a set of 
measures that will allow them to remain where they used to live, and these measures should 
be financed by the countries which have most benefited from the aforementioned activities.  
Where internal migration is possible, the government of the country should be financially 
and logistically helped to make a decent internal migration possible. The financial help should 
again come from the nations which bear the causal responsibility for the migration. If internal 
migration is not possible and where protective measures are not possible either, external 
migration is the next option. And here again, the countries bearing causal responsibility 
should provide help, either by providing land and all the necessary infrastructures for the 
migrants or by helping another country to do so if migration to that country is better for the 
migrants.   
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Abstract 
Our paper bears on the issue of the possibility conditions for another relationship towards 
nature which seems to be required if one wants to ensure a future to mankind on earth. In other 
words we both share the alarmists’ views concerning the future of earth through climate 
change and other issues. We assume them as correct without discussing here. 
Poltier’s part is negative, claiming that liberalism is, from the point of view of this issue, a 
dead end; Hess’ part will inquire the resources for designing another ethics through a critical 
discussion of Jonas’ and Norton’s contributions. 
  
 
Proceedings from the 50th Societas Ethica Annual Conference 2013. Climate Change, Sustainability, and an 
Ethics of an Open Future, August 22-25 2013, Soesterberg, The Netherlands   
Editors: Göran Collste and Lars Reuter 
http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp_home/index.en.aspx?issue=98. 
A. Liberalism, the ethics and politics of self-ownership –  
H. Poltier  
1. Some quotes from the net  
Let me begin by some quotes, gathered here and there on the net 
 
1.  by Deneen Borelli (http://www.nationalcenter.org/P21NVBorelliClimate90108.html 
“Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness - "unalienable rights" cited by our Founding Fathers in 
the Declaration of Independence - are now at risk as left-wing activists seek to curtail our liberties 
and personal choices to save the planet from supposedly man-made global warming. “ 
2. By Alex B. Berezow   http://www.ff.org/climate-change-isnt-worlds-biggest-problem/  
“Just a cursory glance around the world reveals that, given the enormous problems facing our 
planet, it would be surprising if climate change cracked a list of the top 10 immediate concerns. 
[…] As I discussed in my book Science Left Behind, the single biggest threat facing humanity is 
poverty.” 
3. http://www.cato.org/blog/best-government-action-climate-change-no-government-action-climate-change  
The Best Government Action on Climate Change Is No Government Action on Climate Change : 
“[… Obama’s] best response would be to get the federal government out of the energy market and 
allow it to flourish as it may. The inconvenient truth is that the U.S. influence on global climate is 
rapidly diminishing as greenhouse gas emissions from the rest of the world rapidly expand. As a 
consequence, whether or not the United States reduces its emissions at all is immaterial to the path 
of future climate change and its impacts.” 
 
4. The GOP programme: http://www.gop.com/2012-republican-platform_America/  
“We are the party of sustainable jobs and economic growth – through American energy, 
agriculture, and environmental policy. We are also the party of America’s growers and producers, 
farmers, ranchers, foresters, miners, and all those who bring from the earth the minerals and 
energy that are the lifeblood of our nation’s historically strong economy. 
The Republican Party is committed to domestic energy independence.  […] A strong and stable 
energy sector is a job generator and a catalyst of economic growth, not only in the labor-intensive 
energy industry but also in its secondary markets. […]” 
Since 2009, the EPA has moved forward with expansive regulations that will impose tens of 
billions of dollars in new costs on American businesses and consumers. Many of these new rules 
are creating regulatory uncertainty, preventing new projects from going forward, discouraging new 
investment, and stifling job creation. 
We demand an end to the EPA’s participation in “sue and settle” lawsuits, sweetheart litigation 
brought by environmental groups to expand the Agency’s regulatory activities against the wishes 
of Congress and the public. We will require full transparency in litigation under the nation’s 
environmental laws, including advance notice to all State and local governments, tribes, 
businesses, landowners, and the public who could be adversely affected. We likewise support 
pending legislation to ensure cumulative analysis of EPA regulations, and to require full 
transparency in all EPA decisions, so that the public will know in advance their full impact on jobs 
and the economy. We oppose the EPA’s unwarranted revocation of existing permits. We also call 
on Congress to take quick action to prohibit the EPA from moving forward with new greenhouse 
gas regulations that will harm the nation’s economy and threaten millions of jobs over the next 
quarter century. The most powerful environmental policy is liberty, the central organizing 
principle of the American Republic and its people. Liberty alone fosters scientific inquiry, 
technological innovation, entrepreneurship, and information exchange. Liberty must remain the 
core energy behind America’s environmental improvement. […]” 
A comment to these quotes is hardly necessary. But let me point just this: they show how 
powerful is the connexion made by our contemporaries between the right to pursue happiness 
116 
and the ongoing seizure of natural resources; the link is so strong that any constraint on the 
use of nature is characterized as liberticide. In this view, a discourse assigning responsibility 
to human activity on the natural system, let alone on the possibility of human life in a close 
future is mocked as fancied catastrophism. 
In what follows, I show that all the above-quoted claims emanate in straight line from the 
core of liberalism, suggesting therefore that providing we admit the urgency of the looming 
environmental disaster, we, the human collective, should, on that ground alone, renounce 
liberalism as the guiding norm in our relationship to nature. In what follows I briefly develop 
five claims on what constitutes the core of liberal ethics and politics which are relevant to the 
way we as a species relate to nature. 
2. Five claims 
Claim 1 : in its most effective core1, liberalism is the ethics and politics of self-ownership 
as the basis of all rights and duties. Self-ownership is the liberty to dispose of oneself, one’s 
body, ones’ talents, one’s property, etc. so as to promote one’s goal, whose realisation, 
presumably, is one’s happiness. This liberty has only one limit : others’ symetric liberty 
which one has an absolute duty neither to encroach nor to invade. 
Whatever your goals, you have to be free to pursue them, as long as they are not, in and 
of themselves, encroachments to others’ liberty, and provided your ways respect this 
constraint. 
The implication of this core assertion is that what has in itself value is only the free self-
disposition of the free agents who choose whatever means to pursue their goals within the 
mentioned constraint. It follows immediately that all that is not this freedom as such has, at 
best, instrumental value for the only core value recognised by liberalism, i.e. free disposition 
of oneself. Which implies that environment, nature, natural beings, wilderness, ecosystems, 
etc. as such can have no value in and of themselves, but only as far as they are instrumentally 
valued by free agents. 
Claim 2 : historically, in its effectiveness, liberalism – following Locke’s inheritance 
through prominent figures like F.A. Hayek and M. Thatcher – has tended to merge with the 
notion of the free disposition of one’s property. To be free means to enjoy the right to do 
whatever one deems appropriate in the pursuit of one’s happiness with the whole bunch of 
property one has gained through whatever ways (inheritance, successful business, lottery, 
etc.). Again, the only limit is others symetric liberty. 
So that, inherently, liberalism means the free disposition of nature defined as the global 
stock of all the resources that are susceptible for men to appropriate and transform in the 
pursuit of their goals. Coupling this observation with the competitive character of the 
capitalist market economy, the result is an ongoing competition between the capital owners in 
the appropriation of these natural resources. The reason of this necessity is simple: not to 
enter the race means to take the risk to get overrun by competitors. So that, inherently again, 
liberalism ends up in a race for power, i.e. in a race for more and more natural resources 
removed from the environment. 
Claim 3 : Liberalism as free self-ownership is tantamount to capitalism. Since capital 
exists only as divided in a plurality of capital owners, liberalism is, in effect, the ongoing race 
taking place between them – and now, in our globalized era, at a global level. And the more 
1  This qualification explains why, in this characterization of liberalism I do not consider what I consider as 
« idealized » versions of liberalism, such as Galston’s (W.A Galston, Liberal purposes, C.U.P, 1991) for 
example. Besides, should the idealized versions of liberalism be implemented, they would imply so severe 
restrictions to free disposition of one’s property that most liberal – today they call themselves libertarians 
so as to avoid any confusion with liberals such as R. Dworkin, Rawls’ heirs and others – would denigrate 
such a regime as crypto-socialism. 
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protagonists there are, the harder the race. In other words, the more predatory of natural 
resources get the competitors. 
In this competition, nature as a whole appears only as the global stock feeding « the 
economy ». The knowledge of its limitation, though clear to everybody, takes place only in 
the awareness that the control of the resource will be the property of the first to put his hand 
on it, according to the « first come, first serve » principle. 
Claim 4 :  Liberalism as the free for all gets its attraction through its promise of success to 
all and through the message that the only way to success is free market, i.e. competitive 
economy. In a crippled economy, with high unemployment, severe poverty, high crime, poor 
access to basic needs such as lodging, health care, education, energy, and so on, the liberal 
message is for setting aside all the legal obstacles impeding job creation – whatever the cost 
on nature (see the GOP plaform, very clear on this). Having control on most resources, capital 
exerts a sort of blackmail on all of us : if, they say, you want to have a chance to succeed, 
allow us to invest in all possible natural resources so that you might have an opportunity to 
get a job. In other words : either you go with us or you will remain in poverty. It is a sort of 
sad irony to hear the HNWI (high networth individuals), concentrating in their hands the 
largest capital ever in history, tell us that we should allow them to concentrate still more 
capital so that we can access to crumbs of it.  
Claim 5 : Liberalism as capitalism is inherently a limitless process of growing. For 
capital, to stop to grow is to die. And since liberty has merged with economic freedom – see 
M. Thatcher : to hate free enterprise is to have no patience with individual freedom2– 
liberalism has merged with the free right of capital to seek for all possible paths to ensure its 
growth. And again, since capital exists only as divided in plural capital holders, this 
compulsion to grow is necessarily linked with an ongoing pressure on natural resources that 
have to be put in the process of the valuing of value – which is the only inherent value in 
capitalist economy. 
One could object to me that liberalism, as a constitutive dimension of democracy, can put 
limits on the degradation of nature in the name of the common good. Based on a clear and 
shared knowledge that the limitless exploitation of nature can only drive us to catastrophe 
which will cause innumerable sufferings and losses for mankind, we, democratically, could 
decide to stop this whole process, or rather to slow it down drastically. 
My reply to that, shortly, is as follows : 
 
1. In the globalized contemporary economy, the strength of liberalism is far above the 
one of democracy in the sense of « power of the people, by the people, for the 
people » ; this for the very simple reason that the ones who provide the jobs are the 
enterprises and not the State. From which follows that our breadwinning depends on 
the one that ask us to set aside the hurdles limiting free search of future source of 
profit and of jobs. And between immediate deprivation and the distant future threat, 
we will tend to act according to the former. 
2. Which means that, to give democracy as a self-caring process like described by Joan 
Tronto in her Caring Democracy (NYUP, 2013) a chance implies to end with 
liberalism, i.e. free market economy, i.e. capitalism 
3. Conclusion : because capitalism is in and of itself a process whose very end is the 
valuing of value, it cannot but treat everything else – nature, environment, animals, 
seas, mineral resources, other humans as well, etc. – as instrumental to this end : 
adding an incremental value to today’s value ; and this infinitely.  
Which means that the possibility condition of another relationship towards nature 
recognizing its intrinsic (or moral) value is to part with liberalism and develop another 
2  (http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102728) 
118 
                                                          
ethics reshaping our relationship to nature as well as to ourselves and our fellow 
beings. 
 
In what follows, we give a short tentative version of what this other relationship to nature 
could look like. 
II. Environmental ethics, preservation of human life : what 
value for nature ? and the possibility of its effectiveness –  
G. Hess 
Both Hans Jonas and Bryan Norton consider that the aim of environmental ethics lies in 
the preservation of mankind for a long time. But each of them wants to reach this goal 
through new forms of ethics. Though Jonas elaborates an ethics of the future, Norton thinks 
about an ethics of “strong sustainability”3. The issue we want to address is how the purpose of 
the preservation of the future of humankind can be fulfilled. 
The objections we will formulate are first, against, Jonas, that it is not necessary to step 
out of the present to feel a responsibility for the future. And secondly, against Norton, we will 
support the idea that the long-term, in other words the ecological and geomorphological 
values of nature, can count only if those values are not instrumental. 
To be responsible now for a distant future – a future that commits to an ecological and 
geomorphological period of time – supposes what we call an “ecoumenical community” in 
which the moral agents experiment the ability to live beyond the closure of the ego. 
1. How do we preserve the existence of humankind during an 
indefinite amount of time? 
1.1 Jonas 
Jonas addresses this issue with the concept of responsibility. Like the relationship 
between the parents and their child, the human being is responsible not only for actions in the 
past, but for what still has to be done. This kind of responsibility introduces a new 
perspective, that of what is and of what can exist in the future. For Jonas the responsibility 
concerns the other human, but not only; it concerns natural non-human beings too: animals, 
plants and other organisms, landscapes, water, air and so on4. 
From such a responsibility one can deduce a moral duty, that is an obligation towards 
humans and an obligation towards all parts of nature, the “earthly native land” of humanity, as 
Jonas calls it. The author expresses it in a categorical imperative: “Act so that the effects of 
your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life” (p. 11).  Such an 
obligation can only be followed in an adapted political institution. For Jonas, the political 
structure of such an obligation is “a well-intentioned, well-informed tyranny possessed of the 
right insights” (p. 147).  
To materialize such an obligation towards human life and towards the ecological 
conditions for its survival in the future, one needs more. The responsibility of Jonas is not 
only a kind of responsibility for the future; it takes the viewpoint of the future and appeals to 
the present. The perspective is the one of a long-term future which is able to push humans 
who presently are alive to commit to the future. Such an anticipation relies on the force of 
3  See the classification in Norton Brian G., 2005, Sustainability. A Philosophy of Adaptative Ecosystem 
Management, Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press, p. 314. 
4  See Jonas Hans, 1985, The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethics for Technological Age, 
Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press, chapter 3, section 4. 
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imagination. Jonas speaks of a “heuristic of fear” of which the goal is not to paralyze freezing 
action. On the contrary, it aims to avoid the realisation of a disaster5. 
1.2 Norton 
Norton does not believe one can care about the preservation of humankind in the future 
by means of responsibility. He sees the ability to consider the long-term in an ethics which 
concerns common natural goods, especially ecological and geomorphological ones. Such 
goods are those which a community wishes to pass on to the future generations6. They are not 
concerned with individuals but with the community itself. Therefore a community has the 
obligation to maintain a flow of resources for a indefinite time. 
This obligation is similar to the obligation of Jonas towards humans. Norton speaks of 
“generalized obligations” and he thinks they can be realized in environmental policies by 
communicative action and discourse7. A pluralism of values animates contemporary 
democratic societies. Members of a community will stand up for divergent values in looking 
for consensus8.  
Diverging from Jonas who defends a kind of strong hierarchical ecocentrism, Norton 
believes that only humans bear moral value. Mankind must be understood through the very 
long history of life and the progressive complexity of organisms. But nevertheless today this 
history constitutes the human environment. Humanity is a good thing. “A universe containing 
human consciousness, he says, is preferable to one without it.” (1984, p. 143). Thus the 
perpetuation of human life in the future becomes a moral aim and it can be fulfilled if human 
communities recognize ecological and geomorphological values. 
This “weak anthropocentrism” (1984, p. 134), as Norton calls it, must be understood in 
the context of a methodology of environmental management. This methodology must not 
focus on the short-term of experience but on the ecological long-term of the human 
community and on the geomorphological long-term of the species. 
2. Some difficulties to consider long-term future 
We have seen that Jonas endorses the role of a prophet. The question is: can such 
prophesied future of humanity have a real impact on the sensitivity of humans who presently 
are alive so that they commit to the long-term? Responsibility is a feeling and we do not think 
that humans can be afflicted by beings whose virtual existence relies on the imagination of a 
possible disaster. Imagination is actually the only basis for long-term responsibility. It is 
doubtful that it could trigger a responsibility for such virtual beings, because it is felt in the 
present. What exists now can awaken my responsibility, but not what does not exist yet.  
We have seen that Norton thinks of a moral commitment to future human generations not 
from the viewpoint of the future, but from the present of the human community. Present 
communities, here and now, allocate values to nature, such as ecological and 
geomorphological ones which they want to pass on to their descendants. The problem now 
lies in the present itself. The difficulty is of giving preference to those values by reaching a 
consensus on them.  
Norton believes that such values are instrumental values though non-use values9. They 
are like short-term economic values. But if ecological and geomorphological values are of the 
same kind than economic values, why would they outweigh the latter? In a discussion the 
5  See ibid., chapter 2, section 1. 
6  See Norton, 2005, op. cit., p. 234, 240, 388. 
7  Norton, 1984, “Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism”, Environmental Ethics, 6, p. 144. 
8  See Norton 2005, op. cit., p. 278. 
9  See ibid., p. 176-179. 
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short-term economic point of view is seen as rational and there will always be good reasons to 
give them primacy: economic recession, unemployment, poverty, precariousness, social 
injustice, and so on.  So we think it is wishful thinking that ecological and geomorphological 
values can prevail if they are understood as instrumental values. 
We can observe such situations in cases where the soil of natural reserves with rich 
biodiversity, like the park Yasuni in the Amazon part of Ecuador for instance, are abundant 
with fossil energy. Why should the community protect such areas in the long-term future 
using ecological values when the income of their economic exploitation would contribute to 
eradicate the poverty of local populations? 
If ecological and geomorphological values are effectively implemented in environmental 
policies it is because the natural environment of human communities has a value for itself for 
their members, clearly different from an instrumental value. The value of nature for itself can 
only prevail if there first was a debate on this value, before any discussion about solutions to 
environmental issues has happened. And it will prevail, because one does not consider it as an 
instrumental value. Norton himself seems to confess in his book Sustainability that nature 
always has a constitutive value for the human communities, a value which constitutes the 
identity of the communities.  
The existence in nature of a constitutive value or of a value for itself means eventually 
that the community cannot be superimposed with a community of communication. It cannot, 
in other words, be exclusively human.  
3. The ecumenical community 
Norton’s position is that discourse ethics to which the human community refers aims at 
the consensus through a debate which confronts a plurality of values and interests. Such 
values and interests are exclusively human, since only mankind can participate to the 
community of communication.  
But a community, which presently feels responsible for the future of humanity, cannot be 
simply a human community. It must be an ecumenical community. This concept refers to an 
entity, that is a totality composed of members – human, animal, perhaps vegetal too – 
distributed among various living environments, depending in the species they belong to and 
the type of natural environment they live in10. All members of the community and all living 
environments have a moral value for the human members of it. But if the ecoumenical 
community actually exists, we cannot perceive it. Its limit is found in being itself. We could 
give the ecoumenical community a moral value only from the outside of the community, 
which is not possible.  
This shift towards a holistic viewpoint seems to be a necessary precondition for a debate – 
that means a discussion between humans – which takes the survival of mankind in the long-
term future seriously. Without such a kind of holism – say an anthropological one – to care 
about future generations means nothing, because that cannot be a real motivation in the 
discussion and eventually has no effect in political decisions. 
Moreover ethics of the ecoumenical community is essentially ethics based on the 
experience of alterity or otherness – the other human and the other of nature – which goes 
beyond the closure of the ego. 
10  See the book of Berque Augustin, 2000, Écoumène. Introduction à l’étude des milieux humains, Paris, 
Belin, for the idea of “ecoumen” which is here used in an extended and some different way. 
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Abstract 
Our food choices have been characterized as significant moral choices in recent years.  No 
longer is what you eat seen as a morally neutral private affair without moral ramifications. We 
are encouraged to eat organic, local, sustainable foods. Further we are confronted with choices 
about fair trade, humanely raised, absent antibiotics, hormones, and GMOs.  These choices can 
be confusing if only seen as ones relevant to our prudential interests, but the stakes are raised 
when we are chided that we will be immoral if we consume the “wrong” products. Many of 
these considerations are promoted as necessary for achieving sustainability goals: eat and shop 
locally for the good of the planet and the future. Others such as humanely raised animals, 
support other considerations—concern for animals’ welfare—but are also tied back into the 
goals of sustainability since factory farming of animals leads, to among other problems, 
massive quantities of manure that  contaminates the surrounding areas including critical 
waterways, killing off fish and other wildlife.  In this paper, I will consider what we should eat 
if we are concerned about sustainability. Sustainability is a notoriously tricky notion to pin 
down a specific meaning. For this paper, I will understand it as an expansive notion that 
includes preserving ecological integrity for current and future generations, but also includes 
cultural sustainability which embodies values, like justice and care for current and future 
generations as well as non-human animals. I will explore the widely accepted views about 
buying local and whether there are cogent moral arguments based on sustainability for those 
choices. In considering those reasons for buying local, I will investigate Peter Singer’s 
arguments against buying local supported by our duty to aid those suffering immediate harm. 
Singer’s arguments force us to examine what are our duties to aid those in developing nations 
versus supporting local economies. I will argue that our duties in regard to food purchases are 
complex and impinge on multiple values, including supporting local communities, ecological 
integrity, and concern for fair global food practices. 
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Our food choices have been characterized as significant moral choices in recent years. We 
are preached at by nutritionists, chastised by animal welfare supporters, proselytized by small 
farm advocates, foodies and “localavores,” and castigated by sustainable development 
activists to eat only some kinds of foods from only certain places produced by only certain 
types of people. Going hand in hand with these encouragements are the abundance of popular 
books, among them are Fast Food Nation, The Omnivore’s Dilemma, Food Politics, Stuffed 
and Starved, Tomatoland, and The Ethics of What we Eat, exposing the moral, political, 
environmental and nutritious problems of our complex modern food system.  
Why single out food for special moral attention in our consumer choices? What are the 
ethical issues that arise in our food choices and the food system in general? First there are a 
variety of questions pertaining to the environment that are raised about ecological integrity 
resulting from the industrialization of food production. These include the loss of biodiversity, 
depletion of topsoil, increased CO2 levels in the atmosphere from production and 
transportation, and pollution of waterways. Environmental problems such as climate change 
will further transform where and what we can produce, and in some cases, populations will 
have to flee their agricultural lands entirely due to flooding and other results of climate 
change.  The transportation of food across vast distances and borders raises questions about 
the environmental impact of that transportation, the security of national food sources and 
whether such practices contribute to or detract from more equitable and sustainable national 
economies.  
From the perspective of human health, contemporary food ways have led to an “obesity 
epidemic” in developed nations, particularly among the poor and minority populations. Many 
of these people are undernourished since the foods they eat have little or no nutritional value. 
Soaring rates of cancer, heart disease, and other lifestyle diseases are also products of our 
current food practices.  The major killers in the world are not infectious diseases; rather they 
are heart disease, cancers, lung disease and diabetes.  These diseases killed more than 36 
million people in 2008 according a report by the World Health Organization. Industrial 
bioengineered plants and animals, and animals raised in concentrated feeding operations, have 
produced more food, but at what cost to human health, animal welfare, and the welfare of the 
planet? At the same time, malnourishment and starvation remain rampant in less developed 
nations where wholesale loss of cultural food practices have occurred due to increases in 
agricultural trade and resulting crop choices.  
Whether animals should be part of our diet has gained attention first with the exposure of 
the horrors of factory farming and now with exposure of the negative impact of meat 
production on the environment.  Peter Singer raised the issues of the plight of farm animals in 
his classic book from 1975 Animal Liberation. Since then the suffering endemic to the system 
of animal food production has been difficult to ignore. Whether animals have rights as some 
philosophers have argued or are part of the moral community due to their ability to suffer, or 
(even more modestly) if we have a duty to avoid unnecessary cruelty or suffering to animals, 
the contemporary production of meat is morally problematic. 
 And lastly, although not the least of the moral complexity of food, are the social justice 
issues presented by food.  Food is an important lens to view global poverty and sustainable 
development. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights recognizes a right to be free 
from poverty and a right to food.  The global market in food raises serious ethical questions 
since, for instance, people are growing food for export but are food insecure themselves. The 
UN reported that even though in 2009 there were record amounts of food produced, the 
number of hungry people went up. Internationally, 870 million people are food insecure, 
including ironically in the U.S.A. where we export tons of food. “Hunger, in most cases, is 
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caused by lack of money rather than a shortage of food production.” (my italics)1 How it is 
that modern agriculture has increased production, the Green Revolution was supposed to end 
hunger, but “food deserts” make it difficult to eat nutritious food in some American cities, and 
malnutrition continues in Africa and Asia? These paradoxes in our global food system raise 
issues of food security on a national and community level that underscore the difficulty of the 
challenges confronting us. As climate changes occur, new types of injustices emerge; 
developed nations dump their wastes of overconsumption into the common atmosphere, 
where the vulnerable in developed nations will be most disadvantaged. In many cases, climate 
change will exacerbate the food crisis situation of those peoples. Other questions of social 
justice have to do with the conditions of farm laborers and others in the food supply chain in 
the United States and globally. Guest worker programs have increased growers’ access to 
farm labor but have they not alleviated and perhaps, they have aggravated the historic 
problem of depressed wages and itinerancy among farm workers. Farm workers are 
unnecessarily exposed to pesticides and other dangers in a system pursuing cheap food where 
workers’ have little say in the conditions under which they work.   
All these issues compel us to think about the role our food choices play in this morally 
complex system that has effects on so many around the world and into the future. No longer is 
what you eat seen as a morally neutral private affair without moral ramifications. We are 
encouraged to eat organic, local, sustainable foods. Further we are confronted with choices 
about fair trade, humanely raised, absent antibiotics, hormones, and GMOs.  These choices 
can be confusing if only seen as ones relevant to our prudential interests, but the stakes are 
raised when we are chided that we will be immoral if we consume the “wrong” products. 
Many of these considerations are promoted as necessary for achieving sustainability goals: eat 
and shop locally for the good of the planet and the future. Others such as humanely raised 
animals, support other considerations—concern for animals’ welfare—but are also tied back 
into the goals of sustainability since factory farming of animals leads to among other 
problems, massive quantities of manure that contaminates the surrounding areas including 
critical waterways, killing off fish and other wildlife and greenhouse gases.  In this paper, I 
will consider what we should eat if we are concerned about sustainability. Sustainability is a 
notoriously tricky notion to pin down a specific meaning. For this paper, I will understand it 
as an expansive notion that includes preserving ecological integrity for current and future 
generations, but also includes cultural sustainability which embodies values, like justice and 
care for current and future generations as well as non-human animals.  
I will explore the widely accepted views about buying local and whether there are cogent 
moral arguments based on sustainability for those choices. In considering those reasons for 
buying local, I will investigate Peter Singer’s arguments against buying local supported by 
our duty to aid those suffering immediate harm. Singer’s arguments force us to examine what 
are our duties to aid those in developing nations versus supporting local economies. I will 
argue that our duties in regard to food purchases are complex and impinge on multiple values, 
including supporting local communities, ecological integrity, and concern for fair global food 
practices.  
Buying local—always the right ethical choice? 
Many popular writers have been arguing that “buying local” is the single change that one 
can make to ensure that one is making the right eating choices. Buying local foods has 
become shorthand for morally good food.  One of the leaders of this movement is Michael 
Pollen, among the virtues of buying local food he advances these as his top three, the food is 
1  http://www.wfp.org/hunger/causes 
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generally fresher, local food generally leaves a much lighter environmental footprint, buying 
local is an act of conservation.2 
Outside of taste and nutrition, the effects on the environment of buying local are forefront 
in this movement. Gary Nabham, often called the pioneer of the local food movement, argues 
in Coming Home to Eat: The Pleasures and Politics of Local Foods 3 that our global eating 
habits are destroying the environment.4 Other writers such as Anna Lappe in Diet for a Hot 
Planet5 argue for purchasing local as a way to mitigate climate change.  
The idea of investigating where our food comes from, and in particular how far it travels 
to get to our plate, has gained tremendous traction in the last few years.  A researcher in Iowa 
in 2005 found that the milk, sugar, and strawberries that go into strawberry yogurt collectively 
traveled 2,211 miles (3,558 kilometers) to the processing plant. Environmental groups such as 
Natural Resources Defense Council claim:   
How your food is grown, stored, transported, processed and cooked can all influence how 
it impacts climate change and the environment. Transportation-related impacts are 
particularly important for imported foods. NRDC calculated the transportation impacts of 
importing fresh produce and wine widely consumed in California, directly comparing the 
climate and air quality emissions from importing these foods instead of growing and 
consuming them in California. We did not attempt a full lifecycle assessment of all 
climate and air impacts. The results of our analysis show that—all else being equal—
locally grown foods are a better choice.6 
The local-food movement has grown up and the concept of "food miles," meaning the 
distance food travels from farm to plate, has come into its own.  The United Kingdom’s 
Tesco, it's largest supermarket chain, instituted a carbon labeling on all its products.7 This and 
other policies have been supported by environmental groups who encourage local food 
sourcing as the moral choice for the planet.  
Before granting a wholehearted endorsement of local food to solve our environmental 
crisis, what ‘local’ means has itself been a source of controversy. For Gary Nabham in 
Coming Home to Eat in northern Arizona he settled on a radius of 250 miles. Whereas Alisa 
Smith and J.B. MacKinnon, authors of The 100-Mile Diet, explain the boundary of their diet 
as "a 100-mile radius is large enough to reach beyond a big city and small enough to feel truly 
local. And it rolls off the tongue more easily than the ‘160-kilometer diet.’” The term 
"locavore" was coined by Sage Van Wing from Marin County, California, where there is an 
agricultural abundance limited her diet to food from within 100 miles.  Rich Pirog from the 
Leopold Institute conducted a survey of consumers throughout the United States found that 
two-thirds considered “local food” to mean food grown within 100 miles. Yet, sometimes 
‘local’ gets associated with a state or province identification. In Arizona the produce is often 
marketed  “Arizona Grown” the implication that it is local even though for many people in the 
state produce grown in Mexico would be more “local” than other parts of the state—less than 
100 miles. Some countries market their own food as “local” and encourage a kind of 
nationalism or patriotism about purchasing those foods, supporting their farms and resisting 
the globalization of food—the converse is xenophobia about purchasing the foods of others. 
Some have asked if the zeal for local food is a kind of “culinary racism.” 
2  Michael Pollen, “Eat Your View” New York Times May 17, 2006,  
3  Gary Nabham, Coming Home to Eat: The Pleasures and Politics of Local Foods (New York: Norton, 
2001). 
4  Gary Nabham, Coming Home to Eat: The Pleasures and Politics of Local Foods 
5  Anna Lappe Diet for a Hot Planet (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010). 
6  http://www.nrdc.org/policy November 2007 
7  http://www.carbontrustcertification.com/page?pageid=a042000000FjjEv 
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Why is local thought to be morally better? 
Looking at Pollen’s arguments, his first claim is that local food is fresher and more nutritious.  
To this point, Peter Singer’s responds that buying local food that is “fresher and tastes better” 
aren’t ethical reasons for purchases. That’s not entirely accurate, purchasing food that is better 
for you and your family are moral considerations (on the assumption that morality requires 
you to consider your family’s and your own welfare), but local food, as any food may or may 
not be fresh depending on how it is handled. I will leave aside the nutritious claim at this 
point. 
Local food is thought to be the most ecologically sustainable based on the concept of “lower 
food miles.”   Focusing on Rich Pirog’s study of produce in Iowa, for instance,  the average 
produce in the U.S. traveled 1500 miles to the store versus the 47 of local produce.8 That 
difference does seem to imply that buying local would make a big difference in one’s carbon 
footprint. Nevertheless, the caveat that Pirog introduces to this simplistic analysis is that it is 
not only important to consider the food miles but by what form of transport is used. Shipped 
foods, and train transported foods are significantly more efficient than trucked foods. For 
instance, trains are 10 times more efficient than trucks. Rice grown and shipped from Asia 
may have less environmental impact than rice grown and trucked in the United States. Food 
miles just focus on transportations cost and neglect the other environmental impacts of 
growing food in particular regions and the packaging of food. Hot house grown tomatoes in 
northern climates may be local, but the amount of energy consumed to grow them in a 
hothouse, cancels out any saving in transportation. Regions like Florida with lots of sunshine 
and water are better choices from the perspective of greenhouse gases. In the Southwest we 
have an agricultural industry that has grown up on borrowed water resources and overusing 
ground water. So even though the food is locally produced some of that produce is rapidly 
depleting our water supplies and water in the Southwest involves a tremendous amount of 
energy since it needs to be pumped.9 As global climate change occurs or technologies 
advance (for example greenhouses might efficiently be heated with renewable energy), what 
can be grown environmentally efficiently will change as well. The calculations for 
environment impact of particular food products in particular regions will change over time. 
Nevertheless, the shorthand of “food miles” doesn’t capture the entire environmental impact 
of any food, and hence doesn’t provide a useful shortcut for the most sustainable food 
choice.10 
In considering the environmental effect of food choices, certain foods, in particular meat and 
dairy products, create significantly greater amounts greenhouse emissions than other food 
products. Raising animals for food requires producing food in the form of grains and corn, 
and feeding it to the animals. It requires as much as 10 times the number of calories from 
grain to produce the same calories in meat.11 From the perspective of greenhouse gases, that is 
not efficient production of food. All the carbon costs of the grain production and 
transportation including the fertilizers and pesticides are included in the meat and dairy 
emissions.  Additionally, animals like cows and sheep emit gases, methane and nitrous oxide, 
which are 23, in the case of methane and 296 in the case of nitrous oxide, times more 
8  Rich Pirog, “Food, Fuel, and Freeways: An Iowa perspective on how far food travels, fuel usage, and 
greenhouse gas emissions” http://www.leopold.iastate.edu/ 
9  William Debuis A Great Aridness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
10  See Christopher Weber and H. Scott Matthews’ “Food-Miles and the Relative Climate Impacts of Food 
Choices in the United States” in  Environ. Sci. Technol., 2008, 42 (10) analysis where they determined that 
the transportation, the final delivery of food, only represented 4% of the total greenhouse gases for food. 
They found that 83% of the emissions for agricultural products occur before the food leaves the farm. 
11  “Rethinking the Meat Guzzler” By Mark Bittman New York Times,  January 27, 2008. 
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destructive than carbon dioxide.12 Overall, whether local or not, there are heavy 
environmental costs from industrial animal production. Other environmental impacts include 
problems of disposal of the wastes produced by concentrated animal feeding operations (or 
CAFOs), often called “manure lagoons”. A study of the United Kingdom’s food systems 
showed that meat and dairy amounted to half of all the emissions in the U.K. food supply. The 
researcher concluded that “probably the single most helpful behavioral shift one can make” to 
reduce the greenhouse gases from food products is “eating fewer meat and dairy products and 
consuming more plant foods in their place.”13 This conclusion has been taken up with the 
“Meatless Mondays” movement which tries to get people not to consume meat one day a 
week based on the health and environmental benefits. 14 
Food miles are not the only way in which local food is thought to be more environmentally 
sustainable. Local food proponents are also advocates of eating seasonally. Bringing food 
halfway around the world so that consumers can continue to eat grapes in the winter is not 
generally a very greenhouse gas efficient approach to eating. Eating seasonally from your 
local area would have some benefits. Nevertheless, eating locally wouldn’t be feasible 
everywhere given the particular environments.  The prescription of eating local doesn’t have 
to be understood as absolute—“never eat anything that isn’t locally produced”--but rather, 
other things being equal, purchase food that is produced locally. How easy or difficult eating 
locally is, how successful one might be in achieving it will vary on one’s location. Another 
part of the "eat locally” movement is to eat less processed foods. Processed food almost 
always use more energy in producing and packaging them; even just the transport costs of 
moving the ingredients to the point of production adds an additional level to the transportation 
costs. Furthermore, processed foods tend to have more packaging which has environmental 
cost (producing the packaging), and the packaging usually ends up in landfills which itself is 
an environmental problem.   
Finally, local food advocates argue for organically produced foods. Not all “local” producers 
are organic. Nevertheless, organic food is the largest growth area in the food business, in 2011 
the organic industry was worth 31.5 billion.15 Organically produced food does not use 
synthetically produced fertilizers and pesticides and does not use growth hormones and 
antibiotics. Creating synthetic fertilizers and pesticides produces greenhouse gases and 
applying them on the crops results in nitrous oxide. Additionally, the fertilizers pollute 
waterways, kill wild fish and other marine wildlife, and bees; they contribute to soil erosion 
which in turn creates carbon dioxide, further exacerbating the climate problems. Generally, 
organically produced foods have a significantly better effect on the environment even when 
produced at a large scale. A 2012 study by Stanford University researchers argued that 
organically grown foods aren’t more nutritious than nonorganic food.  However, it did show 
that organic foods lead to fewer toxins in the body.16 Since the impact on the ecological 
environment is substantially better than non-organically produced foods, and since they don’t 
expose farm laborers to pesticides which are hazardous to their health, there are good moral 
reasons for choosing organically produced foods. 
It is important to mention, something that Pollen is conspicuously silent about, that buying 
local and even organic doesn’t guarantee fair treatment of farmworkers who helped bring the 
local and/or organic food to market.  In one instance of farm worker exploitation in the United 
12  http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/research/topics/climate-change/response 
13  Garrett T. Sources for the chart showing total UK food consumption GHG emissions as percentage of total 
UK consumption related GHGs. Work in progress, 13 March 2007, Food Climate Research Network, 
http://www.fcrn.org.uk/ 
14  http://www.meatlessmonday.com/why-meatless/ 
15  http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2404-organic-industry-healthy-growth.html 
16  Crystal Smith-Spangler, et.al.,“Are Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than Conventional Alternatives?: A 
Systematic Review” Annals of Medicine 4 September 2012, Vol 157, No. 5 
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States, Eric Holt-Gimenez in “The Coalition of Immokalee Workers: Fighting Modern Day 
Slavery in the Industrial Food System” exposed slave like conditions for farm workers in 
Florida.  Living in Florida and purchasing these tomatoes would be purchasing locally, but in 
so doing, would be supporting conditions of abuse and exploitation. There are not guarantees 
that local, even small scale farmers, are not engaged in unfair labor practices.  Unfortunately, 
there are structural problems in determining whether farm workers in the United States are 
treated fairly. In the 1930s, the National Labor Relations Act (guaranteeing the right to form 
unions) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, didn’t include farm workers in their provisions. 
Consequently, in the US, farm workers are not automatically subject to the same protection as 
other workers, including minimum wage and OHSA protections. 
The final argument Pollen presents for local is that it is “an act of conservation — of the land, 
of agriculture and of the local economy, all of which are threatened by the globalization of 
food. Anyone who prizes agricultural landscapes, and worries about sprawl destroying them, 
should buy local whenever possible….Otherwise the landscape will revert to second-growth 
forest or housing developments.” In Europe they have a saying “Eat your view” which has 
gained momentum in this country including in 2008 with White House’s garden.  Buying 
local will preserve agricultural landscapes. But the types of landscapes Pollen and others have  
in mind are the smaller agricultural operations and not the large-scale industrial 
agribusinesses. What we are trying to conserve are particular types of landscapes, with varied 
crops and animals, practicing good land stewardship. Pollen is correct to point out that 
conservation of land should not be seen as exclusively wilderness preservation as has been the 
focus of many major environmental groups in the latter half of the 20th century.  Aldo 
Leopold was well aware of the virtues of conservation of farm land and wrote extensively 
about farmers as conservationists.  His famous commentary on our current relationship with 
the land was: “We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we 
see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect.” 
17 But not all farms are small and Arcadian, practicing the type of land stewardship that will 
conserve the environment. Again just supporting local is not sufficient, more has to be said 
about the types of practices the farm and farmer are engaged in. 
Peter Singer is more sanguine about the argument of supporting the “endangered family farm” 
than are the other arguments advanced for buying local. He notes the precipitous decline in 
family farms from nearly 40 percent of the population living on farms in the 1900s to less 
than 2 percent today. Much of this decline is a result of widespread industrial agriculture 
taking over family farms. Small farms have difficulty competing with the large-scale 
agribusiness and the consolidation of the food business which have driven down the 
wholesale costs.  Singer points out that not all rural depopulation is a bad thing, rural 
communities can be “stultifying narrow and intolerant of diversity”18 and limit opportunities 
of residents to farming. Farming can involve difficult labor, and in an era where the systemic 
supports are for large operations, it is easy to understand the reason for the decline in small 
farms. Nevertheless, Singer does say that some rural values are: 
undeniably worth preserving. When people see themselves as custodian of a heritage they 
have received from their parent and will pass on to their children, they are more likely to 
cherish the land and farm it sustainability. If those people are replaced by large, 
corporate-owned farms with a focus on recouping the investment and making profits for a 
generation at most, we will all be worse off in the long run.19 
17  Aldo Leopold Sand County Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1949), 203-204 
18  Peter Singer and Jim Mason, The Ethics of what We Eat,  (Rodale, 2006) 143. 
19  Singer 143. 
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Supporting local farmers, small family operations, not multinational agribusinesses, with 
roots in a community, strengthens the local economy by keeping the money spent within the 
local economy. Those purchases from local farmers make it possible for farmers to be 
economically viable. This movement has been embraced by many local retailers as well in the 
digital age where individuals purchase items over the internet and the local businesses can’t 
survive, creating unemployment, and without local businesses communities don’t receive 
taxes for schools and other public services. This is a compelling argument since the tax base 
of a community is what provides the services that make people’s lives better and sustain 
communities-- schools, libraries, parks, police and fire protection all significantly contribute 
to the welfare of residents of a community. If farmers can bring their products more directly 
to community consumers, without intermediaries, they will reap more of the profits, hence 
making the practice of farming sustainable for families. The mantra “buy local” has led to the 
revitalization of farmer’s markets and community supported agriculture (CSA) where people 
commit to purchase produce and meat directly from a particular farmer each week. 
Supporting one’s community represents important values for one’s self-interest--of providing 
a more livable community-- and for the sake of others who are members of your community. 
Community means that we are in an interdependent relationship with the members of the 
community, and being in a community entails relationships of reciprocity with others in the 
community. Communities can’t survive without those reciprocal relationships among the 
members. Already in the digital age more and more commerce and services are going outside 
the local community. It stands to reason that at some point, the geographically situated 
community can’t survive without the support of its members. Globalization of all food 
production and manufacture risks essential relationships needed to keep alive particular 
communities. Singer notes that “keep your dollars circulating in your own community” is not 
an ethical principle and embodies a kind of “community selfishness.” That claim overreaches 
as well. We do have responsibilities to our communities, to promote the welfare of the 
citizens as well as our own. Individuals and groups such as civic organizations take seriously 
those responsibilities and provide important services to communities.  Pragmatically, it makes 
sense to locate moral responsibilities to others primarily to one’s community since one is in a 
better position to know the pressing needs and concerns and share basic values with those in 
one’s community.  Indeed the dangers of paternalism and cultural hegemony when 
individuals try to “help” communities to which they don’t belong, boosts the claim that our 
primary moral concerns should be our own community.  Supporting the economic vitality of 
one’s community by purchasing local as well as the conservation of agricultural landscapes 
and encouraging values of connection with the farmers and nutritional and aesthetic value of 
food are important to the cultural sustainability of communities. So while the contribution to 
ecological sustainability is mixed for purchasing local foods, sometimes buying local and 
organic (although organic is better whether local or not) is better for the environment, 
sometimes it is not, there are other important reasons to purchase local foods.   
Singer’s challenges buying local: 
Singer’s most serious challenge to the enthusiastic movement to purchase local food is 
that in so doing we will be responsible for harm to farmers in the developing world. Whatever 
good is achieved by buying local food (and Singer doesn’t think there is much good in doing 
so) we wouldn’t be purchasing from farmers in the developing world where  people are much 
poorer and in need of basic assistance.  When Tesco in the UK introduced carbon labeling on 
its foods, it was interpreted by some as a dangerous move to destroy farmers in developing 
nations. For Singer, we should ask about the effects of our choice to become a locavore. He 
says: 
130 
When we think ethically, we should put ourselves in the position of all those affected by 
our actions, no matter where they live. If farmers near San Francisco need extra income to 
send their children to good colleges, and farmers in developing nations need extra income 
in order to be able to afford basic health care or a few years of elementary school for their 
children, we will, other things being equal, do better to support the farmers in developing 
countries. 20 
More than being selfish, Singer thinks that we do wrong by preferring local farmers over 
developing nations’ farmers. He argues that we ought to act in a way that prevents the most 
harm and bring about the most good, and since buying local would deprive farmers in 
developing nations our business and since they are worse off relative to American farmers, 
our purchasing from developing nations would be the best ethical choice. Many in the 
international development community have argued for this approach to open and fair trade 
encouraging the richer global north countries to purchase from the global south nations.  As 
Singer points out, developing nations are not in a technological position to compete in that 
arena, but they can on the agricultural level.  
Undoubtedly, we have responsibilities to alleviate suffering and poverty in the world. 
Singer and many in the international sustainable development world argue that one of the 
easiest ways to satisfy that responsibility is to purchase food from developing nations. Such 
food purchases bring cash into the economies of developing nations and help lift individuals 
out of poverty. From a sustainable development perspective this kind of global trade is the 
best way to improve the economies of those countries and alleviate poverty. What this means 
is that by buying local foods, we are thereby forsaking purchasing from farmers in 
impoverished nations and providing more benefit to them than our local farmers. 
What exactly is our responsibility to the poor of the world? Many people think that our 
responsibility to relieve the poverty and suffering of distant strangers in the world are positive 
obligations to aid and not obligations to avoid causing harm to others. Since we are not 
causally responsible for the harmful circumstances of those farmers in developing nations, the 
argument continues, we cannot be obligated to prevent the harm or to aid them. Our 
individual food purchases from developing nations’ farmers might be good to do but not 
obligatory upon us. Since there are various ways to satisfy our responsibilities to aid the poor 
and relieve suffering (sending money to Oxfam or purchasing garments produced in 
Bangladesh) we are not obligated to purchase their food. Just as no given person or NGO 
providing services to the poor can demand aid from us, choosing to buy local food over 
globally produced food doesn’t violate the moral duty to cause harm.   
Philosophers have distinguished between “positive duties,” duties of beneficence or to 
aid, and “negative duties” not to harm others, generally associated with refraining from 
positive actions; for instance, not killing, stealing, or assaulting others. Negative duties are 
often thought to be more stringent duties than positive duties.21 Failure to act upon them is to 
engage in morally wrongful behavior. Typically the sorts of cases we have in mind for 
negative duties are local and specific instances of harm to particular people. In killing 
someone or stealing that person’s property, one has direct contact with an identifiable victim. 
The nature of the harms to others is direct, specific, and assignable to the person doing the 
harming. Positive duties can also be assignable to persons, helping a neighbor with her yard, 
taking meals to senior citizens’ homes, or helping out at the food bank. But many cases are 
less specific, giving money to Oxfam or the Red Cross after a disaster. In giving money to 
disaster relief, one doesn’t know any identifiable person who is aided by the charity. 22 
20  Singer 141. 
21  For a fuller discussion of the issues surrounding the notion of ‘stringency’ see Heidi Malm’s Between the 
Horns of the Dilemma: Philosophical Studies Vol. 61, No. 3, Mar., 1991. 
22  See Joel Feinberg, “The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan” Criminal Justice Ethics 
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There are notorious problems with this distinction between positive and negative duties 
and the acts and omissions associated with them. Not all violations of negative duties are 
actions, for example, failure to put on the brakes for the pedestrian in the cross walk, violates 
a negative duty.  And conversely, some violations of positive duties are omissions. Bad 
Samaritans fail to do easy rescues. Other cases are controversial as well: The physician giving 
a patient a lethal dose of medicine without the patient’s consent violates a negative duty not to 
kill, but does the physician failing to treat a patient violate a positive or negative duty? When 
coming upon a drowning swimmer in an isolated lake, is the failure to do an unconditional 
rescue violate a positive or negative duty? And there are many other instances where it is not 
clear whether it is a case of a negative duty or positive one. In general, negative duties are 
duties not to cause harm and positive duties are duties to prevent harm. The fulfillment of 
either and the violation of either can involve a range of acts and omissions.23 
Singer famously doesn’t accept the distinction between positive and negative obligations 
with the greater stringency to the former than the latter. Using the example of what your 
responsibility would be upon finding an infant face down in a puddle, he argues that it is clear 
that you ought to turn the baby over to save it from drowning even if doing so involves some 
inconvenience to you, such as muddying your shoes. You didn’t create the situation that the 
baby finds itself in, that is, you didn’t create the harmful situation, nevertheless, there is 
significant agreement that you should save the baby from drowning and that failure to do so is 
to do wrong. Since it is foreseeable that the baby will die and you can save it without much 
effort, you are responsible for its death if you fail to save it. Singer is arguing that since we 
can prevent harm (and do much more good) by purchasing food from poor farmers in the 
developing world, with little or no inconvenience to ourselves (we miss out on the fun of 
going to the local farmers market), then we ought to do so. Failure to prevent the harm of 
poverty in the developing world by buying local food means we are responsible for the misery 
of those farmers.   
Singer’s collapsing the distinction between positive and negative duties is too 
implausible. Most of us, most of the time could behave in another way that would increase the 
relative impact of our conduct. By not buying lunch or going to a movie, I could send money 
to the poor, by riding a bike and not driving a car, I could reduce my carbon footprint, by not 
going on vacation I could spend the time helping children in an orphanage. All these 
alternative actions would increase the general welfare of the world. Duties to aid could 
quickly swallow up our lives with fulfilling those requirements, undermining our own 
autonomy and life plans. The distinction between positive and negative duties, and the greater 
stringency in negative duties, avoids this slippery slope of requiring individuals to change 
their plans and provide assistance to those in need all the time. Without the distinction, 
morality is too demanding and our lives would be untenable. With the distinction, negative 
duties are generally easier to fulfill by just avoiding certain activities—don’t kill, steal, or 
rape. Violations of negatives duties are more difficult to justify than violations of positive 
duties. Though there are difficult cases of distinguishing between positive and negative duties 
and acts and omissions, it doesn’t mean that there aren’t clear cases where there is widespread 
agreement. What we identify as harms to others that we are obligated to avoid doing, 
generally are specific acts where we cause harm to identifiable victims. Positive duties are 
moral requirements to do certain things for the benefit of others, but there is more leeway in 
discharging those obligations and it is easier to justify violations. This is not to say that we 
ought not to provide aid to strangers and contribute to eradicating the sufferings of the world, 
but those obligations are not ones that should interfere with our life plans at every moment. 
And it is our decision when and where to act upon them.  Given this discussion, it would 
1984 vol.3 1.  
23  Conversations with Heidi Malm helped to clarify these points about positive and negative obligations. 
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seem, contrary to Singer, that our obligations to alleviate poverty is a positive duty, 
consequently, we are not obligated to purchase food from improvised developing nations’ 
farmers.   
New harms of globalization 
The globalized world provides us with immediate information about the effects of our 
choices on the vulnerable of the world. Our purchase of cheap clothing supports exploitation 
and risky conditions for garment workers as we saw in the recent tragedy in Bangladesh. Our 
addiction to drugs fuels drug wars in Mexico, our desire for diamonds mined in Africa 
finances war lords that terrorize people in those regions. Consuming an abundance of energy 
by driving fuel inefficient cars and lavishly wasting energy in our home and offices dumps 
carbon into the common atmosphere of the globe contributing to global climate change.  
Climate change will have devastating consequences on the most vulnerable of the world. Our 
choices and actions, in concert with others, are creating conditions in developing nations that 
do or will harm those people. These are  “new harms” that challenge the rigid line between 
not harming and aiding those in need.24  The ordinary things we do, viz., driving our cars, 
purchasing food and clothes, what kind of light bulbs and grocery bags we use, can have 
tremendous effects on others around the world and into the future. 
Many of the new harms are a result of the cumulative activities of many people. My 
driving an inefficient car, or eating foods that are flown from the other side of the globe, or 
otherwise consuming more than my share of energy that contributes to the carbon in the 
atmosphere, are part of the cumulative activities that will in concert with others cause harm to 
others. Climate injustice results when those creating climate change are getting the benefits of 
doing so (wanton consumption of energy and economic growth, for example) and imposing 
the harm on others who didn’t contribute to the problem.25  The “polluter pays principle” 
strikes many people as a fair principle —namely those who generate the pollution should have 
to pay for its effects (including compensating those who have to suffer its effects). In the 
current case, those who are going to pay for the effects of pollution to the atmosphere are not 
the polluters since many of the devastating effects of climate change will occur to the 
developed nations.  Even the effects of climate change that do occur in the industrial West 
will be better tolerated since we are able to adapt to the changes, unlike the poor who don’t 
have the resources to support adaption strategies.  
Knowledge of the effects of large-scale agribusiness, the transportation of food (carbon 
miles), the conditions of agricultural workers in the food system, and the conditions of poor 
farmers in developing nations has changed the context in which we make food choices.  Many 
of the practices will lead to global climate change.  Global climate change will result in 
flooding and the destruction of many low-lying areas of the world, displacing millions in 
those countries, these effects are the results of the lifestyles of millions of other people, 
mainly in the western industrial nations.  The most vulnerable of the world will be even worse 
off than they are already. It is difficult to remain oblivious to the effects of our lifestyle 
choices that result in harm to others even if they are in far off lands.  These harms are not the 
discrete and local harms that we have considered in the previous section of negative duties, 
but are they happen to people far away, geographically and in time, and they are the 
consequences of many people acting in particular way.  Since the food system is responsible 
for roughly a third of the greenhouse gases, food choices are significant contributors to these 
24  Judith Lichtenberg, “Negative Duties, and the “New Harms” Ethics vol. 120 no. 3 (April 2010). 
25  Stephen Gardiner, “Climate Justice”.  In John Dryzek, David Schlosberg and Richard Norgaard, eds. 
Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford University Press. (2011) 
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kinds of environmental harms. But as we have seen, the fact of the impact on the environment 
of food doesn’t tell us whether in any given case to purchase local or global. 
What are our responsibilities to avoid or alleviate these “new harms”? Are these new 
harms represented by negative obligations such that we will do wrong if we don’t avoid 
them? They are different from the old harms since we don’t cause them on our own.  Judith 
Lichtenberg’s discussion of the new harms usefully distinguishes them into two types of 
harms.  The first type of harm occurs when an aggregate of people act in certain ways. In and 
of themselves these activities, for example, burning fossil fuels are not harmful, but it is the 
aggregate of many people burning fossil fuels that leads to the harm of global climate change. 
Examples of these types of harms include eating foods that have a larger than necessary 
carbon footprint (out of season fruits flown across the world or energy intensive products 
grown locally). The second type of harm is represented by, for example, buying products 
made in factories where the workers are exploited or animals are treated cruelly.  These harms 
“involve actions that are wrong in themselves, irrespective of what others do.”26 In the second 
kind of cases our reason for not wanting to purchase those goods that involve those types of 
harms is that we don’t want to participate or be complicit in those harms. Our own actions 
may not affect whether the harms occur but we still don’t want to “participate” in those 
harms—“I don’t want to support the use of child labor.” The first type of cases, the 
aggregative harms appeal to considerations of fairness.  Here a person’s reasoning might 
employ the categorical imperative: “Since allowing everyone to consume energy at the rate 
consumed by the average American leads to disaster, it is unfair for her to consume at that 
rate.”27 In both of these cases there is a question whether one’s actions will have any effect on 
the state of the world, that is, whether her action will change anything to reduce the harms 
caused by that type of action.  Often, they will not have the effect of stopping the harms. 
Are failures to purchase food, harms? 
The above examples are cases of harms to others and we have been considering our role 
in creating, contributing or perpetuating those harms.  Even though they are aggregate harms, 
we still need to be responsible for our contribution or complicity. What about the cases of not 
buying from impoverished farmers in developing nations? Are those instances of harms, even 
of the new harms version? Those cases have the aggregative quality as well, namely, my 
purchasing tomatoes from a Guatemalan farmer wouldn’t alone lift him out of poverty, but it 
might do so in concert with others purchasing his product.  The cases we discussed above, the 
contribution to climate injustices or intrinsically wrong actions, e.g., exploiting child labor, 
are cases of negative duties since they involve avoiding harm to others.  Are the instances of 
not purchasing from impoverished farmers instances of harms to others? Are we harming 
those farmers by not purchasing their produce as Singer implies? Harms are judged as making 
people “worse off” than they would be otherwise. Assessments of the baseline from which we 
make the judgment of worse off or better off are not without controversy.  Those questions 
include: How widely or narrowly should we construe the baseline, how much description 
should be included in the baseline, and should that description include normative 
assessments? On the face of it, the purchases from farmers in developing nations appear to be 
instances of benefitting them and not harming them since they are better off with our 
purchases than they would be otherwise.  If that’s true, then these cases are ones of aiding 
others in need, or positive obligations, and not negative duties. (It is not clear that we should 
categorize these purchases   as “duties to aid” since we are being advantaged by the purchases 
unlike the case of unconditional aid to the poor.) These aren’t then instances of  “new harms”.  
26  Lichtenberg, 568. 
27  Lichtenberg, 568. 
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One complicating factor is if we are complicit in the paucity of the background conditions of 
those in need that makes their situation so terrible. Here I have in mind the result of 
colonialism or even the exploitation US companies that engineered conditions in those 
countries supported by the US government that leave the impoverished of the developing 
world in miserable conditions. These factors would change the baseline from which we judge 
better off or worse off. We will discuss these larger background factors in the next section. 
The fact that they aren’t harms doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t purchase from farmers in 
the developing world other things being equal (e.g., carbon footprint) thereby helping them 
out of their poverty. If we can aid the suffering of others we should do so. Though our more 
stringent obligations are to avoid harm, we still have duties to aid. There are cases where 
failing to aid others in suffering does seem particularly callous and indifferent to the suffering 
of others. Singer’s baby in the puddle is an example where failure to render aid makes the 
person morally monstrous. Positive duties are duties, and if we can do something as simple as 
purchasing from a particular farmer then, other things being equal, we ought to do so. Though 
they are positive duties, they too can contribute to integrity; how I think I should live, what 
kind of life plan I have, include my views about caring for the suffering of others and making 
a better world. Consequently drawing a sharp line between positive and negative duties may 
not be necessary in these cases. As Lichtenberg suggests, we can avoid the slippery slope 
when not drawing a sharp line between positive and negative duties by suggesting that each of 
us should do our “fair share” of aiding the suffering of others. 
Other problems with the duty to purchase from developing nations 
Singer argument that we should when possible choose to support the least well off in the 
world economy by purchasing their food and not favoring those in our community as 
locavores advocate for us to do has some other problems.  There is, for example, a knowledge 
problem with Singer’s claim that we should prefer the global poor farmers over local farmers.  
There are so many factors about the conditions under which food is produced, whether the 
laborers are paid a fair wage, who gets the profit, who are the various conglomerates that no 
consumer can know with confidence what the effect of their purchase will be on people in a 
poor nation. Thomas Pogge points out: “This is unknowable because as they [our consumer 
choices] reverberate around the globe, the effects of my economic decision intermingle with 
the effects of billions of decisions made by others, and it is impossible to try to disentangle, 
even ex post, the impact of my decision from this vast traffic by trying to figure out how 
things would have gone had I acted differently.”28  Consequently buying food from poor 
countries is not analogous to preventing the harm of the death of the baby in the puddle. In the 
baby’s case it is very immediate and specific what the outcome of your action or omission 
will be. Since the outcome of your conduct is not foreseeable or knowable in a specific sense, 
you can’t be held responsible for the state of poverty of developing nations’ farmers. On the 
other hand, in buying from a particular farmer at a farmers market, one can have direct 
knowledge of the outcome of that purchase. Isn’t this an argument against the “new harms” 
where I can’t know who is affect by my actions? It isn’t, since we weren’t relying on specific 
individuals being harmed by our collective action rather it is the knowledge that it will affect 
classes of people, for example, people living in low-lying countries. 
Beyond the knowledge problem, there has been a tremendous amount of discussion about 
whether humanitarian aid and development assistance are effective.29 If there are doubts about 
28   Thomas Pogge, editor Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who owes what to the Very Poor?  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 17 
29  See for example Thomas W. Dichter, Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third 
World has Failed (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003) and Dale Jamison, “Duties to the 
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the effectiveness of providing assistance to those in need, then one can't have an obligation to 
engage in futile practices.  One of the problems with aid is, for example, who exactly is 
benefitted by the aid. In the case of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) the US government’s largest agency for aid and assistance, most of the contracts 
and grants go to American firms. For example, food aid, agricultural products, must be 
purchased from US farmers; food cannot be purchased from other countries even if those 
purchases would aid the country that we are trying to help. President Obama has recently tried 
to change this policy but has been unsuccessful in getting it approved by Congress.  Much 
international aid ends up in the hands of corrupt leaders who siphon the funds into their own 
accounts rather than providing for their nation’s poor. Consider the billions of dollars in 
assistance that went into Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. Even though Haiti was the largest 
recipient of aid in the world in 2010, the country is still listed as a fragile state with a high 
vulnerable index. 30 The country remains in crisis. There is much discussion of whether aid is 
effective at all or whether it actually is disadvantaging those that the aid is trying to help. 
Consequently, the requirement that we provide aid to distant strangers is not as 
straightforward as it might seem, or as Singer’s baby in the puddle example suggests. 
The argument we have been considering is that we ought to buy from farmers in 
developing nations in order to lift them out of poverty. This assumes uncritically that the 
system is advantageous to those farmers. Are they, however, being advantaged by the global 
food system?  In the modern food system, though there are many farmers and many 
consumers, there are only a few corporate buyers and transporters of food, and they have 
driven down the price of food from farmers.31 By the time Ugandan coffee is sold in the US it 
is 200 times the amount that the farmer got for his product. The profits for the product are 
mostly received by corporate interests as opposed to the farmer.32 Consider the banana 
plantations in Central America which have been controlled by United Fruit Company (now 
called Chiquita Brands) since 1899. Those countries are notorious for their poverty and the 
brutality of their governments (many of which were supported by United Fruit).  Far from 
supporting the people’s interests, the global food business is as Raj Patel describes it a “story 
of colonialism, control over channels of production, distribution, marketing and finance, 
mobilization of national interests, and a racialized repainting of the Third World.”33 With 
space limitations, I can’t consider all the intricacies of the global food system. Suffice to say, 
we shouldn’t assume that developing nation farmers are advantaged by this schema as 
opposed to another system say where they were encouraged to supply for their own 
community’s needs.  
Human right to avoid severe poverty 
Another approach to the presumed duty to purchase food from farmers of the developing 
world rather than local farmers is that doing so is necessary to avoid violating the human 
rights of developing nations’ farmers. The UN Declaration of Human Rights recognizes a 
right to avoid severe poverty and a right to food. Could our failure to purchase food which 
would alleviate the economic distress of poor developing nation’s farmers be a violation of 
their human rights? We need to ask is what is the construction of the right to avoid severe 
poverty?  Normally we conceive of rights as correlated with duties. In this cases, who has the 
duty with which the right to avoid poverty is correlated? If we thought that the right to food 
Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World” The Journal of Ethics (2005) 9. 
30  http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/haiti 
31  Raj Patel, Stuff and Starved, (Brooklyn: Melville, 2007) 19-22. 
32  Patel, 18. 
33  Patel, 110. 
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was a right that imposes on all of us a correlative duty to feed those in poverty, then it seems 
implausible for the reasons we developed in collapsing the negative/positive duties.  We need 
to determine the signification of the human right to avoid severe poverty. It is plausible to 
suppose that the right to food and the right to be free from severe poverty means that nations 
should have policies that make it possible for individuals to either produce or have access to 
food at reasonable prices which means that states avoid policies that “foreseeably and 
avoidably produce life-threatening poverty.” 34 When nations sell off farmland to foreign 
investors, for example, in countries such as Mozambique, Mali, and the Philippines, pushing 
local farmers off the land, they cut “access to food…livelihoods are shattered and 
communities are uprooted.”35  Nation states that permit the sale of farmland to outside 
investors (in many cases encourage them for the profit) have policies that violate the human 
rights of their citizens.  
Earlier I argued that individuals can’t know the outcomes of individual purchases around 
the world, and consequently they can’t be held responsible for global poverty when they don’t 
purchase food from developing nations’ farmers.  Does this mean that individuals in affluent 
countries have no obligations to those who are impoverished of the world? Is it only the 
responsibility of the nations where those individuals live to protect their human rights to be 
free from poverty and have other basic necessities like food?  Pogge develops an argument 
that we have a negative duty “not to participate in the imposition of social institutions under 
which some avoidably lack secure access to the objects of their economic human rights.” 36   
The most important factors relevant to severe poverty in the world are institutional factors, the 
national and international background rules and policies within which economic transactions 
occur.  At the international level, Pogge points out “[e]ven small changes in the rules 
governing international trade, lending, investment, resource use, or intellectual property can 
have a huge impact on the global incidence of life-threatening poverty.”37 For instance, 
NAFTA was supposed to open up markets to trade in Mexico, the U.S., in Canada. This 
agreement seemed like it would advantage poor farmers in Mexico who could sell their 
products to the US and Canada. The agreement ended up driving 1.2 million small farmers in 
Mexico out of business (forcing them into the cities and driving wages down 10% in Mexico)  
since the agreement permitted the US to continue subsidies of their farmers making their corn 
cheaper than the Mexican produced corn.38 Mexico became an importer of corn after the 
agreement.  NAFTA illustrates how the structural arrangements within which economic 
activities occur have significant effects on individuals’ economic status. Many of the 
international economic agreements, such as those of the WTO, advantage the well-off nations 
and disadvantage the developing nations.  National and international structural reforms which 
are fair would go a long way to eradicating severe global poverty. Since it is foreseeable that 
international agreements such as NAFTA, where unfair advantage is given to US farmers 
usually the industrial agribusinesses with tariffs and subsidies, will result in human rights 
violations to those Mexican farmers who can’t compete, there is a duty to support institutional 
changes that ensure fair and open international trade rules. Poverty is often a product of 
international background conditions including international ones that aren’t fair and give 
unfair advantage to the better off and disadvantage those least well off. Those unfair 
disadvantages extend to small farmers in this country. Those institutional arrangements 
violate individuals’ human rights to avoid severe poverty. Rather than a duty to purchase 
34  Thomas Pogge, editor Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who owes what to the Very Poor?  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
35  Michael Kugelman, “The Global Farmland Rush” The New York Times February 5, 2013 
36  Pogge, 25. 
37  Pogge 26 
38  Patel, 61. 
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individual products to help alleviate poverty, we in democratic countries have duties to 
support institutional change and ensure international agreements and market conditions which 
are fair that will enable individuals to have economic opportunities. 
Our responsibility to alleviate poverty is appropriately understood at an institutional level, 
our nation’s failure to have fair trade arrangements with developing nations, for instance, 
harms the poor of those nations-- threatening them with dire economic conditions.  Our 
responsibility as individuals in democratic countries is to pressure our leaders into 
international agreements or other systemic changes that ensure equitable terms of exchange in 
the global market. The failure of the Doha agreement to have fair markets in agricultural 
products, for example, when it permits wealthy nations to continue to subsidize their own 
farmers putting them at an unfair advantage in the global market. Our duty in regards to the 
human right to avoid severe poverty is addressed at the institutional level of demanding that 
our country and other wealthy countries have fair trade agreements and ensuring that a few 
global corporate interests are not advantaged. If our nation engages in or supports the torture 
of human beings anywhere in the world we have a duty to pressure our leaders to stop 
engaging in torture or stop supporting policies that endorse torture. It is plausible to suppose 
that the specification of the human right to be free from torture would impose on individuals 
in other democratic countries the negative duty to demand policies that don’t lead to torture. 
The human right to be free life-threatening poverty requires that we support international 
agreements that don’t foreseeably and avoidably lead to severe poverty. 
Multiple-values and food choices  
Food choices implicate multiple values. The local food movement have directed our 
focused on sustainability goals in justifying their emphasis on buying local. Acknowledging 
that we do have duties to avoid harm to others, now and into the future, impels us to reduce 
the amount of greenhouse gases created by the product we purchase. Everyone, particularly 
those of us in affluent countries, ought to do our “fair share” to reduce the carbon that goes 
into the atmosphere and failure to do so is to be partially responsible for climate change and 
resulting harms from it. It turns out that the modern food system is a major generator of 
greenhouse gas. In this paper, I argue that “local food” may or may not support the 
sustainability goals of reducing carbon, concern about water usage, the detrimental effects of 
pesticides and fertilizers, packaging, refrigeration, and so on. Food choices depend on many 
factors which are not adequately capture by “food miles.” A more accurate assessment of the 
impact of food is based on what scientists are now calling “life cycle assessment” which is a 
tool that looks at “cradle to grave” of the life of food.39 It calculates what it take to grow the 
food, process it, package it, transport it, cook it, and dispose of it. Life cycle assessments are a 
much more accurate accounting of the environmental effects of food product than food miles 
(although not as easy to figure out).  
We rejected the argument that buying locally produced food rather than food produced by 
impoverished farmers in the developing world harm the developing world farmers.  Like a 
plethora of choices we make to purchase from one person rather than another, the choices 
entail that someone else is not benefitted by our purchasing from them. Eating at one 
restaurant rather than other, even if the avoided restaurant owner is impoverished, is not a 
case of harm to the latter. Every choice we make benefits some agent but not at the expense of 
her competitor.  Conceptualizing not purchasing from impoverished farmer as harming them, 
clutters the world with too many harms and destroys our own agency in creating and 
39  Poritosh Ro, “A review of life cycle assessment (LCA) on some food products” Journal of Food 
Engineering  Vol. 90, Issue 1, January 2009. 
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maintaining our own life plan. That view destroys agency since we are bandied about by 
outside forces that undermine our acting on our own purposes.  
Nevertheless, since we in affluent nations are using more than our “fair share” of the 
energy and consequently, we contribute a disproportionate amount of carbon to the 
atmosphere, we are contributing to the cumulative harm of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere.  What level of use is appropriate is contentious since we have already used more 
than we should and advantaged our economies as a result, and the notion of “fair share” of 
some resource like the atmosphere it is difficult to assess. A starting place is to look at the 
level at which everyone in the world should be consuming to stop the advance of global 
climate change, and to use that as a baseline to judge our own consumption.  We are not 
required to completely stop contributing to greenhouse gases, but there is some level one is 
responsible for not going over. Since food accounts for a huge amount of the greenhouse 
gases that are going into the atmosphere, our food choices are relevant to our decreasing our 
carbon footprint. 
Because we don’t directly harm developing nations’ farmers by buying locally produced 
foods, it doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t purchase from them. As Singer notes, it takes 15 or 
25 times as much energy to grow rice in California as opposed to the low-energy methods of 
farming rice in Bangladesh.40 That gives us a strong reason to purchase from the Bangladesh 
farmer. Much produce grown in Africa have a smaller carbon footprint than British hothouse 
vegetables. Beyond those considerations of ecological sustainability, we should understand 
the effects of poverty on the sustainability of the earth. In the Brundtland commission report, 
Our Common Future, that put sustainability on the world agenda, “sustainability 
development” meant alleviating poverty. We have significant duties to aid those in need and 
when the needs of the poor are so apparent as they now are, we have even more demand upon 
us for relief. Our duties to strangers include those strangers across the world but also those 
strangers in the future who will be impacted by our current practices. I did argue that the 
human right to be free from severe poverty does implicate us through our government’s 
policies. We have a duty  to ensure intuitional arrangements, intellectual property rules, 
resource uses, lending, trade rules,  and the rules governing economic interactions that are fair 
so as to avoid the poverty that has resulted from the current globalization.  
Purchasing local food can often be “all things considered” the best choice since there are 
multiple values that come into play.  We discussed earlier that some of the considerations for 
buying local are for supporting local economies and small farmers. Responsibility to sustain 
one’s community including the cultural traditions is part of the normative framework of 
sustainability. The connection with the food one eats or often now the “reconnection” with 
food which the local food movement encourages is important to one’s health and well-being 
and maintain the culture of a region. Purchasing from individual farmers builds trust when 
one engages with that person on a regular basis.  Additionally, purchases from local farms 
sustain farmlands and ensures some level of food security for your region.  If all or most food 
is imported or the crops that are grown in an area are for export  then in  crisis when 
importation is not possible there is no local ability to feed the community.  
Sustainability is not merely about sustaining natural resources for future generations but 
sustaining culture. 41 We are responsible to preserve things such as wilderness areas, national 
parks, and “land health,” treasures of art, democratic institutions, and so on. We rely upon 
past generations for current bequests, including natural and human-made ones (great works of 
literature, music and art, as well as cultural traditions we believe are worth preserving), and 
the future relies upon us for the same. Cultural traditions are tied up with food traditions and 
can have very specific regional forms that are important to the people of those communities. 
40  Singer 148. 
41  Brian Norton, Sustainability  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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In sustaining food infrastructure we are passing on to the future those cultural traditions 
around food.  
That said, our food choices should be a mix on considerations especially when thinking 
about the environment. Often the slogan “think globally, act locally”, is apt for food 
purchases—local is better. But not always, for instance, buying organic foods, whether local 
or not has the effect, as the Rodale Institute reports, of sequestering 40% of the world carbon 
emissions. Organically grown food improves the soil’s health and generally is better for the 
environment.  Sustaining natural resources and sustaining communities, local and global, for 
the welfare of today and the future, will require a blend of cosmopolitan considerations and 
local ones. 
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Abstract 
The long-term ecological, financial and social sustainability of the European Union is 
dependent upon deepening the level of integration among not only the governments of its 
member states, but also among the people and the diverse communities which inhabit these 
states – which include their citizens, associations, local and regional representatives, 
educational institutions, businesses and cooperatives and the ecosystems which support them. 
Sustainable integration among the nation-states of the EU requires an increasing level of 
cooperation and connectivity on multiple levels.  Such integration includes not only the 
monetary dimension of relations, but also the manner through which member states are linked 
by shared ecological, social, cultural and ethical practices.  To this end, the project of this 
paper is an attempt to explore how the work of transnational community building within the 
EU is fortified and diminished by competing definitions of authority, power and agency. Its 
thesis is guided by the contention that the EU’s current efforts to promote integration are 
diminished when the principal focus of relations among member states is defined through 
financial instruments, institutional structures which support them, and market-oriented 
regulations.  This paper will argue that while the financial dimension of relations among EU 
member states is foundational to the long-term viability of the EU, it’s long term sustainability 
is equally dependent on the development of learning and caring communities, shared 
technologies, and the acknowledgement of common ecological realities.  
Section one of this paper offers some fundamental criticisms of the current state of 
relations between EU member states, with particular attention paid to developments and 
trends of the last two decades, and will rely on an analysis from the perspective of the fields 
of sociology of institutions and organizations, and political science.  This approach will place 
an emphasis on examining what we view as some of the weaknesses of the prevailing 
“vision” guiding the way relations are defined and maintained among EU member states, 
which privileges market efficiency and the language of financial instruments in the practice of 
diplomacy among EU actors. 
The second part of this paper proposes an alternative vision of what we believe the EU 
has the potential to become – a body of nation-states whose connectivities and sense of 
fiduciary responsibilities are grounded in the promotion and fortification of transnational 
sustainable communities, which have the capacity to meaningfully cross individual nation-
Proceedings from the 50th Societas Ethica Annual Conference 2013. Climate Change, Sustainability, and an 
Ethics of an Open Future, August 22-25 2013, Soesterberg, The Netherlands   
Editors: Göran Collste and Lars Reuter 
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state boundaries and build bridges which constructively link populations divided by language, 
cultural identity and perception. We propose that the language of diplomacy that could guide 
the EU in this direction is found within the transnational ecological crisis that all member 
states commonly face – one in which the power of human differences and competing 
narratives are diminished by the acknowledgement of the common requirements for survival: 
potable water, arable land and clean air.  It is through this reality that member states are being 
invited to see in a clearer sense the limitations of an economic realpolitik view of relations 
among nation-states, and in its place to embrace the guiding principles of ecological realism. 
 
Keywords: agency, authority, climate change, ecosphere, ecological realism, financial 
instruments, monetary. nation-state, power, realpolitik, resilience, sustainability, technology 
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Last year, a Greek student declared on his blog: “The developing European economic 
crisis has sparked much debate over the economic future of many European countries and has 
cast doubt on the survival of the European Union itself. Initiating in Greece and propagating 
its way through Portugal and Spain,(…)  these financial calamities have created an 
overdependence on International Monetary Fund bailout packages (…) compounded by an 
incompatibly high euro(..) This puts many European countries in economic and political 
peril.”1 Significantly the student named his message Ethos Logos Pathos, clearly a reference 
to the Old Greek trilogy used as a philosophical understanding of human life, and also as the 
basic structure in classic rhetoric.   
Since 2008, we have been living amidst the unfolding consequences of the financial 
crisis, which is a crisis of technology (techno-logos). When markets, firms and states adopt 
that techno-logos as the only way to resolve all the problems, global and local, they do so 
through imposing ostensibly rational rules on people - individuals, families, communities, and 
nations. Moreover, a majority of officials, politicians and experts are convinced that beyond 
this imperative logos, the “others,” people must also accept a new ethos, a new habitus, whose 
rulings are essentially a matter of technical standards and legality. But do these same officials 
understand or care about the pathos among the lives of humans reduced to becoming 
producers, consumers, or debtors? 
The long-term ecological, financial and social sustainability of the European Union is 
dependent upon deepening the level of integration among not only the governments of its 
member states, but also among the people and the diverse communities which inhabit these 
states – which include their citizens, associations, local and regional representatives, 
educational institutions, businesses and cooperatives and the ecosystems which support them.  
Sustainable integration among the nation-states of the European Union requires an increasing 
level of cooperation and connectivity on multiple levels.  Such integration includes not only 
the monetary dimension of relations, but also the manner through which member states are 
linked by shared ecological, social, cultural and ethical practices.  To this end, the project of 
this paper is an attempt to explore how the work of transnational community building within 
the EU is fortified and diminished by competing definitions of “authority,” “power” and 
“agency”. Its thesis is guided by the contention that the EU’s current efforts to promote 
integration are diminished when the principal focus of relations among member states is 
defined through financial instruments, institutional structures which support them, and 
market-oriented regulations.  This paper will argue that while the financial dimension of 
relations among EU member states is foundational to the long-term viability of the EU, its 
long term sustainability is equally dependent on the development of learning and caring 
communities, shared technologies, and the acknowledgement of common ecological realities. 
To this end, this paper is divided into two sections. 
 Section one of this paper offers some fundamental criticisms of the current state of 
relations between EU member states, with particular attention paid to developments and 
trends of the last two decades. In order to avoid an overly descriptive analysis focusing on a 
long list of events, or an exhaustive examination of the institutional structures and processes 
of EU governance, our intent here is to propose some conceptual frameworks which can serve 
to provide a basis for engaging some of the key limitations facing the EU in its current form.  
This portion of our paper will rely on an analysis from the perspective of the fields of 
sociology of institutions and organizations, and political science.  This approach will place an 
emphasis on examining what we view as some of the weaknesses of the prevailing “vision” 
guiding the way relations are defined and maintained among EU member states, which 
1  http://logospathosethos.com/articles/2011/8/10/the-future-of-the-european-union.html. 
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privileges market efficiency and the language of financial instruments in the practice of 
diplomacy among EU actors. 
The second part of this paper proposes an alternative vision of what we believe the EU 
has the potential to become – a body of nation-states whose connectivities and sense of 
fiduciary responsibilities are grounded in the promotion and fortification of transnational 
sustainable communities, which have the capacity to meaningfully cross individual nation-
state boundaries and build bridges which constructively link populations divided by language, 
cultural identity and perception. We propose that the language of diplomacy that could guide 
the EU in this direction is found within the transnational ecological crisis that all member 
states commonly face – one in which the power of human differences and competing 
narratives are diminished by the acknowledgement of the common requirements for survival: 
potable water, arable land and clean air.  It is through this reality that member states are being 
invited to see in a clearer sense the limitations of an economic realpolitik view of relations 
among nation-states, and in its place to embrace the guiding principles of Ecological Realism. 
The EU As It Is: Beyond Decades of Technocratic Drift, A Deep Need 
a New Sensibility 
In 1949, four years after the end of WWII, Robert Schuman declared that the European 
project could not be considered independently from its humanistic roots. He mentioned 
particularly the contributions of great European thinkers who have compellingly engaged the 
themes of peace, democracy and transnational cooperation.  These include the Italian Dante 
Allighieri, the Dutch thinker Erasmus, the Swiss and French Rousseau and the German Kant. 
Schuman was a Luxembourg-born French statesman who was instrumental in helping to lay 
the foundations for the establishment of the modern EU. Schuman referred to Europe as a 
sustainable expression of humanistic ambition and noted,  
The European spirit signifies being conscious of belonging to a cultural family and to 
have a willingness to serve that community in the spirit of total mutuality, without any 
hidden motives of hegemony or the selfish exploitation of others…. Our century, that has 
witnessed the catastrophes resulting in the unending clash of nationalities and 
nationalisms, must attempt and succeed in reconciling nations in a supranational 
association. This would safeguard the diversities and aspirations of each nation while 
coordinating them in the same manner as he regions are coordinated within the unity of 
the nation.”2.  
Fifteen years later, as European efforts in building integration became the framework for 
cooperation among 6 nations, Schuman wrote in his book Pour l’Europe (For Europe): 
“Before being a military alliance or an economic entity, Europe must be a cultural 
community in the highest sense of this term”3. 
Considering the original ambition of the historical pioneers of a common European 
community, what is the situation now, six decades later? What has happened to Schuman’s 
compelling insights in the present context of an institutionalized, finance and market-oriented 
EU? How can we understand and interpret the meaning of the EU’s increasing emphasis on 
defining itself in technocratic terms? By asking these questions, our purpose is not to be 
trapped in a sterile and depressing inventory of limitations or failures. On the contrary, we 
need to express these criticisms in order to develop beyond them, and thus be prepared to turn 
to constructing new approaches to promoting sustainable European integration.  
2  To read the whole text of this speech given in Strasbourg, (May 16, 1948), or to study other writings or 
speeches given by Schuman, notably his address to the General Assembly of the UN, see 
http://www.schuman.info  
3  Translated from the original French by D. Malherbe. 
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The Empirical Trap: Has the EU been Reduced to an Institutional 
Construction? 
If we compare Shuman’s observations to those of the Greek student whose comments 
began this paper, the dissonance between the two is impossible to dismiss.  We must therefore 
concede that the words of one of the EU’s founding architects and visionaries ring hollow in 
the ears of many young Europeans.  During the decades that separate these two generations, 
the European project progressed through numerous treaties following WII and through the 
Cold War, resulting in the EEC evolving into an institutional Union of member states and 
ultimately giving birth to the modern EU.4 Through this period, the EU has enlarged its 
spatial, economic and demographic weight by the integration of many states, from Ireland to 
Greece and from Portugal to the Baltic States. And correlatively, these successive changes of 
scale have made the need for a deeper level of cooperation and integration among EU member 
states and their citizens even more essential. 
Of course, the initial humanistic purpose of the EU had to be translated into concrete 
structures of ruling, i.e. into institutional forms and processes. But with the passing years, the 
situation became more complex. It became apparent early on that a workable balance between 
the political and technical dimensions of institution building had to be established.  These 
structural needs were then amplified by the dynamics used to integrate new members in a 
paradoxical mix of technical standardizations in the legal and economic fields, coupled with 
continual political bargains and tenuous compromises. 
As member states and candidates for membership increased during the 80’s and expanded 
even further after the geopolitical reconfiguration of the 1990s, the debates between the 
advocates and the opponents of extending the perimeter of the EU focused more and more on 
formal legal treaties and regulations, including economic requirements. In fact, the 
"economization" of the construction of the EU stemmed in great part from its institutional 
development processes, a phenomenon which was set into motion in some of the ECC’s and 
EU’s founding documents.5 In contrast to Schuman’s insight drawn from the European 
humanistic tradition, the institutional choices made under the auspices of the EU were formed 
under marked political and economic constraints. These constraints emerged in response to 
the need to deal with a number of challenges: discrepancies in the way to deal with the 
international context of the Cold War, in the national policies which emerged through the 
restructuring of the European economic and monetary system in the 1970’s, and the mimetic 
changes as a result of the new level financial globalization which the 1980’s produced, 
inspired by principles of a libertarian ideology. The word ‘spill over’ expresses very clearly 
the intent and the logic of the European process during these decades. Under these auspices, 
the construction of a political and social Europe was considered to be a natural consequence 
of the intertwining of institutional rulings, market-oriented regulations and of the anticipated 
creation of wealth for member states and their populations. 
4  Foundation of the European Community for Coal and Steel (1951); Treaty of Rome creating the European 
Economic Community (1957); launching of the Common Agriculture Policy  (1962); successive 
enlargements to new member states (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004); treaty of Maastricht creating the 
European Union with the principles of an unique open market and an monetary union (1992); agreements of 
Schengen (1995); Treaty of Amsterdam (1997); Treaty of Lisbon (2007); agreement toward a new treaty 
including the principle of the budgetary "golden rule" (2011). 
5  For example, the Treaty of Rome (1957) organized the free circulation of goods without customs rights 
between the six founder states.  In 1986, the Unique Act opened the European markets to foreign 
investments and authorizes the internal liberty of exchange of services and financial flows.  More recently, 
just before the blow out of the financial crisis, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) affirmed the principle of “an 
open market economy where competition is free”. 
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As a direct consequence of the Maastricht Treaty, the institution of the Eurozone (EZ), 
fortified a number of questionable trends. Aiming at a more open space for trade and 
cooperation within the EU, and at a stronger common position vis à vis other existing or 
emerging continental major powers, the EZ defined itself through a common currency and 
thus compelled member states to comply with a precise set of technical criteria.  Yet, while 
the EU included 28 member states, only 17 of them joined the Economic and Monetary 
Union, confirming there is neither a political consensus between national governments, nor an 
economic homogeneity behind the expression “European Union.” Moreover, from the 
international financial crisis beginning in 2007 until now, this critical remark has become 
significant, even in the theoretically and legally defined area of the EZ. In recent years, 
tensions between the different national governments have grown higher, and political 
uncertainty has prevailed in some very exposed countries like Greece or Spain.  This has led 
to opposition among national governments to formulas for monetary recovery imposed by the 
EU central authorities, while at the same time the pressure of financial markets has only 
served to exacerbate growing tensions. Without giving a too simplified representation of the 
present European situation, a political and cultural gap has progressively deepened, which has 
led to an increasing level of distrust and acrimony during the last four years.6  Some EU 
members, such as Germany, are perceived by many less economically powerful member 
states as not willing to share the fruit of their success, preferring to use their economic 
capability to promote the aims of their individual economy beyond the borders of the EU. At 
the same time, within southern European countries like Greece, Portugal or Spain, many 
social movements, often led by populist leaders, prefer to visualize a future outside the EU, 
spurred by a desire to re-establish their own individual national sovereignty.7 To these 
southerners, the prospect of remaining in the EU is neither an ideal nor the promise of a better 
future.  It is rather viewed as an unwanted form of servitude. 
Some Conceptual Reflections on European Deficiencies and Failures  
As a synthesis of these considerations, the European makeup has taken on a more 
technocratic complexion. As the EU has grown, it has arguably become increasingly 
dominated by a formalized, top-down organizational structure that is both technical and 
political. In spite of the efforts made to develop elective processes that promote the power of 
individual citizens,8 the European project has come to be governed by an abstract and 
complicated ruling system. While decisions taken in Brussels have most certainly had many 
positive effects on the lives of the EU’s 500 million citizens, they way in which decisions are 
made is often perceived as disconnected from the everyday lives of average citizens.  This 
disconnect often serves to undermine the requirements for providing leadership which can 
effectively promote the work of building transnational sustainable communities.  Such 
sustainability cannot be promoted by a political and economic system perceived by many as 
6  In October 2009, the new Greek Prime-Minister raised the forecast of the public deficit of his country to 
12.7 % of the GNP. This declaration entailed a string depreciation of Greece’s financial ranking by the 
rating agencies; consequently, it marked the beginning of the cascade of emergencies known as the crisis of 
the sovereign debts. After a first aid reaching 110 billion Euros  to Greece and the creation of the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (Mai 2010),  the EU granted aids to Ireland (85 billion Euros, November 
2010), to Portugal (78 billion Euros, Mai 2011) and again to Greece (July 2011). 
7  Comparable discourses can even be observed in the group of the 6 member states which signed the original 
treaties of the European construction in the 1950s. 
8  In 2013, the European Parliament (Brussels and Strasbourg) counts 766 members, directly elected for a 
period of five years, by more than 400 million people within the member states. The first Parlamentiary 
Assembly was created in 1957, and named EP in 1962, the process of a direct vote by citizens was 
established in 1979. According to the integration of new member states, the number of the representatives 
increased and obliges to find, in every new extension, a balance between former and new members. 
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more intent on securing its own survival, rather than the long-term well-being of those it was 
created to serve.   
Such shortcomings are hardly the only challenge the EU must face.  Arguably looming 
more ominously are the coming effects of climate change and the diminished ecological 
predictability and sustainability Europe has historically relied upon. As climate change brings 
with it large scale transformations in the requirements for the maintenance of sustainable 
agriculture, mobility, access to essential natural resources, housing, food, care and energy for 
the people all over the world, many long-held assumptions are brought into question. How 
will we face this challenge? Is it to be through the same means employed to deal with the 
monetary crisis - the myopic lenses of financial instruments organized around the 
optimization of short-term profit? Are we condemned to conceive ethics, especially Christian 
ethics, as simply a moral affirmation of the techno-logical and legal regime of a globalized 
world ruled by “experts without spirit” ("Fachmenschen ohne Geist”) and “pleasure-seekers 
without heart” ("Genussmenschen ohne Herz”)? Are we definitively committed to a 
secularized and disenchanted relation to life and nature? All these questions are borrowed 
from or inspired by Max Weber, who wrote them a century ago. They characterize “the deep 
heuristic schema” (“das tiefheuristische Schema”) of Weber’s work.9  For Weber, modernity, 
as the development of rationality, was a kind of Janus, the Roman god with the double face. 
On one side, modernity offered to humankind new facilities and utilities, related to the 
progress of technology and the establishment of civil law. But on the other side, modernity 
appears also for people like a combination of two losses, the "loss of freedom" 
(“Freiheitsverlust”) and the “loss of sense” (“Sinnverlust”).  
Today the ethical stakes of globalization and climate change should arguably be 
expressed through the necessity of reviewing and transcending the dilemma between the 
legal-technical order of rules and the realm of social sense and spirituality.  On one hand, we 
cannot ignore or underestimate the dangerous pressure of financial rulings that remain highly 
influential and claim a space at the center of value in many peoples’ lives, as expressed in 
Weberian terms, a new styled “iron cage of obedience” (“stahlhartes Gehaüse der 
Hörigkeit”). On the other hand, more than any perceived economic responsibility is the 
necessity to accept the growing weight of ecological and social systems that can serve to 
separate and link diverse countries and peoples. In light of this, responsibility, legitimacy and 
justice become major ecological concerns for humankind. Dealing with such transnational 
challenges requires a new and unprecedentedly open-minded approach to international 
cooperation within the boundaries of the EU and with African, South American and Asian 
nation-states far beyond Europe. Differences in the circumstances of other countries are not 
only legal and economic - they are also deeply linked to the diversity of cultures, of their 
history and of their spiritual traditions. Cooperation between members of the EU cannot be 
shrunk to a simple balancing of scorecards regarding opportunities, threats, the exploitation of 
raw materials, the enrollment of low cost workers, or the search for new markets. 
From a theoretical outlook, power and authority are two well-known concepts in the 
social sciences, especially in the field of sociology. One could even consider that the 
frequency with which these terms are used in modern sociological discourse has served to 
limit their capacity to describe real life situations and future stakes.  For our purposes, these 
terms are actually essential – for they serve to not only describe the impediments to building 
transnational sustainability, but the means by which sustainability can be nurtured and 
promoted. Max Weber developed a conceptual distinction between power and authority. In 
the English translation of his writings, the word “power” corresponds to the German concept 
“Macht,” whereas “authority” is given as equivalent to the notion of “Herrschaft.”10 
9  According to Müller, Hans-Peter (2007), Max Weber, Köln, Böhlau / UTB, p. 22-25 
10  Weber, Max (1921), Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, p.28-29 
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According to him, power and authority must both be understood as expressions of social 
interactions. But they are not characterized by the same meaning and application.11 In other 
words, any experience of authority relies on legitimacy, whatever its root – be it charisma, 
tradition, rationality or legality. In the German source text, Weber particularly insists on the 
verb “gelten” and the noun “Geltung,” meaning respectively “to be considered” and 
“validity,” or “(being) in force or in use”.  From the Weberian point of view, legitimacy is 
regarded as a means of assessing validity. It works dynamically like a process of reciprocal 
recognition by both parties of the relative positions they occupy.12 
Weber’s perspective opened the opportunity for a wide range of empirical and theoretical 
contributions. In the field of political or economic sociology, studies demonstrated early that, 
despite the formal rationality they establish as condition of efficiency and fairness, systems of 
rules and norms can be very rapidly perverted and can become oligarchical or unfair 
practices.13 Basically inherent to law and technology, formal rules are supposed to offer the 
best conditions to exert a rational, equitable and sustainable authority over social practices. 
But as fast as uncertainty grows, some officials and experts tend to harness the control levers 
and use formal rules not as the initial means defined to serve legitimate goals, such as the 
common interest for the population, but as ends by themselves, dedicated to fulfilling their 
own interests. Paradoxically, the initial intent of an authority grounded in legitimacy turns 
progressively to a cynical power that can be seized by a minority.   
This teleological inversion called “goal displacement” (or “Zweckverschiebung”) has 
been central to the work of economic sociology since 1911. It reveals that social cooperation 
is not only a matter of laws, standards, tools, audits and controls but also a matter or sense, 
symbols and interpretation.14 It is absolutely clear that rules are needed in social life, 
especially rational and formalized rules, in modern or post-modern societies like those of the 
EU member states. But to remain sustainably legitimate, these rules must constantly be reread 
and reviewed in the context of uncertainty, unpredictability, and even mystery. From an 
ethical perspective, our technical, liberal society appeals to the importance of accountability 
for officials and experts in the legal-technical forms of compliance, such as national 
regulations or international standards (e.g., Global Compact, ISO26000). 15 16  
11  Power is exerted as an imposed relation by force or seduction whereas authority is embedded in the frame 
of an a priori hierarchical report between Ego (as superior) and Alter (as inferior). With a predefined type 
of content, the order given by Ego to Alter can be effective. 
12  See also Suchman,  Mark C .(1995), “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches”, in:  
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, n° 3, p.571-670 
13  e.g., in the cases of social movements: Michels, Robert (1911), Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der 
modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens, 
Leipzig,Werner Klinkhardt 
14  Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas (1967), The Social Construction of Reality, New York, Double 
Day Anchor; Geertz, Clifford (1973), The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books ; Giddens A. 
(1984), The Constitution of Society, Cambridge, Polity Press; Snow, David A., and Benford, Rodney.D. 
(1988), “Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization”,in:  International Social Movement 
Research, n° 1, p.197-217; Reynaud, Jean-Daniel (1989), Les règles du jeu : l’action collective et la 
régulation sociale,, Paris, Armand Colin; March, James G., Schulz Martin, Zhou Xueguang (2000), The 
Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational Codes, Stanford (Cal.) Stanford University Press; 
Boltanski, Luc, and Thévenot, Laurent (1991),De la justification : les économies de la grandeur, Paris, 
Gallimard ; Boltanski, Luc, and Chiapello, Eve (1999), Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Paris, Gallimard ; 
Scott, W. Richard (2001), Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks (Cal.), Sage; Ortmann, Günther 
(2004), Als ob : Fiktionen und Organisationen, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften… 
15  Baertschi, Bernard (2004), La responsabilité éthique dans une société technique et libérale, CNRS –Maison 
des Sciences de l’Homme – Alpes, Grenoble 
16  For an example of justification of such standards on the theme of sustainability: Kell, George (2013), “The 
value of Comprehensive Reporting”, in: This is Africa: A Global Perspective, September-October 2013, pp. 
24-25. 
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The complicated European regulation system governing monetary practices is a 
particularly obvious illustration of the risks of reducing the project of European integration to 
an institutional responsibility. First, if the achievement of the EZ (1999) marked an important 
step on the way to the European economic integration, since 2007 it has appeared to be a very 
fragile arrangement, as noted by De Grauwe (2009).17 Furthermore, this fragility has been 
deepened during the most recent economic crisis by the bifurcation of EU members between 
those that belong to the EZ and those who remain outside the Euro, a phenomenon which 
places into question the economic viability of the system itself.18 In these conditions, 
institutions like the European Central Bank and other coordination committees have tinkered 
with fuzzy political compromises and shaky technocratic structures, ostensibly working with 
the assumption that adjusting such mechanisms is sufficient for ensuring a stable sense of 
solidarity among nation-states, and among citizens on either side of their borders.19 
Considering the systemic difficulty of realizing common ends for all those who 
participate in the system, EU decision-makers have focused on the means in the great 
tradition of monetarism, as if these means could be in and of themselves efficient substitutes 
for the lack of purpose and goals in serving the needs of all EU citizens.  Under the outward 
appearance of democratic rulings and technocratic rationality, the double-sided European 
monetary construction has turned to a ‘huge labyrinthine system,’20 in other words a 
complicated institutional mechanism, often perceived as disconnected from the human and 
social realities that should be inherent to its mission. 
Similar conclusions could be made regarding the challenge of transitioning the EU to new 
sources of energy. Over the last 20 years, the EU has downsized its goals regarding a common 
policy of diminishing the causes of climatic change. Some countries like Germany or 
Denmark have engaged a national policy of green energy, whereas others, like France, defend 
their industrial interests in a blind pursuit of improving their nuclear energy capacity.  In this 
light, while the global economic crisis was triggered by the collapse of the real estate market 
and correlated mortgage subprime system in the United States, its present effects cannot be 
separated from the long-term challenges posed by climate change and the increasingly 
complex requirements of maintaining the integrity of ecosystems. Such dual concerns mean 
that solutions must be found on a wider and more diverse scale, rather than through an 
exclusive focus on monetary and institutional approaches. And, if the need for a redistribution 
For recent critical commentaries about ISO 26000: Entine, Jon (2012), ISO26000: Sustainability as 
Standard? (http://www.ethicalcorp.com/business-strategy/iso-26000-sustainability-standard) ; or about the 
debate between ISO and the Global Compact in 2009 (http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.fr/2009/07/iso-
responds-gently-to-terse-letter.htmlabout). 
More generally, for a significant array of academic criticisms and reflections of the biases and effects of 
standardization: Brunsson, Nils, and Jacobsson B. (dir.) (2000), A World of Standards, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, and notably: Higgins, Winton, and Tamm Hallström, Kristina (2007), “Standardization, 
Globalization and Rationalities of Government”, in:  Organization 14(5). 
17  De Grauwe, Paul (2009), “The Fragility of the Eurozone Institutions”, research rrticle in: Open Economic 
Review, published online, 22 December 2009. 
18  Sifakis-Kapetanakis, Catherine (2011), “EU Institutional Framework and Euro zone Crisis" available at : 
http://www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/ws5_sifakis_eu_institutional_framework.pdf  
19  Concerning the steering of the monetary policy, the governance of the European Central Bank differentiates 
the Board of governors (members of the EZ) and the General Board (including the non members of he EZ). 
In the same way, the European Board in charge of the Systemic Risk (prevention and control of macro 
financial risk) splits the attributions of its chairman  and those of the vice-chairman. And last but not least, 
the coordination of the budget policies is the competency of the Council of ministers has two levels, the 
Eurogroup as a consultative and informal meeting structure open to EZ members, and the Ecofin, common 
to the ministers of the whole EU. 
20  Adapted and translated from the French idiomatic expression « une véritable usine à gaz »: Demma, Claude 
(2013), « Zone Euro-zone non Euro : le casse-tête des deux Europes », in: L’Europe a-t-elle un avenir ?, 
Alternatives Economiques, Hors-série n° 95, pp. 46-47. 
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of added-value are real throughout the world, including the EU, an effective means addressing 
these multiple challenges will not be realized through exclusively economic solutions, even if 
they are on the scale of Roosevelt’s post-Depression New Deal program.21 Whatever the 
complexity of the economic stakes could be - economic being understood here in in wider 
sense than monetary or financial - the stakes go beyond the capacity of simply establishing 
new regulatory frameworks for investments, trade and cooperation. The connection between 
the present turmoil affecting financial capacities, ecological sustainability and growing 
resource scarcity requires that solutions to the EU’s economic challenges involve not only 
political institutions and the technocratic processes of decision-making and enforcement. The 
nature of climate change itself is transnational, and affects all countries, including the EU’s 
wealthiest members as well as those on its economic margins.22  So too does climate change 
and its attendant ecosystem challenges affect individual EU citizens across all social 
locations, and in turn arguably serves to underscore the factors which further the de-
legitimization of political mechanisms which comprise the EU’s transnational democratic 
systems.23 24 This amalgam of challenges finds the EU standing at the crossroads. 
 
Domains of Action 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Free circulation of the workers and coordination of 
national insurance schemes 
     
Equality of remuneration  and treatment between the 
women and the men 
     
   
Health and Safety in the work      
Education and vocational training 
     
   
Employment 
     
   
Fight against discrimination 
     
 
Convergence of the systems of social welfare      
Pensions      
Health care      
Fight against social exclusion      
No European  
Action 
Regulative  
Action 
Distributive  
Action 
Coordination  
of the National Policies 
Positioning of European Social Action: Adapted from Palier (2013: 67)25 
21  Lipietz, Alain (2013), « Transition énergétique : dernières chances pour l’Europe », in: L’Europe a-t-elle un 
avenir ?, Alternatives Economiques, Hors-série n° 95 pp. 70-72. 
22  For the UN Human Development Indicators ranking, see the reports (1990-2013): 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/. 
For an intra-European analysis: Lefebvre, Mathieu, and Pestieau, Pierre (2012), L'État-providence en 
Europe : performance et dumping social, Paris, Editions de la Rue d’Ulm (GEPREMAP). 
For the territorial and social inequalities in France: Haas, Sandrine, and Vigneron, Emmanuel (2010), 
Solidarités et territoires: l’engagement des établissements hospitaliers et services privés d’aide à la 
personne non lucratifs, FEHAP / La Nouvelle Fabrique des Territoires. 
23  Maurin, Eric (2009), La peur du déclassement : une sociologie des récessions, Paris, Seuil 
24  Dupuy, François (2005),  La fatigue des élites, Paris, Seuil 
25  Palier, Bruno (2013), « Le long chemin de l’Europe sociale », in: L’Europe a-t-elle un avenir ?, 
Alternatives Economiques, Hors-série n° 95, pp. 66-68 
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Democracy and Legitimacy in the Eyes of European Citizens  
In a recent book entitled « Les ennemis intimes de la démocratie » ("the intimate enemies 
of democracy"), the French philosopher Tzvetan Todorov (2012) engages in a critical 
questioning of the meaning of democracy. He asks whether or not modern expressions of 
democracy are reducible to a kind of virtuous incantation, a pure verbal excitement, actually 
disconnected from the experiences of people living under its auspices. This question notably 
concerns the phenomenon of European integration, almost 70 years after the end of WWII, 
and 25 years after the fall of the Berlin wall. After decades of continental rivalries, world 
wars, ideological totalitarianisms and the absolute horror of the Shoah, the EU found its first 
roots in the resolution of “never again," grounded in the desire for peace among the civil 
populations of war torn countries.  
This sentiment was understood and shared by a group of western politicians, probably not 
saints, but pragmatic and engaged officials, who were fully aware of the impasse of any 
prospect of nationalist withdrawals or revanchism.26 More recently, the major geopolitical 
changes of the European map in the 1990s seemed to give a new hope of revival for the ideals 
of a continent at peace, gathering at last its eastern and the western regions after 50 years of 
profound division.  But far beyond this somewhat stereotypical representation of a complex, 
non-linear historical process, Todorov wonders about the present weakening of the European 
democratic model. He emphasizes the entanglement of many factors in this worrying 
evolution. According to him, the European integration is undermined by major drifts like 
changes in the way people think within a heterogeneous framework of countries and 
communities, as well as the triumph of a technocratic, legal and short-term formalism in the 
way the European project itself is managed. In that context, the present reality of the EU 
could be compared to a postmodern avatar of the humanistic and modernist idea of 
democracy. Freedom, as a condition of democracy, has to go through the experience of the 
individuals without whom no community and no union can be effective. In other words, the 
EU project claims to respect the letter of its intent so obsessively that the spirit is lacking. As 
a consequence, Todorov points out that this formal, institutionalized and technocratic way of 
construction introduces harmful effects into the democratic life within its own territories and 
communities. Tied up in a web of dilemmas, contradictions and democratic failures, the logic 
of European integration leads to misunderstandings, rejections and self-interested withdrawals 
that are exploited more and more by populist movements in many EU countries.  
Paradoxically, in the EU today, nobody seems to dispute the abstract principle of democracy; 
but, despite this apparent consensus, only a few people seem to be able to engage themselves 
in a democratic project that goes beyond their own self-interest.       
As we come to the end of the first portion of our analysis, our critical and conceptual 
approach sounds quiet pessimistic, like Todorov’s analysis. But as we move to the second 
portion of our analysis, it is our intent that our reflections open the way for hope and positive 
responses. These responses are not positive in the modernist sense of the triumphal march of 
an endless progress, but instead are offered in what we hope is the spirit of a humble, 
pragmatic and humanistic approach, aimed at exploring potential avenues for promoting 
transnational cooperation and solidarity among individuals, communities and nation-states of 
the European Union. 
26  See for example the interesting biography of Robert Schuman written  by an historian: Roth, François 
(2008),  Robert Schuman: du Lorrain des frontières au père de l’Europe, Paris, Fayard)comment about.  An  
anonymous but official comment is available on the site of the government of the Grand-Duchy of 
Luxemburg (www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/temoignages-reportages/2008/10/roth-schuman/index.html); it 
is entitled « “Père de l’Europe" ou "saint en veston" ? » ("The ‘Europe’s father’ or A ‘Saint in jacket'?” ). 
In fact, as he was his lifelong an engaged member of the Roman Catholic Church, Robert Schuman was 
proposed after his death for a beatification process which is still pending today. 
153 
                                                          
According to Todorov, salvation does not emerge from outside, but rather from within 
people through their inner capacity for self-criticism, and the human search for improvement. 
This aspiration does not mean a passive obedience or submission to the belief of the endless 
progress of humankind.  Quite to the contrary, Todorov insists on the importance of an ethical 
ideal, relying far much more on the deep and existential needs of trust and hope than on 
technical or political calculation. In that sense, restoring an open perspective in the project of 
European integration requires the willingness to instigate and support initiatives which 
promote transnational commitments to sharing, cooperating and developing competencies, 
sense and trust across nation-state borders. 
Social cooperation and ethical attitudes are not only a matter of laws, standards, tools, 
audits and controls, and they are no longer only a matter of monetary criteria or financial 
regulation. The legitimacy of the European project, as well inside as outside of the EU 
borders, is fundamentally a dynamic and collective reconstruction of understanding, 
perception and willingness. It requires the use of living symbols in action, like the willingness 
to share interpretation in the respect of various identities.27 These elements correspond to the 
concept of “binding factors,” without which no social action can be structured, and no social 
structure can produce action,28 particularly in the context of the complexity and uncertainty of 
post-modern societies.29 For this reason it is utterly clear that rules are needed in social life, 
especially rational rules, always more sophisticated, in contemporary European society. But to 
remain sustainably legitimate, these rules must constantly be reread and reviewed in the 
context of uncertainty, unpredictability, and abiding mystery.  
The EU As It Could Be: Authority, Power and Agency in an Eco-
Centric European Union 
As outlined in the first half of our paper, the shortcomings of privileging a monetary 
definition of community among EU member states are clear and numerous.  Such 
shortcomings suggest two critical questions: 1. To what degree should market-oriented and 
monetary relationships be allowed to define the deepest core realities of relations between EU 
member states? And 2., What are the principal non-monetary means that might serve to 
promote and fortify sustainable ties among EU member states? As the Dutch and Canadian 
ecological thinkers Wackernagle and Rees have observed, the human economy, most readily 
expressed in monetary terms, is in some respects an artificial construct, one that allows 
governing bodies to unilaterally print currency, and determine its value detached from clear 
foundational value.30 They argue that it is in fact what they call earth economy, defined in 
terms of specific and limited “natural capital” (such as fish stocks, arable land and fresh 
27  Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas (1967), The Social Construction of Reality, New York, Double 
Day Anchor; Geertz, Clifford (1973), The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books ;  
Giddens A. (1984), The Constitution of Society, Cambridge, Polity Press; Snow, David A., and Benford, 
Rodney.D. (1988), “Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization”,in:  International Social 
Movement Research, n° 1, p.197-217; Reynaud, Jean-Daniel (1989), Les règles du jeu : l’action collective 
et la régulation sociale,, Paris, Armand Colin; March, James G., Schulz Martin, Zhou Xueguang (2000), 
The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational Codes, Stanford (Cal.) Stanford University 
Press; Boltanski, Luc, and Thévenot, Laurent (1991),De la justification : les économies de la grandeur, 
Paris, Gallimard ; Boltanski, Luc, and Chiapello, Eve (1999), Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Paris, 
Gallimard ; Scott, W. Richard (2001), Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks (Cal.), Sage; 
Ortmann, Günther (2004), Als ob : Fiktionen und Organisationen, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften 
28  Giddens, Anthony (1984), The Constitution of Society, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
29  Giddens, Anthony (1990),  The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press ; 
30  Wackernagel, Mathis and Rees, William E., Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the 
Earth, (Gabriola Island, B.C.: New Society Publishers, 1996). 
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water) which is the true foundation of economic reality.  Earth economy is thus the ecological 
equivalent of a currency being tied to a gold standard. There are only so many hectares of 
arable land – more cannot be printed at will.  While viewing relations among nation-states 
through the lens of earth economy cannot be done without acknowledging the great 
importance of the human economy, it does in fact open the door to new and arguably more 
sustainable definitions of authority, power and agency.  
How might Authority be defined among EU member states in positive and proscriptive 
ways that cleave to the realities of Earth economy?  The work of the Lutheran social ethicist 
Larry Rasmussen invites us to consider the ecological realities of the land itself as a principle 
source and a starting point – the land with it’s geographic contours and common ecosystems 
that do not always respect political borders.  The integrity of such systems, Rasmussen notes, 
cannot be secured by individual nations acting alone, but only through sustained levels of 
cooperation and coordination.31 A portion of the ozone cannot be purchased or preserved by 
even the wealthiest nation.  The phenomenon of climate change itself only underscores the 
reality of this ecological interconnectivity.  For example, diminished snow packs in the 
mountains of Switzerland and France affect the water levels and ecological resilience of rivers 
in Germany, Italy, and Spain.32  These interconnected ecological realities serve to determine 
the far more durable borders of bioregions that transverse multiple nation-states, and whose 
ecological integrity has measurable impacts on the long-term prospects for sustainable 
employment, food security and human migration patterns.  Such transnational ecological 
connectivity suggests that human economic activity that aims for long-term resilience must 
therefore be more concretely tied to earth economy realities by design based in foresight.  
Sustainable employment, food security and the promotion and support of transnational 
sustainable communities will not be achievable in the absence of deepening this connection. 
While theoretical ecological arguments are attractive, they do not increase sustainability 
without concrete application.  The work of building transnational sustainable communities 
that deepen ties among EU member states requires the use of common languages.  While the 
Euro itself clearly offers a common language – to the good and detriment of the transnational 
community it serves – what other languages might the EU harness to strengthen ecologically 
sustainable ties among it’s member states?  One among many answers to this question is 
found in the work of the Italian thinker Carlo Petrini, the founder of the International Slow 
Food movement and the network of food communities it produced, called Terra Madre.  The 
aim of Terra Madre is to create connectivities among consumers, cooks and farmers which 
privilege sustainable agricultural practices, while teaching the value of honoring and 
fortifying local cultures through the common hermeneutic of food, a language spoken and 
celebrated across the EU.  Petrini argues that the third industrial revolution will not be based 
on the work of financial actors or information technology innovators, but rather through the 
collective choices, actions and work of farmers and consumers - average people on the ground 
– who must intimately live within the limits defined by the authority and power of the 
ecosphere itself, grounded in the realities of climate change.33 Petrini argues that the work of 
Terra Madre is to help people to see that their true neighbors often live on either side of 
artificially drawn political borders. 
The eco-centric notion of power in this case is measured by the degree to which regional 
communities can meet their resource and waste disposal needs within their own respective 
31  Rasmussen, Larry, Earth Honoring Faith: Religious Ethics in a New Key, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013) and Earth Community, Earth Ethics, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996). 
32  For a comprehensive and accessible explanation of resilience, see Walker, Brian and Salt, David, Resilience 
Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2006). 
33  Petrini, Carlo, Terra Madre: Forging a New Global Network of Sustainable Food Communities, (White 
River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2010) p. xix. 
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bioregions.  As bioregions often do not neatly fall within politically drawn borders, the 
language of intra-European diplomacy must now move beyond its current focus on 
privileging monetary cooperation and competition between communities defined by national 
identities.  Moving beyond the privileging of diplomacy being conducted by national 
governments, eco-centric approaches to building bridges among people of different European 
nationalities opens the door to elevating the practice of paradiplomacy – the conduct of 
diplomacy by subnational, regional and local governments on either side of national borders, 
as well as civil society actors, including the members of Terra Madre’s food communities.34 
The definitions of power that emerge from this approach include not only the power that 
comes from being able to identify and speak the common transnational language of 
agriculture, but also the power of the ecosphere itself, which can increasingly be seen as 
having its own, often unpredictable agency.  For example, as climate change necessitates 
increasing adaptations in the practice of viticulture, and impacted human migration patterns 
alter the ethnic identities of those who harvest the grapes, the processes that produce wines 
that serve to define regional identities reveal new dependencies and new vulnerabilities that 
do not respect national borders.  At the same time, the experiences of one community in a 
particular ecological niche may well provide crucial insights to coping with the effects of 
climate change in another.  For example, a wine grower in Spain’s arid region of Extremadura 
may well be the best source of information for French Burgundian wine makers who are 
struggling to maintain their standards and output in a modern or future France in need of more 
rain.  In this light, earlier definitions of agency, which focused on financial commerce and 
standards, now give way to the need to acknowledge that in fact there are many factors over 
which traditional arbiters of power no long have as much agency as they imagined.  Agency 
in this regard is rooted in the willingness and ability to adapt and in turn to share what has 
been learned in one context with those who struggle in another location.  As climate change 
brings ecological systems previously thought to be stable to what resilience theory calls the 
stage of release or collapse, human adaptation and the efficacy of agricultural practices that 
draw on the evolving creativity and agency of people on the ground gain a vital, new level of 
importance. 
Applying the Insights of Ecological Realism to the Practice of 
Diplomacy and the Building of Transnational Sustainable 
Communities Among EU Member States 
Defining relations among EU member states in terms of monetary and financial 
instruments only serves to fortify the cleavages and competition endemic to the disadvantages 
of a realpolitik (realist) worldview.  Such an approach to diplomacy privileges a broad set of 
materialistic assumptions regarding human exchanges, and understands nation-state conduct 
as guided by the desire to acquire, retain and project power.  It is this worldview that sees 
alliances among nation-states as only temporary by definition, and the individual, sovereign 
nation-state as the largest durable human entity capable of sustainability.  Modern interpreters 
of realpolitik, such as Hans Morgenthau, argue that the rules that have governed the praxis of 
political realism were founded in European antiquity, and are impervious to change.35 
In stark contrast to the realist view of relations among nation-states, ecological realism 
holds that power cannot be defined in terms of the capacity of individual nations to coerce 
34  Cornoago, Noé, “Perforated Sovereignties, Agonistic Pluralism and the Durability of (Para)diplomacy,” in 
Constantinou, Costas M. and Der Darian, James, eds., Sustainable Diplomacies, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) pp. 89-108. 
35  Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1978). 
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other nations through the use of economic or military means, but rather that real power 
emerges from the capacity of a nation or a group of nations that share a common bioregion to 
protect, cultivate, efficiently utilize and share natural capital.36  The recognition that 
bioregions themselves are the central arbiters for defining borders and common realities 
among human populations is central to the worldview of ecological realism. 
What might it mean if EU member states were to define their relationships and the project 
of transnational community building among member states through the lens of ecological 
realism? In broad terms, authority in this light would have to be seen in terms of the 
ecosphere itself, and its capacity to strengthen and diminish ecological, social, cultural and 
economic resilience.  In this way, the monetary fortunes and economic exposure of individual 
European economies would have to be re-evaluated in light of their dependency on the 
climate not changing. At the same time, what might be seen through a realpolitik lens as 
sources of strength (such as autonomy) could come to be seen as sources of weakness.  And 
what is traditionally seen as weakness (such as dependency), could come to be seen as a 
source of strength insofar as dependency necessitates the deepening of transnational ties, 
while potentially revaluing the moral guidepost of fiduciary responsibility toward one’s 
neighbors. In turn, ecological realism holds that while primary agency is governed by the 
ecosphere itself, human agency is rooted in people having the capacity to understand the 
requirements of sustainability, and the willingness to recognize and be guided by the fact that 
EU nations and their citizens live in a web of intimate ecological interdependence.   While 
many economic commentators have observed that the long-term viability of the Euro is 
diminished due to the lack of a universally acknowledged central monetary authority, the 
ecosphere itself is both contiguous and central to multiple transnational European realities.  In 
this regard, natural capital is a currency that will remain viable and valuable regardless of the 
fluctuations or vicissitudes of the human economy. 
Religion, Ethics and the Requirements of Building Community in a 
Pluralistic European Context 
There is little question that currently one of the more corrosive sources of tension within 
the EU is rooted in the fear and resentment associated with modern encounters of those who 
are considered “Other” by dominant European groups.  Whether it is through increased levels 
of human migration that open borders allow, through illegal immigration by those seeking to 
escape the limits of the economic South, or by the growing influence of Islam associated with 
newcomers to the EU in a historically Christian Europe, cleavages old and new are impacting 
the viability of normative European models of social and cultural sustainability.  This 
encounter with an Other who is growing in numbers and influence has invited EU member 
states and individual citizens to re-evaluate how modern European identities are defined, 
interpreted and claimed. 
Some who would prefer the diminishment or even dissolution of the EU claim that this 
development is one of the root causes of European economic instability, and calls into 
question the long-term viability of maintaining a Europe that is congruent with its historical 
roots.   Yet others see the growing ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism of the EU’s 
population as a welcome development, one that holds the potential to give birth to a Europe 
which is more profoundly transnational and more concretely interconnected with nations, 
economies and cultures beyond the borders of the EU. 
36  For a more amplified description of ecological realism, see Wellman, David Joseph, Sustainable 
Diplomacy: Ecology, Religion and Ethics in Muslim-Christian Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004) pp. 29-41. 
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Building transnational sustainable communities requires acknowledgement of the spiritual 
dimension of human connectivity and difference.  To this end, the economic, political and 
cultural developments which have infused a greater level of human diversity into the life of 
EU member states simultaneously invites members of historically dominant European groups 
to interrogate their own religious and cultural identities and claims in a new light.  This 
phenomenon is played out in different ways in different contexts.  In a France constitutionally 
committed to a strong secularism, the encounter with an overtly religious Other is an 
invitation for French citizens to examine what remains of the influence of Christianity in their 
own lives and the architecture of French culture.  In Spain, the encounter with North and Sub 
Saharan Africans is an invitation for Spaniards to acknowledge their collective debt to their 
own profoundly African and Islamic roots.  In Romania human migration is a double sided 
coin, one in which Romanians themselves experience becoming the Other while searching for 
work in Western Europe, while those who remain at home define themselves over against 
their ethnic Hungarian, German or Roma neighbors whose ancestors arrived in earlier 
migrations. 
All of these encounters are arguably an opportunity for citizens of the EU to acknowledge 
the utility of understanding not only the cultural impact of religion, but also its abiding 
influence on the way moral norms are formed in ostensibly secular cultures.  Operative 
definitions of hospitality, justice and responsibility to one’s neighbors are all arguably 
intimately connected to what were originally religious claims. At the same time, the encounter 
with the religious Other highlights the limitations that are placed on individuals and 
populations who are religiously illiterate – both in terms of understanding their own religio-
cultural identities and those of people who do not share their identity.  The value of such 
knowledge has little to do with whether or not one is an actual practitioner of a tradition.   
Yet beyond the cultural and intellectual value of understanding religion, those who seek 
to nurture and broaden sustainable communities would do well to critically examine the 
spiritual dimension of human connectivity with the land and every community that is defined 
by its relationship to the land.  That the ecological crisis should be seen as the primary 
challenge of the present and future is clear, but what has not yet become clear is that the 
common ecosphere we share provides the lingua franca of a new type of diplomacy – one in 
which words like “air,” “water” and “land” are readily apprehensible and present the 
possibility of conveying profound spiritual meaning.  It is these words that hold the potential 
to become the building blocks of communities that have the capacity “see” beyond the limits 
of the national borders of individual nation-states, and visualize a new approaches to peace 
building and cooperation.  The requirements of building ecological sustainability in the 
context of climate change necessitates acknowledging that some components of the ecosphere 
cannot be owned and controlled by any one nation-state, and that their potential conservation 
or destruction are connected to competing claims rooted in divergent religio-cultural 
worldviews and theological anthropologies. The common ecological needs of populations on 
either side of these cleavages is one key to understanding new approaches to transnational 
community building. 
The project that eventually became the EU was a highly creative and profoundly 
ambitious response to the incalculable loss of life born of two world wars, which wove 
together the death of millions, the destruction of economies, and unprecedented levels of 
coercive nationalism and xenophobia.  It was the recognition that the borders of sovereign, 
individual nation-states were in fact not the best guarantor of security which informed the 
construction of a common European community.  As the power of the memory of the events 
that led to the EU’s formation fades among younger generations, one might actually consider 
the common transnational ecological crisis – though a tragedy on multiple levels, as also a gift 
– one that holds the potential to necessitate a new and more profound level of inter-European 
158 
cooperation.  For it is the transnational nature of the ecological crisis itself that reveals a 
common European ecological history and a new language of diplomacy, grounded in the 
requirements of ecological sustainability and survival.  This is a language whose authority, 
power and agency go well beyond the myopia and short-sightedness of an exclusively 
financial or institutional set of concerns.  The power of this new language lies not only in its 
ability to speak to material realities.  Its power also illumines the spiritual dimension of 
relations – one that engages core values rooted in land, food, diverse human cultures and 
respect. 
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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the so-called spillover effect in the environmental domain, or the 
tendency of individuals adopting a specific green behaviour to behave environment-friendly 
also in other, not related contexts. Different psychological mechanisms explaining this process 
have been singled out in literature (e.g.: Self Perception Theory, Cognitive Dissonance Theory, 
etc). However, there is no general agreement neither on the strength nor on the drivers of 
spillover. The study provides a value added to literature by analyzing the role played by 
specific factors (so far neglected) in hindering or spurring spillover: monetary and non-
monetary rewards. A real-life experiment is carried out on a sample of undergraduate students 
from Aarhus University (Denmark), based on a panel study with online surveys filled in twice: 
before and after the experimental intervention. The latter consists of encouraging the uptake of 
a specific green behaviour (purchase of sustainable products) for a period of 6 weeks, 
investigating the effects on different behavioural domains and the role played by incentives. 
Results show how the nature of incentives has a relevant direct impact on the behaviours being 
incentivized, whereas no significant spillover effect to other behavioural domains is detected. 
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I. Introduction 
We do not inherit the earth from our ancestors: we borrow it from our children. 
The underlying assumption of this famous saying is that we need to take action to 
preserve and improve the social and environmental heritage that our generation will pass onto 
future ones. All actors at different levels of society ought to feel involved in the process, from 
policy makers and corporations to single individuals, who can (and must) play a relevant role 
by adopting sound behaviours in their everyday lives: ethical behaviours at the individual 
level represent indeed the core element and the basis for a switch to ethical societies at large.  
I here focus on ethical behaviours dealing with the issue of sustainability, as I investigate 
how different green behaviours connect to, and influence, each other. I refer to positive 
spillover as to the phenomenon (and related psychological mechanisms) according to which 
the uptake of a green behaviour in a given domain spills over, increasing the chances of other 
environmentally sound behaviours being carried out in different, not correlated domains.  
The study that I hereby present is part of a broader research project on pro-environmental 
spillover. First, I investigated the existence itself of a positive contamination between green 
behaviours, with the results of my analyses corroborating the spillover hypothesis1. Then, 
building on such preliminary evidence, I focus on the role played by external drivers like 
monetary and non-monetary incentives in spurring or hindering spillover. The choice of the 
specific driver to be investigated reflects the need to fill a gap in the literature on spillover: to 
my knowledge, only one empirical study assessed the role played by rewards in such 
framework, albeit from a different perspective (Evans et al. 2013). 
 The work is hence organized as follows: after an introductory paragraph providing a 
theoretical framework to spillover, a literature review on the effects of rewards on motivation 
and behaviour is presented. Then the research hypotheses are specified and the methodology 
of the study, as regards both research design and data collection, is described in detail. The 
results of the data analysis are reported and discussed, with concluding remarks on the 
limitations of the study and ideas for further research. 
II. Spillover: theoretical background 
The literature on spillover is vast and growing, as numerous studies analyzed the strength 
of positive contamination between pro-environmental behaviours investigating whether going 
green in one domain acts like a nudge, leading to environmentally sound behaviours in other 
domains.  
No general agreement has been reached as regards the existence of positive spillover. 
Some scholars suggest that behaviours are not correlated, so that what individuals do in one 
domain has no effect in other domains (Gray 1985, Pickett et al. 1993, McKenzie-Mohr et al. 
1995). Others speculate that individuals contributing to the environmental cause in a specific 
domain believe they have provided a fair contribution, diminishing their willingness to 
behave consistently in other domains. This psychological mechanism, which is referred to as 
contribution ethics (Guagnano et al. 1994, Kahneman et al. 1993, Thøgersen and Crompton 
2009), could lead to negative spillover, and get exacerbated by self-serving biases 
overemphasizing the effective contribution provided to the environmental cause (Pieters et al. 
1998).  
This brief outline indicates that the hypothesis of a positive spillover between pro-
environmental behaviours is not universally accepted in the academic community; however, 
1  The paper focusing on this part of the project has been submitted to an international journal and is currently 
under review (co-author: John Thøgersen) 
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most of the studies on the topic suggest that green behaviours are indeed positively correlated 
(Berger 1997, Scott 1977, Kals et al. 1999, Maiteny 2002, De Young 2000, Frey 1993). There 
is a number of psychological models and theories that support and explain the spillover 
hypothesis. 
 According to Self-Perception theory, we use our past behaviours as cues of our own 
dispositions (Bem 1972). If I do something green, I develop a self-image of a person caring 
about the environment, so that it is likely that I will use this as a reference for future 
behaviours. Consistently with Self-Perception theory, the foot-in-the-door paradigm 
(Freedman and Fraser 1966) suggests that people carrying out a small request first are more 
likely to comply with more demanding requests later. A possible explanation is that the first 
task acts like a nudge, with individuals using it as a guide for subsequent behaviours. 
According to Cognitive Dissonance theory (Festinger 1957), individuals tend to act 
consistently across behaviours since inconsistent behaviours cause feelings of discomfort: for 
instance, if I am environmentally responsible in the realm of green purchasing, I would feel 
uncomfortable in behaving unsustainably in the domain of recycling, and so on. The theory is 
consistent with a vast body of empirical investigations even in the environmental domain 
(Dickerson et al. 1992, Aitken et al. 1994). 
Knowledge theories focus on how a learning-by-doing process can increase 
environmental awareness which in turn can drive sustainable behaviours also in domains 
different from those where such knowledge and capabilities originated, although some 
scholars suggest that the role of awareness should not be overemphasized (see Kollmuss and 
Agyeman 2002 for a review on the topic). 
Lastly, while most of the literature on pro-environmental spillover is clearly linked to one 
of the above mentioned theoretical frameworks, it should be noted that there are studies with 
an implicit theory on spillover (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1998). If it is safe to infer that 
awareness, self-perception and consistency are relevant factors in shaping spillover 
trajectories, there are indeed other elements that might be taken into consideration, both 
internal like values and norms (Thøgersen and Ölander 2003) and external like incentives, 
whose effects are the subject of the present paper. 
III. The effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation and behaviour 
Rewards represent a broad and heterogeneous family. I focus on two specific categories: 
monetary rewards (consisting of a financial incentive to carry out an activity) and verbal (or 
praise) rewards, consisting on praising the individual for an activity and providing positive 
performance feedback. Rewards have an impact on the motivation of individuals. By intrinsic 
motivation I consider the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some 
separable consequence (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, refers 
to whenever an activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome (Ryan and Deci 
2000), so that the carrying out of the activity is spurred by its instrumental value rather than 
intrinsic enjoyment. 
The ultimate effect of external (monetary or praise) rewards on intrinsic motivations and 
behaviour is still an object of debate, as it is still equivocal whether the latter can be hindered, 
or spurred, by the former (Cameron, Banko and Pierce 2001, Cameron and Pierce 1994, Deci, 
Koestner and Ryan 1999, 2001). Indeed, controversy characterized the debate since the early 
1970s, when decades of behaviourist dominance in motivation research (according to which 
reinforcements such as external rewards are the best motivators of behaviour) was challenged 
by cognitive explanations of motivation. 
Cognitive evaluation theory (Deci 1975, Deci and Ryan 1980) specifies the factors 
determining variability of intrinsic motivation, based on the assumption that individuals 
evaluate a task basing on its capability to satisfy human need to be competent and in control. 
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Self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 1985) incorporates cognitive evaluation theory, but 
is broader in scope. Self-determination theory suggests that the three core psychological needs 
of individuals are needs for competence (or effectance), relatedness, and autonomy. “People 
are inherently motivated to feel connected to others within a social milieu (relatedness), to 
function effectively in that milieu (effectance), and to feel a sense of personal initiative in 
doing so (autonomy)” (Deci and Ryan 1994). Cognitive evaluation theory can hence be 
considered a sub-theory of self-determination theory, specifically focused on those factors 
hindering or spurring intrinsic motivation. It suggests that intrinsic motivation can be either 
increased or decreased by rewards according to two properties of the latter, namely 
information and control, and how they affect our self-determination and perception of 
competency. As regards the informational aspect of a reward, cognitive evaluation theory 
predicts that intrinsic motivation will be enhanced if the reward itself conveys the message 
that the person is competent. On the other hand, the controlling aspect may lead to the sense 
of uneasiness that people usually perceive when they feel being controlled from the outside. 
Locus of causality is the degree to which individuals perceive their behaviour to be self-
determined rather than driven from other people. If outside pressures are perceived, people 
may feel an external locus of causality. Rewards perceived as controlling might hence lead to 
an outward shift of the locus of causality, and a subsequent undermining of intrinsic 
motivation. It is hence important to analyze the type of reward contingency to determine 
whether a reward is to be perceived as informational or controlling and, if both aspects are 
salient, further factors have to be considered in making predictions (Deci et al. 2001). 
Praise rewards usually enhance perceived competence and subsequently motivation. If 
people engage in a given behaviour specifically to gain praise, however, a controlling element 
emerges, thus decreasing intrinsic motivation (Deci et al. 2001). Tangible rewards such as 
monetary incentives, on the other hand, are usually (yet not necessarily) perceived as 
controlling and aiming at inducing people to adopt behaviours they would not adopt in the 
absence of the reward, thus undermining intrinsic motivation. Moreover, tangible rewards can 
be either expected or unexpected (Deci et al. 2001), and task-non contingent, task-contingent 
and performance-contingent (Ryan et al. 1983). The expected vs unexpected reward 
dichotomy is relevant insofar rewards have motivational implications only as long as 
individuals are aware they are getting them (that is, rewards are expected), so that they may 
engage in a behaviour (also) to obtain the reward. In such a case, intrinsic motivation to 
perform the task could be undermined. Task non-contingent rewards do not require 
performing a task per se, as they are linked to other reasons such as experiment participation. 
Task contingent rewards, on the other hand, require performing the task while performance 
contingent rewards require not only performing an activity, but also meeting given standards, 
criteria or scores. Task contingent rewards can be further disaggregated in completion 
contingent rewards and engagement contingent rewards according to whether engagement 
alone in an activity is required, or also completion of the task itself. 
Cognitive Evaluation theory originally developed in the fields of educational research and 
motivation in organizations, but its insights can be easily adapted to a broad range of domains 
characterized by the interaction between rewards and intrinsic motivation, including 
environmental behaviours (Koestner et al. 2001, Pelletier 2002, Thøgersen 2003). Moreover, 
notwithstanding the relevant role played by rewards, it has to be stressed that cognitive 
evaluation theory applies to the effects of many other external factors as well, such as 
evaluations (Smith 1975), deadlines (Amabile et al. 1976), competition (Deci et al. 1981) and 
externally imposed goals (Mossholder 1980). 
The empirical evidence supporting Cognitive Evaluation theory is growing. In his seminal 
work on the issue, Deci conducted two laboratory and one field experiment, investigating the 
effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation (Deci 1971). The laboratory experiments showed 
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that different types of incentives had different effects on the intrinsic motivation of 
individuals: whereas monetary incentives diminished motivation and effort, the opposite 
happened for non-monetary incentives such as verbal praise and positive feedback. Deci’s 
hypothesis has been backed by the outcome of the field experiment as well, as monetary 
rewards proved to be counterproductive from the point of view of intrinsic motivation. 
Pritchard and colleagues conducted a similar study in 1977 to test Deci’s hypothesis, and the 
results of their laboratory experiment confirmed that monetary rewards decreased the 
motivation to perform a given activity. Interestingly, these results are common also to studies 
carried out on young individuals like nursery school babies. In a 1975 experiment where 
children completing a simple task were divided in three groups (with expected reward, 
unexpected reward and no reward respectively), Lepper and Greene found that children in the 
expected reward condition decreased in intrinsic motivation whereas those in the other two 
conditions maintained it. 
Since the 1970s, numerous studies on the rewards-motivation relationship have been 
carried out, as well as different meta-analyses on the topic. Most of these works lead to results 
consistent with cognitive evaluation theory, and external rewards playing a downgrading role 
on intrinsic motivation (Rummel and Feinberg 1988, Wiersma 1992, Tang and Hall 1995, 
Deci et al. 2001). The meta-analysis of Tang and Hall is the more comprehensive meta-
analysis conducted, with a review of 50 studies that overcame shortcomings that limited the 
reliability of previous works (such as the lack of contingent-non contingent, or expected-
unexpected disaggregation of rewards). 
 It has to be pointed out that Cognitive Evaluation theory received critiques, as well. The 
work of Cameron, Pierce and colleagues (Cameron and Pierce 1994, Cameron et al. 2001) 
reached the conclusion that rewards seemingly have no impact on intrinsic motivation (if not 
enhancing it altogether), baldly suggesting the abandoning of Cognitive Evaluation theory. 
Many scholars argued however that such critiques are not well grounded (see Kohn 1996, 
Lepper et al. 1996, Ryan and Deci 1996), since the meta-analysis of Cameron and Pierce was 
invalid and its conclusions false. Many flaws reportedly undermined the reliability of the 
results, such as the emphasis on boring tasks (which by their very nature have little to no 
intrinsic motivation) or failure to include studies showing negative effects of reward on 
performance. 
 In light of the various flaws in these meta-analyses, Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) 
teamed up to compose the most comprehensive meta-analysis of the time on rewards, where 
128 studies were examined. The results show how verbal rewards are indeed capable of 
increasing intrinsic motivation (see Blanck et al. 1984, Koestner et al. 1987, Ryan 1982, 
Sansone et al. 1989), unless they are administered in a controlling manner, in which case the 
opposite effect is found. Deci and colleagues also state that unexpected rewards do not 
decrease intrinsic motivation, probably because participants do not feel controlled from the 
outside, as they are not performing the task to actually get the reward. As regards tangible 
expected rewards, they appear to have a substantial undermining effect, which can be ascribed 
to both over-justification (our tendency to diminish motivation when we are provided with an 
extrinsic reason to do something we would do even in the absence of such incentive) and the 
uneasy feeling of being controlled deriving from incentives that thus undermine our feelings 
of self-determination (see Deci et al. 1999, Deci and Ryan 1985). While the latter explanation 
fits within the Cognitive Evaluation theory framework, the over-justification effect (Lepper et 
al. 1973, Lepper and Greene 1975) is largely based on attribution (Kelley 1967) and self-
perception (Bem 1972) theories. Motivation and performance are believed to be influenced by 
the perceptions we hold about the inner causes of our own behaviour. When external controls 
are present, individuals tend to ascribe their own behaviour to an external agent, and this 
undermines their own motivation. In the case of rewards such as monetary incentives, 
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perceptions shift from accounting behaviour as self-initiated to considering it as sparked from 
the outside, and people feel they are facing too many reasons (or justifications) to perform an 
activity so that the role of intrinsic motivation gets discounted and motivation itself decreases. 
Even assuming that rewards have a hindering effect on intrinsic motivation, the overall effect 
will depend on the relative strength of two forces operating in opposite directions: the 
motivating power of the incentive and the decrease in intrinsic motivation (Frey 1997). 
 The risk of offsetting the benefits of a reward such as financial incentives by means of 
decreased intrinsic motivation is relevant as far as environmentally sound behaviours are 
concerned. Thøgersen, in a study on differentiated garbage fees, reaches similar conclusions: 
monetary rewards may re-frame the environmental issue into a cost-benefit calculation 
sphere, so that such negative effects offset positive impacts of rewards on attitudes and 
behaviour (Thøgersen 1994). Frey invokes the term crowding out to describe a scenario where 
extrinsic motivation involving external rewards is at odds with intrinsic, or behavioural, 
motivation. Crowding in, on the other hand, refers to the case when intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation work in the same direction. Not only does Frey (1993) recognize that crowding 
out effect undermines intrinsic motivation to perform a task; he stresses how the effect could 
also spillover to other domains not affected by the reward, if the individual finds it hard to 
distinguish motivations according to such different domains. Hence policy makers in the 
environmental field should be careful with pricing as a strategy to shift people environmental 
behaviours, as this could not only hinder intrinsic motivation and undermine the behaviour 
object of the reward, but such negative effect could spill over to other (not rewarded) 
environmental behaviours as well, multiplying the detrimental impacts of the policy. 
Conditions facilitating spillover range from similarity of domains (with respect to both 
material content and processes) to the social and religious incentive to adapt similar intrinsic 
motivation to all spheres of life. 
Motivation crowding effect and motivation spillover effect represent two limits to policies 
encompassing extrinsic rewards that have to be carefully taken into consideration, as to avoid 
possible counterproductive effects. Crowding out effects contradict a traditional rational 
choice model (Becker 1976, Coleman 1990), according to which behaviour is determined by 
preferences and constraints only. Extrinsic monetary rewards cause a shift in relative prices 
(constraints), thus resulting in changes in behaviour: behavioural changes are here assumed to 
be extrinsically motivated. Frey suggests that also another type of behavioural incentive 
should be taken into consideration, and intrinsic motivation. Neoclassical economics, on the 
other hand, takes preferences as given and thereby implicitly assumes that monetary rewards 
have no effects on intrinsic motivation. 
As already mentioned, according to Cognitive Evaluation theory monetary incentives 
could under given circumstances enhance intrinsic motivation. Facilitating conditions are 
represented by the capability of the reward to boost individuals’ perceived competence (what 
Bandura -1982- calls self-efficacy, typically achieved through feedbacks on the performance), 
or the reward itself being perceived as not controlling. In a 2003 study on weight dependent 
garbage fees (Thøgersen 2003) it was found that such rewards have a positive effect, and the 
result is due not only to the price effect, but also (and perhaps mostly) to an increase in 
perceived self-efficacy and personal norms regarding the specific environmentally desirable 
behaviour. The author suggests that a further explanation could refer to the fact that the small 
incentive provided is considered as an insufficient justification to recycle, making new 
adopters of the behaviour adjust their attitudes as to be more consistent with the new 
behaviour. 
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IV. Research questions and methods 
The study aims at shedding light on the influence of incentives on behavioural patterns, at 
different levels of analysis. I first focus on the direct effects of financial and praise rewards on 
the specific behaviour being incentivized, which is represented by green purchasing. I expect 
that monetary incentives (even if limited to very small amounts) support the purchase of green 
products more than praise rewards, and I test this speculation by means of the following 
research hypothesis: 
H1) The direct effect of incentives in spurring the adoption of a pro-environmental 
behaviour is stronger for monetary rewards compared to praise rewards. 
The core of the study is represented by the role played by different types of incentives on 
spillover between pro-environmental behaviours; in other words, the focus shifts to the 
indirect effect of incentives on green behaviours other that those directly incentivized. 
Reading Self Determination and Cognitive Evaluation Theory in the light of the spillover 
hypothesis, one could expect spillover to be stronger for praise group members, as individuals 
incentivized to purchase green products by means of monetary rewards have their intrinsic 
environmental motivation hindered, with negative repercussions on the spillover process. 
The second research hypothesis to be tested is hence the following: 
H2) Pro-environmental spillover is stronger when triggered by praise rather than 
monetary incentives. 
As the aim of the study is to shed light on the variation over time of consumer 
behavioural intentions within the domain of sustainability, the methodology consists of a 
panel study based two waves of online surveys, administered before and after the 
experimental intervention. Participants are undergraduate students from Aarhus University in 
Denmark, recruited in June and October 2012 through mailing lists of the Departments of 
Business Administration and Business Communication. The recruiting message specified that 
students volunteering in the project might have to purchase specific products for a short 
period of time, as the experimental manipulation consisted in spurring participants to 
purchase green products for a period of six weeks and to keep track of their purchasing 
patterns by means of a shopping diary. A total of 80 complete shopping diaries with receipts 
were returned, so that the sample used for the present analyses is composed of 80 students 
(n=80). 
 The sample was randomly split into two sub-groups. Monetary group members (nm=46) 
were incentivized to purchase green products by means of financial incentives consisting of 
two elements: a sum covering the extra costs sustained for the purchase of green products and 
the chance to win 1000 DKK in a final lottery draw. Praise group members (np=34) received 
instead emails praising their effort and stressing the beneficial effects for the common good of 
a shift to environmentally conscious purchasing patterns. Specific attention was devoted in 
framing messages (in equal number and frequency for both groups) so that they were not 
perceived as controlling, as this would have hindered intrinsic motivation. 
The questionnaire investigated a broad range of topics dealing with the relationship 
between participants and sustainability; as regards the present study, the main piece of 
information refers to the intrinsic motivation and intention of individuals to carry out pro-
environmental behaviours. Intentions to act in a pro-environmental way are assessed with 
respect to a battery of environment friendly behaviours, using the format: How likely do you 
think you will do “X” in the next occasion, if you have the chance to do so? (where “X” 
stands for each behaviour), rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = very unlikely to 7 = very 
likely. The behaviours cover the domains of transport mode, recycling, energy/water 
conservation and green purchasing, which are the main macro-categories in most research on 
pro-environmental behaviour and spillover (see Thøgersen and Ölander 2003). 
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Participants received the link to the online survey (using Qualtrics) by email and they 
could choose between a Danish and an English version. After filling out the first 
questionnaire, establishing the baseline, experimental interventions were deployed. 
Participants were encouraged to buy organic food and other eco-labeled products for a period 
of 6 weeks. I choose this as the source behaviour because it represents a class of behaviours 
where money is naturally involved and the consumer typically needs to bear extra costs, like 
the premium-price required for the purchase of such products. For 6 weeks, participants were 
asked to record their purchases within a specified set of product categories in a shopping 
diary, specifying whether they opted for an environment-friendly version (e.g: organic milk vs 
traditional milk, etc). Receipts had to be kept to allow crosschecking at the end of the 
experiment. Once the six weeks elapsed, a second questionnaire (exact replication of the first) 
was mailed to participants. This allows us to gain insights into the effects of the intervention 
and possible spillover between behaviours. Incentives were terminated at this point and 
participants were de-briefed thanking them for their participation in the study and informing 
them that they might be contacted in the upcoming weeks for some follow-up questions. 
V. Results and discussion 
I first consider the direct effect of different types of rewards on purchasing patterns. Table 
1 illustrates the average number of items (and, in brackets, of green items) purchased by 
participants in both monetary and praise groups for each of the 10 product categories analyzed 
in the shopping diaries.  
Table 1: Average number of (green) items purchased 
Average n of (green) 
items purchased 
Monetary group Praise group Total 
Milk 8,57      (5,70) 6,18      (2,09) 7,55      (4,16) 
Yoghurt 2,57      (1,39) 1,94      (0,68) 2,30      (1,09) 
Eggs 2,09      (0,89) 1,94      (0,82) 2,03      (0,86) 
Meat 6,33      (1,22) 4,88      (0,44) 5,71      (0,89) 
Vegetables 12,52     (4,17) 10,18     (1,76) 11,53     (3,15) 
Fruit 9,35      (2,52) 7,74      (1,26) 8,66      (1,99) 
Detergents for house 1,09      (0,39) 0,65      (0,26) 0,90      (0,34) 
Soaps personal hygiene 2,02      (0,63) 1,59      (0,62) 1,84      (0,63) 
Kitchen paper 0,35      (0,22) 0,35      (0,03) 0,35      (0,14) 
Toilet paper 0,93      (0,50) 0,85      (0,24) 0,90      (0,39) 
 
Individuals receiving monetary rewards purchase more green products than individuals 
receiving praise rewards: on average, each participant of the monetary group purchased 17.63 
green items during the six weeks of the experiment, compared with only 8.20 of those in the 
praise group. Differences are large for some items (such as milk, meat, vegetables or kitchen 
paper) and smaller for others (such as eggs and detergents for personal hygiene). I then focus 
on the relative share of green products purchased, rather than on their absolute numbers. The 
mean percentages of green products purchased by participants in the monetary and praise 
groups are 35.54% and 22.06%, respectively: while over one third of products purchased by 
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individuals spurred by financial incentives to buy green are indeed environment-friendly, the 
figures drop to just over one fifth in the case of individuals spurred by praise rewards. 
 To assess the significance of these preliminary results, I carry out an analysis of variance 
where the dependent variable is represented by the percentage of green products purchased by 
each participant and the independent variable is represented by the treatment group of 
pertinence (monetary vs praise). There is indeed a significant difference between the 
monetary and the praise group on percentages of green products purchased (F=7.523, p<.01, 
partial eta squared=.088). Monetary incentives are much more effective than praise 
incentives in spurring individuals to adopt a sustainable behaviour like purchasing green 
products. 
 These findings are consistent with a broad literature on consumer behaviour and with 
empirical evidence gathered in a wide set of domains ranging from eating at restaurants (Jang 
and Mattila 2005) to responding to survey requests (Church 1993), and so on. In the domain 
of purchase a useful distinction has to be made between hedonic and utilitarian products 
(Hirschman and Holbrook 1982, Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000): we use goods in two ways 
(…), as symbols of status and simultaneously as instruments to achieve some end-in-view 
(Hamilton 1987). Evidence in literature suggests that while for utilitarian goods the effect of 
monetary rewards is stronger, for hedonic products it is non-monetary rewards which are 
more effective (Liao et al. 2009). The product items that participants have been asked to 
purchase are not easy to be placed in either of the two categories, as they encompass features 
typical of both hedonic and utilitarian goods and being thus eligible for a borderline status. 
Even typical utilitarian products like detergents or kitchen paper should be handled with care 
before being labeled as such in this specific setting, since the overarching goal of 
environmental protection embodies a role trespassing the boundaries of mere functionalism 
and use. Future research should first investigate in depth how participants perceive the green 
products object of the study, and then test whether there are significant differences regarding 
the effects of different types of rewards on purchasing patterns. 
As regards the indirect effects of rewards on behavioural patterns, I investigate whether 
monetary and praise rewards impact differently on the uptake of pro-environmental 
behaviours other than those directly incentivized (i.e. on positive pro-environmental 
spillover). I consider as target behaviours those for which a positive spillover was found in 
Study 1: switching off the lights when exiting room as last person, turning off the water while 
soaping and while brushing teeth, and recycling batteries. Table 2 illustrates the descriptive 
statistics on the evolution over time in participants´ behavioural intentions to carry out each of 
the four target behaviours.  
Table 2: Evolution over time of behavioural intentions 
 Monetary Group Praise Group 
 t1 t2 Δt2-t1 t1 t2 Δt2-t1 
Turn off lights 6,63 6,70 0,07 6,65 6,74 0,09 
Turn off water while 
brushing teeth 6,46 6,59 0,13 6,74 6,71 -0,03 
Turn off water while soaping 
in the shower 4,65 4,67 0,02 4,56 5,21 0,35 
Recycling batteries 4,91 5,41 0,50 5,47 5,35 -0,12 
 
Consistently with the results of Study 1 on the existence of positive spillover, there is a 
generalized trend towards an increase in behavioural intentions to behave environment-
friendly with the only exceptions of behavioural items on saving water while brushing teeth 
and recycling batteries for praise group members. However, if we consider the differences 
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between monetary and praise group members, there is no clear pattern emerging as in two 
target behaviours (turning off water while brushing teeth and recycling batteries) people 
treated with monetary incentives experience stronger leaps in behavioural intentions, while in 
other two target behaviours (turning off the light when exiting room as last person and turning 
off water while soaping) the opposite happens. 
 To test the statistical significance of these differences, I conduct a one-way between-
groups analysis of covariance:  the independent variable is represented by the treatment group 
(monetary vs praise), while the dependent variable consists of participants´ scores on 
behavioural intentions for the four target behaviours administered after completion of the 
intervention. Participants´ scores on the same question administered before the intervention 
are used as the covariate in the analysis, to control for pre-existing differences between the 
groups. Table 3 illustrates the results of the analysis:  
Table 3: Statistical analysis 
Item Δmon-Δpra2 F p Partial ƞ2 
Turning off light when exiting as 
last person - .02 .081 .776 .001 
Turning off water while brushing 
teeth .16 .018 .894 .000 
Turning off water while soaping - .33 2.921 .091 .037 
Recycling batteries .62 1.397 .241 .018 
 
The picture emerging is controversial and there is no general trend regarding which type 
of incentives is more effective in triggering a positive spillover to other domains. 
Furthermore, the differences in leaps of behavioural intentions between participants in the 
monetary and praise conditions are not statistically significant as can be inferred by the high p 
values (with the partial exception of the behavioural item turning off water while soaping, 
showing marginally significant differences). According to my data the two groups do not 
differ significantly as regards changes in intentions to perform sustainable behaviours other 
than those directly spurred by the incentives: spillover is not affected by the type of rewards 
(monetary or praise) triggering it. 
Few other studies have been carried out on the topic, to date. Swim and Bloodhart (2013) 
conducted lab experiments investigating whether pro-environmental spillover is affected by 
praise and admonishment for acting green or not, respectively. Results show that praising 
participants for their pro-environmental behaviour (taking the stairs instead of the elevator) 
only produces a modest and indirect spillover towards other, not related green behaviours 
(turning off lights and monitor at the end of the experiment). The authors suggest that the 
modest result may be attributable to a lack of internalization of admonishment and praise, as 
participants may not have felt pride for taking the stairs because their decision was not based 
upon its environmental or social implications (Swim and Bloodhart 2013). Evans and 
colleagues (2013) conducted lab experiments investigating spillover from a source behaviour 
represented by carpooling to a target behaviour represented by recycling. Participants in two 
experimental conditions received environmental and financial information about the benefits 
of carpooling, respectively. Results suggest that the spillover to the target behaviour (that is, 
throwing the paper with carpooling information in a recycling bin at the end of the 
experiment) is stronger when self-transcending reasons are made salient.  
2 it represents the difference between the mean variations (before to post experiment) in monetary and praise 
group participants (on a 1 to 7 scale). Positive values indicate that the willingness to uptake the specific 
green behaviour increased more (decreased less) in the monetary group 
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The scattered empirical evidence on the role played by different incentives on pro-
environmental spillover seems to be consistent (especially in the case of Evans and 
colleagues) with the theoretical background suggesting that praise messages (or incentives) 
increase intrinsic motivation to perform other pro-environmental behaviours, while financial 
incentives undermine such motivation. A thorough comparison of such evidence with the 
results of my study is hindered by relevant differences both at the methodological and 
theoretical level: for instance, my experiment represents the first empirical investigation 
trespassing laboratory boundaries, with financial incentives being directly correlated to the 
degree of uptake of the source behaviour. However, what emerges from my experiment seems 
in contrast with the results of the above-mentioned studies, as no clear pattern suggesting the 
relevance of the type of incentives as predictors of spillover emerges. Only for one of the four 
observed behaviours (turning off water while soaping) there is a marginally significant effect 
of incentives, suggesting that praise rewards indeed spur pro-environmental spillover more 
than monetary rewards.  
In conclusion, my experiment suggests that the nature of incentives only plays a marginal 
role in shaping spillover trajectories, which are seemingly more affected by internal factors 
such as values or habits3. However, this result has to be handled with care as many factors 
might have affected the outcome of the experiment. As Swim and Bloodhart suggest, lack of 
internalization of the self-transcending vs self-interested appeal of the rewards could eliminate 
the effects on intrinsic motivation advocated by Self Determination and Cognitive Evaluation 
theories. Moreover, the specificity of the source behaviour (green purchasing) suggests that 
future research adopting the same methodology should address the hedonic-utilitarian 
dichotomy as to investigate whether the effects of incentives on spillover are mediated by 
which feature of products (hedonic or utilitarian) is perceived as salient by participants. 
  
3 As emerging from the results of my preliminary study on spillover within the current research project 
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Abstract 
This article titled “An Ethics of Sustainability and Jewish Law?” at first addresses the 
issue why it is important to ask for ethical responses to questions of sustainability and an ethics 
of an open future, and why the technocratic approach as practiced in most Western countries is 
not ‘sustainable’ enough, meaning not sufficient in the long term. 
Secondly it is examined what a religious perspective has to offer for the discourse. In 
particular this is the perspective of Jewish Law (Halakhah), today a mere niche subject, a law 
system without territory and primarily based on the tradition of a religious group that makes up 
for less than 0.2% of the world population. It is argued why despite these facts it is worth to 
take a closer look at the Jewish legal system, as it offers a rich and unique tradition of more 
than 3,000 years of discussion and thought that still gives revealing insights. Two Jewish legal 
principles, Bal Tashchit and Migrash, are to exemplify this claim, before an outlook on 
possible future contributions is given. 
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I. Introduction 
First, why should we ask for ethical responses to questions of sustainability? Is the 
technocratic approach as practiced in most Western countries not sufficient? 
And second, what has a religious perspective to offer for the discourse? Especially the 
perspective of Jewish Law, a mere niche subject, a law system without territory1 and 
primarily based on the tradition of a religious group that makes up for less than 0.2% of the 
world population. Why should we look there to find an open ethics for a more sustainable 
world tomorrow? 
1. Ethics and Sustainability? 
The answers to these questions are manifold. We might ask for ethical responses because 
we are not satisfied with the answers politics, economy, society, and science offer. Many 
human beings seem to feel a lack of confidence in their motivation to transform to a more 
sustainable way of living, and to convince others to follow their example. Perhaps they long 
for the feeling to be part of something bigger, at least a community, or a movement: In the 
relatively individualized Western world oftentimes the only remaining communities are 
families, the company one works for, or in some cases the local sports club. Politics all too 
often seem far away, e.g. in the case of the European Union. While the EU is continuously 
gaining political power, people feel unconnected. So, where are places remaining that allow 
people on the one hand to share thoughts and discuss visions and feelings, and on the other 
hand to put them into action, to become a voice in the social as well as in the political 
discourse? Although we live in the age of communication, in the public perception actual 
communication about the shape of the future seems to diminish,2 and as a matter of fact 
subsequent individual as well as collective action too. It is an apparent problem that in our 
Western democracies the average citizen is relatively powerless with his single vote or voice 
compared to the lobbies and associations of an industry that not always, but often is primarily 
concerned with the maximisation of its profits. Ethics allow us to take a critical view on these 
circumstances. And religious communities can and do serve as places for this ethical 
discourse. 
If we take a look at which effects the practical implementation of the idea of sustainability 
may have on us, our everyday life, and our political and economic institutions we have to 
distinguish between two major approaches how to reach more sustainability. The first and 
most common approach in the Western hemisphere is a technocratic one, the second a more 
ethical or psychological one. The technocratic approach sees at its core engineering, i.e. the 
development of green technology replacing our current more polluting ones. In the beginning 
and the short term the effects of this first approach will be most noticeable in rising costs for 
the public (e.g. energy turn in Germany with higher prices for electricity or energy 
consumption in general). While the humans do not have to refrain too much from and 
question their current standard of use of energy the risk of a rebound effect exists. The 
second, more neglected ethical approach aims at changing not the material circumstances but 
the level below: the underlying thinking and values. According to this approach people are 
supposed to act sustainable because of inner conviction. Thus, ethics can help to substantiate 
the current efforts, and by this strengthen them. If people are convinced in their innermost, the 
success of the development of a more sustainable world is much more realistic. Still at the 
1  Of course, countries like Israel, Morocco etc. where only marriage and family law are religious, but state 
law rules otherwise do not count as countries of Jewish law. 
2  For example when being compared to the times of rise of socialist movements during the first half of the 
20th century. 
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moment ethics are more a satellite to than an essential part of the debate.3 While certainly 
both approaches have their pros and cons, a combination of both would be most preferable as 
this article will show. 
2. Theological Ethics and Sustainability? 
While religious responses indeed focus on the second approach,4 one still has to ask: why 
exactly theological ethics? In my opinion it is worth (re-)considering theological ethics 
because religion for a very long time has been a highly influential part of the daily political 
discourse in the Western world, fundamentally shaping it, and – despite some dark corners in 
its history – most of the time representing certain values and an orientation. People might look 
for that again, and in asking themselves what they can do for the environment and future 
generations could feel the urge to take a look at what our forefathers thought about these 
issues. Judaism and thus Jewish law are predestined for this endeavour: Jewish Law is the 
world’s oldest continuous legal system with a rich tradition of more than 3,000 years, offering 
a unique documentation of thoughts and discussions, as well as a vast collection of principles 
developed from them.5 Though not only but especially due to WWII the position of Judaism 
and Jewish law has often been forgotten, overseen and therefore neglected in large parts of 
Western Europe for the past decades. For instance in Germany this used to be different at the 
beginning of the 20th century when Jewish positions even had a notable impact on 
parliamentary discussions concerning criminal law, land law, and much more.6 Today, 
although the parts of the population that are Jewish (or even consider themselves as observant 
Jews) might be small in most countries – aside from Israel (75%) and the US (1.7%) –, the 
ideas of this tradition can still be inspiring. And interest in it has shown a permanent growth 
in recent years. 
Since this Jewish approach has been neglected for so long and has not yet been able to 
develop its full impact it is worth taking a deeper look into its motivations to discover 
forgotten or even new ways to create a more sustainable world based on ethical values. Jewish 
law is particularly suited to function as an ethical foundation and for developing not only a 
Jewish, but even a more general ethics for an open future. In its tradition ethics have always 
played an important role: Jewish law has the aim to make the people observing it morally and 
above all ethically ‘better’ – according to divine will and values of course. And when working 
with Jewish law, dealing with ethical questions is pretty much unavoidable as there is no strict 
separation between ethics and law. This separation is a relatively recent phenomenon of 
secularism.7 And especially due to its historic non-territoriality, the diaspora, Jewish law was 
able, maybe compelled to develop primarily as a system of ethics: Because neither physical 
force nor state pressure could keep this legal system alive and working, but legal 
commandments needed – despite their divine origin granting authority – not for all, still for 
many Jews more and more an ethical or philosophical basis to be persuasive and to prevent 
3  Although there are a few examples where ethics play a role in politics: In Germany the chancellor Angela 
Merkel appointed an ethics commission on the secure supply of energy after the nuclear incidents in 
Fukushima, Japan in 2011. 
4  Lawrence Troster, From Apologetics to New Spirituality: Trends in Jewish Environmental Theology 
(November 2004, online at http://www.coejl.org/_old/www.coejl.org/scholarship/jetheology.pdf, accessed 
2013-11-11). 
5  For an overview see: Elliot N. Dorff and Arthur I. Rosett, A Living Tree: The Roots and Growth of Jewish 
Law (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988); Louis Jacob, Jewish Law (New York: 
Behrman House, 1968). 
6  Access to the respective material has been simplified by large digitalization projects in recent years. Such as 
the compact memory project. See: http://www.compactmemory.de/. 
7  Alan Mittleman, A Short History of Jewish Ethics: Conduct and Character in the Context of Covenant 
(Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 5. 
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migration to competing religions or cults. Especially as the advance of science, particularly 
when informed by Aristotelian philosophy,8 led to an increasing questioning of the literally 
meaning and authority of substantial parts of the classic Jewish texts and their interpretations. 
This ethical, and more rationally derived basis developed through lengthy and controversial 
discussions led by scholars and rabbis on the major documents of Jewish Law. Due to the 
relevance of tradition and the authority of the founding documents people who work with 
Jewish legal material always have to respect, cite and thus come back to the original sources, 
therefore also to the themes and topics discussed; the tradition requires a dialogue between 
basically all periods which also includes the respect of dissenting or minority opinions. These 
are passed on over the generations and not simply removed by the majority opinion, and by 
this are allowing a deep intergenerational and –periodical dialogue. Due to its dialogue 
character Jewish law furthermore was able to think in long terms; and thinking in long terms 
definitely is one of the key aspects of sustainability. It is characteristic for this dialogue that 
the telos of the older sources has to be applied to the new circumstances of modernity which 
happens through interpretation. And because the telos of the religious commandments has to 
be revealed and flexibly applied continuously it appears almost as of a solely rational or 
abstract character,9 thus even secular people or atheists can take the results of this revelation 
which is mostly free from mere religious rituals and use it for their reflection on topics like 
climate change, sustainability and an ethics of an open future. In this wider adaptation process 
it is not about the specific obligations of Jewish law that may be copied, integrated, or 
adopted to secular law systems. It is about the telos, the principles. In Jewish law there are 
many principles that have the potential to contribute to the discourse on sustainability. Later 
in this article (paragraph IV.) two of them will be presented: One is the famous principle Bal 
Tashchit (the prohibition of wanton destruction) which – due to its extensive interpretation – 
has become somewhat difficult to grasp. The second one is the urban planning principle 
Migrash. 
These principles are most of the time based on ethical considerations which are discussed 
openly in the texts of Jewish law. Of course, the intermingling of ethics and law has become 
somewhat uncommon in secular legal systems of the Western world as the concept of 
freedom generally recognizes ethics as being a matter of the individual, not of the collective 
or legal realm.10 But is it not important to bring back ethics to the public and secular debate, 
not necessarily incorporating them as positive law, but at least discussing them? Relying on a 
purely technocratic or instrumental approach and language might work, but to have a 
‘sustainable’ shift to more sustainability people – politicians as well as citizens – have to be 
convinced of what they are doing. 
II. What is Jewish Law? 
But before giving more attention to specific Jewish legal principles and comparing them 
to secular laws, a brief answer to the question “What is Jewish law?” shall make 
understanding easier. 
8  This happened during the Middle Age and probably was the second significant shift from a purely 
religious/theological reading and understanding to a more scientific, philosophical, secular reading and 
understanding of the Halakhah. The interpretation and claiming of authority by the rabbis by arguing that 
God’s direct contribution to law ended with giving the Torah to Moses being the first shift. 
9  One of the best known figures of this – within Judaism not undisputed – movement is Moses Maimonides 
(1135-1204). While still respecting the canonical material and its authority at the core of the system he 
approached the classical sources more scientifically and philosophically; trying to harmonize his belief in 
God, thus religion, and science/philosophy. 
10  One can argue about the question of morality though which might well be a part of our legislation, 
especially our jurisdiction. 
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1. The Basics of Jewish Law 
Not surprisingly: Jewish law is the religious legal system of the Jews.11 It is also known 
under the term Halakhah which is derived from the Hebrew word halakh (to go, to walk). A 
more literal translation of Halakhah would be "the path to walk". This already tells much 
about the character of the Jewish legal system: It is conceived as a moral framework and an 
ethical guide to its observants, giving them a concept of how to act and live their lives 
according to the divine will. Furthermore it is important to notice that the area of application 
of law in Judaism is much wider compared to modern secular systems: The Halakhah 
embraces almost every aspect of life, e.g. diet and rituals. In contrast to the legal part of 
Judaism, there is the Aggadah which is the narrative or mystical part of Jewish tradition, but 
will not be further examined in this article. 
To get a grasp of Jewish law it is necessary to comprehend its structures. These are as 
follows:12 At first, one has to differentiate between primary and secondary legal sources. 
According to the tradition, within the primary sources one again has to distinguish between 
originally written and oral law, while the secondary sources are all extensions of the oral 
tradition. At the top of the Jewish legal system is the Torah as the primary written source of 
law, or the ‘constitution of Jewish law’.13 The Torah is the law Moses received from God at 
Mt. Sinai.14 It is legal text and narrative at the same time; this blending of different types of 
texts might feel unfamiliar and thus might be confusing for readers used to Western law codes 
or case law collections. According to rabbinic tradition the Torah originally contains 613 
commandments15, the so called Mitzvot. Due to the emergence of new problems and the 
change of circumstances these Mitzvot needed adaptation which happened through 
interpretation. As a result a strong oral tradition evolved. Out of this tradition further legal 
texts resulted, inter alia: the Midrash Halakhah which is basically a line-by-line commentary 
on the Torah, and the Mishnah which is the textualisation of the further oral tradition of the 
Jews around 220 CE and basically the founding document of rabbinic Judaism.16 Though for 
a long time the practically most important legal document was the Talmud. In the Talmud 
rabbis and scholars (the Gemarah) commented on the Mishnah, the text of the Mishnah thus 
is reprinted in the Talmud, and defines its structure. There are two versions, the Jerusalem and 
the Babylonian Talmud which have been compiled around 400-500 CE with the Babylonian 
Talmud being the more authoritative one. As secondary sources the Responsa (legally binding 
answers of rabbinic authorities), commentaries, and especially codifications are to mention 
(like Moses Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, the Tur by Jacob ben Asher (1269-1343), or the 
most relevant legal code in Judaism, the Shulkhan Arukh by Yosef Karo (1488-1575)). Also 
very important in order to understand the Halakhah is the periodization system, i.e. the Jewish 
11  In this article for reasons of easier understanding there will be no differentiation between the existing 
differences of the various movements of Judaism (orthodox, conservative, reform etc.). For an introduction 
to Jewish law either in German or in English see: Moris Lehner, “Alttestamentarisches und talmudisches 
Recht: Eine Einführung in das jüdische Recht”, JURA 1, 1999, pp. 26-31; Walter Homolka, “Das Jüdische 
Recht: Eigenart und Entwicklung in der Geschichte”, Humboldt Forum Recht 17, 2009, pp. 251-282; Jacob, 
Jewish Law. 
12  Homolka, “Das Jüdische Recht“, pp. 251-282. 
13  Justus von Daniels, Religiöses Recht als Referenz. Jüdisches Recht im rechtswissenschaftlichen Vergleich 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), p. 21. 
14  The Torah is also known as the Old Testament (from a Christian perspective) or Five Books of Moses or 
Pentateuch. See: von Daniels, Religiöses Recht als Referenz, p. 21; The Torah again is part of the Tanakh 
or Hebrew Bible that contains besides the Torah the Nevi’im (“Prophets”) and Ketuvim (“Writings”). 
15  Divided into 365 negative and 248 positive commandments. 
16  Tsvi Blanchard, “Can Judaism Make Environmental Policy? Sacred and Secular Language in Jewish 
Ecological Discourse”, Judaism and Ecology: Created World and Revealed Word, edited by Hava Tirosh 
Samuelson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Center for the Study of World Religions, 
Harvard Divinity School, 2002), pp. 423–448 (428). 
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legal tradition can be divided chronologically into periods. So far there are at least six 
different periods17 which in the end always relate to major legal documents of Judaism 
(basically the above mentioned). Certainly every primary source of Jewish law could build a 
legal system of its own; being that Biblical, Mishnaic or Talmudic law. Still the closer a 
period is to the Torah the more authority it has which once more emphasizes the relevance of 
tradition. The challenge is to conceptualize the fragments to a coherent system; this still has to 
happen in terms of ecological or sustainability issues where there has all too often been a 
quite selective reading, picking out mostly single Mitzvot out of their systematic or historic 
context that seemed to support the intentions of the author. Surely, developing a coherent 
system of obligations of sustainability within Jewish law is a task requiring great diligence, 
but the Jewish legal history has a tradition of concerning itself with such tasks. Maybe this 
could be one of the major contributions of the current period of the Acharonim (1563 until 
present).18 
A further significant characteristic of the Halakhah is its conception as an obligation, and 
not a rights-based legal system.19 By this the Jewish legal system theoretically differs from 
the notion of most contemporary Western legal systems and their philosophical justifications 
which emphasize the concept of natural, human or basic rights as the legal manifestation of 
the protection of individual freedom. Of course, in most cases rights regularly correspond to 
obligations or duties, and vice versa. And the covenantal obligations of humans to God most 
of the times practically result in corresponding rights of other human beings or living 
creatures. The Halakhah practically knows rights and claims as well and thus there are less 
practical differences as one would expect. But the mind-set is a different one. And – as 
mentioned before – this does matter as the mind-set will decide about how successful the idea 
of sustainability will be in the long run. 
2. Rights versus Obligations? 
As will be shown the obligational character is of highest relevance to the functioning of 
the Halakhah. And the self-perception of being part of a covenant with God plays – next to 
social pressure – a major role for the enforcement, not only individually but also collectively. 
In contrast, in the secular Western world legal objectives are almost entirely enforced by a 
rights-based system. The emergence of rights as we know them today in the Western world is 
closely linked to liberalism and the respective state theories: These are mostly based on social 
contract theories of philosophers like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) or John Locke (1632-
1704). The following chapter is thus dedicated to the relationship of rights in a modern liberal 
sense and obligations, and their application on sustainability issues. As sustainability is by 
nature an assessment of present actions and their future impact, there is a strong (secular) 
debate on the protection of the supposed interests of future generations as well as of animate 
and inanimate nature. Assumed – to have a basis to start from – there is an agreement on the 
relevance of this issue and on the need of active protection, the subsequent question would be 
how this protection can be realized most efficiently. In the legal area there are basically two 
theoretical concepts: The first concept focuses on rights attributed to future generations and 
nature.20 It is frequently claimed that future generations already have certain inherent human 
17  These being: Tannaim, Amoraim, Savoraim, Geonim, Rishonim, Acharonim. 
18  There are some notably contributions to a wider view though: Lawrence Troster, “Judaism”, Berkshire 
Encyclopedia of Sustainability. The Spirit of Sustainability, edited by Willis Jenkins und Whitney Bauman 
(Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire Pub. Group, 2010-), pp. 254–257. 
19  Robert M. Cover, “Obligations: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order”, Journal of Law and Religion 
5:1, 1987, pp. 65–74. 
20  Klaus Bosselmann, Christian Calliess, Michael Schröter and Prue Taylor, Ökologische Grundrechte: Zum 
Verhältnis zwischen individueller Freiheit und Natur (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998). 
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rights that do not need to be attributed to them anymore. Whereas the second and also 
Halakhic approach focusses on obligations of current to future generations. 
In the context of this article there are basically two levels where these two different 
approaches might clash: The first level is the basic level of self-conception of human nature 
or of the respective legal system itself. Either one sees humans as endowed with (natural) 
rights from a certain point of time on (e.g. birth, majority) or one follows the other approach 
and takes – in the case of Judaism the covenant, therefore – obligations (to God) as the 
(theoretical) ground to start from and for constructing a coherent system. This first level 
addresses the why of becoming active. On the second level which builds on the theoretical 
fundaments of the first level it has to be determined how and when these rights or obligations 
can be realized most effectively in practice. Within the second level one has to further 
distinguish at least between present and future situations. Therefore, when for example 
addressing the question of intergenerational justice, thus a future situation, one might come to 
a different result compared to questions of justice between present generations. 
Focusing on the second level, ascribing rights to future generations – which is the most 
obvious reaction from a Western secular perspective – appeared to have some flaws in regard 
to practice (e.g. the representative model). Therefore contemporary legal scholars are looking 
for new ways to get out of this dilemma and to better protect future generations. This is 
increasingly resulting in the insight that obligations are pretty much inevitable for this 
purpose. Surely, rights in fact do have advantages, e.g. when it comes to restraining the state. 
But these advantages mainly relate to present, not future citizens. And if one takes a closer 
look at contemporary legal norms dealing with sustainability, it shows that even when these 
are formulated as rights, in our Western legal cultures these norms de facto already are more 
duties than rights. This is logical as future generations and nature cannot claim their rights on 
their own and are basically dependent on the good will and the self-imposed rules, thus of 
obligations of the present generation. 
This obligation orientation offers a connecting factor between secular and Jewish law. 
Jewish law for the major part of its history did not have to deal with protecting citizens 
against the abuse of state power, as it is not that elaborate in terms of rights. It has much to 
offer when it comes to obligations. Due to its long tradition and deep knowledge of how to 
formulate and establish a system of obligations in a legal context the current secular legal 
implementation of ideas and concepts of sustainability could benefit from this considerably. 
Besides being less dependent on possible representatives or political interests, obligations do 
have further advantages. One to mention is clarity: It is in the nature of obligations that they 
generally have to be more specific and concrete than rights when being established. Of 
course, rights can be extremely specific as well, and also obligations have to be filled with 
content, but they start from a more detailed level. For example when Moses received the 
Torah at Mt. Sinai it was a) clear who was addressed and b) by the commandments’ directive 
form the addressees right away had a sense of what they owed to God and to each other. 
Certainly, later adjustments and explanations were necessary, and most noticeable took place 
in the Mishnah and the Talmud. Also one might argue that obligations are more restrictive to 
(individual) freedom – which in a way they are. So how might these policies affect our 
individual freedoms and basic or human rights (which ultimately are and probably will be at 
the core of the Western legal systems in the long view)? Secular Westerners in general are 
very sensible when these are restricted in any way. Thus a compromise has to be sought. And 
to make the grade: A combination of both approaches is the only, but at the same time the 
most preferable option to strengthen the role of obligations in the secular legal systems of the 
West, and by this improving the protection of future generations and nature based on a 
consistent theory. 
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III. Jewish Law and Ecology/Sustainability 
So, before we take a closer look at specific Halakhic laws and their suitability for secular 
implementation, the question should be asked: How and when did Jewish law and ecology 
‘meet’ each other?  
1. The Critique on the Worldview of Genesis 1:28 
This can basically be traced back to the late 1960’s when the article The Roots of Our 
Ecological Crisis by the US American historian Lynn White Jr. was published in the Science 
magazine.21 In his article White accused the Judeo-Christian worldview of being responsible 
for the contemporary ecological crisis, thereby especially referring to Genesis 1:28 where God 
is said to have given man dominion over nature.22 Others joined White in his view, e.g. the 
British historian Arnold Toynbee who wrote an article suggestively titled “The Genesis of 
Pollution” which was published in 1973.23 Since these times Jewish literature tried to find 
responses to this accusation as well as to the question how Jews should behave in regard to 
the ecological crisis. Parallel to Christian authors they developed the so called stewardship 
model which is based on Genesis 2:15 and sees humans as caretakers to conserve God’s 
creation. Thus already in the chapter next to Genesis 1 there is a concept that contradicts or at 
least limits the extensive interpretation of White et al. This Biblical understanding of the role 
of humans as stewards was extended in the theological context even to such an extent to the 
opposite of White’s accusations that a re-sacralisation of nature was claimed; of course 
bringing the position somewhat close to a pagan view. This position is often connected to a 
critique on the secular language of Enlightenment as being too scientifically, thus too 
‘disenchanting’.24 Seen in a wider context of sustainability which exceeds its ecological roots 
there is in fact some important vocabulary not much pronounced in Enlightenment language. 
Examples are sacrifice, solidarity, or community. 
2. The Development of a Jewish Position 
Nevertheless it took a while until one could speak of a unique ‘Jewish position’. At first 
there was sheer defence only and Jewish authors picked (especially Biblical) passages and 
verses quite selectively and used almost every Mitzvah dealing with plants or nature as an 
argument for the ecological orientation of the Bible, thus warping Mitzvot and detaching them 
from their context as well as their underlying concepts. But the Bible did not have in mind 
global ecological problems. So, at first there is a problem of historical context: “Although 
traditional Jewish texts provide important conceptions of the natural world and of the human 
relationship to it, they were never meant as a response to the world-threatening ecological 
problems we face today. We simply do not find a sense of ecological crisis in traditional 
Jewish texts.”25 Therefore a new and openly communicated exegeses and philosophical re-
reading is necessary. Slowly, a still on-going process of such re-interpreting of the sources 
started, at first referring mostly to the Bible, but then taking a turn to focus more on rabbinic 
texts. This is consistent for a Jewish position because this literature has been so influential and 
still dominates the understanding of the Torah. More recently even Aggadic sources are used. 
21  Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis”, Science 155, 1967, pp. 1203–1207. 
22  Interestingly White in his article never mentions Genesis 1:28 explicitly though. 
23  Arnold J. Toynbee, “The Genesis of Pollution”, Horizon 15:3, 1973, pp. 4-9. An even more perceived 
excerpt was published in the New York Times: Arnold J. Toynbee, “The Genesis of Pollution”, New York 
Times, 16 September 1973). 
24  Blanchard, “Can Judaism Make Environmental Policy?”, pp. 424-425. 
25  Blanchard, “Can Judaism Make Environmental Policy?”, p. 424. 
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Despite being inaccurate in speaking of one Jewish position, a practical anthropocentrism 
based on a theoretical theocentrism developed, some may call it a ‘weak anthropocentrism’. 
The respective Mitzvot were no longer solely seen as ecological norms, but as more complex 
commandments in a wider context. Although, Jewish law of course does not know the term 
sustainability, if we take our contemporary understanding of this term and try to connect it to 
originally Jewish laws and principles or interpret them from a perspective of sustainability, it 
becomes clear that Jewish law addresses almost every aspect of this area, e.g. environmental 
protection (water, soil, air), urban planning, noise control, waste management, recycling, 
intergenerational justice, warfare, budget management, animal protection and ethics, diet, and 
consumption in general. Characteristic for Jewish laws of sustainability thus is the mixture of 
ecological, social and economic interests: the three columns of the most popular 
contemporary definition of sustainability. Still it has to be stated that the impetus to this re-
reading from a perspective of sustainability came from the ‘outside’, the secular society in 
form of the ecological movement. But maybe now society can profit from Jewish law in 
return. 
IV. Legal Comparison 
In the following paragraph a brief and exemplary legal comparison of how sustainability 
issues are handled in German basic law on the one, and Jewish law on the other hand will 
give an idea of the practical implications of the theoretical foundations discussed above. 
1. Western Legal Culture as Exemplified by German Basic Law Article 20a (GG) 
The central aspect of German basic rights is human dignity which is guaranteed in Article 
1 (1) of the Basic Law/Grundgesetz (GG). It is the duty of all state authority to respect and 
protect this good. This duty is followed by the statement in paragraph two that human rights 
are to be acknowledged as the foundation of every community, peace and justice. Future 
generations, the environment, or even sustainability are not mentioned explicitly in the 
beginning of the German Basic Law until the relatively recent Article 20a. By Article 20a of 
the Basic Law the sustainability issues are addressed as follows: 
Mindful also of its responsibility toward future generations, the state shall protect the 
natural foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and 
justice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional 
order. 
Although Article 20a GG is part of the basic law, it is not part of the basic rights. It is a 
Staatszielbestimmung (state objective) that was introduced in 1994 (for environmental 
protection) and 2002 (for animal protection).26 Still it is of importance for interpretation of 
legal norms and weighing of interests. It also includes a mandate for action of the state (not its 
people); still specific content and extent of the duty to protect the above mentioned 
foundations is left open. 27 Article 2 (1) GG is already construed to guarantee an ecological 
subsistence level, therefore Article 20a GG has to require more than this. 
Today Article 20a GG is interpreted in a way that the German basic law not only 
demands to implement the idea of protecting the environment and animals by specific laws, 
but also via educational measures.28 Furthermore the duty of the German state to foster a 
more sustainable behaviour is not to end at its borders; it is seen as a mandate to development 
26  Stefan Huster and Johannes Rux, “Art. 20a”, Beck’scher Online-Kommentar GG, edited by Volker Epping 
and Christian Hillgruber (München: C. H. Beck, 18th edition, 15 May 2013), para. 1. 
27  Huster and Rux, “Art. 20a”, para. 28. 
28  See: Umweltinformationsgesetz (UIG), Huster and Rux, “Art. 20a”, para. 34. 
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policy.29 The mentioning of “in accordance with law and justice” means that environmental 
and animal protection do not per se overrule other objectives of the constitution.30 The 
weighing in regard to other Staatszielbestimmungen is conceptually quite similar in German 
and Jewish law. But explicitly taking into account ecological matters is pretty recent in 
Western law (although it de facto took place earlier than 1994). As a result nowadays it is 
always a balancing of social, economic and ecological aspects31 – as it already can be seen in 
classical Jewish law.32 
The German federal law obliges the state (foremost the legislator, but also the executive 
and judicative) as the democratic representative of its people to take action and develop a 
more sustainable environment. But the duty itself is formulated quite ‘open’ and needs to be 
filled with content; also it is a somewhat weak ‘shall obligation’. In Jewish law one will 
hardly find such a generalist Mitzvah. This openness of Article 20a GG certainly bears a risk 
of an abuse of legal flexibility. Furthermore – as mentioned above – it again does not address 
the German people directly. This might lead to (an unconscious) delegation of responsibility 
as many might think that it is the duty of the state to take care of a more sustainable world, 
not theirs. 
2. Environmental and Sustainability Principles in Jewish Law 
After having presented the structural as well as conceptual basis of Jewish law, and given 
an example of Western secular law dealing with sustainability issues in the form of Article 
20a GG, in the following paragraph there will be two examples for Jewish legal principles 
that in their contemporary interpretation fit our current understanding of sustainability. 
Jewish law knows many examples for principles that address issues of ecology and/or 
sustainability, but due to the limits in length of this article in the following only two of them 
will be discussed briefly: Bal Tashchit (the prohibition of wanton destruction, Deuteronomy 
20:19-20), and Migrash (green belt or urban planning principle, Numbers 35:1-15, Leviticus 
25:34). 
3. Bal Tashchit, Deuteronomy 20:19-20 
The first example to be introduced was a Biblical law of warfare in the beginning. It 
prohibits the cutting down of fruit trees33 while besieging a city in times of war. The complete 
passage reads:34 
19 When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou 
shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of 
them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man' life ) to employ 
them in the siege: 
20 Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt destroy 
and cut them down; and thou shalt build bulwarks against the city that maketh war with 
thee, until it be subdued. 
By rabbinic interpretation the field of application of this Mitzvah was extended and 
developed to the rabbinic legal principle Bal Tashchit, the (general) prohibition of wanton 
29  Huster and Rux, “Art. 20a”, para. 38. 
30  Huster and Rux, “Art. 20a”, para. 1. 
31  Because of this balancing some commentators of the German basic law speak of an eco-social market 
economy as the modern German state model; see for example: Huster and Rux, “Art. 20a”, para. 41; Rupert 
Scholz, Rupert, “Art. 20a”, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, edited by Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig 
(München: C. H. Beck, 69th supplement 2013), para.16. 
32  Huster and Rux, “Art. 20a”, para. 41. 
33  While it is permitted to cut down trees that do not bear any fruit. 
34  King James Version. 
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destruction. The most cited classic rabbinic authorities and interpreters of Bal Tashchit in 
contemporary Jewish environmental literature are Rashi (1040-1105), Moses Maimonides, 
and Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888). 
This principle became one of, if not the most popular ecological principle in 
contemporary Jewish environmental ethics. Especially after the accusations of Lynn White Jr. 
et al., when Jewish authors sometimes desperately were searching for seemingly ecological 
precepts to invalidate criticisms. So, one of the first direct respondents from a Jewish 
background back then was Eric G. Freudenstein. In 1970 his article Ecology and the Jewish 
Tradition35 was published. The article starts with the citation of: Deuteronomy 20:19-20. 
Although only the 19th verse is printed and not the 20th (this being methodically a bit dubious 
already), Freudenstein in his article means to disprove the arguments of White et al., and a) 
wants to show what ecological concern especially Torah and Talmud contain and b) what the 
reasons are that ecological aspects seem to have been forgotten in Judaism. For the first point 
a) he cites Bal Tashchit and other principles. The second point b) he ascribes to the diaspora, 
thus the divorce from land, and that before – during Biblical and Talmudic times – there was 
no threat of an ecological crisis; but that actually nature was a threat to the human survival. 
Freudenstein thus quotes quite selectively and names Deuteronomy 20:19 “the general 
prohibition against destroying the environment”. For this selective citing he got criticized 
with good reason36 – just as White did get criticized for focusing too much on the first chapter 
of Genesis. 
Without any doubt one has to consider how Jewish legal texts work in their wider context. 
In general there is nothing to say against extending the area of application of a law, and 
Jewish legal tradition is particularly famous for this. But although Freudenstein explains 
“According to Hirsch, the Torah will select a particular law for inclusion in its code in order 
to demonstrate the validity of a fundamental principle by showing how that principle must 
apply even under extraordinary conditions”,37 and recurs to the point that Bal Tashchit was 
meant to emphasize the importance of the protection of the environment.38 The context, 
especially the Talmudic sources provide a very different picture. Bal Tashchit is in fact much 
more a rational, utilitarian law. It is basically a prohibition of wasting things that can be useful 
to humans (examples are garments, even the human body). It tries to warn of focusing only on 
short-term goals. Furthermore the rabbinic environmental policy dealt primarily with more 
local issues, such as fairness and risk management;39 and not with a global protection of 
nature. This has to be kept in mind as a warning of too enthusiastically ‘over-interpreting’ the 
area of application and content of Mitzvot. 
4. Migrash, Leviticus 25:34, Numbers 35:1-15 
The Biblical principle of Migrash differs fundamentally from Bal Tashchit in terms of 
content, structure and development. As mentioned in the beginning of this article it primarily 
is a principle of urban planning or land law. And our relationship to land is one major 
example for dealing with ecological, social, and economic interests at the same time. The 
Migrash principle is based on several Biblical passages, i.e. Leviticus 25:34 or Numbers 35:1-
15. Originally the law was applied on Levitical cities only, but later it was extended to all 
35  Eric G. Freudenstein, “Ecology and the Jewish Tradition”, Judaism 19 (1970), pp. 406-41 (411); see 
alternative reference: Eric G. Freudenstein, “Ecology and the Jewish Tradition” (1970), Judaism and 
Human Rights, edited by Milton R. Konvitz (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 265–274.; on page 273 he 
directly refers to the criticism. 
36  For instance by David Nir, “A Critical Examination of the Jewish Environmental Law of Bal Tashchit – 
"Do Not Destroy””, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 18:2 (2005), pp. 335–354 (354). 
37  Freudenstein, “Ecology and the Jewish Tradition” (1972), p. 266. 
38  Freudenstein, “Ecology and the Jewish Tradition” (1972), p. 266. 
39  Blanchard, “Can Judaism Make Environmental Policy?”, p. 424. 
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(Jewish) cities (again by famous commentators like Rashi, Maimonides and Nahmanides 
(1194-1270)).40 
First of all the translation of the term Migrash bears some difficulties. It was for example 
translated as pasturelands, open land, green belt, or common.41 There are lengthy discussions 
on what might be the proper English term for it. In regards to its content the principle of 
Migrash states that a city has to be designed from its inside to its outside in the following 
way: a) inner city, b) common, c) fields and vineyards.42 Furthermore it embraces different 
prohibitions that sometimes are closely intertwined. There are basically three of them at the 
core of the Migrash principle: (1) a prohibition of changes in size (there are specific 
measurements for instance in Numbers 35 – although it is argued that these have to be 
understood relatively as the city would be rather small if the Biblical measurements would be 
applied directly), (2) a prohibition of changes in use, and (3) a prohibition of selling (to 
gentiles; see Leviticus 25:34). Samson Raphael Hirsch in this context mentions that “all future 
times have equal claim to it, and in the same condition that it has been received from the past 
is it to be handed on to the future.”43 
Despite this layer of prohibition there are also other aspects which could be named as 
intentions, a more psychological or physical (health) level. According once more to Hirsch in 
his commentary on the Pentateuch, the Migrash had to serve the psychological well-being of 
the inhabitants of the city as it was supposed to establish a connection of sophisticated urban 
dwellers to nature – for him this was the ideal city; probably heavily influenced by the 
Romantic Movement in Germany around his time. Physical recreation was furthermore a fact 
already mentioned by Rashi. It was also Rashi who in his commentary on Numbers 35:2 
refers to aesthetical reasons, i.e. that Migrash should serve to beautify the city. Furthermore it 
served simple practical reasons as the Migrash was to be used for animal keeping and laundry 
(Numbers 35:3, and Babylonian Talmud Nedarim 81a).44 Finally disease prevention played a 
role as cemeteries had to be situated outside of the area. 
Astonishingly, it is possible to draw a line from the Hebrew Bible and the Migrash 
principle to land law concepts like Henry George’s (1839-1897) single tax,45 over to early 
20th century land reform movements in Germany, to works like Garett Hardin’s The Tragedy 
of the Commons (1968), and even to current urban planning. For example urban planners in 
Seoul (Republic of Korea) in their plans to create a green belt refer to the so called Garden 
City Movement. And it was without any doubt the Migrash principle that inspired this 
movement that became popular around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. For example 
Frederic Osborn (1885-1978) – besides Ebenezer Howard (1850-1928) one of its most 
influential representatives – directly referred to the respective Biblical passages in his works. 
As all this development can be traced back to this Biblical (legal) source and concept, this 
might serve as another argument why to ask for theological responses and religious 
perspectives. These – like Migrash shows – still can have a relevant impact and be a force for 
change, especially as our present land law needs to be questioned and should not be seen as 
‘given’ while despite its positives effects (stabilisation etc.) it all too often leads to social, 
ecological, and economic injustice at the same time. Of course, the Biblical rules cannot be 
adopted literally, but their telos can as it still has the meaning and substance to suit and to 
inspire us. That is why we should take a look at how Jewish law and ethics can be used to 
40  More on the process of ‘extension’ of Jewish laws: Ruth N. Sandberg, Development and Discontinuity in 
Jewish Law (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001). 
41  James Barr, “Migras in the Old Testament”, Journal of Semitic Studies XXIX (1) (1984), p. 15. 
42  Freudenstein, “Ecology and the Jewish Tradition” (1972), p. 268. 
43  Freudenstein, “Ecology and the Jewish Tradition” (1972), p. 268. 
44  The principle is further discussed in the Babylonian Talmud (Arakhin 33b for instance). 
45  Henry George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase 
of Want with Increase of Wealth: the Remedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 (1881)). 
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develop criteria of provision that can be applied in the secular Western world. And it opens a 
platform for inter-religious discourse too as it is not as emotionally charged as other, more 
theological topics in religion. 
V. Conclusion 
So where a ‘new’ German basic law like Article 20a GG in the beginning is quite general 
due to its conceptualisation, Jewish law is per se much more specific. And this specificity of 
obligations is needed to accelerate actions in regard to climate change, sustainability, and 
intergenerational justice as it is well known that the clock is ticking. 
But how can the insights gained, i.e. the concept of obligations but also the weighing of 
interests, be implemented practically? To tackle this task it is recommended to distinguish 
between three levels: a) the intra-religious, b) the interreligious, and c) the secular level. In the 
case of c) many observant Jews might face what one could call a “dilemma of double 
commitment”, as they might feel committed to their sacred texts and rituals, and for instance 
to actively engage in environmental protection on a secular level at the same time. Therefore 
there has to be a compromise found to get both commitments together and find a single non-
religious voice to speak as the environmental protection discourse is noticeably secular.46 
Due to these circumstances Judaism has to respect the dominant secular language and 
thinking as well as the technical-rational argumentation to become part of the debate. 
Although the Halakhic concepts have to be made adaptable and comprehensible in a secular 
environment,47 this does not mean the erosion of their content. Jewish legal history has 
already proven this. 
As a common language is one of the key factors; therefore at first a more technical 
principle like Migrash may prove useful to begin with when using classical Jewish texts and 
examining them in the light of the current ecological crisis.48 If this whole language dilemma 
is considered thoroughly and principles are put into their historical, systematic, and 
teleological context, Judaism can make influential environmental policy, like it has influenced 
policies in the past. 
1. Action Levels 
Coming back to the three above mentioned levels where action needs to be taken: On a) 
the intrareligious level Jewish law on sustainability first of all urgently needs systematisation. 
Especially as the next step has to be done to move onward from writings and articles on 
ecological issues to the broader more complex questions of sustainability of which ecology is 
an important, but still just one part besides at least social and economic issues. More 
awareness has to be created in communities and schools and other public occasions. 
Environmental organizations need further ideal and especially monetary support as the 
financial crisis has led to severe cuts of their budgets. On b) the interreligious level there has 
to be a discourse between different religions to develop a perceptible religious voice. Of 
course, the ‘religions of the book’ have a somewhat common ground to start from in regard to 
tradition, sources, and language. A critical elaboration of similarities and differences is 
46  Blanchard, “Can Judaism Make Environmental Policy?”, p. 426. 
47  Blanchard sees basically three difficulties for this operation: (1) Classic Jewish texts were crafted in a time 
when an ecological crisis was not foreseeable (historic context), (2) classic Jewish texts were designed for a 
limited number of addressees (the Jews), and (3) the language used is religious or theological. In regard to 
difficulty (3) Blanchard speaks of three possible models to deal with it. His favoured model employs both 
religious and secular language at the same time, but does this explicitly. Linking, but not merging the 
different languages as an approach seems preferable to him; see: Blanchard, “Can Judaism Make 
Environmental Policy?”, p. 426. 
48  Blanchard, “Can Judaism Make Environmental Policy?”, p. 425. 
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necessary. Finally on c) the secular level religious concepts have to be contributed to the 
secular discourse, e.g. by publications, presenting Jewish positions at interdisciplinary 
conferences, and looking for a dialogue with politicians. 
2. Types of Action 
Here are two further examples of – especially with regards to Judaism promising – types 
of action that can or should be taken: Education and stories. Foremost education offers an 
opportunity to realize the objectives of a more sustainable world. Religion can be a major 
educational multiplier. It can educate its communities and spread ideas; therefore it is crucial 
to carefully carve out the religious values and principles, and in the case of Jewish law to 
openly re-read and to re-interpret the Biblical, Mishnaic, and Talmudic sources from a 
perspective of sustainability within the communities. Besides that education in general is 
something the Jewish religion is famous for: The imperative of education is a central aspect of 
Jewish law, and had a major impact on the development of Jewish ethics, as well as the 
people and the character of the religion itself.49 This can and has to be used for sustainability 
issues too as education can be considered as the most important step on the journey to a more 
sustainable world. 
Furthermore in addition to the more rational educational part we need inspiring, shining 
examples, i.e.: stories that move us – which is always a critical and risk-bearing act of 
balancing as history has taught us. Yet if ideas of sustainability are connected to famous 
(historic) religious figures and narratives they can serve as a model and guide for (observant) 
people. Judaism offers a very rich and unique tradition of stories to which can be referred to. 
And would not a successful contribution of Jewish ethics to a more sustainable world be 
another good story to be written? 
  
49  Maristella Botticini and Zvi Eckstein, “From Farmer to Merchants, Conversions and Diaspora. Human 
Capital and Jewish History”, Journal of the European Economic Association 5:5 (2007), pp. 885–926. 
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Transrational Interpretations of Peace and its 
Contribution to Alternative Worldviews for a 
Sustainable, Ethical and Aesthetical Present  
Egidio de Bustamante 
UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace Universitat Jaume I 
Introduction 
Climate Change and Global Warming. Pollution. Rainforests turning into deserts. 
Diwindling biodiversity. At least since 1972, man has realized the impact his actions were 
causing in the environment. 1972 was not only the year The Limits to Growth was first 
published, it was also the year when the United Nations gathered in Stockholm with many 
other global actors to discuss man’s environmental impact and how to tackle the deriving 
issues. Fast forward to 2013: what has changed since then? Many environmental politics have 
been debated, many other conferences on the environment made, many research projects 
conducted and many policies adopted in the name of sustainability. Yet we still find ourselves 
unable to give an effective and lasting response to the problems that our own actions cause in 
the environment. This is the aim of the 2013 Societas Ethica Conference and what motivates 
this paper, as a philosophic response to the issue of sustainability. However, instead of 
focusing on normative ethical stances on the environmental issue, I would like to explore how 
cultural values and philosophical understandings embody, produce ways of leading life which 
are ethical towards the environment, without compromising one’s freedom of choice and/or 
action. The reason for taking this approach is based in the foucauldian belief that norms very 
often represent more a disciplinarization by fear of punishment than a conscious manifestation 
of respect towards otherness. Freedom does not necessarily lead to a hobbesian state-of-
nature, especially if one reckons the interconnectedness between him/herself and nature. 
This paper makes a small contribution to the above-mentioned topic deriving from the 
area of Peace Studies, more especifically from transrational peaces, a framework proposed by 
Wolfgang Dietrich from Innsbruck University. With this approach, I argue that a concrete 
leap towards an ethical relation to the environment could take place by acknowledging what 
Dietrich calls the “energetic” and the “transrational”. The energetic/transrational 
interpretations of peaces give renewed meaning and point to diverse cultural understandings 
which embody ethical and aesthetical ressonance with the environment. The issue, however, 
is that these perspectives remain marginalized and have received little attention from academy 
so far. Because of this, I will briefly expose three of these perspectives on this paper 
(Ecofeminism, Deep Ecology and Sumak Kawsay). Then I will analyse how transrational 
interpretations of peace give renewed meaning and importance to them and how the Western 
world (as the world derived from European/Modern values and colonization) could benefit 
from these marginalized understandings of human relation with/in the world for a sustainable 
way of living. The persistance of the marginalization and even fragility these perspectives 
undergo seem to reside mostly in cultural barriers which make these diverse cultural practices 
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void of meaning or mere debatable alternatives to the West, due to its particular development 
(and place of power) and modern mindset. With the deconstruction and critique of this 
modern mindset, its limitations becomes clearer and open space for transrationality. This 
could then blur previously mentioned cultural barriers, posing not only a dialogue but a 
connection to other cultures which can finally provide transformative experiences when it 
comes to an eco-logical, ethical being which manifests sustainable actions from their values 
rather than from instituted norms. 
Alternative Worldviews 
There is a vast plethora of cultures in the world that could provide us with valuable 
lessons when it comes to a harmonious way of living with and in nature.  Ethnographic 
research clearly gains a renewed importance when it comes to learn from perspectives which 
have not been engulfed in a globalized Western urban capitalist-consumerist culture nor strive 
for developing themselves into it. In this paper I would like to briefly describe three of these 
perspectives when it comes to the way we relate and deal with the environment and 
sustainability. After describing them, I would like to analyse in depth the origins of a 
Western/modern perspective and why it is hostile to such a harmonious and sustainable way 
of living and relating to nature. Afterwards, I also analyse how the transrational answer from 
Dietrich manages to transcend that and incorporate core tenets of these marginalized 
perspectives. 
Ecofeminism 
Ecofeminism flourished in the seventies among the diversity of the feminist movements. 
It focused on fostering a society that, more than eradicating women’s oppression, strove for 
being ecological, decentered, non-hierarchical and non-militarized, respecting the diversity of 
life and the environment. If traditional feminism originally proposed equal conditions for men 
and women in the market, outside of home - in the men’s world, ecofeminism refrained from 
falling in such a trap by realizing the threats of such practices to the environment. The 
difference between traditional feminism and ecofeminism would be that in an ecofeminist 
view women would not have to abandon their households and conquer men’s positions in the 
capitalist job market, but rather could amplify their household-care ethics to a world level. 
Among the most notable ecofeminists is Vandana Shiva. Born in India as the daughter of 
a farmer and a forest conservationist who were strong supporters of Mohandas Gandhi, Shiva 
follows his message of being the change we want to see in the world. Because of her close 
relation to nature, she saw how modernizing policies and practices, especially in education, 
led to a disciplinarization1 and along with that, the need for industrial progress and growth 
that leads to resource depletion. But Shiva believes that the biodiversity in India is deeply 
related to the cultural diversity and plurality of knowledges of her country. She is also one of 
the original Chipko tree-huggers.2 Shiva (1997) argues that a male-dominated political world 
and patriarchal praxis in the context of a globalized economy is not sustainable and cannot 
offer any lasting solution to the issue of the environment. She contends that a new paradigm is 
fundamental to ensure our very existence.  In her words: 
In an ecological feminist perspective, diversity rather than sameness becomes the 
possibility for freedom. Striving is not to be competitive but to create space for yourself 
and for everyone else. To be strong is to know the boundary between protecting your 
autonomy and allowing other people to exercise theirs. In this sense, power is not power 
over others but the power to be yourself and allow others to be themselves (1997 p.1). 
1  For more on this debate, see Ivan Illich’s Deschooling Society. 
2  http://www.thegreeninterview.com/vandana-shiva-bio last access November 2012. 
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Ecofeminism stresses the need of recognizing household work as something fundamental 
for life, denouncing the traditional capitalist and patriarchal systems that do not give value to 
such form of work. This capitalist patriarcal systems ignore a sustainable activity that is 
fundamental for maintenance of life, especially when exploitation of natural resources is 
leading to a huge crisis. 
Ecofeminism then proposes a reintegration of humans and nature, sublating the 
dichotomy imposed since Cartesian thinking. This approach contends significant implications 
for one’s life which affects the political realm, but also goes beyond it. Social relations and 
relations with the environment would not be disciplined through rule/hierarchy but through 
care. It sees in the historically discriminated and relegated domestic work of women the 
possibility of a new interpretation of the world as our house and family, bonding everything 
with motherly, feminine love. It contends that this reinterpretation has the power to uplift the 
contemporary dichotomy between economy and ecology, which in fact have the same Greek 
root oikos, which stands for the household, domestic, family – the origin of every economic 
activity. 
Vandana Shiva, however, does recognize that she is accused of essentializing 
womenhood. Answering to that, she argues that ecofeminism “has never required it to be said 
that women are biologically closer to nature” (SHIVA, 1997, p.2) but rather that our unity 
with nature is true to everyone, whether men, women or children. Shiva mentions that “it is 
ecological blindness to assume that humans can so insulate themselves from the natural world 
and what brutality we subject it to, (...) to assault nature and live priviledged situations for 
ourselves” (SHIVA, 1997, p.2). 
Maria Mies is another prominent ecofeminist, who has also worked with Shiva. In the 
book she wrote with Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen (The Subsistence Perspective, 1999), they 
derive from the experience of women in their everyday countryside life, producing their most 
basic needs, the key for an economic change. With many stories of household and peasant 
work of women, they demonstrate that another relation to nature and to human beings is 
possible. They explain how patriarchy and financial capitalism (through globalization) turn 
money and its purchase power into the producers of life (p. 58), relegating both women’s and 
peasants’ work to a second category. 
With this, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen reclaim the importance of the subsistent peasant 
work (for the peasants are the ones who work with nature to produce the food they need to 
maintain their life), differentiating it from agriculture or farming (which is agricultural work 
for profit-making). The difference is that peasantry represents diversified small farms and 
home gardens with little impact, while farming represent an industrial agriculture. They show 
that such a peasant life is not at all filled with deprivation, but rather with abundance, joy and 
caring for other living beings – animals, plants and the soil. According to the authors, the 
features that a subsistence perspective brings are: change in the sexual division of labour; 
production geared towards needs not wants; technology that should be used not to control 
nature but to cooperate with it - respecting its limits to regenerate life, respecting biodiversity; 
a new set of economical praxis with local markets and seasonal products for subsistence and 
never profit; and a change in the concept of need and sufficiency, with satisfaction of human 
needs and not accumulation of surpluses and reciprocal relations between rural and urban 
areas (p. 62-63). 
Deep Ecology 
Now very close to Ecofeminism is the approach of Deep Ecology. Deep Ecology was 
proposed by Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss3 as a reaction to “shallow” ecological 
3  Article available at: http://www.ecology.ethz.ch/education/Readings_stuff/Naess_1973.pdf accessed in 
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initiatives like resource conservation and value assumption of soils for the sake of human 
beings only and not for nature itself. From that, Arne Næss came with the Eight-Point 
Platform of Deep Ecology, which provided the unifying principles of the deep ecology 
movement. The intention was to shift from an anthropocentric worldview to a biocentric 
egalitarianism in which a relational self lead to ecoconsciousness and ethics. The eight points 
are: 
 
1- The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in 
themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent 
of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 
2- Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and 
are also values in themselves. 
3- Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital 
needs. 
4- The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller 
human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller human 
population. 
5- Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation 
is rapidly worsening. 
6- Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, 
technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply 
different from the present. 
7- The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in 
situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of 
living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and 
greatness. 
8- Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly 
to try to implement the necessary changes. 
 
(SESSIONS, 1995 p.68) 
 
I am well aware that the Deep Ecology movement has started as a philosophical reaction 
to an aggressive human relation with nature. But I dare to call it a culture because these very 
clear insights provide a derivative code of conduct that produces a certain way a of living 
which is not necessarily normative but arise out of a realization of the interconnection of all 
living beings, going beyond traditional Cartesian rationality and Newtonian atomization. This 
way of living conforms a culture of sustainability and respect towards nature that breaks from 
its Western origins. 
Buen Vivir 
Lastly, I would like to explore a local alternative to the modern-Western mindset. In 
Ecuadorean Kichwa it is called Sumak Kawsay or, in Spanish, Buen Vivir (good living); in 
Bolivian Aymara it is called Suma Qamaña and in local Spanish could be translated Vivir 
Bien (living well). Both approaches are quite similar and, in Cecilia Bizerra (2009) words, 
they mean a  
solid principle which means life in harmony and equilibrium between men and women, 
between different communities and, above all, between human beings and the natural 
environment of which they are part. In practice, this concept implies knowing how to live 
September, 2012 
198 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in community with others while achieving a minimum degree of equality. It means 
eliminating prejudice and exploitation between people as well as respecting nature and 
preserving its equilibrium.4 
This perspective was first presented in the World Social Forum in 2009 and commented 
in an article by Gustavo Esteva in the same year as an alternative to development.5 Since then, 
it has spreaded and gained particular force in the region, having been translated to Portuguese 
and also French. Movements in Latin America argue that it offers an uncolonized, local 
understanding of life that dearticulates institutions and instances of capitalist dominance and 
Westernization manifested through growth projects and industrial development. It allows for a 
debate of equals and does not essentialize those communities, giving value to their local 
traditions and culture.  
But, above all, beyond being an appraised alternative to a global capitalist Westernizing 
project (which would still be thinking in reaction and negation of modernity - therefore 
limiting the Buen Vivir itself) the Buen Vivir centers in the indigenous populations their own 
“right” to define in which terms they want to lead their lives, terms which can provide a 
balance between the communities, the cultural heritage and the Pachamama. In fact, the 
Consejo Indígena de Centro América (CICA) contends that Buen Vivir is “la expresión de 
una Vida Armónica en permanente construcción (...) en directa vinculación y equilibrio con 
la naturaleza”.6 The Buen Vivir is founded by the indigenous cosmovisions of each 
community and their own forms of organization.7 Leonardo Boff contends that  
El “buen vivir” apunta a una ética de lo suficiente para toda la comunidad, y no solamente 
para el individuo. El “buen vivir” supone una visión holística e integradora del ser 
humano, inmerso en la gran comunidad terrenal, que incluye además de al ser humano, al 
aire, el agua, los suelos, las montañas, los árboles y los animales; es estar en profunda 
comunión con la Pachamama (Tierra), con las energías del Universo, y con Dios. (BOFF, 
2009, p.1).8 
Cultural barriers and contexts 
After this brief look on alternative cultures/ways of living which can promote a shift in 
human relations with the environment and embody ethics and sustainability, one starts asking: 
How does my culture differ to that? In the case of a Western, capitalist, eurocentric, urban and 
above all modern perspective it is also important to ask: how did we get so stranded from 
nature to the point of having these perspectives become something so radical or so 
alternative? This process seems so deep that sometimes it becomes even hard to understand 
these other perspectives.  
In order to talk about the cultural barriers and mindsets which block a learning experience 
from different cultures and approaches, a first and important task is to ground and situate our 
own understandings of the world and context - our culture, ultimately - to highlight its 
limitations when it comes to understanding otherness and other mindsets/cultures, or even 
4  Text available at http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2010/02/28/18639072.php accessed in October 20th, 
2011. 
5  América Latina en Movimiento nº445, June 2009. 
6  The expression of a Harmonious Life in permanent construction (…) in direct relation and balance with 
nature. Translation by Egidio de Bustamante. Available at http://www.consejoindigena.org/BuenVivir.html 
Last Access December 2012. 
7  http://www.consejoindigena.org/BuenVivir.html Last Access December 2012. 
8  The Buen Vivir points to an ethics of what's enough for the whole community, and not only for the 
individual. It entails a holistic and integrative vision of the human being, inmerse in the great earth 
community, that also includes beyond the human beings the air, the water, the lands, the mountains, the 
trees and the animals. It means being in deep communion with the Pachamama (Mother Earth), with the 
energies of the Universe, and with God. Translation by Egidio de Bustamante 
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look for alternatives to the model of thinking/living we have. Having said that, even though I 
come from Brazil, I must acknowledge that I come from an Eurocentric and Western cultural 
context. Plus, I am writing from Europe. Trying to break away from certain cultural 
undertakings is not an easy task. Such endeavour is carried out nowadays throughout 
academics from liberal arts, making Dietrich no exception. So, what are the implications of 
these cultural barriers for myself and for Dietrich? Both of us were educated/disciplined by 
the interpretation of all histories and cultures from an European (and modern/colonial) 
perspective. Having clarified that, more specifically on our concrete context, we both find 
ourselves in academia and, in terms of it, the overall contemporary academic and philosophic 
debate leads us to pass by the debate on “the Modern and Post-modern” in order to transcend 
it. 
In his book "Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture (2012)", Dietrich analyses 
Modernity as a mindset spread out in the world via colonization and a persistent way to 
interpret things.9 The main argument of Dietrich is that Modernity is not so much a well 
defined epoch in time but rather a way to produce meaning to the world around us that could 
happen in any given time, given certain premises. Dietrich argues that the meanings this 
modern mindset comes to ascribe to the world (and consequentially to nature and the 
environment), can be best represented by and due to (but not exclusively) the works of 
Galileo Galilei, René Descartes and Isaac Newton, especially with the formation of Science. 
As this paper dwells on responses to the environment and sustainability, the work of Charles 
Darwin can be very well represented under this modern interpretation too. 
The formation of modern Science, as proposed by Galilei, was a mathematical project 
concerned with matter and its quantifiable and objective properties, leaving everything related 
to subjectiveness behind. Isaac Newton’s work founded an atomistic interpretation of the 
world in which the Universe would be made up of building blocks of substance, which then 
entered into relations defined by natural laws and determined by cause and effect (reactions). 
The consequence of this was that prediction could be made upon an accurate analysis of this 
linear chain of events. Galileo’s and Newton’s views fed each other and found in René 
Descartes much support when he advocated and deemed possible a rational/objective analysis 
of the universe, which for him functioned as a clockwork.  
Parallel to this, Darwin’s evolutionism came to an undisputed position in the natural 
sciences field. According to Darwin, all life would be a matter of survival of the fittest 
because of Natural Selection – the concept in which all beings evolve from the weakest to the 
strongest for their need to survive in an aggressive environment. This would be a bodily 
reaction to the aggressive environment that called for the best adaptation. Darwinism left no 
room for cooperation or solidarity among species as a ways to maintain their existence, or 
ethics, for that matter, only for struggle, aggressiveness. 
These are some of the most important undertakings for the modern mindset. A modern 
mindset is characterized by a mechanistic (cause-effect, reactive) interpretation of events in 
the Universe, which is not only held as an absolute truth but can also be predicted, analysed, 
understood, reinforced and improved via Science. Modernity can be perceived then as the 
attempt for men to attain the universal laws via rationality and build from that. This mindset 
also made posible all those scientific advancements and the creation of industrial machinery 
which, culminating in the Industrial Revolution, sew the seed of progress, but also the seed of 
what nowadays brings us near the brink of environmental catastrophe. The hegemonic place 
of this scientific, objective mindset (especially coming from Descartes) also subjugates any 
other form of understanding the world – ecological or spiritual matters in particular. This 
mindset, that nowadays conforms a large part of the world and works as cultural delimitation, 
9  Modern interpretations of peace are one of the 5 images or interpretations of peace proposed by Dietrich. 
The other images are: energetic, moral, postmodern and transrational peaces. 
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was enlarged/globalized via colonization, the process which spreaded of these 
modern/European beliefs. 
Yet, in the very cradle of these values came the reaction to this absolute project. Out of 
the incredulity towards modernity’s promises/premises of capacity to control the functioning 
of the world arose a skepticism that, without having an equally powerful counterproposal, 
tries to celebrate the multiplicity of ways to address existence and tries to safeguard them 
from universalizing and homogenizing modern trends. This makes Dietrich understand 
postmodernity as an intent to disempower the spread of Modern European values/mindset 
(that which Lyotard would refer to as “grand narrative”) and at the same time an intent to 
open space to diverse sets of practices and beliefs that are never a final solution and remain 
open to review. This opens room for dialogue and curiosity towards otherness and also makes 
room for marginalized perspectives to manifest. The relation between postmodernism and 
decolonialism is clear. 
Postmodern thought started paying attention not to the overarching modern system, which 
on its political side manifested in the Nation-State and the institutionalization of practices, but 
how life flourished underneath it. The well-written and polished discourses and international 
agreements, made by governments and high instances of this system in order to try to 
safeguard nature, were transformed into laws that made punishable those who did not follow 
them. But, what about those embodiments/practices that were actually harmonious with the 
environment without the need to be shaped into laws (beyond these sterile/aseptical and harsh 
approaches)? Instead of homogenizing groups of people into political citizens, postmodern 
thought tries to learn from plurality. It is in this sense that marginalized and alternative 
perspectives, which are sustainable and harmonious to nature, come into play. From this point 
on, it will become helpful to delineate what Dietrich calls the energetic and the transrational 
in order to give meaning and learn from alternatives coming from an energetic/transrational 
perspective. 
Transcendence 
Dietrich realized that the modern/cartesian mindset is based on an approach that ignores 
intersubjectivity, dichotomizing and prioritizing reason from body, feelings and emotions 
(ignoring an every other part of human the human experience except reason). To make 
matters worse, this view also imposes itself as absolute truth via science. So how did Europe 
start suppressing its energetic/contextual answers and sought instead for a grand truth? 
Dietrich searched for possible answers for how Europe first disconnected the mind from 
feelings and emotions. The Middle Ages were marked by the power and moral teachings of 
the Church that condemned any mundane feelings10. So it could not have been this moment. 
It had to come before that. He dived deep in European history and, hinted by Nietzsche’s 
book The Birth of Tragedy in the Spirit of Music, found in Greek mythology energetic 
interpretations of the world and of life. 
In The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (NIETZSCHE, 2000) Dietrich found 
strong evidence of Nietzsche’s rediscovery of energetic interpretations and Nietzsche’s 
combat to his contemporary mentality. In the above-mentioned book, Nietzsche tried to 
understand how Greek tragedy came to influence culture not only in the period he lived but 
throughout history and towards the future. This is why the book also has the subtitle of 
Hellenism and pessimism. Nietzsche’s discovery relied on the perception that, in Greek 
tragedy, the choir was so significant that it was in fact their dithyramb that had the main, 
generative role in the tragedy.  
10  Ascetism took place as a phobic behavior to what was human, aiming at reproducing on Earth the image of 
heaven and God. 
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For Nietzsche, the choir and the dithyrambs produced, with their rhythms and crescendos, 
a powerful and strong force that was explored by the human/hero in question. The 
human/hero, who dealt with/manipulated/pondered upon this energy, was regarded as the 
manifestation of Apollon, giving form, aesthetic to the energy. Meanwhile, the chorus was 
regarded, in contrast, as the generative, fertile life impetus of Dionysian energy. This process 
could only be understood in relation to one another, only as an apparent contradiction that 
gave form to a whole (KOPPENSTEINER, 2009) – the relation of these elements reinforce 
their balance. 
But once Christianity juxtaposed Apollon with Christ and Dionysus with Satan this 
created a cradle for the Christian phobic behaviour towards energetic interpretations 
throughout the Middle Ages and, later on in modernity, for the dismissal of everything non-
rational/un-scientific. This is the root of Descartes Cogito ergo sum and the inherent exclusion 
of, for instance, Sentio ergo sum, the repression of the energetic nature of society, leading to a 
limited, harsh perception of life in general. 
Such energetic interpretation of Greek mythology, however, can also be found in many 
other ancient cultures in different forms (and this already allows us to build bridges between 
cultures). In fact, Dietrich analyses that it is significantly present in variations of Taoism and 
Tantrism. The general aspect present in energetic interpretations is the sublation of human life 
and experience as central in the universe. Existence is relational and what we experience is 
part of a greater and complex whole which is interconnected, as energy only perpasses us. 
Trying to control/suppress our energy was brought up to modern belief mostly via Plato’s 
legacy: the introduction of truth, prioritizing Apollon and the Christian demonization of 
Dyonisus – producing white man’s disease or neurosis. 
Dietrich considers that such a deconstruction of European mainstream thought since 
Greece and the recovery of what it left behind points us to to a realm where reason alone 
cannot be upheld, as there is no such true/rational way to grasp the cosmos – transcending 
modernity. This is the realm of the transrational. The transrational departs from postmodern 
critique and deconstruction of modernity, but understands its limitation as mere reaction to 
this hard modern way to interpret the world and henceforth reincorporates that which had 
been supressed for more than 2000 years, being aware of the contextual relationality and not 
falling in the modern trap of becoming a nouveau absolu. Dietrich points that some of the 
areas of knowledge that transgressed the boundaries of modern science towards the 
transrational are System’s Theory, Quantum Physics and Transpersonal Psychology. For 
brevity’s sake, in this paper I shall briefly expose only his approach to Transpersonal 
Psychology. 
Gustav Jung is considered the precursor of Transpersonal Psychology. However, 
understanding his approach requires us to review his relation with Freudian psychology, also 
for contextual reasons. It is possible to understand this relation and dissidence via Nietzsche’s 
previously mentioned book. In Freud’s approach, a direct relation can be made between 
Dyonisus and id, just like Apollon would relate to the ego. But for Freud those would be 
separate categories. Jung’s argument was that the Freudian ego was in fact a mere 
consciousness, which is embedded in the collective unconscious (STEVENS, 2001). Just like 
in Nietzsche the hero and Apollon relate to the energetic Dyonisian principle, for Jung, this 
consciousness/individuation of the self would necessarily relate to a whole that transcends the 
self. 
It was in this Jungian line of thought that the psychology of Abraham Maslow and 
Stanislav Grof could posit that a transpersonal experience is one that goes beyond one’s 
biographical boundaries and transcend space and time. Transpersonal psychology poses then 
that every existence is interconnected and that Psyche cannot be separated from Mitwelt, even 
though people have sovereignty to re-design their path/fate. (DIETRICH,2012 p,250-251). 
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This is how transrationality goes ‘beyond the limits of [ego-] persona into its oscillation with 
its environment, the physiosphere, biosphere [and] noosphere (DIETRICH, 2012 p. 258).  
Finally, the relational aspect of a transpersonal understanding rests then between the 
individual and his/her Mitwelt, gaining awareness that one is never self-sufficient and 
autonomous like Modernity deems. Fritjof Capra, for instance, calls for an urgent integration 
of Cartesian (modern) thinking into a broader ecological and transpersonal perspective for an 
affirmative mode of living in which the human action would be harmoniously embedded in 
the transcendental dimension of existence.11 
With such approaches, the derivative relations between humans, environment and 
sustainability already become easily graspable. After these insights, it becomes possible and 
interesting to produce an ethnography that tries to understand and analyse how some 
marginalized perspectives have either recovered or conserved understandings that embody 
energetic and transrational intepretations, making the bridge between an assumed 
insurmountable cultural barrier. 
The Transrational Approach and Ecological Perspectives 
When it comes to the way we perceive the environment and deal with sustainability in an 
ethical manner, how does the transrational interpretations of peace perceive these 
cultures/approaches? Which kind of actions does it invite us to adopt and which change does 
it entail in relation to the environment? How is it infused above all with ethics and aesthetics? 
Both Deep ecology’s and Buen Vivir’s ecocentric value claims that humans are part of 
one huge system and that we do not have any special or particular privilege over any other 
form of life. Such biocentric egalitarianism resonates in those energetic interpretation of peace 
reclaimed by transrationality when it calls for integrating that which is beyond the illusion of 
an autonomous self. The interconnection in the circle of life can be reinterpreted as the flow 
of energy through everything - a natural process and what leads to peace and harmony. When 
institutions pose themselves between men and nature to organize the way men relate to other 
living beings, or when the Mitwelt simply becomes resources and humans become the 
privileged, superior being in a scale, this impedes our connection of to other beings because in 
this newly acquired logic they are objectified and inferiorized. 
Mark Hathaway and Leonardo Boff, in their book The Tao of Liberation (2009), make 
some contentions about deep ecology and ecofeminism that resonate very well in Dietrich’s 
transrational approach. If deep ecology proposes an underlying connectivity of all things, be it 
in a physical, spiritual or psychic level in a great web of life, then “what is around us, is also 
within us” (HATHAWAY & BOFF, 2009, p.64). The universe is considered a great 
interdependent whole in which there is no distinction between humans and nature. As these 
authors put it, this revolutionizes consciousness and the perception of self, as we perceive 
something greater than ego, than the mere human as an individual, allowing biocentric 
equality to manifest subsequently and the appearance of ecopsychology. This is strongly 
present in Bateson’s systemic approach, which is one gate to transrationality, as the relational 
self connects with the ecological psyche (BATESON, 2002 and 1985). Such a fundamental 
element present in Deep Ecology and the Buen Vivir, seen from the lenses of transrationality, 
allows us to pose a sustainable relation to nature for the reconaissance that we are nature 
therefore if we affect us, we ultimately affect ourselves. Human beings still take from the 
Earth what is necessary for his survival, but acknowledging that nature is entitled to respect 
and part of ourselves, our actions are guided by care and love – an ethics that arises from the 
11  Indeed Fritjof Capra is key for understanding transrationality via quantum physics. Parallel and 
complementary to this, such discussion find support also in the systemic approach of Gregory Bateson 
(DIETRICH, p.243). 
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heart or the realization that we are in the end caring for our expanded selves. This is not 
dissimilar to the peasantry style claimed by Maria Mies in The Subsistence Perspective 
(1999), where she explains that it is never a matter of using nature to accumulate capital and 
cash-farming, because we feel and we understand that we belong to/in nature and also suffer 
if nature does, because we learn to love and live in communion with it. 
Now ecofeminism ultimately leads to similar insights when it connects the patriarchy of 
the modern traditions of thought with its anthropocentric accusation, denouncing it as an 
andro-anthropocentric aggressive culture. Ecofeminism claims that both the masculine and 
the feminine are socially constructed and that those social constructions assign a role to each 
of them. The fact that those stereotypes are so ingrained in our mind by centuries of repetition 
does not allow us to assume they are natural. From the subjugation of women to the 
household affairs (the oikos), from the connection of the feminine elements of nurturing and 
care to nature (which are also present in men, in fact in every human being, no matter its 
sex/gender), comes the will to organize life in other principles which do not intend to look at 
nature and others in a dominant manner. In this sense, oikonomia no longer refers to economy 
as we understand it in modernity, even though the origins of "economics" came from 
"oikonomia". The oikonomia, or the household approach, imbued and marked with the 
feminine supportiveness and lovingness, provides a different way to relate to the world which 
can be sustainable and respectful and once again leads to subsistence and the possibility to 
connect with everything else. In this sense ecofeminism reinforces the claims of deep ecology 
and the practices of the Buen Vivir and the derivative ethics. From a transrational lens, 
ecofeminism could be perceived as a contemporary manifestation of those beliefs that 
celebrate nature and fertility – tending to an energetic interpretation of life and the cosmos. 
When it comes to Buen Vivir, some Latin American intellectuals like Arturo Escobar 
regard it as an original form of thinking and living, which is different from what is deemed 
modern/colonial. The Buen Vivir is the expression of modes of living which once again stress 
a harmonious relation to nature and to our environment, in which the Earth is a “closely 
woven community of living beings” (HATHAWAY & BOFF, 2009, p.132) nurtured by the 
Pachamama. From this derives a praxis, which Hathaway and Boff would refer to as 
biorregionalist, wherein to live well means that the whole environment is in consonance with 
this wellness. I cannot be well if my surrounding, my community is not, so it highlights the 
importance of understanding the local and the wider ecosystem and the importance of 
diversity as to promote the symbiosis necessary to the stability of life. In the Buen Vivir one 
finds the transrational perspectives of ecology, spirituality and system all in an overlapping 
and interconnected manner. This comprises a holistic phenomena that encompasses both the 
microcosm of human relations and its relations to the macrocosm, which are inseparable. 
Roughly speaking, transrational peaces, as a combination of the twisted modern aspect of 
reason and rationality with the respect for diversity brought in by postmodernity, adds to that 
the millenia-old energetic interpretation. This can manifest via transpersonal, systemic, 
ecological or spiritual perspectives. The explanation for the use of the prefix trans- is that 
transrationality passes by rationality but understands that it is not an absolute and/or final, 
framing it. The consequences of it lead to abandon the rational modern metanarrative and 
open up for diversity, especially for those critiques that regain/reclaim the energetic aspect of 
peace. In this sense comes not only deep ecology but any other perspective that allows us to 
reconnect ourselves and experience peace. The energetic makes possible for humans to 
experience peace in the here and now instead of projecting it into a future where everybody 
would enjoy the same uniform lifestyle of a consumption society, which is neither sustainable 
nor feasible. This is the ultimate contribution that peace studies can make in terms of 
addressing the issue of an environmental crisis and generalized global crisis of modern values. 
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The transrational interpretation of peaces, perceiving an underlying unity of all existence, 
integrates human beings into nature and cosmos. From the understanding that everything 
relates to and affects everything, peace could be perceived as harmony. In this logic, human 
action should derive from a serenity that seeks to disturb universal harmony as little as 
possible, what for instance Taoists would call wu wei. This changes the steward-like approach 
to nature which represents the direct intent of humans to control the outcomes of their actions 
to integrate themselves with nature for it to flourish on its own, respectfully. Sublating the 
dichotomy between humans and nature towards the understanding of this unity allows for a 
whole new set of practices to become manifest. This gives meaning and possibility for Deep 
Ecology’s biocentric equality and ultimately an ethics to the environment. The perception of 
the world as our house and part of us also validates Ecofeminist practices when they pose an 
ethics of care to nature, without hierachization. Lastly, it is consonant with the Andean native 
cosmology of the Sumak Kawsay, which perceives a brotherhood between humans and non-
humans, all part of the pachamama or mother-earth. 
It is true that the transrational approach of Dietrich could be “self sufficient” for the 
transformation of one self and his relation to the environment. Yet, it is my belief that it will 
get incredibly richer when confronted by the perspectives previously mentioned in this article, 
as a way to diversify our understandings of life and the world. If transrational peaces advocate 
a plurality of peaces, it also opens up for dialogue amongst them, leading always to new 
insights. It also presents a way out of postmodern nihilism, as it once again celebrates life 
with the unification of Dyonisus and Apollon, as reason is counter-balanced with feelings and 
life. Transrationality leads to consistent changes in our behaviour by the adoption of a 
different rationality if compared to the modern one, integrating that which is beyond reason, 
and ultimately leading to an ethics that is not a pre-given set of moral rules but which is 
connected to the appreciation of something bigger than one’s self, introducing aesthetics as 
the appreciation of the senses and not only of reason. 
Conclusion 
In a context of multiple crisis, be it in terms of beliefs, economics, or the environment, the 
scientific system in which we were disciplined to think and act (in a fragmented manner) 
produces experts in certain areas but who seem unable to think holistically (or systemically, if 
you prefer). This myopia does not allow for taking uncolonized alternatives into 
consideration, and so far it did not seem to produce any encompassing answers for the ethical 
relation of/with the environment without compromising human freedom and its capacity to 
generate empathy. Yet changing directions and avoiding an environmental catastrophe have 
become urgent tasks.  
The answer I offer to this question is by critically looking at how the 
modern/Western/colonial way of organizing and giving meaning to life, which base its actions 
on rationality and scientifity, have tried to deal with the environment: With an ever increasing 
impact and without respect to it. Along with that, I also cast a gaze upon how marginalized 
perspectives have managed to deal with it. In this sense, referring to the transrational 
interpretations of peaces (which signify different ways to engage with wisdom and nature), 
combining it with an open curiosity and respect towards marginalized perspectives prove to 
be of extreme help when it comes to a transformation of human relations with the 
environment. To see things holisticaly (or transrationally) implies seeing the developments of 
one’s actions and beliefs and how it affects several layers and levels beyond and within this 
self, not just politically but systemically, ecologially and spiritually.  
Looking through this transrational lenses, ethical stances refer to broader perspectives that 
are part of human existence, because if one deals with the ethical treat of nature but ignores 
the imbalance it generates towards the unethical relations between men and their freedom, it 
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becomes clear that the problem/conflict soon will remanifest itself in a different form. A new 
embodiment of ethics which is not imposed could be achieved via an integration of human 
capacities that go beyond rationality, providing a reconnection with others and with the 
environment via sensibility and aesthetics. This seems to be effective in many marginalized 
perspectives which the Western world have not been able to understand, due to the particular 
development of its history, tied to modern thinking. But now is the time that we set ourselves 
free from these burdens and enlarge our human possibilities to reconnect with nature and 
avoid environmental disasters. This is key for a life in harmony.   
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Die Zukunft der Nachhaltigkeit 
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Abstract 
Anders als der Titel nahelegen mag, soll der Vortrag weder der Frage nachgehen, ob und 
gegebenenfalls in welcher Weise der Nachhaltigkeitsbegriff auch morgen noch Teil der 
politischen Auseinandersetzung sein wird, noch danach fragen, ob aktuelle 
Nachhaltigkeitskonzepte in dem Sinne zukunftsfähig sind, dass sie als korrektive oder 
funktionale Faktoren einer möglichst optimalen Planung vorhersehbarer Szenarien und 
Entwicklungen in den Bereichen Umwelt, Gesellschaft oder Wirtschaft einsetzbar sind. 
Hingegen möchte der Vortrag eine Gelegenheit sein, zu fragen, in welcher Weise sich die 
genannten Konzepte auf die Zukunft beziehen und deren Offenheit zur Sprache bringen bzw. 
in welcher Weise sich die Offenheit der Zukunft im Nachhaltigkeitsbegriff ausspricht und von 
diesem in einer Bedeutung gehalten wird.  
 
Keywords: Nachhaltigkeit; offene Zukunft; normative Ethik; wirtliche Ökonomie. 
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Der im Titel Die Zukunft der Nachhaltigkeit vorkommende Genitiv ist als genitivus 
subjectivus und nicht als genitivus objectivus zu verstehen. Im Folgenden soll also nicht der 
Frage nachgegangen werden, ob und gegebenenfalls in welcher Bedeutung der heute oft 
gebrauchte Nachhaltigkeitsbegriff auch morgen noch Teil der gesellschaftlichen und 
politischen Auseinandersetzung sein kann – es soll auch nicht der Frage nachgegangen 
werden, ob aktuelle Nachhaltigkeitskonzepte in dem Sinne zukunftsfähig sind, dass sie als 
korrektive oder funktionale Faktoren einer möglichst optimalen Planung vorhersehbarer 
Szenarien und Entwicklungen in den Bereichen Umwelt, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft einsetzbar 
sind. Hingegen soll der einfache Versuch unternommen werden, zu fragen, in welcher Weise 
sich die angesprochenen Konzepte auf die Zukunft beziehen und dadurch deren Offenheit zur 
Sprache bringen bzw. in welcher Weise sich die Offenheit der Zukunft in dem 
Nachhaltigkeits-Begriff ausspricht und von diesem in einer Bedeutung gehalten wird. 
In einem ersten Schritt soll der normative Grundzug aufgewiesen werden, der dem 
Begriff der Nachhaltigkeit ebenso wie den Nachhaltigkeitskonzepten inhärent ist, um ihn 
dann im Hinblick auf seine Bedeutung für die Erschließung einer offenen Zukunft in Frage zu 
stellen. In einem zweiten Schritt soll die Nachhaltigkeit als ein in erster Linie ökonomisches 
Prinzip aufgewiesen werden1 – um dann in einem dritten, abschließenden Schritt 
andeutungsweise in einen Zusammenhang mit einer fortgesetzten Verwahrlosung des 
Wesensreichtums der Dinge gebracht zu werden. 2 
I 
Gehen wir davon aus, die Grundfrage der Ethik sei die Frage »Was soll ich tun?«3 bzw. 
»Was soll ich als ein in Gemeinschaft lebendes Wesen tun?«, und begreifen wir die Ethik in 
diesem Sinne als ein normatives Wissen, das um jene Gesetze weiß, nach welchen, wie Kant 
in der Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten meint,  »alles geschehen soll«4, anerkennen wir 
damit  die Möglichkeit einer Norm, die das menschliche Tun und Lassen einerseits zu 
orientieren, andererseits in seiner Angemessenheit bzw. Unangemessenheit zu vermitteln 
vermag.  
Stellen wir die genannte Frage mit Blick auf unser heutiges Wirtschaften und auf das 
dieses Wirtschaften leitende Wissen, dann werden wir alsbald in eine Auseinandersetzung mit 
dem geführt, was wir ohne weiteres den Leitwert unsere Zeitalters5 nennen können – nämlich: 
die Nachhaltigkeit. Der diesem Leitwert innewohnende normative Grundzug verspricht dem 
menschlichen Handeln hinreichend Orientierung für die gleichzeitige Verwirklichung 
ökonomischer Sicherheit, sozialer Gerechtigkeit und ökologischen Gleichgewichts.  
Gemäß dem traditionellen Verständnis des Verhältnisses von Ethik und Ökonomie ist die 
Ethik das Wissen um die letzten Zwecke menschlichen Handelns, während die Ökonomie das 
1  Vgl. Ivo De GENNARO, Building Leadership on the Invaluable. Towards the Groundworks for a 
Phenomenological Approach to the Philosophy of Management, in: Anchilla Juris, Frankfurt a. M.: 
Klostermann, 2006, S. 78-87. 
2  Aufgrund der Kürze, die der dem Referat zugrunde gelegte Text haben soll, kann dieser letzte Schritt nur 
andeutungsweise erfolgen. Andeuten sollte sich der Bezug des hier vorgestellten Themas zu einer Reihe 
von Vorträgen, die Martin Heidegger 1949 unter dem Titel Einblick in das was ist gehalten hat. Die vier, in 
dieser Reihe versammelten Vorträge sind: Das Ding, Das Ge-Stell, Die Gefahr und Die Kehre. (Martin 
HEIDEGGER, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, HGA Bd. 79, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 22005). Da wir 
im Folgenden nicht explizit auf diese Vorträge eingehen werden, kann es hier auch in keiner Weise um eine 
Auslegung derselben gehen, wohl aber um den Versuch der Vorbereitung einer solchen Auslegung.   
3  Immanuel KANT, KrV, B 833. 
4  Immanuel KANT, GMS, AA IV: BA V. 
5  Vgl. dazu: »[...] sustainability should become a priority item« (Agenda 21, UN 1992,  § 2.1). Vgl. dazu 
auch: Sustainability »[...] the fundamental guiding principle of international community« (United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, § 6 und § 22ff.) 
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Wissen um eine möglichst optimale und folglich effiziente Bereitstellung der Mittel zur 
Erreichung dieser Zwecke ist.6 Sprechen wir im Rahmen dieses traditionellen Verständnisses 
von Nachhaltigkeit, dann begreifen wir diese für gewöhnlich als ethisches Prinzip und stellen 
uns das mit ihr beschäftigte Wissen als einen ethisch-normativen Gestaltungsansatz für die 
Implementierung zukunftsfähiger Werte im Hinblick auf eine ebenso zukunftsfähige wie 
möglichst optimale Entwicklung vor. 
Als normatives Wissen ist die Ethik ein zukunftsgewandtes Wissen, insofern sie in die 
Erschließung jener Bahnen eingelassen ist, denen menschliches Handeln zukünftig zu folgen 
hat und auf denen es sich folglich bewegen wird. Die Ethik ist darüber hinaus aber auch 
insofern ein zukunftsgewandtes Wissen, als sie durch ihr fortgesetztes Eingelassen-Sein in die 
Erschließung der genannten Bahnen ihrerseits dem menschlichen Handeln das Zukünftige in 
seiner Offenheit zugänglich macht und jedes Mal erschließt. 
So erweist sich das Normative von Anfang an als etwas wesentlich Zwiefältiges. 
Schlagen wir die Herkunft des Wortes »Norm« im Wörterbuch nach, finden wir es in einer 
Verwandtschaft mit den griechischen Worten γιγνώσκω (einsehen, verstehen), γνώμη 
(Einsicht, Vermögen zur Einsicht, Sinnesart) und γνώμων (Richtschnur, Maßstab, 
Winkelmaß, oder auch: Zeiger an der Sonnenuhr, d.h. etwas, von dem wir sagen, dass es die 
Zeit auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise anzeigt und von dem wir deshalb annehmen, dass es 
die Zeit zugänglich macht und also das Wesen der Zeit ein Stück weit erschließt)7. Pianigianis 
Vocabolario etimologico della lingua italiana sagt von der Norm, sie sei: »cosa per fare 
conoscere«, d. h. sie sei etwas, das wissen lässt, sie sei etwas, durch das Wissen möglich wird, 
insofern durch sie anderes zur Kenntnis gelangt und verstanden werden kann.8 Was zur 
Kenntnis gelangt und verstanden werden kann, hält sich jeweils schon in der Möglichkeit, 
gewusst zu werden und ist so gesehen als ein Zukünftiges gegenwärtig. 
Einerseits ist die Norm also etwas Maßgebendes. Sie gibt das vor, nach dem, wie Kant 
sagt, »alles geschehen soll«. Als diese Vorgabe ist die Norm andererseits zugleich in die 
Erschließung dessen eingelassen, dem sie von sich her und von sich aus zugewandt ist: dem 
Zukünftigen. Sie selbst ist Erschließung des Zukünftigen. Durch sie wird das Zukünftige ein 
Stück weit zugänglich und als das noch nicht gegründete Gründbare gegenwärtig. Sie trägt 
und entscheidet die Offenheit des Zukünftigen mit. Sodass wir sagen können: der normative 
Grundzug einer zukunftsgewandten Ethik trägt und entscheidet die Offenheit des Zukünftigen 
derart, dass sich daraus für unser Tun und Lassen jedes Mal eine Richtung, eine Ausrichtung, 
letztlich ein Sinn9 ergibt.  
Indes bedenken wir das Normative solange zu ungenau, solange wir die Norm lediglich 
als die Vorschrift einer Regel zur Steuerung des menschlichen Handelns und mithin zu einer 
planmäßigen Herstellung künftiger Verhältnisse sehen und auf diese Weise von vorne herein 
im Hinblick auf eine in ihrer Ausrichtung bereits entschiedene operative Nutzbarmachung 
auslegen. Im Zuge einer solchen Auslegung bleibt die Ethik nämlich in erster Linie mit der 
Ergründung und Begründung jener Normen beschäftigt, die das menschliche Handeln auf eine 
planmäßige Einrichtung künftiger Verhältnisse hin abstellt. Dabei setzt sich eine rein 
instrumentelle Vorstellung der Norm ins Recht, ohne dass wir zugleich bemerken, wie sich 
6  Vgl. Ivo De GENNARO, Building Leadership on the Invaluable (cf. n. 1), S. 78. 
7  Duden – Das Herkunftswörterbuch. Etymologie der deutschen Sprache, Mannheim [u. a.]: Dudenverlag, 
32001, S. 563. 
8  Ottorino PIANIGIANI, Vocabolario etimologico della lingua italiana, La Spezia: Melita Editori, 41991, 
S. 916. 
9  Die Wurzel des Wortes »Sinn« ist das idg. *sent- das unter anderem auf die Bedeutungen von »gehen«, 
»nachgehen«, »im Begriff sein, eine Richtung zu nehmen« verweist. In dem Wort »Uhrzeigersinn« ist diese 
ursprüngliche Bedeutung noch erhalten. Vgl. dazu Duden – Das Herkunftswörterbuch. Etymologie der 
deutschen Sprache, Mannheim [u. a.]: Dudenverlag, 32001, S. 770f. 
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die Offenheit der Zukunft dadurch in einer bestimmten und gerade nicht selbstverständlichen 
Entschiedenheit zeigt, d. h. von vorn herein entschieden ist. 
Als normatives Wissen ist die Ethik zukunftsgewandt, insofern sie durch die Frage nach 
dem, was getan und was unterlassen werden soll, eine Verbindlichkeit anzeigt, in der sich 
jedes Mal das ausspricht, was Kant in der Preisschrift des Jahres 1764, Untersuchung über die 
Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral, eine »Notwendigkeit 
der Handlung«10 nennt. Im Hinblick auf die Begründung dieser Notwendigkeit und der durch 
sie angezeigten Verbindlichkeit führt Kant einen Unterschied ein, der klarstellt, welcherart 
»die ersten Gründe der Moral«11sind.12 Der Unterschied weist sich zuerst in dem normativen 
Grundzug, der dem Sollen als Sollen eigen ist:13 
Man soll dies oder jenes tun, und das andere lassen; dies ist die Formel, unter welcher 
eine jede Verbindlichkeit ausgesprochen wird. Nun drückt jedes Sollen eine 
Notwendigkeit der Handlung aus, und ist einer zwiefachen Bedeutung fähig. Ich soll 
nämlich entweder etwas tun (als ein Mittel), wenn ich etwas anderes (als einen Zweck) 
will, oder ich soll unmittelbar etwas anderes (als einen Zweck) tun, und würklich machen. 
Das erstere könnte man die Notwendigkeit der Mittel (necessitatem problematicam), das 
zweite die Notwendigkeit der Zwecke (necessitatem legalem) nennen.14 
Von der erstgenannten Notwendigkeit, der Notwendigkeit, der Mittel sagt Kant, sie zeige 
eigentlich 
[...] gar keine Verbindlichkeit an, sondern nur die Vorschrift als die Auflösung in einem 
Problem, welche Mittel diejenigen sind, deren ich mich bedienen müsse, wie ich einen 
gewissen Zweck erreichen will.  [...] etwa so, wie es eine Verbindlichkeit wäre, zwei 
Kreuzbogen zu machen, wenn ich eine gerade Linie in zwei gleiche Teile zerfällen will, 
d. i. es sind gar keine Verbindlichkeiten, sondern nur Anweisungen eines geschickten 
Verhaltens, wenn man einen Zweck erreichen will.15 
Daraus folgert Kant nun im Hinblick auf den jeweiligen Zweck einer Handlung, dass 
[...] alle Handlungen, die die Moral unter der Bedingung gewisser Zwecke vorschreibt, 
[solange] zufällig [sind] und [...] keine Verbindlichkeit heißen, solange sie nicht einem an 
sich notwendigen Zweck untergeordnet sind.16 
Unser Tun und Lassen erfüllt so gesehen zwar jedes Mal einen Zweck, nicht immer aber 
taugt der zu verwirklichende Zweck zur Begründung der Notwendigkeit der Handlung und 
10  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 96. 
11  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 96. 
12  Wenngleich Kant an dieser Stelle auch feststellt, dass diese ersten Gründe der Moral »nach ihrer 
gegenwärtigen Beschaffenheit noch nicht aller erforderlichen Evidenz fähig sind«. Immanuel KANT, Nat. 
Theol. A 96. 
13  Gemäß dem, was wir im Vorherigen von der Norm gesagt haben, können wir das, was Kant hier zeigt, in 
der Weise verstehen, dass die im »Sollen« (Nat. Theol. A 96) zur Sprache gebrachte »Verbindlichkeit« 
(Nat. Theol. A 96) nicht ausschließlich und nicht in erster Linie als eine mittelbare Handlungsanweisung zu 
verstehen ist, sondern dass sie auch und vor allem in die unmittelbare Erschließung »der ersten Gründe der 
Moral« (Nat. Theol. A 96) eingelassen ist, welche durch sie allererst zur Kenntnis gelangen. Die 
Formulierung einer »solche[n] unmittelbare[n] oberste[n] Regel aller Verbindlichkeit« (Nat. Theol. A 97) 
erscheint Kant hier noch, wie er selbst sagt »schlechterdings unerweislich« (Nat. Theol. A 97), weswegen 
eine Erschließung »der ersten Gründe der Moral« bisher aller »erforderlichen Evidenz« (Nat. Theol. A 96) 
entbehrt. In der Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) wiederholt Kant die Fragestellung und sagt, 
die Aufgabe der Untersuchung sei die »Aufsuchung und Festsetzung des obersten Prinzips der Moralität, 
welche allein ein in seiner Absicht ganzes und von aller anderen sittlichen Untersuchung abzusonderndes 
Geschäft ausmacht« (GMS 329). 
14  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 96. 
15  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 96. 
16  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 96. 
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der durch sie merklichen Verbindlichkeit. Entweder erfüllt die Handlung einen mittelbaren 
Zweck – so, dass sie ebenso wie die von ihr berührten Dinge als Mittel zur Erfüllung eines 
auswärtigen Zweckes erscheinen und ihr Sinn jedes Mal in Abhängigkeit von diesem Zweck 
erschlossen wird17 – oder die Handlung erfüllt einen unmittelbaren Zweck, der zwar durch sie 
verwirklicht wird – so aber, dass die Handlung selbst und mithin die von ihr berührten Dinge 
sich in einer größtmöglichen Vollkommenheit zeigen und sich ihr Sinn gerade nicht in der 
Erfüllung eines auswärtigen Zweckes erfüllt und sie mit Bezug auf diesen nicht bloß 
zweckmäßig sind. 
Tue das Vollkommenste, was durch dich möglich ist [...] Unterlasse das, wodurch die 
durch dich größtmögliche Vollkommenheit verhindert wird [...].18 
Besonders aufschlussreich ist,  was Kant zufolge unterlassen werden soll – nämlich: dass 
die durch uns »größtmögliche Vollkommenheit verhindert wird«. Demnach ist jedem von uns 
aufgegeben, jeweils eine  größtmögliche Vollkommenheit zu verwirklichen, u. z. unmittelbar, 
d. h. in völliger Absehung eines jeden mittelbaren Zwecks, der durch die Handlung darüber 
hinaus verwirklicht werden könnte. »Tue das Vollkommenste [...]«19: Hierin sieht Kant im 
Rahmen der zitierten Schrift den »erste[n] formale[n] Grund aller Verbindlichkeit«.20 Unser 
Tun und Lassen ist unmittelbar und gerade nicht mittelbar in die Verwirklichung des 
Vollkommensten eingelassen. Was verwirklicht werden soll, ist noch nicht. Was noch nicht 
ist, bleibt ausständig. Was ausständig bleibt, ist offen. Genau genommen ist unser Tun und 
Lassen nichts anderes als unmittelbares Eingelassen-Sein in die Ausständigkeit und Offenheit 
des Vollkommensten, d. h. unmittelbares Ein-gelassen-sein in die zukünftige Ermöglichung 
von Vollkommenheit und Unvollkommenheit. Derart erschließt sich dem menschlichen 
Handeln in allem Tun und Lassen ein unmittelbarer Zweck, eine anfängliche Richtung, mithin 
ein zukünftiger Sinn, der nicht schon in der bloßen Zweckmäßigkeit des Handelns und der 
Dinge zugunsten eines auswärtigen Zwecks zugänglich gemacht ist und demnach auch nicht 
schon darin zu finden ist.  
II 
Kommen wir an dieser Stelle auf die Forderung nach einem nachhaltigen und so gesehen 
zukunftsfähigen Handeln zurück und achten wir insbesondere auf den der Nachhaltigkeit 
inhärenten normativen Grundzug, dann zeigt sich: Mittelbar verspricht die Nachhaltigkeit 
Orientierung im Hinblick auf die gleichzeitige Verwirklichung ökonomischer Sicherheit, 
sozialer Gerechtigkeit und ökologischen Gleichgewichts. Unmittelbar erschließt sie das 
Zukünftige ein Stück weit in seiner Offenheit – so weit nämlich, als die Nachhaltigkeit 
unserem Tun und Lassen ebenso wie allem, was von diesem berührt ist, eine anfängliche 
Richtung vorgibt und es auf diese Weise von vorn herein in seinem zukünftigen Sinn 
erschließt – d. h. es im Voraus in sein jeweiliges Was-Sein und Wie-Sein einsetzt, sodass die 
Dimension des menschlichen Aufenthalts und Sich-Einrichtens auf der Erde (ἦθος) in ihrer 
Zukunft bestimmt und gerade nicht mehr offen ist.  
Gemäß ihrer ursprünglichen, aus der Forstwirtschaft stammenden Bedeutung ist die 
Nachhaltigkeit in erster Linie in die Erhaltung der jeweils relevanten Faktoren eines 
regenerierbaren Systems eingelassen, sodass dieses System in seinen wesentlichen 
Funktionen bestehen bleibt und weiterhin nutzbar ist. Als Leitwert unseres Zeitalters ist die 
17  Wobei nun aber – so könnte ergänzt werden – der eigentliche Zweck nirgends anderes als in der 
unmittelbaren Zweckmäßigkeit der Handlung und der unmittelbaren Zweckmäßigkeit der Dinge liegen 
kann. 
18  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 97. 
19  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 97. 
20  Immanuel KANT, Nat. Theol. A 97. 
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Nachhaltigkeit dementsprechend in die Erhaltung aller relevanten Faktoren dessen 
eingelassen, was für die Konstitution unseres eigenen Zeitalters maßgebend ist und was als 
Maßgebendes den Sinn aller Dinge bestimmt – nämlich: die fortgesetzte Optimierung bzw. 
der Optimierungswille, welcher sich in der Selbst-Ermächtigung eines ständigen zu 
erwirkenden Optimums zur Geltung bringt.21  
Aus der Sicht der Ökonomie ergibt sich dort ein Optimum, wo ein möglichst ideales 
Verhältnis zwischen eingesetzten Ressourcen und erwirktem Effekt besteht – sprich, wo im 
Hinblick auf die Generierung eines letztlich quantifizierbaren Wachstums die dafür 
aufgewandten Ressourcen gegen das größtmögliche Minimum und der dabei erwirkte Effekt 
gegen das größtmögliche Maximum hin tendieren.22 Eigentümlich ist, dass Wachstum nur 
dort ein Sein hat, wo Wachstum besteht, d. h. wo Wachstum fortbesteht und in seinem 
Fortbestand gesichert ist. Gesichertes Wachstum ist indes ausschließlich dort möglich, wo 
zugleich alle für sein Bestehen und Fortbestehen relevanten Faktoren in ihrer künftigen 
Verfügbarkeit gesichert sind. Dabei ist das Wachstum im Grunde ebenso wie die Optimierung 
selbst prinzipiell unbegrenzt.23 Um in dem genannten Sinne bestehen zu können, braucht die 
Selbst-Ermächtigung des zu erwirkenden Optimums Macht über die Verfügbarkeit aller für 
die Optimierung relevanten Faktoren, um sich auf diese Weise die Kontrolle über – erstens – 
den zu erwirkenden Effekt und – zweitens – über die Optimierbarkeit dieses Effektes zu 
sichern. Wo sich der jeweils erreichte Optimierungsgrad nicht in eine weitere Optimierbarkeit 
übersetzen lässt, ist er seinerseits nicht optimal, insofern sich durch ihn eine Grenze 
manifestiert, welche die Möglichkeit eines prinzipiell unbegrenzten Wachstums außer Kraft 
setzt und in seiner maßgebenden Funktion in Frage stellt.  Dort, wo also der Anspruch auf ein 
unbegrenztes Wachstum an seine Grenzen stößt und nicht mehr zu funktionieren scheint, 
gerät die Durchsetzung der Optimierung selbst in Krise. Dementsprechend die Forderung 
nach einem nachhaltigen Wachstum, d. h. nach einer langfristigen Sicherung der 
Verfügbarkeit aller für das Wachstum relevanten Faktoren.  
In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich die Nachhaltigkeit nun als ein ökonomisches 
Prinzip, das von Anfang an im Dienste einer quantifizierbaren Optimierung steht. Was indes 
im Lichte der Selbst-Ermächtigung des zu erwirkenden Optimums als relevanter und mithin 
erhaltenswerter Faktor erscheint und worin seine Relevanz bestehen soll, ist durch die 
Maßgabe der quantifizierbaren Optimierung selbst bereits im Voraus definiert und gerade 
nicht mehr offen. 
III 
In eins damit erscheinen nun alle Dinge – mithin auch unser Tun und Lassen und das 
Wesen des Menschen selbst – in einer mittelbaren Zweckmäßigkeit für die fortgesetzte 
21  Das für unser Zeitalter Maßgebende nennt Ivo De Gennaro in einem Beitrag aus dem Jahre 2006 
»Empowerment to performance«. »The expression 'the dominant trait of our time' refers to the fundamental 
trait which, in our epoch, constitutes the sense of all things This trait we call the empowerment to 
performance (or, which is the same, empowerment to power). 'Empowerment to performance' means: 
imparting the power or command over effects, enabling the implementation of the enhancement of 
effectiveness (i.e. the capacity for producing effects). According to this trait, the truth and validity of all 
human knowledge and action, is determined by the capacity for and the degree of this empowerment«. Ivo 
De GENNARO, Building Leadership on the Invaluable (cf. n.1), S. 78f. 
22  Vgl. JÜRGEN GEDINAT, Globalisierung – eine Erörterung,  in: Ein Modell von Welt. Unterwegs in der 
Globalisierung, Freiburg: Centaurus, 2013, S. 166-177.  
23  Als ein metaphysisches Prinzip finden wird die Maßgabe der Optimierung in dem von Leibniz formulierten 
principium determinationis: »Semper scilicet est in rebus principium determinationis quod a Maximo 
Minomove petendum est, ut nempe maximus praestetur effectus, minimo ut sic dicam sumtu«. Gottfried 
Wilhelm LEIBNIZ, De rerum originatione radicali, Philosophische Schriften, hrsg. von C. Gerhardt, VII 
(1890, NB 1961), S. 303. 
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Selbst-Ermächtigung des zu erwirkenden Optimums. Sie erscheinen als bloße Faktoren einer 
Optimierung, für welche sie immer schon ein quantifizierbarer und zu quantifizierender Wert 
sind und also von vornherein in ihrer Werthaftigkeit gesehen werden. Die Rede von dem Wert 
der Natur und dem Wert des Menschen, die längst selbstverständlich erscheinende 
Notwendigkeit zur Evaluierung von allem und jedem, die längst selbstverständlich er-
scheinende Notwendigkeit zur Indizierung, Parametrisierung und Digitalisierung sind nur die 
sichtbarsten Zeichen für die Macht dieser vorausreifenden Maßgabe. Die Natur ist ein Wert. 
Der Mensch ist ein Wert. Ihr Sein besteht in ihrer Werthaftigkeit, d. h. in ihrer mittelbaren 
Zweckmäßigkeit für die fortgesetzte Optimierung. Dementsprechend haben sie sich von 
vornherein – d. h. auch in Zukunft – in einer möglichst vollständigen Evaluierbarkeit, 
Indizierbarkeit, Parametrisierbarkeit, Digitalisierbarkeit, zu halten. So, dass sich uns an dieser 
Stelle die unmittelbare Unwirtlichkeit der fortgesetzten Optimierung erschließt. 
Was nun aber ausschließlich in seiner mittelbaren Zweckmäßigkeit zugänglich wird und 
so von vornherein als etwas Werthaftes erschlossen ist, bleibt ganz und gar in dem unbemerkt, 
was es von sich her und von sich aus zu sein vermöchte. Im Lichte der genannten Maßgabe ist 
unmittelbare Vollkommenheit von vornherein unmöglich. Alles bleibt ständig unvollkommen, 
da es keine Möglichkeit zur Vollkommenheit gibt. Die quantifizierbare Optimierung kennt 
prinzipiell keine Grenze, sodass in ihrem Bereich jede Möglichkeit der Vollkommenheit 
ausgeschlossen ist. Die Dinge bleiben auf ihre bloß mittelbare Zweckmäßigkeit beschränkt, 
sodass sie ihrem Wesen nach – heute ebenso wie morgen oder in einer Woche, in zehn 
Monaten oder in einhundert Jahren – immer nur als »Faktoren für ...«, »als Wert für ...« gelten 
und so in ihrer messbaren Wirkung für die fortgesetzte Optimierung erscheinen und gerade 
nicht in der ihnen eigenen Offenheit zukünftig sind.24 
Unter diesen Voraussetzungen bleibt der unmittelbare Zweck der Dinge – mithin der 
unmittelbare Zweck unseres Tun und Lassens und des Wesens des Menschen – verschlossen, 
so nämlich, dass sich, um mit Kant zu sprechen, keine eigentliche Notwendigkeit des 
Handelns ergibt, insofern sie durch die ständig unvollkommene Erfüllung eines auswärtigen 
Zwecks unmittelbar verborgen bleibt.  
  
24  Ding, ahd. thing: »Versammlung«, »Versammlung zur Verhandlung einer in Rede stehenden 
Angelegenheit, d. h. eines in Rede stehenden Streitfalls« »Name für jegliches, was den Menschen in 
irgendeiner Weise angeht« (Martin HEIDEGGER, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge (GA 79), cf. n. 2, S. 13.): 
eine in Verhandlung stehende Sache ist eine Sache, die noch nicht entschieden ist, die einer Entscheidung 
harrt; das Ding ist so gesehen das, was den Menschen in der Weise angeht, dass es ihn für die Entscheidung 
seines Seins braucht, insofern der Mensch als Mensch in die Ausständigkeit dieser Entscheidung 
eingelassen ist und sie als solche zu wahren vermag. 
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English summary in the end of this article, translated by  
Dr. Lars Reuter, The Møller Foundation 
Erlauben Sie, verehrte Damen und Herren, dass ich vorweg spontan meiner Freude 
darüber Ausdruck gebe, dass sich zu unserer diesjährigen Jahrestagung hier in Soesterberg 
wieder eine so grosse Teilnehmerschaft eingefunden hat, sozusagen wie zu den besten Zeiten 
unserer Societas. Als das Mitglied mit der wahrscheinlich längsten Mitgliedschaft (die ich 
und in den letzten Jahrzehnten auch regelmässig durch Teilnahme realisieren konnte) war ich 
bei der geringen Teilnehmerzahl an manchen der letzten conferences besorgt, wie es wohl 
weitergehen könnte mit unserer „Europaeischen Forschungsgesellschaft für Ethik“. Heuer 
aber können wir alle in eigener Erfahrung feststellen: Die societas lebt – was immer die 
Ursachen der Teilnahme-Fluktuation sein mögen (die jeweilige Thematik, die Referenten, die 
Tagungsorte, die papers oder...?). Offensichtlich brauchen sich die jeweiligen Praesidien und 
der konstante Kern der Teilnehmerschaft nicht davon irritieren zu lassen, dass sich auch 
unsere „Forschungsgesellschaft“ ebenso wie andere Institutionen in einem stetigen Auf und 
Ab sowohl ihrer inhaltlichen als auch ihrer institutionellen Resonanz bewegt. 
Der Wandel in diesen beiden Bereichen charakterisiert deutlich auch die Geschichte der 
Societas Ethica. Diesem folgend gliedere ich meinen Vortrag in folgende 3 Teile: 
Erstens: Die Intentionen der Gruenderväter – und ihre Realisierungen bis zur 
„Europaeischen Wendezeit“ um 1990; 
Zweitens: Veränderungen mit und seit der „Wendezeit“; 
Drittens: Flexible TeilnahmeMotivationen an den SE-Jahreszagungen 
Erster Teil: Die Intentionen der Gründerzeit und ihre Realisierungen 
bis zur Europaeischen Wendezeit um 1990. 
1) Die Gründungstagung 
Am frühen Nachmittag des 9. Oktober 1964 konnten der Rektor der Universität Basel und der 
Vizepräsident des Kantons Basel 40 damals renommierte Professoren für Theologische Ethik 
aus ganz Europa begrüssen. Ich nenne  ein paar klangvolle Namen: Arthur Rich und Hendrik 
van Oyen aus der Schweiz, Helmut Thielicke, Friedrich Delekat und Heinz Horst Schrey aus 
dem evangelischen Deutschland, Franz Böckle und W. Schöllgen aus dem katholischen 
Deutschland, Sven Aalen aus Oslo, Niels Hansen Søe aus Kopenhagen, Johannes de Graaf 
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aus Utrecht, Robert Mehl aus Strassburg, Jan Michalko aus Bratislawa, Pal Török aus 
Debrecen. Der Konfession nach waren drei Viertel der Anwesenden evangelisch; ein Viertel 
war katholisch. 
Sie waren zusammengekommen, um über die Gründung einer, wie es im 
Einladungsschreiben hiess, „Ökumenischen Gesellschaft für christliche Ethik“ zu beraten 
und zu entscheiden. Schon am nächsten Tag wurde die „Societas Ethica“ (=SE) vorläufig 
gegründet. Eine Satzung sollte „bis zur nächsten Zusammenkunft in ein oder zwei Jahren“ 
vom Vorstand vorgelegt werden. Sie wurde dann auch auf der Jahrestagung 1965, ebenfalls in 
Basel, verabschiedet und daraufhin veröffentlicht in der „Zeitschrift für Evangelische 
Ethik“, die man als offizielles Publikationsorgan der SE bestimmt hatte. In §3 der Satzung 
wird der Zweck der SE folgendermassen formuliert: „Der Verein hat die Aufgabe, 
regelmässige Zusammenkünfte der Dozenten für Ethik an den Universitäten und Hochschulen 
zur Diskussion aktueller Fragen ihres Faches herbeizuführen. Hauptgrundlage der Diskussion 
soll das Evangelium bilden. Nach Möglichkeit sollte ein Treffen jedes zweite Jahr in einem 
Universitätszentrum stattfinden.“ 
Schon jahrelang vorher hatte es Vorgespräche darüber gegeben, warum und wie eine 
solche Gesellschaft notwendig wäre. Ich selbst war 1963 als Assistent am Münsteraner Uni-
„Institut für Christliche Gesellschaftswissenschaften“ zusammen mit meinen Kollegen Trutz 
Rendtorff und Hinrich Ringeling in ein solches Vorgespräch zwischen Arthur Rich und Heinz 
Dietrich Wendland  eingebunden. Konkretere Überlegungen zu dem Vorhaben waren mir 
auch deshalb bekannt, weil ich darüber gelegentlich informiert wurde durch meinen 
Studienfreund Dr. Klaus Bockmühl, der damals Assistent des Gründungspräsidenten Prof. 
van Oyen war und der sich bei der Vorbereitung sowie dann als  Gründungssekretär der 
Societas Ethica organisatorisch wie inhaltlich, auch mit wichtigen eigenen Initiativen 
verdienstvoll für ihren Aufbau eingesetzt hat. 
2) Inhaltliche Intentionen 
Das inhaltlich tiefere Interesse an der Gründung einer „Ökumenischen Gesellschaft für 
Theologische Ethik“ wird bereits im Thema der Baseler Gründungstagung erkennbar; es 
lautete: „Die theologische Begründung der Ethik angesichts der modernen Forderung 
einer New Morality“. 
Es ging also von Anfang an um Fragen, mit denen sich die Societas Ethica in den 
folgenden 50 Jahren in unterschiedlichen thematischen Kontexten  immer wieder beschäftigt 
hat. Ich unterscheide vier solcher inhaltlichen Problemstellungen, die freilich theologisch eng 
miteinander verflochten waren: 
Erstens: Das Programm einer New Morality weist hin auf einen in fast allen 
Lebensbereichen virulenten Wertewandel, der hauptsächlich verursacht war und ist durch die 
technischen sowie die sozioökonomischen Entwicklungen und der die etablierte christliche 
Ethik vor neue und oft, gänzlich ungewohnte Herausforderungen stellte. Zugespitzter wurde 
gefragt: Gibt es eine spezifisch christliche Antwort, oder wenigstens eine Antwort-Tendenz 
gegenüber dem allgemeinen und neuartigen, anscheinend irreversiblen Ethikbedarf? Und 
darüber hinaus: gibt es Antworten, die von katholischen und evangelischen Theologen 
einheitlich vertreten werden können? Explizit beschäftigte sich mit diesem Fragenkreis schon 
die dritte Jahrestagung (1966 in Lund) unter dem Hauptthema „Das Proprium der Christlichen 
Ethik“. In allerlei Variationen wird diese Thematik dann bis 1990 immer wieder behandelt.  
Zweitens ging es darum, ob die in der Nachkriegszeit (nach 1945) in beiden 
Konfessionen jeweils vorherrschenden Paradigmen theologischer Ethik ausreichten, um ein 
christliches Proprium in der Ethikbegründung auch für Nichttheologen und für Vertreter einer 
„nicht-christlichen, profanen Ethik“ verständlich und nachvollziehbar zu machen. 
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Bei den damals diskutierten 'vorherrschenden Paradigmen' wäre auf protestantischer Seite 
etwa zu denken an die lutherische Ordnungstheologie oder an das von Karl Barth 
vorgeschlagene, in seinem Offenbarungsbegriff wurzelnde Modell der Analogia Fidei. Auf 
katholischer Seite wäre vielleicht zu denken an ein neuscholastisches Verständnis von 
Naturrecht oder an die normative Geltung von Aussagen des Kirchlichen Lehramtes. 
Ein dritter Frageaspekt galt dem mehr binnentheologischen Diskurs: Wie weit nämlich 
entsprachen diese damals, zu Beginn der 1960er Jahre, verbreiteten Paradigmen dem jeweils 
aktuellen Forschungs- und Diskussionsstand der anderen theologischen Disziplinen, also der 
Exegese oder der Kirchengeschichte. In diesem Sinne behandelte die Jahrestagung 1968 in 
Amsterdam „Die Bedeutung des Dekalogs – theologisch und wirkungsgeschichtlich“. 
Viertens: Das Themenspektrum der Jahrestagungen und damit das inhaltliche Interesse 
der neuen Gesellschaft war freilich von Anfang an keineswegs auf die 
Begründungsprobleme einer spezifisch christlichen Ethik begrenzt. Schon die zweite, für 
den institutionellen Konsolidierungsprozess wichtige Jahrestagung 1965 machte mit ihrer 
Thematik deutlich, dass gerade der Neue Ethikbedarf ebenso dringlich die Problemfelder der 
sogenannten „Angewandten Ethik“ oder „Konkreten Ethik“ in den Blick bringen musste. 
Das Thema für Basel 1965 lautete: „Die Monogamie in theologischer und in ethnologischer 
Sicht“; behandelt wurden dabei Probleme, über die bis in die allerjüngste Zeit, zumindest 
beiden grossen Kirchen Deutschlands heftig gestritten wird.-  
In den folgenden Jahren häuften sich bei den conferences der SE solche Themenfelder der 
Angewandten Ethik; beispielsweise 1969 in Strasbourg: „Wirtschaftsethik und 
Entwicklungspolitik“;  1970 in Hofgeismar: „Gewalt als Problem der politischen Ethik“; 1971 
ging es im schwedischen Bastad erstmalig um „MedizinEthik“; 1976 dann, am ungarischen 
Balaton, um „Ökologische Verantwortung“ - und damit inhaltlich um ganz ähnliche Fragen, 
wie sie uns heute, knapp 40 Jahre später, hier in Soesterberg (bei Utrecht) unter dem 
Gesamtthema „Climate Change, Sustainability, and an Ethics of an Open Future“ 
beschäftigen. 
Im Blick auf die inhaltlichen Intentionen der Gründungsväter lässt sich also am Beispiel 
dieser vier Hauptthemen konstatieren, dass ihnen schon damals in nuce das breite Spektrum 
von modernen Herausforderungen der Ethik vor Augen steht. Diese Herausforderungen, 
haben in vielerlei Variationen die Themen der folgenden 50 Jahrestagungen bestimmt. 
3) Institutionelle Entwicklungen und gesellschaftspolitische Relevanzen 
Die Initiative zur Gründung der Societas Ethica war von evangelischen 
Theologieprofessoren aus den deutschsprachigen Ländern ausgegangen. Von vornherein war 
zwar ein intensiver ökumenischer Austausch mit den katholischen Kollegen angestrebt 
worden, doch waren es nur wenige katholische Theologen, die in den Anfangsjahren der SE 
als Mitglieder beitraten oder an den Jahrestagungen häufig teilnahmen. Ein Jahr nach 
Gründung der Societas waren von insgesamt 85 eingetragenen Mitgliedern nur 14, also knapp 
20% katholisch. Langsam aber stetig erhöhte sich danach jedoch der  katholische Anteil. 
Obwohl mir keine genaueren statistischen Daten bekannt sind, schliesse ich aus den 
Teilnehmerlisten der Jahrestagungen mit ihren Angaben von Namen und Heimat-Universität, 
dass während und nach der denkwürdigen conference in Warschau 1980 ca 40% der 
Teilnehmenden katholisch war. Ich erinnere mich auch an viele späteren Jahrestagungen, an 
denen mehr katholische als evangelische Theologen und Laien anwesend waren. 
Wichtig für das zunehmende Engagement von katholischen Kollegen in der SE dürfte 
dann die in den 70er Jahren einsetzende betonte Ausweitung von SE-Aktivitäten nach 
Osteuropa gewesen sein. Eine Schlüsselfigur dafür war der Warschauer Theologieprofessor 
Helmut Juros, der an dem Zustandekommen der bahnbrechenden Warschauer Jahrestagung 
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von 1980 wesentlichen Einfluss hatte und als Vorstandsmitglied der SE die Integration 
osteuropäischer katholischer Kollegen in die societas ganz generell vorangebracht hat.  
Die Öffnung nach Osteuropa führte zu einer unerwartet starken gesellschaftspolitischen 
Reichweite und Relevanz der SE. So wurde in der fachlich, aber auch in der politisch 
interessierten Öffentlichkeit aufmerksam und durchweg positiv wahrgenommen, dass schon 
zu Beginn der 70er Jahre die sonst verschlossenen Grenzen von und nach Osteuropa zum 
Zwecke wissenschaftlichen Austausches überschritten werden konnten. Zu der ersten betont 
auf Ostkontakte ausgerichteten Jahrestagung, 1973 in Wien mit dem Thema „Ansätze 
ethischen Denkens in Osteuropa“, waren auch (sowjet-)marxistische Ethik-Professoren 
eingeladen; unter den tatsächlich Teilnehmenden war tatsächlich einer der führenden Ethiker 
der Moskauer Lomonossow-Universität. Erörtert und in Anfängen tatsächlich versucht wurde, 
ob und wie ein Dialog über ethische Fragen zwischen marxistischer und christlicher Ethik 
möglich wäre. 
Auch nachdem dieser Dialog-Versuch abgeblasen worden war, blieb es in der Folgezeit 
den osteuropäischen Kollegen beider Konfessionen möglich, die SE-Jahrestagungen in 
Westeuropa zu besuchen. Unsere conferences gehörten so zu den wenigen Veranstaltungen, 
zu denen Theologieprofessoren den Ostblock vorübergehend verlassen durften. Umgekehrt 
war auch für uns westeuropäische Universitätsangehörige der Besuch der SE-Jahrestagungen 
am Balaton, in Warschau, in Dubrovnik (1982) oder in Debrecen (1987) eine der wenigen 
Gelegenheiten, einen unmittelbaren Kontakt zu osteuropäischen Kollegen und 
Universitäten aufzunehmen, sowie einen eigenen Eindruck vom Leben im damaligen 
Ostblock zu gewinnen. 
Doch reichte die gesellschaftspolitische Relevanz über die allseits begrüssten 
Möglichkeiten des Austausches durchaus hinaus in sensiblere, den meisten eher verborgene 
Dimensionen der Ost-West-Politik. So hat die Warschauer Tagung wahrscheinlich 
erhebliche Anstösse für die Ausweitung des politischen Revolutionsprozesses in Polen 
gegeben; vielleicht hat sie sogar unmittelbar zum Sturz des kommunistischen ZK-
Generalsekretärs E. Gierek, kurz nach der Warschauer SE-Tagung (1980) beigetragen. Auf 
späteren SE-Tagungen (z.B. in Palermo 1985 sowie besonders im ungarischen Debrecen 
1987) gab es für die meisten Teilnehmer kaum erkennbare, aber latent heftige 
Auseinandersetzungen zwischen „Stasi-IM's“ und Kritikern des Systems der DDR und 
anderer Ostblock-Staaten. 
Eine andere, wissenschaftspolitisch aber ebenfalls relevante und die Entwicklung der SE 
weit über die Wendezeit (1990) hinaus bestimmende institutionelle Entwicklung war, dass 
seit dem Ende der 80er Jahre der ökumenische Dialog zwischen evangelischen und 
katholischen Kollegen dezidiert ausgeweitet wurde auf das interdisziplinäre Gespräch mit 
Vertretern der philosophischen Ethik sowie anderer angrenzender Humanwissenschaften 
(Soziologie, Medizin u.a.). Auch ein solcher Dialog war in den Gründungsgesprächen 
ausdrücklich intendiert worden. Allerdings blieb der Anteil von Nichttheologen unter den 
Mitgliedern und den Tagungsteilnehmern während der ersten 20 Jahre des Bestehens der 
Societas Ethica ausgesprochen klein, nämlich meist weniger als 10% von inzwischen 
insgesamt ca. 250 Mitgliedern. Das änderte sich meinem Eindruck nach zu Beginn der 80er 
Jahre, als vor allem der schwedische evangelische Theologe Hemberg während seiner 
Präsidentschaft und in enger Kooperation mit seinem deutschen Freund, dem katholischen 
Moraltheologen Bruno Schüller SJ, das Gespräch mit der sogenannten „Analytischen Ethik“ 
suchte und damit den Kontakt zu den profanen Moralphilosophen forcierte und ausbaute. In 
den folgenden Jahren stieg die Zahl von Tagungsteilnehmern aus den Bereichen der 
Philosophie erheblich an; zu Beginn der 90er Jahre wurde sogar ein Professor für Praktische 
Philosophie, Robert Heeger aus den Niederlanden, für 4 Jahre zum Präsidenten der SE 
gewählt; 20 Jahre später wurde ebenfalls ein Philosoph,  Hugues Poltier aus der französischen 
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Schweiz, zum Präsidenten (2008 - 2011) gewählt. Demgegenüber blieb allerdings in der SE-
Mitgliedschaft der Anteil von Nichttheologen weiterhin klein. 
Ausser Ökumenizität und Interdisziplinarität war in den Gründungsgesprächen eine 
bewusste Internationalität im Rahmen Europas, auch unabhängig von den Ost-West-
Kontakten, intendiert worden. Diese Absicht wurde ersichtlich schon während der ersten 25 
Jahre SE in hohem Masse realisiert, was das deutschsprachige Europa sowie Skandinavien, 
die Niederlande und (in quantitativem Abstand) eben auch Osteuropa betrifft. Deutlich 
weniger stark vertreten waren und blieben freilich Grossbritannien, Frankreich, Spanien und 
Italien. Während der zweiten „Halbzeit“ der SE änderte sich auch das mit weitreichenden 
Folgen. Das Spektrum der Internationalität unter den Teilnehmenden an den Jahrestagungen 
wurde erheblich breiter; der Anteil aus den deutschsprachigen Ländern ging prozentual 
zurück.  
Bevor ich auf die Gründe dieser Entwicklung in einem zweiten Teil der SE-Geschichte 
näher eingehe, soll eine kurze statistische Übersicht den ersten Teil abschliessen: 
Im groben Durchschnitt der letzten 40 Jahre ergaben sich für die Teilnehmerschaft an den 
Jahrestagungen bei jährlichen Schwankungen etwa  folgende Prozent-Anteile: 
 
Deutschsprachige ~55% (BRD: 45%, CH: 10%,  A:1%);  
Skandinavier (S, Fin, N, Dk): ~15%;    Niederländer: ~10%; 
Osteuropäer (DDR, H, Pl, Sl, Sk, Ro): ~10%;   Westeuropäer (GB,F,USA) ~5%; 
Südeuropäer (I, E) u.a.: ~4%. 
 
In absoluten Zahlen waren zu den Jahrestagungen seit 1980 durchschnittlich zwischen 
60 und 100 Teilnehmende anwesend; die absolute Zahl der SE-Mitglieder schwankt in den 
letzten 30 Jahren zwischen 250 und 280. 
Wie nur wenige andere Jahrestagungen (Padua 1999 und Oxford 2006) stellt  unsere 
heutige Tagung hier in Soesterberg, was die Statistik angeht, eine gewisse Ausnahme dar: Es 
sind über 110 Teilnehmende anwesend; dabei ist der Anteil aus dem deutschsprachigen 
Europa (erstmalig!) auf unter 40% gesunken; der Anteil von Skandinaviern und 
Niederländern liegt bei je ca.15%; der Anteil aus angelsächsischen Ländern ist ebenso auf 
über 10% angestiegen wie der aus Frankreich  plus Westeuropa. Der Anteil der Osteuropäer 
dagegen ist auf 2 % (=2 Teilnehmer!) gesunken; auch auf die Gründe dafür ist später 
einzugehen.  
Ein kleines Resümee der ersten 25 Jahre SE-Geschichte wird also feststellen, dass die 
institutionellen Vorstellungen der Gründungsväter ein gutes Stück weit realisiert wurden: 
nämlich ein dezidiert  ökumenischer Austausch von theologischen Ethikern aus ganz Europa 
sowie die Entwicklung eines regelmaessigen Gespräches mit der Philosophischen Ethik, 
insonderheit mit der „Analytischen Ethik“. Nicht realisiert allerdings wurde der Wunsch, dass 
sich möglichst alle (deutschsprachigen) Dozenten für Theologische Ethik sich in 
zweijährigem Rhythmus treffen und austauschen möchten. Die Zahl der teilnehmenden 
deutschen evangelischer Universitätsprofessoren etwa blieb immer klein (sie lag im 
Durchschnitt bei 4-5). 
Im Sinne der Gründungsdiskurse weniger realisiert wurden andererseits gewisse, teils 
zentrale inhaltliche Erwartungen: der vorrangig theologische Charakter verbunden mit einer  
gewissen „religiösen Praxis“ trat zugunsten von mehr profanwissenschaftlichen Tendenzen 
und. Ähnliches gilt für die ursprüngliche Deutschsprachigkeit und eine ihr entsprechende 
„Tagungs-Mentalität“. 
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Zweiter Teil: Neue Tendenzen seit der „Wendezeit“ um 1990 
1) „Wendemarken“ 
Wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass die europäische Wendezeit um 1990 auch für die Geschichte 
der SE von gravierender Bedeutung war und noch ist, dann betrifft das also in erster Linie ihr 
sozusagen wissenschaftspolitisches Profil, nämlich die erwähnten Übergänge von ihrem 
dezidiert theologischen Charakter zum Vorrang interdisziplinär-profanwissenschaftlicher 
Thematiken und Erörterungsebenen, - sowie den Übergang in der Kongresssprache vom 
früher dominierenden „Deutsch“ auf das heute dominierende „English-intercultural“. Beidem 
und einigen weiteren „Wendemarken“ ist etwas genauer nachzugehen. 
Mit dem Wegfall der Ost-West-Spaltung unmittelbar hängen allerdings nur wenige 
Veränderungen zusammen: nämlich insbesondere ein fast totaler Rückzug der 
osteuropäischen Theologen aus der Mitarbeit und aus der Mitgliedschaft in der Societas. 
Andere, ebenfalls gravierende institutionelle und inhaltliche Veränderungen waren schon 
länger, teilweise seit Beginn der 1980er Jahre erkennbar. 
Inhaltlich war die Dominanz theologischer Fragestellungen, (manifestiert etwa in der 
Dauerproblematisierung eines christlichen Propriums oder einer spezifisch theologischen 
Begründung für fast jede konkrete ethische Stellungnahme) immer stärker zurückgetreten  
gegenüber einem wachsenden Interesse an den philosophischen und humanwissenschaftlichen  
Paradigmata und Problemstellungen. Parallel dazu war die in den Diskussionen früher 
dominierende theologische Fachsprache langsam überlagert worden von interdisziplinär 
breiter angelegten profanwissenschaftlichen, hauptsächlich philosophischen 
Kommunikationsmustern.  
Als mit diesem Zurücktreten von Theologie verwandt und damit ebenfalls die Kultur der 
Societas Ethica mitteldristig verändernd empfand ich die Entwicklung der, wie ich es nenne, 
„praktizierten Religiosität“: Vor 50 Jahren war ja eingeladen worden zur Gründung einer 
„Ökumenischen Gesellschaft für Christliche Ethik“; in der Satzung wird „das Evangelium als 
Hauptgrundlage der Diskussionen“ bezeichnet. Von Beginn an also war die christlich-
religiöse Komponente unübersehbar und konstitutiv. Diese Komponente blieb über Jahrzehnte 
erkennbar – auch unabhängig davon, dass sie schon 1965 in der religiös unspezifisch 
formulierten Selbstbezeichnung „Societas Ethica“ mit ihrem später hinzugefügten Untertitel 
„Europäische Forschungsgesellschaft für Ethik“ (= English: „European Society for research in 
Ethics“) nicht mehr explizit erwähnt wurde. Erhalten blieb jedoch als Kennzeichen der 
ökumenisch theologischen Ursprungsintentionen die religiöse Praxis einer gemeinsame 
Morgenandacht als stetiger und selbstverständlicher Bestandteil aller Jahrestagungen bis ca. 
2005. Allerdings muss auch berücksichtigt werden, dass dieser Ritus bereits seit ca 20 Jahren 
erkennbar an Interesse und Bedeutung verloren hatte. Das zeigte nicht zuletzt die oft 
minimale Teilnahme an der Andacht – und, wenn diese gelegentlich ganz ausfiel, wurde 
selbst das kaum öffentlich erörtert.  
Wahrscheinlich hat dieses Zurücktreten des religiösen Rahmens ebenso wie das des 
theologischen Charakters der Societas-Kultur durch „die Wende“ einen Schub erfahren; es 
entspricht aber einem schon vorher vielerorts in Europa erkennbaren Säkularisierungsprozess 
– und der dürfte kaum aufzuhalten sein. Doch meine ich, dass hier ein Kulturverlust zu 
beklagen ist, der das Profil der SE wesentlich umgeformt hat und sowohl zu Veränderungen 
in der Mitgliedschaft als auch zu gewissen Defiziten in der sozialen Integration der 
Tagungsteilnehmer führte. Symptomatisch ist jedenfalls, dass zahlreiche jüngere 
Wissenschaftler bei den letzten Tagungen gar nichts von einer theologisch-ökumenischen 
Ursprungsintention bei der Gründung der Societas wussten 
Als auf eine weitere Veränderung durch die und nach der Wendezeit mit ebenfalls 
gravierenden institutionellen Folgen für die SE-Kultur muss ich auf die angedeutete 
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Entwicklung des Sprachenproblems etwas genauer eingehen: In der Anfangszeit war 
ausschliesslich und in den folgenden 20 Jahren vorwiegend deutsch auf den Tagungen 
gesprochen worden; seit der Wendezeit wurde eine einigermassen ausgewogene 
Zweisprachigkeit angestrebt – und heute dominiert fast ausschliesslich die englische Sprache. 
Bis in die 90er Jahre waren dementsprechend die Teilnehmenden aus den Niederlanden, 
Skandinavien und insbesondere aus Osteuropa gewöhnlich soweit mit der deutschen Sprache 
vertraut, dass sie sich aktiv an den Diskussionen beteiligen konnten. Seit der Wendezeit und 
je häufiger Themen der Philosophischen Ethik und der „Angewandten Ethik“ („Applied 
Ethics“) behandelt wurden, desto ausschliesslicher wurde dann englisch geredet. Eine solche 
Entwicklung findet sich zwar ebenfalls ähnlich in fast allen wissenschaftlichen Fächern und 
genauso in den meisten Forschungsgebieten der Theologie – und auch sie wird sich 
offensichtlich weiter fortsetzen. Für die SE jedoch hatte sie insofern nachhaltig relevante 
Folgen, weil im Zuge dieses Prozesses nicht wenige der deutschsprachig sozialisierten 
Wissenschaftler die Societas Ethica frustriert verlassen haben  
Bis über das Jahr 2000 hinaus ist auf den SE-Conferences immer wieder diskutiert 
worden, warum es denn sein müsse, dass in dem überwiegenden Teil der Vorträge und 
Diskussionen englisch gesprochen werde, wo doch 70% der Teilnehmer (oder mehr) lieber 
und besser deutsch als englisch sprächen und wo weitere 20% deutsch wenigstens 
einigermassen verstünden. Frustriert davon waren vor allem die meisten Kollegen aus 
Osteuropa; für sie wurde die Sprachbarriere zu einem der beiden Gründe, sich aus der 
Mitarbeit und der Mitgliedschaft in der SE zurückzuziehen. Aber auch manche langjährige 
Mitglieder aus Deutschland und der Schweiz haben oft im persönlichen Gespräch bedauernd 
erklärt, dass sie nicht genügend Englisch verstanden hätten, um sich bei den Tagungen 
weiterhin ausreichend rezeptiv oder in eigenen Beiträgen beteiligen zu können. Allerdings 
dürfte das Sprachproblem als Grund für den Abschied von der SE, was die Mitglieder aus 
deutschsprachigen Ländern angeht, auf die ältere Generation begrenzt sein, da eine 
Diskussionsfähigkeit in englischer Sprache für die nachfolgenden Generationen von 
Wissenschaftlern immer stärker vorausgesetzt wird. 
Bei den osteuropäischen Kollegen freilich dürften zusätzlich andere Faktoren für ihren 
Abschied von der SE eine verstärkende Rolle gespielt haben; deren Teilnahme nämlich war 
bis in die Wendezeit von 1990 und teils darüber hinaus grossenteils durch Subventionen von 
beiden Kirchen finanziell ermöglicht worden. Diese Zuschüsse kamen nach „der Wende“ 
langsam in Wegfall – und für die meisten osteuropäischen Kollegen wurde daraufhin die 
Teilnahme an unseren Jahrestagungen – auch abgesehen vom Sprachproblem - schlicht zu 
teuer. 
Erwähnenswert sei darüber hinaus, worauf von einigen katholischen Kollegen aus 
Osteuropa beiläufig hingewiesen wurde, dass sich in manchen Diözesen und bei einem 
wachsenden Teil der jüngeren Theologengeneration eine konservativ-klerikale Mentalität 
ausbreite, mit der sich oft eine zunehmend kritische Einstellung gegenüber Arbeit und 
Ausrichtung der SE verbinde. 
2) Neue inhaltliche Akzente in der fachlichen Ausrichtung 
Die Entwicklung von einem mehr theologischen zu einem mehr profanwissenschaftlichen 
Charakter der SE manifestierte sich inhaltlich in mehreren neuen Akzentsetzungen. Vier von 
ihnen möchte ich herausheben; einige von ihnen waren zwar ansatzweise bereits in der ersten 
„Halbzeit“ der SE-Geschichte erkennbar; sie haben sich aber nach 1990 erheblich verstärkt 
und immer deutlicher die Kultur der SE bestimmt und verändert. Wie die Entwicklungstrends 
vor 1990 sind sie untereinander vielfach verflochten. 
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Erstens: Zunehmende Prägung durch Interessenfelder der Philosophischen Ethik 
Das  im deutschen Sprachraum vorherrschende Verständnis von  Ethik war sowohl in der 
Theologie beider christlicher Konfessionen als auch in den profanwissenschaftlichen 
Bereichen traditionell vorrangig ausgerichtet auf deren normative oder präscriptive 
Funktion. Das änderte sich mit der erwähnten Öffnung und Ausweitung der SE-Interessen 
auf die “Analytische Ethik“ oder/und die  „Descriptive Ethik“, wie sie insbesondere in der 
Moralphilosophie des angelsächsischen Sprachraums, und damit verwandt in den 
Niederlanden und Skandinavien, verstanden und traktiert wurden. In der Diskussion mit deren 
Vertretern wurde manchen in der traditionellen deutschsprachigen Ethik sozialisierten SE-
Mitgliedern oder Tagungsbesuchern die Bedeutung der Aufgaben und der Reichweite von 
descriptiver Ethik neben und gegenüber der praescriptiven deutlicher bewusst.  
Über dieses Arbeitsfeld hinaus wurde das neue Interesse an der Philosophischen Ethik 
realisiert und vertieft in den Gesprächen mit den angelsächsischen, skandinavischen und 
niederländischen Kollegen. Vorangetrieben haben diesen Prozess insbesondere als erster 
nichttheologischer Präsident (1992, 1995) der schon erwähnte niederländische Philosoph 
Robert Heeger sowie, auch als langjähriges Vorstandsmitglied der SE, die britische 
Moralphilosophin Brenda Almond. Trotz der breiten Öffnung zur profanen Moralphilosophie 
haben sich allerdings nur wenige professionelle Vertreter der philosphischen Ethik zur 
Mitgliedschaft in der SE entschlossen  
Etwas anders sah und sieht es aus mit dem Anteil von nichttheologischen Teilnehmern an 
den Jahrestagungen: Je nach dem  Hauptthema und wohl auch je nach der Attraktivität des 
Tagungsortes schwankt diese Zahl von Jahr zu Jahr erheblich. Doch belassen es die jüngeren 
Nichttheologen, die auf den conferences ihre papers präsentieren und diskutieren, meistens 
bei einer ein- oder zweimaligen Teilnahme. Zu einer Dauer-Mitgliedschaft ist es bei ihnen nur 
selten gekommen. 
 Zweitens: „Die Wendung zur Konkreten Ethik“  
So lautete vor 20 Jahren das Thema der Jahrestagung von 1992 im hier nahegelegenen 
Utrecht. In den ersten Jahrzehnten der SE stand, wie erwähnt, das Interesse an der 
sogenannten „Theorieebene“ oder „Begründungsebene“ im Vordergrund der Diskussionen. 
Demgegenüber wurde der „Angewandten Ethik“ unter den Theologen vielfach eine gewisse 
Nachrangigkeit oder Zweitrangigkeit zugewiesen. Ursache für die seit 1992 erkennbare 
„Wendung zur Konkreten Ethik“ waren m.E. einerseits die immer neuen, im Prinzip schon in 
der Thematik der Gründungstagung von 1963 erkannten Herausforderungen durch eine „New 
Morality“ und durch den sich darin ausdrückenden „Neuen Ethikbedarf“ in allen 
Lebensbereichen der Gegenwart. Erkennbar wurde das seit den 70er und 80er Jahren in einer 
in Teilen der Öffentlichkeit zunehmenden Nachfrage nach ethischen Stellungnahmen, 
Gutachten oder Auftragsarbeiten zur Sozial-, Wirtschafts- oder Friedenspolitik; seit den 90er 
Jahren traten weitere hinzu, etwa die Ausdifferenzierungen von Bio- und Medizinethik hinzu, 
sowie bald auch die Einrichtung von Ethik-„Kommissionen“ auf regionaler Ebene sowie 
eines „Nationalen Ethik-Rates“ in mehreren Staaten.  
Zur gleichen Zeit war andererseits manchen im deutschsprachigen Raum sozialisierten  
Teilnehmern im Austausch mit den angelsächsischen, skandinavischen oder niederländischen 
Kollegen die sozusagen wissenschaftliche Seriosität sowie die theoretische Relevanz von 
„Applied Ethics“ vielleicht deutlicher bewusst geworden als früher. Das drückte sich m.E, 
sowohl in der Theologie wie in der Philosophie aus in der Aufwertung von Konkreter Ethik 
und führte zu Gewichtsverlagerungen auf den Arbeitsfeldern der akademischen Disziplin 
„Ethik“. 
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Drittens: Die Postulierung einer „Rationalen Verständigungspraxis“ 
Trotz der wachsenden Bedeutung von „Konkreter Ethik“ blieben nach wie vor in den 
Bereichen  der Begründungs- und Theorieebene wichtige überkommene oder neue 
Prinzipienprobleme bearbeitungsbedürftig, so etwa Fragen nach den dogmatischen 
Praemissen oder nach den latenten Absolutheitsansprüchen bestimmter theologischer oder 
philosophischer Positionen. Unterschiedliche Ausgangs-Annahmen oder unterschiedliche 
Schwerpunkte in der Begründung des jeweiligen Konzeptes von Ethik gab es ja weiterhin 
sowohl im innerprotestantischen wie im innerkatholischen Bereich; sie finden sich erst recht 
weiterhin im Gegenüber von katholisch und evangelisch sowie im Gegenüber von theologisch 
und philosophisch. Um in den damit gegebenen Spannungsfeldern zumindest innerhalb der 
SE zu einer  tragfähigen Diskursbasis zu kommen, wurde von dem evangelischen Ethiker 
Martin Honecker während seiner Präsidentschaft (1988, 1991) eine „Rationale 
Verständigungspraxis“ postuliert und umzusetzen versucht. Sie ist in gewisser Weise 
verwandt mit dem Konzept einer „Autonomen Ethik“, wie es von dem katholischen 
Moraltheologen Franz Böckle und seiner Schule vertreten wird. Auf der Basis dieser 
inhaltlich verwandten Intentionen katholischer und evangelischer Theologen ergaben sich für 
die interkonfessionelle wie für die interdisziplinäre Kommunikation in der SE  stets die 
Möglichkeiten  einer Zusammenarbeit ohne theologisch-dogmatische oder ideologische 
Absolutheitsansprüche und ohne die aus solchen Ansprüchen leicht  erwachsende Verteilung 
von Ketzerhüten. 
Viertens: Die Tendenz zu einer ethikpolitischen Mittel- und Vermittlungsposition  
Als ein weiteres, seit Jahrzehnten ebenfalls erkennbares inhaltliches Merkmal der SE 
möchte ich  eine „Mittel- und Vermittlungsposition“ herausstellen, die sich meiner 
Wahrnehmung nach zuerst in den gesellschaftspolitischen und den ihnen verwandten 
theologiepolitischen Auseinandersetzungen der 1970er und 80er Jahre herausgebildet hatte 
und die sich später in den ethikpolitischen Diskussionen seit der Wendezeit (beispielsweise in 
der Sozial- oder der Medizinethik) etwas modifiziert neu formierte. Die Mehrheit der SE-
Mitgieder also wollte wohl eine Position vertreten, die jenseits der sich wissenschaftspolitisch 
als dezidiert „positionell“ bezeichnenden Richtungen lag, mochten sich diese in „rechter“ 
(pointiert konservativer) oder in „linker“ (pointiert gesellschaftskritischer) Tendenz 
darstellen.. Den positionell engagierten Theologen und Philosophen gegenüber erstrebte man 
in der SE eine Haltung der Reflexionsdistanz anstelle eines unmittelbaren und bewusst 
parteiischen Engagements; man wollte auf der Basis einer klaren Unterscheidung von 
Wissenschaft und Politik ein Forum für strittige Diskussionen anbieten und darstellen. In der 
Fachwelt wurde die SE auch dieser Absicht entsprechend eingeschätzt. Wer ein sozusagen 
„positionalistisches“ Wissenschaftsverständnis vertrat, nahm schon deshalb kaum an den 
Jahrestagungen der SE teil.  
Um den Angehörigen der Generationen, die die Auseinandersetzungen im letzten Viertel 
des 20. Jahrhunderts nicht miterlebt haben, die ethikpolitische Szene jener Zeit etwas zu 
veranschaulichen, möchte ich hier in vereinfachender Strukturierung schildern, wie ich die 
damalige Situation wahrgenommen habe. 
Der katholische Bereich hat sich mir in drei Hauptgruppierungen dargestellt: Auf der einen, 
oft als „rechts“ bezeichneten Seite standen Vertreter einer neoscholastischen Interpretation 
von Naturrecht mit dezidiert konservativen Auffassungen von Gesellschafts- und 
Kirchenpolitik. Auf der Gegenseite, also „links“, standen die Vertreter einer betont 
befreiungstheologisch argumentierenden, ebenso dezidiert gesellschaftskritischen und 
kirchenkritischen Richtung. Dazwischen gab es eine breitere Gruppe, die bei allen 
Unterschieden in ihren theologischen und teilweise auch ethischen Konzepten u.a. 
zusammengehalten wurde durch die erwähnte Distanz gegenüber einer zu unmittelbaren 
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Verflechtung von theologischer Erkenntnis und politischer Ideologie. Statt dessen tendierte 
man zu einer pragmatischen, aber keineswegs unkritischen Orientierung an der empirischen, 
auch sozialwissenschaftlich fassbaren Realität und ihren Möglichkeiten. 
Mir schien, dass die meisten deutschsprachigen katholisch-theologischen Mitglieder der 
Societas dieser mittleren, generell auf realitätsnahen Diskurs ausgerichteten Tendenz 
zuzuordnen wären. Als einen ihrer Protagonisten sowohl innerhalb der societas wie auch 
sonst im Wissenschaftsgeschehen habe ich den leider früh verstorbenen Münsteraner 
Sozialethiker Franz Furger vor Augen.   
Im Blick auf die deutschsprachige Evangelisch-Theologische Ethik erscheint das 
Spektrum von ähnlich abgrenzbaren ethikpolitischen Gruppierungen für die Zeit von 1975 bis 
ca. 2000 schmaler als im katholischen Bereich. In den Vordergrund öffentlich 
wahrgenommener Diskussion getreten sind m.E. nur zwei einigermassen konsolidierte 
Richtungen: Einmal eine tendenziell „linke“ Position, die durch die 68er Bewegung sowie 
durch die „Frankfurter Schule“ stark beeinflusst war,  ebenfalls pointiert mit gesellschafts- 
und kirchenkritischen Postulaten hervortrat – und deren Vertreter kaum an den 
Veranstaltungen der Societas teilnahmen. Auf der anderen Seite gab es, wie im katholischen 
Bereich eine breite Gruppe, die entgegen einem „gewollt parteilichen“ Engagement 
distanzierter und pragmatisch auf die sozialwissenschaftlich erfassbare Realität und auf den 
interdisziplinären Diskurs mit den empirischen Humanwissenschaften ausgerichtet war.  Eine 
dritte, eindeutiger „rechte“ und  in Kirchen- wie Gesellschaftspolitik dezidiert konservative 
Mentalität lässt sich unter den deutschsprachigen Evangelischen Ethikern kaum ausmachen; 
allerdings kann man in manchen Beiträgen aus evangelikaler Richtung, besonders wenn es 
um Medizinethik, Bioethik oder auch Homosexualität geht, eine Nähe zu katholisch-
konservativen Auffassungen erkennen. 
Über die ethikpolitischen Positionen und Gruppierungen in den angelsächsischen Ländern 
sowie in Skandinavien und den Niederlanden weiss ich zu wenig, um sie genauer mit der 
deutschsprachigen Szene in Beziehung setzen zu können; aus Gesprächen auf unseren 
Jahrestagungen liess sich jedoch schliessen, dass die dortigen Verhältnisse in wichtigen 
Grundzügen ähnlich waren wie die im deutschsprachigen Raum.  
Die Zweite Halbzeit theologie- oder ideologiepolitisch zusammenfassend, dürfte die 
Mehrheit der SE-Mitglieder, der Theologen wie der Nichttheologen, der deutschsprachig, der 
englischsprachig oder noch anders kulturell sozialisierten Wissenschaftler in ihrer inhaltlichen 
Mentalität sowohl vor wie nach 1990 eine aehnliche Richtung vertreten haben 
Tendenziell von ihrer Gründung an und explizit noch deutlicher seit der Wendezeit hat sie 
in Begründungsfragen wie in Anwendungsfragen die  Bearbeitung ethischer Problemfelder im 
Wege einer undogmatisch-vernunftorientierten Verständigung auf der Basis einer 
theologisch oder philosophisch reflektierten christlichen Humanität angestrebt. Auf dieser 
Basis stellt sie sich dar als ein Forum für den interdisziplinären Austausch über die 
unterschiedlichen Konzepte von Ethik sowie  über die immer neuen Herausforderungen durch 
den rapiden gesellschaftlichen Wertewandel und die daraus resultierenden Aufgaben für die 
Konkrete Ethik. Diese Funktionen werden wohl auch in einer absehbaren Zukunft das 
Erscheinungsbild der  SE bestimmen. 
Dritter Teil: Zur Vielfalt der Motivationen für die Teilnahme an den 
SE-Conferences und damit von deren Funktionen. 
Bei den Teilnahme-Motivationen und damit indirekt bei den Funktionen der SE-
Jahrestagungen handelt es sich für eine wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft um eine solch 
aussergewöhnliche Vielfalt, sowie um solch variable Kombinationen von unterschiedlichen  
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Interessen, dass sie als ein eigener thematischer Teil am Ende dieses Rückblickes auf 50 Jahre 
Societas Ethica  behandelt werden sollen. 
Sprach und spricht man mit Besuchern unserer Jahrestagungen informell über die Anlässe 
für ihre Teilnahme, dann werden gewöhnlich zuerst die üblichen, für wissenschaftliche 
Fachkongresse allgemein geltenden Gründe genannt: Jüngere wie ältere Teilnehmer wollen 
erfahren, was zur Zeit in ihrem Fachgebiet generell und was speziell zu der jeweiligen 
Tagungsthematik verhandelt wird. Viele wollen einmal die namhaften 
Vertreter/Vertreterinnen ihres Faches, deren Bücher oder Aufsätze sie kennen, persönlich 
erleben und auch mal mit ihnen diskutieren. Daneben wollen Nachwuchswissenschaftler ihre 
papers und Thesen zur Diskussion stellen und ein kompetentes Feedback erwarten. Etablierte 
Professoren können wieder einmal ihre anderswo lebenden Kollegen treffen und sich mit 
ihnen über „the state of the art“ unterhalten etc.   
Kommt man intensiver ins Gespräch, dann erfährt man, dass die meisten Teilnehmer  
manches  Interesse an der Societas formulieren, das über diese konventionellen Motive und 
fachlichen Aspekte hinaus weist. Wenn ich solche spezifischeren Äusserungen zusammen mit 
meinen eigenen Interessen und Eindrücken bündele, dann ist es die Kombination von drei 
„Transzendierungen“ (im Sinne von Überschreitungen) der klassischen akademischen 
Kongressarbeit, die das Besondere der SE ausmacht und ihre Attraktivität verstärkt. Solche 
Transzendierungen betreffen die  folgenden drei Charakteristika:  
1) Ihre Interkonfessionalität, 2) ihre Interdisziplinarität, 3) ihre Internationalität. 
Für jedes dieser „Transzendierungsfelder“ nenne ich beispielhaft einige Aspekte, die in 
den Gesprächen mit Tagungsteilnehmern oft genannt wurden und die ein über die 
Sachthematik hinausgehendes Interesse an der SE und  ihren Tagungen anzeigen.  
Erstens: Zur Interkonfessionalität:  
Jeder Theologe lernt in seinem Studium einiges über die theologische Ethik der jeweils 
anderen Konfession: über deren theologischen Begründungsmuster, ihre Anwendungsregeln 
sowie durchaus auch (vielleicht in gelegentlicher Konfessionspolemik) etwas von 
tatsächlichen oder angeblichen Defiziten. Häufig bleiben diese einmal  gelernten 
Vorstellungen für den als Pfarrer oder Lehrer amtierenden  Theologen ein Leben lang 
bestimmend für seine Einschätzung, besonders die  der ethischen Defizite der konfessionellen 
Gegenseite (etwa in Bezug auf ein „ein autoritäres kirchliches Lehramt in Rom“ oder auf 
„eine im Prinzip libertinistische protestantische Sexualmoral“). Zwar könnte sich der studierte 
Theologe leicht kundig machen über inzwischen erfolgte Differenzierungen und 
Entwicklungen in der Ethik der anderen Konfession; doch geschieht das selten mit 
nachhaltiger Wirkung. Er verbleibt zumeist  in den konventionellen Denkstrukturen seiner 
eigenen theologischen Provenienz befangen. Manchmal gilt das sogar, wenn vielleicht auch 
auf  höherem Niveau, für Professoren und für Bischöfe.  
Eine realitätsgerechte Korrektur von veralteten, aber konventionell gebliebenen 
Vorstellungen und Vorurteilen gelingt nach meiner Beobachtung und Erfahrung am ehesten 
dann, wenn Theologen beider Konfessionen in einem gemeinsamen Arbeitsprozess, 
besonders in ökumenischen Arbeitsgruppen über eine längere Zeit zusammenarbeiten oder 
wenn sie wenigstens ein paar Tage lang in Kleingruppen miteinander diskutieren. Der 
persönliche Kontakt spielt offensichtlich eine kaum ersetzbare Rolle.  
Genau solche Kommunikationsbedingungen hat die Societas Ethica auf ihren 
Jahrestagungen immer geboten. Man ist mehrere Tage zusammen: in Fachdiskussionen wie in 
der Freizeit, bei themenbezogenen Exkursionen wie, nicht zuletzt, bei der gemeinsamen 
Morgenandacht. Die Kommunikation ist bei den Jahrestagungen offenbar dichter und 
vielfältiger als beispielsweise bei interkonfessionellen Arbeitsgesprächen innerhalb der 
eigenen Universität. Mir persönlich kam es so vor und andere sagten mir ähnliches, dass es 
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gerade im Zuge derartiger Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten nicht selten zu den erwähnten 
Transzendierungen tief eingelebter Denkmuster kommt; auf der anderen Seite können in 
solchen Gesprächen aber auch die bleibenden theologischen Unterschiede klarere Konturen 
gewinnen und von dem Gegenüber besser verstanden werden.  
So ist die seit der Gründung der Societas betonte ökumenische Ausrichtung gerade auf 
dem Felde der Überwindung von Vorurteilen und Desinformiertheit bis heute häufig in einem 
konstruktiven Sinn realisiert worden. Die Arbeit daran, verbunden mit dem Kennenlernen der 
religösen Identität des Kollegen sowie der unmittelbare Austausch über Trennendes und 
Verbindendes war und ist eines der wichtigsten Motive für die Mitarbeit in der Societas 
Ethica. Das alles bildete eine tragende Säule des Interesses an der SE – auch in einer Zeit, in 
der ihr vorrangig theologischer Charakter zurückgetreten ist.  
Zweitens: Zur Interdisziplinarität:  
Auch hier geht es um eine Überschreitung von traditionellen Grenzen akademischer 
Disziplinen, nämlich denen zwischen der Theologie und den dezidiert nichttheologischen 
Profanwissenschaften, besonders der Philosophie. In diesem Kontaktfeld waren in den letzten 
50 Jahren und sind in Teilen bis heute, zumindest auf den Begründungsebenen, die Gräben 
noch tiefer und eine gegenseitige Unkenntnis oder auch gegenseitiges Unverständnis noch 
grösser als zwischen „katholisch und evangelisch“.  
Soweit ich sehe, ändert sich das in das in den letzten 20 Jahren nicht zuletzt im Zuge der  
Zusammenarbeit auf den Arbeitsgebieten der Konkreten Ethik: zunächst auf dem der 
Sozialethik, dann zunehmend im Blick auf die Medizin- und Bioethik sowie den Gebieten 
unseres diesjährigen Generalthemas „Climate change, Sustainability and an Etihcs of an Open 
Future“. Dabei ist auffällig, wie viele jüngere Wissenschaftler aus nichttheologischen 
Disziplinen an den Jahrestagungen mit solcher Thementendenz teilnehmen. Doch auch für 
jüngere Theologen ist offensichtlich ein interdisziplinärer Austausch in diesen Bereichen 
attraktiv genug für eine Teilnahme an entsprechenden SE-conferences. 
Zu einem echten und fruchtbaren Austausch ist es aber nötig, die traditionell 
unterschiedlichen theoretischen Annäherungen an die Aufgaben der Ethik zwischen einerseits 
englischsprachigen Denkmustern der Applied Ethics, andererseits deutschsprachigen 
Paradigmen der philosophischen Ethik und drittens den Konzepten der beiden Theologien  
untereinander verstehbar und vergleichbar zu machen. Ausser den sprachlichen 
Voraussetzungen gehört dazu ein fundiertes inhaltliches Verständnis der wichtigsten 
Paradigmen. Daran „grenzüberschreitend“ zu arbeiten war (auch in seinem eigenen 
wissenschaftlichen Engagement) die ausdrückliche Intention des SE- Präsidenten Hans Ulrich 
(2004-2007).  
Für viele Tagungsbesucher besonders informativ und darum attraktiv war es 
offensichtlich, in teilnehmender Beobachtung beide Charakteristika, das der 
Interdisziplinarität wie das der Interkonfessionaltät zu kombinieren; beispielsweise in der 
Frage, ob und wie evangelische Theologen anders auf bestimmte Ansätze der Philosophischen 
Ethik reagieren als ihre katholischen Kollegen – und umgekehrt. 
Drittens: Zur Internationalität 
Dass Internationalität zu den Charakteristika der SE gehört, erlebt jeder Teilnehmer 
unserer conferences und es manifestiert sich unübersehbar in den Teilnehmerlisten der 
Jahrestagungen (an der diesjährigen Tagung nehmen Ethiker aus 25 Ländern teil), es 
unterscheidet jedoch die SE hinsichtlich der Teilnahme-Motivation nicht von anderen 
wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften: weder im Blick auf den weltweiten Wechsel attraktiver 
Tagungsorte noch auf die Möglichkeiten für grenzüberschreitende kollegiale Freundschaften. 
Dass aber neben und in alledem die internationale Dimension gerade für die ethischen 
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Reflexionen im akademischen Bereich in mehrfacher Hinsicht notwendig und anregend sind, 
soll im folgenden kurz angedeutet werden: 
Die wiederholten Begegnungen mit bestimmten häufig teilnehmenden Tagungsbesuchern 
aus anderen Ländern vermitteln wichtige Informationen über den sozialen Kontext und den 
kulturellen Hintergrund der ethisch relevanten Probleme, die in ihrer Heimat aktuell diskutiert 
werden. Die alte Frage, wie stark ethische Plausibilität durch kontextuelle Bedingtheiten 
geprägt ist und was das für die Verallgemeinerungsfähigkeit ethischer Urteile und ihre 
konkrete Umsetzung bedeutet, gewinnt angesichts einer fortschreitenden Globalisierung von 
zentralen Wertvorstellungen eine neue Dringlichkeit.  
Sowohl die Jahrestreffen an unterschiedlichen europäischen Tagungsorten als auch die 
gelegentlich (in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren durch den ehemaligen SE-Präsidenten Weiler) 
durchgeführten, auf Ethikforschung ausgelegten Studienreisen in kulturell fremde Länder 
(China, Japan u.a) ermöglichen in mehrtägigem Aufenthalt eine tiefergehende Wahrnehmung 
der etablierten Moralauffassungen und des anstehenden Neuen Ethikbedarf  in den jeweils 
besuchten Regionen. Der Tagungs- wie der Reiseteilnehmer kann unmittelbar erfahren, dass 
und worin der aktuelle „Ethikbedarf“ etwa in den Niederlanden sich unterscheidet von dem in 
Ungarn (um 2 häufig besuchte Konferenz-Regionen exemplarisch zu nennen). Vor Ort 
können auch Kenntnisse darüber gewonnen werden, welch unterschiedliche nationale 
Regelungen in den ethisch umstrittenen Problemfeldern etwa der Embryonenforschung oder 
der „Sterbehilfe“ in Geltung stehen und wie sie empfunden werden. Ähnliches gilt für die 
europaweit zunehmende Etablierung von „Ethikkommissionen“ und „Nationalen Ethikräten“, 
die in einzelnen Regionen sehr unterschiedlich angelegt sind und die doch mittelfristig auf 
einheitliche gesamteuropäische Regeln hin synchronisiert werden müssen. Mit dieser Aufgabe 
wird sicher über kurz oder lang auch die SE befasst sein. Doch bleibt diese Aufgabe der 
nachfolgenden Generation überlassen.  
Mit den Überlegungen darüber, worin die besondere, über die konventionellen 
Funktionen einer wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft hinausgehende Anziehungskraft der 
Societas Ethica zumindest über  lange Zeiträume lag, mag der heutige Rückblick auf die 50 
Jahre ihrer bisherigen Geschichte abgeschlossen sein. So wünsche ich der Societas heute ein 
kräftiges „Vivat-Crescat-Floriat“ für die kommenden Jahrzehnte. In diesen Wunsch schliesse 
ich ausdrücklich ein, dass in ihrer praktizierten Kommunikation von Interkonfessionalitaet, 
Interdisziplinarität und Internationalität die inhaltliche Hauptintention ihrer Gründungsväter 
bei allen notwendigen Merarmorphosen erhalten und erkennbar bleibt: Auf der 
Ausgangsbasis christlicher Humanität ein Forum zu sein für den Diskurs zwischen den 
Vertretern unterschiedlicher Konzepte von „Ethik“ und darin für eine lebensförderliche 
Bearbeitung des rapide steigenden Ethikbedarfes – in Europa und weltweit! 
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Main points of Karl-Wilhelm Dahm's paper 
on the Societas Ethica Golden Jubilee 
Translation into English by Dr. Lars Reuter, The Møller Foundation 
1. Origins 
a. Ecumenical Society for Christian Ethics. 
b. Fist Plenary of forty invited professors in theological ethics held 9 October 1964 in 
Basel. 
c. Clear Ecumenical focus with ¾ from a Protestant, ¼ from a (Roman) Catholic 
background. 
2. Programmatic intentions 
a. Examining whether a specific Christian response to contemporary ethical demands 
can be given unisonally, i.e. ecumenically. 
b. Critically analysing the role and function of traditional Protestant and Catholic 
paradigms in heterogeneous contexts. 
c. Ascertaining that theological ethics was up to date with findings in other theological 
disciplines. 
d. Seeking sound answers to pressing issues in practical ethics. 
3. Institutional developments 
a. Gradual, but somewhat slow involvement of Catholic ethicist (from 14 of 85 members 
in 1965 to about 40 % Catholic attendees at the 1980 Warsaw conference). 
b. Since 1970s clear focus on Eastern Europe with remarkable conferences held at the 
Balaton, in Warsaw, Dubrovnik and Debrecen. 
c. Gradual, but likewise slow involvement of ethicists from other disciplines, in particular 
philosophical ethics, changing under the Swedish presidency with support from Bruno 
Schüller (Catholic ethicist) in the 1980s by integrating analytic ethics and the election 
of Robert Heeger, professor in philosophy, as president in 1991 + 1992. 
d. Pan-European dimension successfully implemented with regards to attendance with 
the following ratio of attendance since 1975: 
(i) Germanophones: 55 % 
(ii) Nordic: 15 % 
(iii) Low countries: 10 % 
(iv) Warsaw Treaty incl. GDR/Central Europe: 10 % 
(v) Italy, Spain: 4 % 
(vi) France, UK, USA: 5 % 
e. Attendees per conference since 1980 between 60 and 100 with a membership 
between 250 and 280. 
4. Times of change 
a. Theologically influenced discussions e.g. in ethical theory gradually substituted by a 
wider interdisciplinary approach. 
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b. Less common religious practice e.g. in the forms of morning prayer, services et al., 
thus reducing the original clear Ecumenical profile, perhaps instigated by the fall of 
the iron curtain and the general process of secularization. 
c. Until 1990s, German was the dominant conference language, but with the turn to 
issues in applied ethics use of English increased. A number of colleagues not fully 
familiar with English have subsequently left the society or feel at least less attracted 
to it. 
d. Central and Eastern European participants enjoyed special rates from the 1960s to 
1990s made possible by contributions from churches or political institutions, but with 
their significant reduction, participation is now too costly for many from this part of 
Europe. 
e. The work and profile of the society were also seen critically from certain Catholic 
milieus in Eastern and Central Europe, adding to the drop in participants from this 
region. 
5. New dimensions of subjects discussed within the Society 
a. The original focus on normative or prescriptive ethics was widened by 
interdisciplinary discussions particularly with philosophers introducing descriptive 
ethical approaches. This process was especially supported by Scandinavian and Dutch 
colleagues. 
b. Participants with a background in philosophical ethics are less present (with the 2006 
Oxford conference as an exception) and non-theologians participating once or twice 
do not necessarily seek membership. 
c. Intensified discussions of issues in practical ethics rather than ethical theory, with 80% 
of conference themes since 1990 pertaining to applied ethics, instigated by societal 
developments raising questions particularly in medical, social and business ethics. 
d. Certain fundamental problems in ethical theory remain also ecumenically and in the 
dialogue between philosophy and theology. Concepts of autonomous ethics or 
rational practices of agreement were used in order to facilitate co-operation made 
difficult by absolutist positions. 
e. In the strong societal debates of the 1970s and 1980s, the society had a mediating 
function between theological extremes of left- or right wing positions. Most of the 
conference participants appear to have subscribed to this role of the society, seeking 
consensus rather than disagreement. 
f. In the last 35 years, the ethical discussions in Germany could be characterized by the 
following movements: 
a. In the (Roman) Catholic fields, the groups of neo-scholastic (or right wing 
positions) based on natural law, the defenders of positions defined by 
liberation theology (left wing) and a middle group seeking to keep theological 
insights and political ideology apart by orienting on pragmatic approaches. 
b. In Protestant ethics, a similar grouping seems less apparent, but a left wing 
position based on the 1968 movement and the Frankfurt School, as well as a 
pragmatic group similar to the Catholic can be identified. A clear right wing 
position among Protestant ethicist seems difficult to detect, with some 
exceptions from evangelical positions on medical ethics, bioethics, or 
homosexuality. 
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g. Overall, the discussions within the society have been marked by intellectual openness, 
rationally based deliberations on basis of an also theologically reflected assumption of 
(Christian) humanity, and a clear inter-disciplinary approach. 
6. Motivations for participating in the conferences 
a. Standard reasons for participating in academic conferences (meeting colleagues, 
keeping up to date, presenting papers et al.) 
b. Three clear dimensions of the particular approaches within the Society: 
a. Its Ecumenical profile, helping to deepen the understanding of other 
theological traditions. 
b. Its inter-disciplinary way of proceeding trying to bridge the sometimes wide 
gap between theological and philosophical ethics with varying degrees of 
success. 
c. Its internationality. 
c. The special atmosphere created by the free exchange during hours of leisure, 
sightseeing and visits, creating a unique Societas Ethica conference profile most 
clearly fathomed by those not used to it. 
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Launching De Ethica 
A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and  
Applied Ethics 
www.de-ethica.com 
Brenda Almond 
University of Hull, UK 
I am happy to welcome members of Societas Ethica to the launch of the new web journal, 
De Ethica. It is the hope of its founding editors that it will find a special niche for itself as a 
European-initiated project treating a diversity of ethical issues and open to contributions from 
authors in all parts of the world. We hope this focus will have wide appeal but we take 
nothing for granted. At an early stage in the evolution of the project, Marcus Agnafors, whose 
hard work and application were instrumental in transforming De Ethica from mere idea to real 
existent asked the important question: Is there room for another ethics journal? As work 
proceeded on the development of the idea of a journal with a triple focus, it became clear that, 
as far as De Ethica is concerned, the answer to that question is ‘yes.’ There are a number of 
reasons for this but the first of these must be its close connection to Societas Ethica with its 
50-year history as a Society for Ethical Research with a multi-national and multilingual 
membership.  This connection brings with it a distinctive approach and tradition which De 
Ethica will be proud to follow: a broad tolerance and understanding of the variety of 
philosophical and religious traditions reflected in that membership. As for its distinctively 
triple focus, there are few, if any, journals explicitly dedicated to philosophical, theological, 
and applied ethics and this in itself should attract some fresh and interesting submissions. But 
the journal has other distinctive features of a more direct and practical kind.  De Ethica will 
be an Open Access journal operating on a non-profit-making basis. Its contributors will also 
have the assurance that their article will be vigorously peer-reviewed and that, while we had 
to recognize with regret that it would not be feasible to adopt the Societas tradition of a 
bilingual or multilingual approach, we will seek to adopt a sympathetic approach to 
submissions from those whose first language is not English. Finally, De Ethica will, from its 
foundation, have a special interest in what is now called practical or applied ethics – the 
analysis and discussion of issues for decision in the real world, from human relationships to 
environmental ethics and climate change. 
So we can answer that original question ‘Is there room for De Ethica?’ with a firm yes. 
De Ethica is indeed a journal capable of filling an important gap and we would like to thank 
those who have shown their support for the project including, in particular, the Swedish 
Research Council and Linköping University Electronic Press. 
In setting out our aspirations for the new journal we would like to make it clear that, while 
we welcome submissions from all philosophical and theological traditions, we will seek to 
encourage work that advances an original thesis and a clear and concise argument. While this is 
important for all three areas, we regard this element as fundamental, not only from the point of 
view of philosophy, both theoretical and applied, but also in the discussion of religious topics. 
 
Proceedings from the 50th Societas Ethica Annual Conference 2013. Climate Change, Sustainability, and an 
Ethics of an Open Future, August 22-25 2013, Soesterberg, The Netherlands   
Editors: Göran Collste and Lars Reuter 
http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp_home/index.en.aspx?issue=98. 
The inclusion of religious perspectives on ethics implied by the journal’s title is especially 
important at the present time in that philosophy and religion are currently often seen as rivals in 
universities in the English-speaking world. Indeed, it is fashionable at the moment for leading 
philosophers to loudly advertise their atheism or secularism. Nevertheless, most ordinary 
people, continue to see these two areas of human thought as close.  
If we were to ask when philosophy and theology were last in philosophical harmony with 
each other, we might need to look back to the mid-twentieth century and the kind of practical 
philosophy favoured by philosophers such as the Scottish philosopher John Macmurray or the 
Danish philosopher Knud Loegstrup, author of The Ethical Demand (1956). Although 
sometimes described as Christian Socialism, this tendency is better seen not in political or 
even religious terms, but rather as pioneering the late twentieth century move to applied 
applied ethics. 
As this implies, there is every reason to regard applied ethics as a continuing tradition 
with a much longer pre-history than it is usually given credit for. But there can be little doubt 
that, as we understand it today, applied ethics, especially bioethics, has made a special and 
distinctive contribution to the landscape of philosophical thinking in the twentieth century, 
and that it, together with the broader conception, applied philosophy, has changed public 
perceptions of the task of philosophy in the twenty-first. The latter part of the twentieth 
century brought a mindset more sympathetic to philosophical engagement with practical 
problems.  It also saw a marked retreat from abstruse metaphysical philosophy and a wish to 
see complex ideas put forward in language that can be readily understood. On the negative 
side, however, it has become associated in some minds with forms of postmodernism that 
have created new versions of abstruse philosophy and an invasion of political correctness that 
has brought with it a new threat of enforced conformism.  
Perhaps pressures like these are inevitable when practical issues are increasingly 
occupying the philosophical stage. Today’s world is plagued by many of the age-old problems 
of crime and violence but it also faces new threats and new weapons of mass destruction. At 
the same time, the moral consensus on which we could in the past rely is rapidly eroding. Of 
course, for some of the problems confronting us, such as the planetary and environmental 
concerns that provide the focus of this conference, we may hope that science and technology 
may be able to provide some solutions. But technology is not enough. We need normative as 
well as practical expertise, combined with the defining feature of true philosophy - a 
willingness to follow an argument where it leads.  And for this we need scope for thoughtful 
discussion – something beyond the brief and fragmented opportunities offered by articles in 
the national press and other media outlets.  
In launching this journal, then, we hope to provide a platform for philosophically 
reflective articles that address the problems of the day. We hope that, while publication has 
become a necessary end in itself for academics, the unique combination of its European and 
international status will attract submissions for De Ethica from people whose goals are 
broader than this, who do genuinely have something to say, and who are capable of ignoring 
outside pressures and giving their time and energy only to what they believe is truly important 
and worthwhile.  
Applied philosophy is faced by a particular challenge because it requires people to 
struggle with new and untried issues – often areas where technology has moved ahead of 
human experience and in which there is no history to draw on. I hope that we will find authors 
who recognise this and tread carefully in areas where mistakes in reasoning can have 
unprecedented practical impact. The background assumption for those who venture to tread in 
these difficult   areas must be that despite the inevitability of change and the unavoidably 
shifting concerns of the present day, we still need to ask those traditional questions: What 
makes a good life? And what kind of society is most likely to make that good life possible? 
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